GitBook: [#3054] No subject

This commit is contained in:
CPol 2022-03-13 16:39:41 +00:00 committed by gitbook-bot
parent 3a14232f69
commit e611cdb14f
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 07D2180C7B12D0FF
5 changed files with 14 additions and 10 deletions

Binary file not shown.

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 255 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 255 KiB

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 280 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 280 KiB

After

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 342 KiB

View file

@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ rpm -qa --root=/ mntpath/var/lib/rpm
### Other ### Other
**Not all installed programs will be listed by the above commands** because some applications are not available as packages for certain systems and must be installed from source. Therefore, a review of locations such as _**/usr/local**_ and _**/opt**_ may reveal other applications that have been compiled and installed from source code.  **Not all installed programs will be listed by the above commands** because some applications are not available as packages for certain systems and must be installed from source. Therefore, a review of locations such as _**/usr/local**_ and _**/opt**_ may reveal other applications that have been compiled and installed from source code.
```bash ```bash
ls /opt /usr/local ls /opt /usr/local
@ -196,6 +196,10 @@ find /sbin/ -exec dpkg -S {} \; | grep "no path found"
find /sbin/ exec rpm -qf {} \; | grep "is not" find /sbin/ exec rpm -qf {} \; | grep "is not"
``` ```
## Recover Deleted Running Binaries
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (641).png>)
## Inspect AutoStart locations ## Inspect AutoStart locations
### Scheduled Tasks ### Scheduled Tasks
@ -219,9 +223,9 @@ ls -l /usr/lib/cron/tabs/ /Library/LaunchAgents/ /Library/LaunchDaemons/ ~/Libra
It is extremely common for malware to entrench itself as a new, unauthorized service. Linux has a number of scripts that are used to start services as the computer boots. The initialization startup script _**/etc/inittab**_ calls other scripts such as rc.sysinit and various startup scripts under the _**/etc/rc.d/**_ directory, or _**/etc/rc.boot/**_ in some older versions. On other versions of Linux, such as Debian, startup scripts are stored in the _**/etc/init.d/**_ directory. In addition, some common services are enabled in _**/etc/inetd.conf**_ or _**/etc/xinetd/**_ depending on the version of Linux. Digital investigators should inspect each of these startup scripts for anomalous entries. It is extremely common for malware to entrench itself as a new, unauthorized service. Linux has a number of scripts that are used to start services as the computer boots. The initialization startup script _**/etc/inittab**_ calls other scripts such as rc.sysinit and various startup scripts under the _**/etc/rc.d/**_ directory, or _**/etc/rc.boot/**_ in some older versions. On other versions of Linux, such as Debian, startup scripts are stored in the _**/etc/init.d/**_ directory. In addition, some common services are enabled in _**/etc/inetd.conf**_ or _**/etc/xinetd/**_ depending on the version of Linux. Digital investigators should inspect each of these startup scripts for anomalous entries.
* _**/etc/inittab**_ * _**/etc/inittab**_
* _**/etc/rc.d/**_&#x20; * _**/etc/rc.d/**_
* _**/etc/rc.boot/**_ * _**/etc/rc.boot/**_
* _**/etc/init.d/**_&#x20; * _**/etc/init.d/**_
* _**/etc/inetd.conf**_ * _**/etc/inetd.conf**_
* _**/etc/xinetd/**_ * _**/etc/xinetd/**_
* _**/etc/systemd/system**_ * _**/etc/systemd/system**_
@ -248,9 +252,9 @@ Look in all available log files on the compromised system for traces of maliciou
**Logon** events recorded in the system and security logs, including logons via the network, can reveal that **malware** or an **intruder gained access** to a compromised system via a given account at a specific time. Other events around the time of a malware infection can be captured in system logs, including the **creation** of a **new** **service** or new accounts around the time of an incident.\ **Logon** events recorded in the system and security logs, including logons via the network, can reveal that **malware** or an **intruder gained access** to a compromised system via a given account at a specific time. Other events around the time of a malware infection can be captured in system logs, including the **creation** of a **new** **service** or new accounts around the time of an incident.\
Interesting system logons: Interesting system logons:
* &#x20;**/var/log/syslog** (debian) or **/var/log/messages** (Redhat) * **/var/log/syslog** (debian) or **/var/log/messages** (Redhat)
* Shows general messages and info regarding the system. Basically a data log of all activity throughout the global system. * Shows general messages and info regarding the system. Basically a data log of all activity throughout the global system.
* &#x20;**/var/log/auth.log** (debian) or **/var/log/secure** (Redhat) * **/var/log/auth.log** (debian) or **/var/log/secure** (Redhat)
* Keep authentication logs for both successful or failed logins, and authentication processes. Storage depends on system type. * Keep authentication logs for both successful or failed logins, and authentication processes. Storage depends on system type.
* `cat /var/log/auth.log | grep -iE "session opened for|accepted password|new session|not in sudoers"` * `cat /var/log/auth.log | grep -iE "session opened for|accepted password|new session|not in sudoers"`
* **/var/log/boot.log**: start-up messages and boot info. * **/var/log/boot.log**: start-up messages and boot info.
@ -302,7 +306,7 @@ Note that you can also **take a look to this information reading the logs**.
### USB Logs ### USB Logs
&#x20;[**usbrip**](https://github.com/snovvcrash/usbrip) is a small piece of software written in pure Python 3 which parses Linux log files (`/var/log/syslog*` or `/var/log/messages*` depending on the distro) for constructing USB event history tables. [**usbrip**](https://github.com/snovvcrash/usbrip) is a small piece of software written in pure Python 3 which parses Linux log files (`/var/log/syslog*` or `/var/log/messages*` depending on the distro) for constructing USB event history tables.
It is interesting to **know all the USBs that have been used** and it will be more useful if you have an authorized list of USB to find "violation events" (the use of USBs that aren't inside that list). It is interesting to **know all the USBs that have been used** and it will be more useful if you have an authorized list of USB to find "violation events" (the use of USBs that aren't inside that list).
@ -348,7 +352,7 @@ To deal with such anti-forensic techniques, it is necessary to pay **careful att
* It's interesting to see the files and folders of a directory **sorted by creation date** instead alphabetically to see which files/folders are more recent (last ones usually). * It's interesting to see the files and folders of a directory **sorted by creation date** instead alphabetically to see which files/folders are more recent (last ones usually).
You can check the most recent files of a folder using `ls -laR --sort=time /bin`\ You can check the most recent files of a folder using `ls -laR --sort=time /bin`\
You can check the inodes of the files inside a folder using `ls -lai /bin |sort -n`&#x20; You can check the inodes of the files inside a folder using `ls -lai /bin |sort -n`
{% hint style="info" %} {% hint style="info" %}
Note that an **attacker** can **modify** the **time** to make **files appear** **legitimate**, but he **cannot** modify the **inode**. If you find that a **file** indicates that it was created and modify at the **same time** of the rest of the files in the same folder, but the **inode** is **unexpectedly bigger**, then the **timestamps of that file were modified**. Note that an **attacker** can **modify** the **time** to make **files appear** **legitimate**, but he **cannot** modify the **inode**. If you find that a **file** indicates that it was created and modify at the **same time** of the rest of the files in the same folder, but the **inode** is **unexpectedly bigger**, then the **timestamps of that file were modified**.

View file

@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Inside the scheme of the HTTP/2 connection you might be able to send a full URL
### Request Line Injection via spaces ### Request Line Injection via spaces
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (641).png>) ![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (641) (1).png>)
## Frontend->backend connection reuse ## Frontend->backend connection reuse