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@ -189,6 +189,7 @@
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* [macOS Default Sandbox Debug](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-default-sandbox-debug.md)
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* [macOS Sandbox Debug & Bypass](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass/README.md)
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* [macOS Office Sandbox Bypasses](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass/macos-office-sandbox-bypasses.md)
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* [macOS Authorizations DB & Authd](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-authorizations-db-and-authd.md)
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* [macOS SIP](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sip.md)
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* [macOS TCC](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-tcc/README.md)
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* [macOS Apple Events](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-tcc/macos-apple-events.md)
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@ -196,7 +197,8 @@
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* [macOS Apple Scripts](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-tcc/macos-tcc-bypasses/macos-apple-scripts.md)
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* [macOS TCC Payloads](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-tcc/macos-tcc-payloads.md)
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* [macOS Dangerous Entitlements & TCC perms](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-dangerous-entitlements.md)
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* [macOS MACF](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-macf.md)
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* [macOS - AMFI - AppleMobileFileIntegrity](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-amfi-applemobilefileintegrity.md)
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* [macOS MACF - Mandatory Access Control Framework](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-macf-mandatory-access-control-framework.md)
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* [macOS Code Signing](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-code-signing.md)
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* [macOS FS Tricks](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-fs-tricks/README.md)
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* [macOS xattr-acls extra stuff](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-fs-tricks/macos-xattr-acls-extra-stuff.md)
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@ -498,11 +498,11 @@ int main() {
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Debugging the previous example it's possible to see how at the beginning there is only 1 arena:
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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Then, after calling the first thread, the one that calls malloc, a new arena is created:
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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and inside of it some chunks can be found:
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@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ This gadget basically allows to confirm that something interesting was executed
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This technique uses the [**ret2csu**](ret2csu.md) gadget. And this is because if you access this gadget in the middle of some instructions you get gadgets to control **`rsi`** and **`rdi`**:
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt="" width="278"><figcaption><p><a href="https://www.scs.stanford.edu/brop/bittau-brop.pdf">https://www.scs.stanford.edu/brop/bittau-brop.pdf</a></p></figcaption></figure>
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt="" width="278"><figcaption><p><a href="https://www.scs.stanford.edu/brop/bittau-brop.pdf">https://www.scs.stanford.edu/brop/bittau-brop.pdf</a></p></figcaption></figure>
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These would be the gadgets:
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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" d
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
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@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ There are several tools out there that will perform part of the proposed actions
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* All free courses of [**@Jhaddix**](https://twitter.com/Jhaddix) like [**The Bug Hunter's Methodology v4.0 - Recon Edition**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4JgIu1mceI)
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
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@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ Check also the page about [**NTLM**](../windows-hardening/ntlm/), it could be ve
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* [**CBC-MAC**](../crypto-and-stego/cipher-block-chaining-cbc-mac-priv.md)
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* [**Padding Oracle**](../crypto-and-stego/padding-oracle-priv.md)
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<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="
|
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
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@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ However, in this kind of containers these protections will usually exist, but yo
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You can find **examples** on how to **exploit some RCE vulnerabilities** to get scripting languages **reverse shells** and execute binaries from memory in [**https://github.com/carlospolop/DistrolessRCE**](https://github.com/carlospolop/DistrolessRCE).
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<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
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@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
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# macOS - AMFI - AppleMobileFileIntegrity
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{% hint style="success" %}
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Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
|
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Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
|
||||
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<details>
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<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
|
||||
* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
|
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* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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## AppleMobileFileIntegrity.kext and amfid
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It focuses on enforcing the integrity of the code running on the system providing the logic behind XNU's code signature verification. It's also able to check entitlements and handle other sensitive tasks such as allowing debugging or obtaining task ports.
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Moreover, for some operations, the kext prefers to contact the user space running daemon `/usr/libexec/amfid`. This trust relationship has been abused in several jailbreaks.
