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diff --git a/SUMMARY.md b/SUMMARY.md
index c40fd1122..c000a5589 100644
--- a/SUMMARY.md
+++ b/SUMMARY.md
@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@
* [GCP - Buckets Enumeration](cloud-security/gcp-security/gcp-buckets-enumeration.md)
* [GCP - Local Privilege Escalation / SSH Pivoting](cloud-security/gcp-security/gcp-local-privilege-escalation-ssh-pivoting.md)
* [GCP - Persistance](cloud-security/gcp-security/gcp-persistance.md)
+ * [Workspace Security](cloud-security/gcp-security/workspace-security.md)
* [Github Security](cloud-security/github-security/README.md)
* [Basic Github Information](cloud-security/github-security/basic-github-information.md)
* [Kubernetes Security](pentesting/pentesting-kubernetes/README.md)
diff --git a/cloud-security/gcp-security/workspace-security.md b/cloud-security/gcp-security/workspace-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c25299d74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cloud-security/gcp-security/workspace-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+# Workspace Security
+
+## Google Groups Privesc
+
+By default in workspace a **group** can be **freely accessed** by any member of the organization.\
+Workspace also allow to **grant permission to groups** (even GCP permissions), so if groups can be joined and they have extra permissions, an attacker may **abuse that path to escalate privileges**.
+
+## Oauth Apps
+
+**Google** allows to create applications that can **interact on behalf users** with several **Google services**: Gmail, Drive, GCP...
+
+When creating an application to **act on behalf other users**, the developer needs to create an **OAuth app inside GCP** and indicate the scopes (permissions) the app needs to access the users data.\
+When a **user** wants to **use** that **application**, he will be **prompted** to **accept** that the application will access to his data specified in the scopes.
+
+This is a very juicy way to **phish** non-technical users into using **applications that access sensitive information** because they might not understand the consequences. Therefore, in organizations accounts, there are ways to prevent this from happening.
+
+### Unverified App prompt
+
+As it was mentioned, google will always present a **prompt to the user to accept** the permissions he is giving the application on his behalf. However, if the application is considered **dangerous**, google will show **first** a **prompt** indicating that it's **dangerous** and **making more difficult** to the user to grant the permissions to the app.
+
+This prompt appears in apps that:
+
+* Uses any scope that can access to private data (Gmail, Drive, GCP, BigQuery...)
+* Apps with less than 100 users (apps > 100 a review process is needed also to not show the unverified prompt)
+
+### Interesting Scopes
+
+You can [**find here**](https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/scopes) a list of all the Google OAuth scopes.
+
+* **cloud-platform**: View and manage your data across **Google Cloud Platform** services. You can impersonate the user in GCP.
+* **directory.readonly**: See and download your organization's GSuite directory. Get names, phones, calendar URLs of all the users.
+
+## App Scripts
+
+Developers can create App Scripts and set them as a standalone project or bound them to Google Docs/Sheets/Slides/Forms. App Scripts is code that will be triggered when a user with editor permission access the doc (and after accepting the OAuth prompt)
+
+However, even if the app isn't verified there are a couple of ways to not show that prompt:
+
+* If the publisher of the app is in the same Workspace as the user accessing it
+* If the script is in a drive of the user
+
+### Copy Document Unverified Prompt Bypass
+
+When you create a link to share a document a link similar to this one is created: `https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1i5[...]aIUD/edit`\
+If you **change** the ending **"/edit"** for **"/copy"**, instead of accessing it google will ask you if you want to **generate a copy of the document.**
+
+{% hint style="warning" %}
+If someone creates a **copy** of that **document** that **contained the App Script**, he will also be **copying the App Script**, therefore when he **opens** the copied **spreadsheet**, the **regular OAuth prompt** will appear **bypassing the unverified prompt**, because **the user is now the author of the App Script of the copied file**.
+{% endhint %}
+
+This method will be able to bypass also the Workspace admin restriction:
+
+.png>)
+
+But can be prevented with:
+
+.png>)
+
+### Shared Document Unverified Prompt Bypass
+
+Moreover, if someone **shared** with you a document with **editor access**, you can generate **App Scripts inside the document** and the **OWNER (creator) of the document will be the owner of the App Script**.
