# Anti-Forensic Techniques
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## Timestamps
An attacker may be interested in **changing the timestamps of files** to avoid being detected.\
It's possible to find the timestamps inside the MFT in attributes `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` \_\_ and \_\_ `$FILE_NAME`.
Both attributes have 4 timestamps: **Modification**, **access**, **creation**, and **MFT registry modification** (MACE or MACB).
**Windows explorer** and other tools show the information from **`$STANDARD_INFORMATION`**.
### TimeStomp - Anti-forensic Tool
This tool **modifies** the timestamp information inside **`$STANDARD_INFORMATION`** **but** **not** the information inside **`$FILE_NAME`**. Therefore, it's possible to **identify** **suspicious** **activity**.
### Usnjrnl
The **USN Journal** (Update Sequence Number Journal) is a feature of the NTFS (Windows NT file system) that keeps track of volume changes. The [**UsnJrnl2Csv**](https://github.com/jschicht/UsnJrnl2Csv) tool allows for the examination of these changes.
.png>)
The previous image is the **output** shown by the **tool** where it can be observed that some **changes were performed** to the file.
### $LogFile
**All metadata changes to a file system are logged** in a process known as [write-ahead logging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Write-ahead\_logging). The logged metadata is kept in a file named `**$LogFile**`, located in the root directory of an NTFS file system. Tools such as [LogFileParser](https://github.com/jschicht/LogFileParser) can be used to parse this file and identify changes.
.png>)
Again, in the output of the tool it's possible to see that **some changes were performed**.
Using the same tool it's possible to identify to **which time the timestamps were modified**:
.png>)
* CTIME: File's creation time
* ATIME: File's modification time
* MTIME: File's MFT registry modification
* RTIME: File's access time
### `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` and `$FILE_NAME` comparison
Another way to identify suspicious modified files would be to compare the time on both attributes looking for **mismatches**.
### Nanoseconds
**NTFS** timestamps have a **precision** of **100 nanoseconds**. Then, finding files with timestamps like 2010-10-10 10:10:**00.000:0000 is very suspicious**.
### SetMace - Anti-forensic Tool
This tool can modify both attributes `$STARNDAR_INFORMATION` and `$FILE_NAME`. However, from Windows Vista, it's necessary for a live OS to modify this information.
## Data Hiding
NFTS uses a cluster and the minimum information size. That means that if a file occupies uses and cluster and a half, the **reminding half is never going to be used** until the file is deleted. Then, it's possible to **hide data in this slack space**.
There are tools like slacker that allow hiding data in this "hidden" space. However, an analysis of the `$logfile` and `$usnjrnl` can show that some data was added:
.png>)
Then, it's possible to retrieve the slack space using tools like FTK Imager. Note that this kind of tool can save the content obfuscated or even encrypted.
## UsbKill
This is a tool that will **turn off the computer if any change in the USB** ports is detected.\
A way to discover this would be to inspect the running processes and **review each python script running**.
## Live Linux Distributions
These distros are **executed inside the RAM** memory. The only way to detect them is **in case the NTFS file-system is mounted with write permissions**. If it's mounted just with read permissions it won't be possible to detect the intrusion.
## Secure Deletion
[https://github.com/Claudio-C/awesome-data-sanitization](https://github.com/Claudio-C/awesome-data-sanitization)
## Windows Configuration
It's possible to disable several windows logging methods to make the forensics investigation much harder.
### Disable Timestamps - UserAssist
This is a registry key that maintains dates and hours when each executable was run by the user.
Disabling UserAssist requires two steps:
1. Set two registry keys, `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Start_TrackProgs` and `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Start_TrackEnabled`, both to zero in order to signal that we want UserAssist disabled.
2. Clear your registry subtrees that look like `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\`.
### Disable Timestamps - Prefetch
This will save information about the applications executed with the goal of improving the performance of the Windows system. However, this can also be useful for forensics practices.
* Execute `regedit`
* Select the file path `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters`
* Right-click on both `EnablePrefetcher` and `EnableSuperfetch`
* Select Modify on each of these to change the value from 1 (or 3) to 0
* Restart
### Disable Timestamps - Last Access Time
Whenever a folder is opened from an NTFS volume on a Windows NT server, the system takes the time to **update a timestamp field on each listed folder**, called the last access time. On a heavily used NTFS volume, this can affect performance.
1. Open the Registry Editor (Regedit.exe).
2. Browse to `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem`.
3. Look for `NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate`. If it doesn’t exist, add this DWORD and set its value to 1, which will disable the process.
4. Close the Registry Editor, and reboot the server.
### Delete USB History
All the **USB Device Entries** are stored in Windows Registry Under the **USBSTOR** registry key that contains sub keys which are created whenever you plug a USB Device into your PC or Laptop. You can find this key here H`KEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR`. **Deleting this** you will delete the USB history.\
You may also use the tool [**USBDeview**](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/usb\_devices\_view.html) to be sure you have deleted them (and to delete them).
Another file that saves information about the USBs is the file `setupapi.dev.log` inside `C:\Windows\INF`. This should also be deleted.
### Disable Shadow Copies
**List** shadow copies with `vssadmin list shadowstorage`\
**Delete** them running `vssadmin delete shadow`
You can also delete them via GUI following the steps proposed in [https://www.ubackup.com/windows-10/how-to-delete-shadow-copies-windows-10-5740.html](https://www.ubackup.com/windows-10/how-to-delete-shadow-copies-windows-10-5740.html)
To disable shadow copies [steps from here](https://support.waters.com/KB\_Inf/Other/WKB15560\_How\_to\_disable\_Volume\_Shadow\_Copy\_Service\_VSS\_in\_Windows):
1. Open the Services program by typing "services" into the text search box after clicking the Windows start button.
2. From the list, find "Volume Shadow Copy", select it, and then access Properties by right-clicking.
3. Choose Disabled from the "Startup type" drop-down menu, and then confirm the change by clicking Apply and OK.
It's also possible to modify the configuration of which files are going to be copied in the shadow copy in the registry `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\BackupRestore\FilesNotToSnapshot`
### Overwrite deleted files
* You can use a **Windows tool**: `cipher /w:C` This will indicate cipher to remove any data from the available unused disk space inside the C drive.
* You can also use tools like [**Eraser**](https://eraser.heidi.ie)
### Delete Windows event logs
* Windows + R --> eventvwr.msc --> Expand "Windows Logs" --> Right click each category and select "Clear Log"
* `for /F "tokens=*" %1 in ('wevtutil.exe el') DO wevtutil.exe cl "%1"`
* `Get-EventLog -LogName * | ForEach { Clear-EventLog $_.Log }`
### Disable Windows event logs
* `reg add 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\eventlog' /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f`
* Inside the services section disable the service "Windows Event Log"
* `WEvtUtil.exec clear-log` or `WEvtUtil.exe cl`
### Disable $UsnJrnl
* `fsutil usn deletejournal /d c:`
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