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AMFI uses **MACF** policies and it registers its hooks the moment it's started. Also, preventing its loading or unloading it could trigger a kernel panic. However, there are some boot arguments that allow to debilitate AMFI:
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* `amfi_unrestricted_task_for_pid`: Allow task\_for\_pid to be allowed without required entitlements
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* `amfi_allow_any_signature`: Allow any code signature
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* `cs_enforcement_disable`: System-wide argument used to disable code signing enforcement
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* `amfi_prevent_old_entitled_platform_binaries`: Void platform binaries with entitlements
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* `amfi_get_out_of_my_way`: Disables amfi completely
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These are some of the MACF policies it registers:
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* **`cred_check_label_update_execve:`** Label update will be performed and return 1
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* **`cred_label_associate`**: Update AMFI's mac label slot with label
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* **`cred_label_destroy`**: Remove AMFI’s mac label slot
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* **`cred_label_init`**: Move 0 in AMFI's mac label slot
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* **`cred_label_update_execve`:** It checks the entitlements of the process to see it should be allowed to modify the labels.
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* **`file_check_mmap`:** It checks if mmap is acquiring memory and setting it as executable. In that case it check if library validation is needed and if so, it calls the library validation function.
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* **`file_check_library_validation`**: Calls the library validation function which checks among other things if a platform binary is loading another platform binary or if the process and the new loaded file have the same TeamID. Certain entitlements will also allow to load any library.
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* **`policy_initbsd`**: Sets up trusted NVRAM Keys
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* **`policy_syscall`**: It checks DYLD policies like if the binary has unrestricted segments, if it should allow env vars... this is also called when a process is started via `amfi_check_dyld_policy_self()`.
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* **`proc_check_inherit_ipc_ports`**: It checks if when a processes executes a new binary other processes with SEND rights over the task port of the process should keep them or not. Platform binaries are allowed, `get-task-allow` entitled allows it, `task_for_pid-allow` entitles are allowed and binaries with the same TeamID.
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* **`proc_check_expose_task`**: enforce entitlements
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* **`amfi_exc_action_check_exception_send`**: An exception message is sent to debugger
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* **`amfi_exc_action_label_associate & amfi_exc_action_label_copy/populate & amfi_exc_action_label_destroy & amfi_exc_action_label_init & amfi_exc_action_label_update`**: Label lifecycle during exception handling (debugging)
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* **`proc_check_get_task`**: Checks entitlements like `get-task-allow` which allows other processes to get the tasks port and `task_for_pid-allow`, which allow the process to get other processes tasks ports. If neither of those, it calls up to `amfid permitunrestricteddebugging` to check if it's allowed.
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* **`proc_check_mprotect`**: Deny if `mprotect` is called with the flag `VM_PROT_TRUSTED` which indicates that the region must be treated as if it has a valid code signature.
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* **`vnode_check_exec`**: Gets called when a executable files are loaded in memory and sets `cs_hard | cs_kill` which will kill the process if any of the pages becomes invalid
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* **`vnode_check_getextattr`**: MacOS: Check `com.apple.root.installed` and `isVnodeQuarantined()`
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* **`vnode_check_setextattr`**: As get + com.apple.private.allow-bless and internal-installer-equivalent entitlement
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*  **`vnode_check_signature`**: Code that calls XNU to check the code signature using entitlements, trust cache and `amfid`
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*  **`proc_check_run_cs_invalid`**: It intercepts `ptrace()` calls (`PT_ATTACH` and `PT_TRACE_ME`). It checks for any of the entitlements `get-task-allow`, `run-invalid-allow` and `run-unsigned-code` and if none, it checks if debugging is permitted.
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* **`proc_check_map_anon`**: If mmap is called with the **`MAP_JIT`** flag, AMFI will checks for the `dynamic-codesigning` entitlement.
