Mirrors/hacktricks
2
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks synced 2024-11-22 04:33:28 +00:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity

GITBOOK-4166: change request with no subject merged in GitBook

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
CPol 2023-11-11 10:49:26 +00:00 committed by gitbook-bot
parent 3ce30a548d
commit e0fc725d40
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 07D2180C7B12D0FF
3 changed files with 9 additions and 3 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

2
SUMMARY.md
View file

@ -179,7 +179,7 @@
* [macOS .Net Applications Injection](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-proces-abuse/macos-.net-applications-injection.md)
* [macOS Security Protections](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/README.md)
* [macOS Gatekeeper / Quarantine / XProtect](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-gatekeeper.md)
* [macOS Launch/Environment Constraints](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-launch-environment-constraints.md)
* [macOS Launch/Environment Constraints & Trust Cache](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-launch-environment-constraints.md)
* [macOS Sandbox](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/README.md)
* [macOS Default Sandbox Debug](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-default-sandbox-debug.md)
* [macOS Sandbox Debug & Bypass](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass/README.md)

2
macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-dangerous-entitlements.md
View file

@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ Allow to modify files inside apps bundle (inside app.app), which is **disallowed
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
It's possible to check who has this access in _System Settings_ > _Privacy & Security_ > _App Management._
## Medium
### `com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit`

8
macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-launch-environment-constraints.md
View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# macOS Launch/Environment Constraints
# macOS Launch/Environment Constraints & Trust Cache
<details>
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Category 1:
* `(on-authorized-authapfs-volume || on-system-volume)`: Must be in System or Cryptexes volume.
* `launch-type == 1`: Must be a system service (plist in LaunchDaemons).
* &#x20; `validation-category == 1`: An operating system executable.
* `validation-category == 1`: An operating system executable.
* `is-init-proc`: Launchd
### Reversing LC Categories
@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ In **macOS** there are a few trust caches:
And in iOS it looks like it's in **`/usr/standalone/firmware/FUD/StaticTrustCache.img4`**.
{% hint style="warning" %}
On macOS running on Apple Silicon devices, if an Apple signed binary is not in the trust cache, AMFI will refuse to load it.
{% endhint %}
### Enumerating Trust Caches
The previous trust cache files are in format **IMG4** and **IM4P**, being IM4P the payload section of a IMG4 format.