+
+{% hint style="warning" %}
+This means, that the **creator of the document will appear as creator of any App Script** anyone with editor access creates inside of it.
+
+This also means that the **App Script will be trusted by the Workspace environment** of the creator of the document.
+{% endhint %}
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+This also means that if an **App Script already existed** and people has **granted access**, anyone with **Editor** permission to the doc can **modify it and abuse that access.**\
+****To abuse this you also need people to trigger the App Script. And one neat trick if to **publish the script as a web app**. When the **people** that already granted **access** to the App Script access the web page, they will **trigger the App Script** (this also works using `![]()
` tags.
+{% endhint %}
+
+## Post-Exploitation
+
+### Google Drive
+
+When **sharing** a document yo can **specify** the **people** that can access it one by one, **share** it with your **entire company** (**or** with some specific **groups**) by **generating a link**.
+
+When sharing a document, in the advance setting you can also **allow people to search** for this file (by **default** this is **disabled**). However, it's important to note that once users views a document, it's searchable by them.
+
+For sake of simplicity, most of the people will generate and share a link instead of adding the people that can access the document one by one.
+
+Some proposed ways to find all the documents:
+
+* Search in internal chat, forums...
+* **Spider** known **documents** searching for **references** to other documents. You can do this within an App Script with[ **PaperChaser**](https://github.com/mandatoryprogrammer/PaperChaser)****
+
+### **Gmail**
+
+* You can create **filters to hide** security notifications from Google
+ * from: (no-reply@accounts.google.com) "Security Alert"
+ * Hide password reset emails
+* Create **forwarding address to send sensitive information** (You need manual access)
+ * Create a forwarding address to send emails that contains the word "password" for example
+
+### App Scripts
+
+* Create **time-based triggers** to main **persistance**
+ * The docs mention that to use `ScriptApp.newTrigger("funcion")` you need the **scope** `script.scriptapp`, but **apparently thats not necessary** as long as you have declare some other scope..
+
+## References
+
+* [https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/6AsVUS79gLw](https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/6AsVUS79gLw) - Matthew Bryant - Hacking G Suite: The Power of Dark Apps Script Magic
diff --git a/pentesting-web/http-request-smuggling/request-smuggling-in-http-2-downgrades.md b/pentesting-web/http-request-smuggling/request-smuggling-in-http-2-downgrades.md
index 4fbf37aa9..7e23d0aa2 100644
--- a/pentesting-web/http-request-smuggling/request-smuggling-in-http-2-downgrades.md
+++ b/pentesting-web/http-request-smuggling/request-smuggling-in-http-2-downgrades.md
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ This technique was abused on AWS load balancer, so making sure that the users ac
This is exactly the same technique as before, but checking the requests James noticed that clients were asking to send him their credentials, so he just modified his server to allow CORS to send him peoples credentials:
-.png>)
+ (1).png>)
### H2.TE via Request Header Injection
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ In this case **the header Transfer-Encoding was injected**.
HTTP/2 on some servers lets you put a **colon in the header name, and with a \r\n** you can inject a new header inside the header name like this:
-.png>)
+ (1).png>)
Note that if you put just the new line characters sending a header without content, the request is going to be treated as **invalid**:
diff --git a/phishing-methodology/phishing-documents.md b/phishing-methodology/phishing-documents.md
index bc6f3dba5..f1b4a7114 100644
--- a/phishing-methodology/phishing-documents.md
+++ b/phishing-methodology/phishing-documents.md
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ DOCX files referencing a remote template (File –Options –Add-ins –Manage:
### Word with external image
Go to: _Insert --> Quick Parts --> Field_\
-_**Categories**: Links and References, **Filed names**: includePicture, and **Filename or URL**:_ [http://\/whatever](http://\/whatever)
+_**Categories**: Links and References, **Filed names**: includePicture, and **Filename or URL**:_ http://\/whatever
.png>)