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`AMFI.kext` also exposes an API for other kernel extensions, and it's possible to find its dependencies with:
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```bash
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kextstat | grep " 19 " | cut -c2-5,50- | cut -d '(' -f1
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Executing: /usr/bin/kmutil showloaded
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No variant specified, falling back to release
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8 com.apple.kec.corecrypto
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19 com.apple.driver.AppleMobileFileIntegrity
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22 com.apple.security.sandbox
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24 com.apple.AppleSystemPolicy
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67 com.apple.iokit.IOUSBHostFamily
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70 com.apple.driver.AppleUSBTDM
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71 com.apple.driver.AppleSEPKeyStore
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74 com.apple.iokit.EndpointSecurity
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81 com.apple.iokit.IOUserEthernet
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101 com.apple.iokit.IO80211Family
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102 com.apple.driver.AppleBCMWLANCore
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118 com.apple.driver.AppleEmbeddedUSBHost
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134 com.apple.iokit.IOGPUFamily
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135 com.apple.AGXG13X
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137 com.apple.iokit.IOMobileGraphicsFamily
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138 com.apple.iokit.IOMobileGraphicsFamily-DCP
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162 com.apple.iokit.IONVMeFamily
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```
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## amfid
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This is the user mode running daemon that `AMFI.kext` will use to check for code signatures in user mode.\
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For `AMFI.kext` to communicate with the daemon it uses mach messages over the port `HOST_AMFID_PORT` which is the special port `18`.
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Note that in macOS it's no longer possible for root processes to hijack special ports as they are protected by `SIP` and only launchd can get them. In iOS it's checked that the process sending the response back has the CDHash hardcoded of `amfid`.
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It's possible to see when `amfid` is requested to check a binary and the response of it by debugging it and setting a breakpoint in `mach_msg`.
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Once a message is received via the special port **MIG** is used to send each function to the function it's calling. The main functions were reversed and explained inside the book.
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## Provisioning Profiles
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A provisioning profile can be used to sign code. There are **Developer** profiles that can be used to sign code and test it, and **Enterprise** profiles which can be used in all devices.
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After an App is submitted to the Apple Store, if approved, it's signed by Apple and the provisioning profile is no longer needed.
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A profile usually use the extension `.mobileprovision` or `.provisionprofile` and can be dumped with:
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```bash
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openssl asn1parse -inform der -in /path/to/profile
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# Or
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security cms -D -i /path/to/profile
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```
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Although sometimes referred as certificated, these provisioning profiles have more than a certificate:
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* **AppIDName:** The Application Identifier
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* **AppleInternalProfile**: Designates this as an Apple Internal profile
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* **ApplicationIdentifierPrefix**: Prepended to AppIDName (same as TeamIdentifier)
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* **CreationDate**: Date in `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:mm:ssZ` format
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* **DeveloperCertificates**: An array of (usually one) certificate(s), encoded as Base64 data
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* **Entitlements**: The entitlements allowed with entitlements for this profile
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* **ExpirationDate**: Expiration date in `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:mm:ssZ` format
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* **Name**: The Application Name, the same as AppIDName
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* **ProvisionedDevices**: An array (for developer certificates) of UDIDs this profile is valid for
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* **ProvisionsAllDevices**: A boolean (true for enterprise certificates)
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* **TeamIdentifier**: An array of (usually one) alphanumeric string(s) used to identify the developer for inter-app interaction purposes
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* **TeamName**: A human-readable name used to identify the developer
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* **TimeToLive**: Validity (in days) of the certificate
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* **UUID**: A Universally Unique Identifier for this profile
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* **Version**: Currently set to 1
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Note that the entitlements entry will contain a restricted set of entitlements and the provisioning profile will only be able to give those specific entitlements to prevent giving Apple private entitlements.
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Note that profiles are usually located in `/var/MobileDeviceProvisioningProfiles` and it's possible to check them with **`security cms -D -i /path/to/profile`**
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## **libmis.dyld**
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This is the external library that `amfid` calls i order to ask if it should allow something or not. This has been historically abused in jailbreaking by running a backdoored version of it that would allow everything.
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In macOS this is inside `MobileDevice.framework`.
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## AMFI Trust Caches
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iOS AMFI maintains a lost of known hashes which are signed ad-hoc, called the **Trust Cache** and found in the kext's `__TEXT.__const` section. Note that in very specific and sensitive operations It's possible to extend this Trust Cache with an external file.
