# Proxy / WAF Protections Bypass
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{% embed url="https://websec.nl/" %}
## Bypass Nginx ACL Rules with Pathname Manipulation
Techniques [from this research](https://rafa.hashnode.dev/exploiting-http-parsers-inconsistencies).
Nginx rule example:
```plaintext
location = /admin {
deny all;
}
location = /admin/ {
deny all;
}
```
In order to prevent bypasses Nginx performs path normalization before checking it. However, if the backend server performs a different normalization (removing characters that nginx doesn't remove) it might be possible to bypass this defense.
### **NodeJS - Express**
| Nginx Version | **Node.js Bypass Characters** |
| ------------- | ----------------------------- |
| 1.22.0 | `\xA0` |
| 1.21.6 | `\xA0` |
| 1.20.2 | `\xA0`, `\x09`, `\x0C` |
| 1.18.0 | `\xA0`, `\x09`, `\x0C` |
| 1.16.1 | `\xA0`, `\x09`, `\x0C` |
### **Flask**
| Nginx Version | **Flask Bypass Characters** |
| ------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1.22.0 | `\x85`, `\xA0` |
| 1.21.6 | `\x85`, `\xA0` |
| 1.20.2 | `\x85`, `\xA0`, `\x1F`, `\x1E`, `\x1D`, `\x1C`, `\x0C`, `\x0B` |
| 1.18.0 | `\x85`, `\xA0`, `\x1F`, `\x1E`, `\x1D`, `\x1C`, `\x0C`, `\x0B` |
| 1.16.1 | `\x85`, `\xA0`, `\x1F`, `\x1E`, `\x1D`, `\x1C`, `\x0C`, `\x0B` |
### **Spring Boot**
| Nginx Version | **Spring Boot Bypass Characters** |
| ------------- | --------------------------------- |
| 1.22.0 | `;` |
| 1.21.6 | `;` |
| 1.20.2 | `\x09`, `;` |
| 1.18.0 | `\x09`, `;` |
| 1.16.1 | `\x09`, `;` |
### **PHP-FPM**
Nginx FPM configuration:
```plaintext
location = /admin.php {
deny all;
}
location ~ \.php$ {
include snippets/fastcgi-php.conf;
fastcgi_pass unix:/run/php/php8.1-fpm.sock;
}
```
Nginx is configured to block access to `/admin.php` but it's possible to bypass this by accessing `/admin.php/index.php`.
### How to prevent
```plaintext
location ~* ^/admin {
deny all;
}
```
## Bypass Mod Security Rules
### Path Confusion
[**In this post**](https://blog.sicuranext.com/modsecurity-path-confusion-bugs-bypass/) is explained that ModSecurity v3 (until 3.0.12), **improperly implemented the `REQUEST_FILENAME`** variable which was supposed to contain the accessed path (until the start of the parameters). This is because it performed an URL decode to get the path.\
Therefore, a request like `http://example.com/foo%3f';alert(1);foo=` in mod security will suppose that the path is just `/foo` because `%3f` is transformed into `?` ending the URL path, but actually the path that a server will receive will be `/foo%3f';alert(1);foo=`.
The variables `REQUEST_BASENAME` and `PATH_INFO` were also affected by this bug.
Something similar ocurred in version 2 of Mod Security that allowed to bypass a protection that prevented user accessing files with specific extensions related to backup files (such as `.bak`) simply by sending the dot URL encoded in `%2e`, for example: `https://example.com/backup%2ebak`.
## Bypass AWS WAF ACL
### Malformed Header
[This research](https://rafa.hashnode.dev/exploiting-http-parsers-inconsistencies) mentions that it was possible to bypass AWS WAF rules applied over HTTP headers by sending a "malformed" header that wasn't properly parsed by AWS but it was by the backend server.
For example, sending the following request with a SQL injection in the header X-Query:
```http
GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: target.com\r\n
X-Query: Value\r\n
\t' or '1'='1' -- \r\n
Connection: close\r\n
\r\n
```
It was possible to bypass AWS WAF because it wouldn't understand that the next line is part of the value of the header while the NODEJS server did (this was fixed).
## Generic WAF bypasses
### Request Size Limits
Commonly WAFs have a certain length limit of requests to check and if a POST/PUT/PATCH request is over it, the WAF won't check the request.
* For AWS WAF, you can [**check the documentation**](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/waf/latest/developerguide/limits.html)**:**
Maximum size of a web request body that can be inspected for Application Load Balancer and AWS AppSync protections
8 KB
Maximum size of a web request body that can be inspected for CloudFront, API Gateway, Amazon Cognito, App Runner, and Verified Access protections**
64 KB
* From [**Azure docs**](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/web-application-firewall/ag/application-gateway-waf-request-size-limits)**:**
Older Web Application Firewalls with Core Rule Set 3.1 (or lower) allow messages larger than **128 KB** by turning off request body inspection, but these messages won't be checked for vulnerabilities. For newer versions (Core Rule Set 3.2 or newer), the same can be done by disabling the maximum request body limit. When a request exceeds the size limit:
If p**revention mode**: Logs and blocks the request.\
If **detection mode**: Inspects up to the limit, ignores the rest, and logs if the `Content-Length` exceeds the limit.
* From [**Akamai**](https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/article/Can-WAF-inspect-all-arguments-and-values-in-request-body?language=en\_US)**:**
By default, the WAF inspects only the first 8KB of a request. It can increase the limit up to 128KB by adding Advanced Metadata.
* From [**Cloudflare**](https://developers.cloudflare.com/ruleset-engine/rules-language/fields/#http-request-body-fields)**:**
Up to 128KB.
### Obfuscation
```bash
# IIS, ASP Clasic
<%s%cr%u0131pt> == #changing the case of the tag
< #prepending an additional "<"
#using backticks instead of parenetheses
java%0ascript:alert(1) #using encoded newline characters