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## References
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||||
* [**\*OS Internals Volume III**](https://newosxbook.com/home.html)
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{% hint style="success" %}
|
||||
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
|
||||
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
|
||||
* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
|
||||
* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
|
|||
# macOS Authorizations DB & Authd
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
{% hint style="success" %}
|
||||
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
|
||||
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
|
||||
* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
|
||||
* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
||||
## **Athorizarions DB**
|
||||
|
||||
The database located in `/var/db/auth.db` is database used to store permissions to perform sensitive operations. These operations are performed completely in **user space** and are usually used by **XPC services** which need to check **if the calling client is authorized** to perform certain action checking this database.
|
||||
|
||||
Initially this database is created from the content of `/System/Library/Security/authorization.plist`. Then, some services might add or modify this dataabse to add other permissions to it.
|
||||
|
||||
The rules are stored in the `rules` table inside the database and contains the folliwing colmns:
|
||||
|
||||
* **id**: A unique identifier for each rule, automatically incremented and serving as the primary key.
|
||||
* **name**: The unique name of the rule used to identify and reference it within the authorization system.
|
||||
* **type**: Specifies the type of the rule, restricted to values 1 or 2 to define its authorization logic.
|
||||
* **class**: Categorizes the rule into a specific class, ensuring it is a positive integer.
|
||||
* "allow" for allow, "deny" for deny, "user" if the group property indicated a group which membership allows the access, "rule" indicates in an array a rule to be fulfilled, "evaluate-mechanisms" followed by a `mechanisms` array which are either builtins or a name of a bundle inside `/System/Library/CoreServices/SecurityAgentPlugins/` or /Library/Security//SecurityAgentPlugins
|
||||
* **group**: Indicates the user group associated with the rule for group-based authorization.
|
||||
* **kofn**: Represents the "k-of-n" parameter, determining how many subrules must be satisfied out of a total number.
|
||||
* **timeout**: Defines the duration in seconds before the authorization granted by the rule expires.
|
||||
* **flags**: Contains various flags that modify the behavior and characteristics of the rule.
|
||||
* **tries**: Limits the number of allowed authorization attempts to enhance security.
|
||||
* **version**: Tracks the version of the rule for version control and updates.
|
||||
* **created**: Records the timestamp when the rule was created for auditing purposes.
|
||||
* **modified**: Stores the timestamp of the last modification made to the rule.
|
||||
* **hash**: Holds a hash value of the rule to ensure its integrity and detect tampering.
|
||||
* **identifier**: Provides a unique string identifier, such as a UUID, for external references to the rule.
|
||||
* **requirement**: Contains serialized data defining the rule's specific authorization requirements and mechanisms.
|
||||
* **comment**: Offers a human-readable description or comment about the rule for documentation and clarity.
|
||||
|
||||
### Example
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# List by name and comments
|
||||
sudo sqlite3 /var/db/auth.db "select name, comment from rules"
|
||||
|
||||
# Get rules for com.apple.tcc.util.admin
|
||||
security authorizationdb read com.apple.tcc.util.admin
|
||||
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
|
||||
<plist version="1.0">
|
||||
<dict>
|
||||
<key>class</key>
|
||||
<string>rule</string>
|
||||
<key>comment</key>
|
||||
<string>For modification of TCC settings.</string>
|
||||
<key>created</key>
|
||||
<real>701369782.01043606</real>
|
||||
<key>modified</key>
|
||||
<real>701369782.01043606</real>
|
||||
<key>rule</key>
|
||||
<array>
|
||||
<string>authenticate-admin-nonshared</string>
|
||||
</array>
|
||||
<key>version</key>
|
||||
<integer>0</integer>
|
||||
</dict>
|
||||
</plist>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover in [https://www.dssw.co.uk/reference/authorization-rights/authenticate-admin-nonshared/](https://www.dssw.co.uk/reference/authorization-rights/authenticate-admin-nonshared/) it's possible to see the meaning of `authenticate-admin-nonshared`:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
'allow-root' : 'false',
|
||||
'authenticate-user' : 'true',
|
||||
'class' : 'user',
|
||||
'comment' : 'Authenticate as an administrator.',
|
||||
'group' : 'admin',
|
||||
'session-owner' : 'false',
|
||||
'shared' : 'false',
|
||||
'timeout' : '30',
|
||||
'tries' : '10000',
|
||||
'version' : '1'
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Authd
|
||||
|
||||
It's a deamon that will receive requests to authorize clients to perform sensitive actions. It works as a XPC service defined inside the `XPCServices/` folder and use to write its logs in `/var/log/authd.log`.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover using the security tool it's possible to test many `Security.framework` APIs. For example the `AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges` running: `security execute-with-privileges /bin/ls`
|
||||
|
||||
That will fork and exec `/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline /bin/ls` as root, which will ask for permissions in a prompt to execute ls as root:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
{% hint style="success" %}
|
||||
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
|
||||
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
|
||||
* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
|
||||
* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
|
||||
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="
|
|||
|
||||
Mach-o binaries contains a load command called **`LC_CODE_SIGNATURE`** that indicates the **offset** and **size** of the signatures inside the binary. Actually, using the GUI tool MachOView, it's possible to find at the end of the binary a section called **Code Signature** with this information:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image.png" alt="" width="431"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1).png" alt="" width="431"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
The magic header of the Code Signature is **`0xFADE0CC0`**. Then you have information such as the length and the number of blobs of the superBlob that contains them.\
|
||||
It's possible to find this information in the [source code here](https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/94d3b452840153a99b38a3a9659680b2a006908e/osfmk/kern/cs\_blobs.h#L276):
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|||
# macOS Gatekeeper / Quarantine / XProtect
|
||||
|
||||
{% hint style="success" %}
|
||||
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
|
||||
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
|
||||
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
|
||||
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -70,11 +70,13 @@ If the software **passes** this inspection without raising any concerns, the Not
|
|||
|
||||
Upon the user's first installation or execution of the software, the existence of the notarization ticket - whether stapled to the executable or found online - **informs Gatekeeper that the software has been notarized by Apple**. As a result, Gatekeeper displays a descriptive message in the initial launch dialog, indicating that the software has undergone checks for malicious content by Apple. This process thereby enhances user confidence in the security of the software they install or run on their systems.
|
||||
|
||||
### Enumerating GateKeeper
|
||||
### spctl & syspolicyd
|
||||
|
||||
GateKeeper is both, **several security components** that prevent untrusted apps from being executed and also **one of the components**.
|
||||
{% hint style="danger" %}
|
||||
Note that from Sequoia version, **`spctl`** doesn't allow to modify Gatekeeper configuration anymore.
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible to see the **status** of GateKeeper with:
|
||||
**`spctl`** is the CLI tool to enumerate and interact with Gatekeeper (with the `syspolicyd` daemon via XPC messages). For example, it's possible to see the **status** of GateKeeper with:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Check the status
|
||||
|
|
@ -89,7 +91,9 @@ GateKeeper will check if according to the **preferences & the signature** a bina
|
|||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1150).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
The database that keeps this configuration ins located in **`/var/db/SystemPolicy`**. You can check this database as root with:
|
||||
**`syspolicyd`** is the main daemon responsible to enforcing Gatekeeper. It maintains a database located in `/var/db/SystemPolicy` and it's possible to find the code to support the [database here](https://opensource.apple.com/source/Security/Security-58286.240.4/OSX/libsecurity\_codesigning/lib/policydb.cpp) and the [SQL template here](https://opensource.apple.com/source/Security/Security-58286.240.4/OSX/libsecurity\_codesigning/lib/syspolicy.sql). Note that the database is unrestricted by SIP and writable by root and the database `/var/db/.SystemPolicy-default` is used as an original backup in case the other gets corrupted.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, the bundles **`/var/db/gke.bundle`** and **`/var/db/gkopaque.bundle`** contains files with rules that are inserted in the database. You can check this database as root with:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Open database
|
||||
|
|
@ -105,10 +109,12 @@ anchor apple generic and certificate 1[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.2.6] exists an
|
|||
[...]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**`syspolicyd`** also exposes a XPC server with different operations like `assess`, `update`, `record` and `cancel` which are also reachable using **`Security.framework`'s `SecAssessment*`** APIs and **`xpctl`** actually talks to **`syspolicyd`** via XPC.
|
||||
|
||||
Note how the first rule ended in "**App Store**" and the second one in "**Developer ID**" and that in the previous imaged it was **enabled to execute apps from the App Store and identified developers**.\
|
||||
If you **modify** that setting to App Store, the "**Notarized Developer ID" rules will disappear**.
|
||||
|
||||
There are also thousands of rules of **type GKE**:
|
||||
There are also thousands of rules of **type GKE** :
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
SELECT requirement,allow,disabled,label from authority where label = 'GKE' limit 5;
|
||||
|
|
@ -119,7 +125,11 @@ cdhash H"0a71962e7a32f0c2b41ddb1fb8403f3420e1d861"|1|0|GKE
|
|||
cdhash H"8d0d90ff23c3071211646c4c9c607cdb601cb18f"|1|0|GKE
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
These are hashes that come from **`/var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/gke.bundle/Contents/Resources/gke.auth`, `/var/db/gke.bundle/Contents/Resources/gk.db`** and **`/var/db/gkopaque.bundle/Contents/Resources/gkopaque.db`**
|
||||
These are hashes that from:
|
||||
|
||||
* `/var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/gke.bundle/Contents/Resources/gke.auth`
|
||||
* `/var/db/gke.bundle/Contents/Resources/gk.db`
|
||||
* `/var/db/gkopaque.bundle/Contents/Resources/gkopaque.db`
|
||||
|
||||
Or you could list the previous info with:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -166,6 +176,8 @@ spctl --assess -v /Applications/App.app
|
|||
/Applications/App.app: accepted
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Regarding **kernel extensions**, the folder `/var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration` contains files with lists of kexts allowed to be loaded. Moreover, `spctl` has the entitlement `com.apple.private.iokit.nvram-csr` because it's capable of adding new pre-approved kernel extensions which need to be saved also in NVRAM in a `kext-allowed-teams` key.
|
||||
|
||||
### Quarantine Files
|
||||
|
||||
Upon **downloading** an application or file, specific macOS **applications** such as web browsers or email clients **attach an extended file attribute**, commonly known as the "**quarantine flag**," to the downloaded file. This attribute acts as a security measure to **mark the file** as coming from an untrusted source (the internet), and potentially carrying risks. However, not all applications attach this attribute, for instance, common BitTorrent client software usually bypasses this process.
|
||||
|
|
@ -225,7 +237,7 @@ com.apple.quarantine: 00C1;607842eb;Brave;F643CD5F-6071-46AB-83AB-390BA944DEC5
|
|||
# F643CD5F-6071-46AB-83AB-390BA944DEC5 -- UID assigned to the file downloaded
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Actually a process "could set quarantine flags to the files it creates" (i tried to apply the USER\_APPROVED flag in a created file but it won't apply it):
|
||||
Actually a process "could set quarantine flags to the files it creates" (I already tried to apply the USER\_APPROVED flag in a created file but it won't apply it):
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -309,11 +321,24 @@ find / -exec ls -ld {} \; 2>/dev/null | grep -E "[x\-]@ " | awk '{printf $9; pri
|
|||
```
|
||||
{% endcode %}
|
||||
|
||||
Quarantine information is also stored in a central database managed by LaunchServices in **`~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2`**.
|
||||
Quarantine information is also stored in a central database managed by LaunchServices in **`~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2`** which allows the GUI to obtain data about the file origins. Moreover this can be overwritten by applications which might be interested in hiding its origins. Moreover, this can be done from LaunchServices APIS.
|
||||
|
||||
#### **libquarantine.dylb**
|
||||
|
||||
This library exports several functions that allow to manipulate the extended attribute fields.
|
||||
|
||||
The `qtn_file_*` APIs deal with file quarantine policies, the `qtn_proc_*` APIs are applied to processes (files created by the process). The unexported `__qtn_syscall_quarantine*` functions are the ones that applies the policies which calls `mac_syscall` with "Quarantine" as first argument which sends the requests to `Quarantine.kext`.
|
||||
|
||||
#### **Quarantine.kext**
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel extension is only available through the **kernel cache on the system**; however, you _can_ download the **Kernel Debug Kit from https://developer.apple.com/**, which will contain a symbolicated version of the extension.
|
||||
The kernel extension is only available through the **kernel cache on the system**; however, you _can_ download the **Kernel Debug Kit from** [**https://developer.apple.com/**](https://developer.apple.com/), which will contain a symbolicated version of the extension.
|
||||
|
||||
This Kext will hook via MACF several calls in order to traps all file lifecycle events: Creation, opening, renaming, hard-linkning... even `setxattr` to prevent it from setting the `com.apple.quarantine` extended attribute.
|
||||
|
||||
It also uses a couple of MIBs:
|
||||
|
||||
* `security.mac.qtn.sandbox_enforce`: Enforce quarantine along Sandbox
|
||||
* `security.mac.qtn.user_approved_exec`: Querantined procs can only execute approved files
|
||||
|
||||
### XProtect
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -482,8 +507,8 @@ In an ".app" bundle if the quarantine xattr is not added to it, when executing i
|
|||
{% embed url="https://websec.nl/" %}
|
||||
|
||||
{% hint style="success" %}
|
||||
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
|
||||
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
|
||||
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
|
||||
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" d
|
|||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ If there is an ACL that only allows some IPs to query the SMNP service, you can
|
|||
* snmpd.conf
|
||||
* snmp-config.xml
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" d
|
|||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ msf6 auxiliary(scanner/snmp/snmp_enum) > exploit
|
|||
|
||||
* [https://medium.com/@in9uz/cisco-nightmare-pentesting-cisco-networks-like-a-devil-f4032eb437b9](https://medium.com/@in9uz/cisco-nightmare-pentesting-cisco-networks-like-a-devil-f4032eb437b9)
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" d
|
|||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ Find more info about web vulns in:
|
|||
|
||||
You can use tools such as [https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io](https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io) to monitor pages for modifications that might insert vulnerabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ Before activation:
|
|||
|
||||
After activation:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" d
|
|||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ These are some of the actions a malicious plugin could perform:
|
|||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" d
|
|||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ More information in: [https://medium.com/swlh/polyglot-files-a-hackers-best-frie
|
|||
* [https://www.idontplaydarts.com/2012/06/encoding-web-shells-in-png-idat-chunks/](https://www.idontplaydarts.com/2012/06/encoding-web-shells-in-png-idat-chunks/)
|
||||
* [https://medium.com/swlh/polyglot-files-a-hackers-best-friend-850bf812dd8a](https://medium.com/swlh/polyglot-files-a-hackers-best-friend-850bf812dd8a)
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data
|
|||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ The token's expiry is checked using the "exp" Payload claim. Given that JWTs are
|
|||
|
||||
{% embed url="https://github.com/ticarpi/jwt_tool" %}
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data
|
|||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ intitle:"phpLDAPadmin" inurl:cmd.php
|
|||
|
||||
{% embed url="https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/LDAP%20Injection" %}
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="
|
|||
</details>
|
||||
{% endhint %}
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ SELECT $$hacktricks$$;
|
|||
SELECT $TAG$hacktricks$TAG$;
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
# XSS (Cross Site Scripting)
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1574,7 +1574,7 @@ Find **more SVG payloads in** [**https://github.com/allanlw/svg-cheatsheet**](ht
|
|||
* [https://gist.github.com/rvrsh3ll/09a8b933291f9f98e8ec](https://gist.github.com/rvrsh3ll/09a8b933291f9f98e8ec)
|
||||
* [https://netsec.expert/2020/02/01/xss-in-2020.html](https://netsec.expert/2020/02/01/xss-in-2020.html)
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are hiring!** (_fluent polish written and spoken required_).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ At the heart of automatic differentiation is the **chain rule** from calculus. T
|
|||
|
||||
Mathematically, if `y=f(u)` and `u=g(x)`, then the derivative of `y` with respect to `x` is:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
**2. Computational Graph**
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ In AD, computations are represented as nodes in a **computational graph**, where
|
|||
|
||||
Let's consider a simple function:
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
Where:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ For each word in the sentence, compute the **attention score** with respect to "
|
|||
|
||||
**Attention Score between "shiny" and "shiny"**
|
||||
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt="" width="563"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (1) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt="" width="563"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
|
||||
|
||||
**Attention Score between "sun" and "shiny"**
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue