GITBOOK-3976: change request with no subject merged in GitBook

SUMMARY.md

@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@
   * [macOS Security Protections](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/README.md)
     * [macOS SIP](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sip.md)
     * [macOS Sandbox](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/README.md)
-      * [macOS Sandbox Debug & Bypass](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass.md)
+      * [macOS Sandbox Debug & Bypass](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass/README.md)
+        * [macOS Office Sandbox Bypasses](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass/macos-office-sandbox-bypasses.md)
     * [macOS TCC](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-tcc/README.md)
       * [macOS Apple Scripts](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-tcc/macos-apple-scripts.md)
   * [macOS Users](macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-users.md)

macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing/README.md

@@ -122,6 +122,12 @@ Note that in order to debug binaries, **SIP needs to be disabled** (`csrutil dis
 Note that in order to **instrument system binaries**, (such as `cloudconfigurationd`) on macOS, **SIP must be disabled** (just removing the signature won't work).
 {% endhint %}
 
+### Unified Logs
+
+MacOS generates a lot of logs that can be very useful when running an application trying to understand **what is it doing**.
+
+Moreover, the are some logs that will contain the tag `<private>` to **hide** some **user** or **computer** **identifiable** information. However, it's possible to **install a certificate to disclose this information**. Follow the explanations from [**here**](https://superuser.com/questions/1532031/how-to-show-private-data-in-macos-unified-log).
+
 ### Hopper
 
 #### Left panel

macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/README.md

@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ Therefore, these checks are **only run when executing apps with the quarantined
 
 {% hint style="warning" %}
 **Note that Safari and other web browsers and applications are the ones that need to mark the downloaded files**
+
+Moreover, **files created by sandboxed processes** are also appended this attribute to prevent sandbox escaped.
 {% endhint %}
 
 It's possible to **check it's status and enable/disable** (root required) with:

macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/README.md

@@ -218,8 +218,8 @@ Bypasses examples:
 
 Processes are automatically Sandboxed from userland when they start if they have the entitlement: `com.apple.security.app-sandbox`. For a detailed explanation of this process check:
 
-{% content-ref url="macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass.md" %}
-[macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass.md](macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass.md)
+{% content-ref url="macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass/" %}
+[macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass](macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass/)
 {% endcontent-ref %}
 
 ### **Check PID Privileges**

macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass/README.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 
 ## Sandbox loading process
 
-<figure><img src="../../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2).png" alt=""><figcaption><p>Image from <a href="http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf">http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf</a></p></figcaption></figure>
+<figure><img src="../../../../../.gitbook/assets/image (2).png" alt=""><figcaption><p>Image from <a href="http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf">http://newosxbook.com/files/HITSB.pdf</a></p></figcaption></figure>
 
 In the previous image it's possible to observe **how the sandbox will be loaded** when an application with the entitlement **`com.apple.security.app-sandbox`** is run.
 
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ Finally, the sandbox will be activated will a call to **`__sandbox_ms`** which w
 
 ## Possible Bypasses
 
+{% hint style="warning" %}
+Note that **files created by sandboxed processes** are appended the **quarentine attribute** to prevent sandbox escaped.
+{% endhint %}
+
 ### Run binary without Sandbox
 
 If you run a binary that won't be sandboxed from a sandboxed binary, it will **run within the sandbox of the parent process**.
@@ -178,16 +182,16 @@ Process 2517 exited with status = 0 (0x00000000)
 
 If from then sandbox process you are able to **compromise other processes** running in less restrictive sandboxes (or none), you will be able to escape to their sandboxes:
 
-{% content-ref url="../../macos-proces-abuse/" %}
-[macos-proces-abuse](../../macos-proces-abuse/)
+{% content-ref url="../../../macos-proces-abuse/" %}
+[macos-proces-abuse](../../../macos-proces-abuse/)
 {% endcontent-ref %}
 
 ### Interposting Bypass
 
 For more information about **Interposting** check:
 
-{% content-ref url="../../mac-os-architecture/macos-function-hooking.md" %}
-[macos-function-hooking.md](../../mac-os-architecture/macos-function-hooking.md)
+{% content-ref url="../../../mac-os-architecture/macos-function-hooking.md" %}
+[macos-function-hooking.md](../../../mac-os-architecture/macos-function-hooking.md)
 {% endcontent-ref %}
 
 #### Interpost `_libsecinit_initializer` to prevent the sandbox
@@ -280,7 +284,7 @@ ld -o shell shell.o -macosx_version_min 13.0
 ld: dynamic executables or dylibs must link with libSystem.dylib for architecture arm64
 ```
 
-### Abusing Austo Start Locations
+### Abusing Auto Start Locations
 
 If a sandboxed process can **write** in a place where **later an unsandboxed application is going to run the binary**, it will be able to **escape just by placing** there the binary. A good example of this kind of locations are `~/Library/LaunchAgents` or `/System/Library/LaunchDaemons`.
 
@@ -288,8 +292,8 @@ For this you might even need **2 steps**: To make a process with a **more permis
 
 Check this page about **Auto Start locations**:
 
-{% content-ref url="broken-reference" %}
-[Broken link](broken-reference)
+{% content-ref url="../../../../macos-auto-start-locations.md" %}
+[macos-auto-start-locations.md](../../../../macos-auto-start-locations.md)
 {% endcontent-ref %}
 
 ## References

macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sandbox/macos-sandbox-debug-and-bypass/macos-office-sandbox-bypasses.md

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# macOS Office Sandbox Bypasses
+
+<details>
+
+<summary><a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/pentesting-cloud-methodology"><strong>☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️</strong></a> -<a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live"><strong>🐦 Twitter 🐦</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ Twitch 🎙️</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
+
+* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
+* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
+* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
+* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
+* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
+
+</details>
+
+### Word Sandbox bypass via Launch Agents
+
+The application uses a **custom Sandbox** using the entitlement **`com.apple.security.temporary-exception.sbpl`** and this custom sandbox allows to write files anywhere as long as the filename started with `~$`: `(require-any (require-all (vnode-type REGULAR-FILE) (regex #"(^|/)~$[^/]+$")))`
+
+Therefore, escaping was as easy as **writing a `plist`** LaunchAgent in `~/Library/LaunchAgents/~$escape.plist`.
+
+Check the [**original report here**](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/08/escaping-the-sandbox-microsoft-office-on-macos/).
+
+### Word Sandbox bypass via Login Items and zip
+
+(Remember that from the first escape, Word can write arbitrary files whose name start with `~$`).
+
+It was discovered that from within the sandbox it's possible to create a **Login Item** (apps that will be executed when the user logs in). However, these apps **won't execute unless** they are **notarized** and it's **not possible to add args** (so you cannot just run a reverse shell using **`bash`**).
+
+From the previous Sandbox bypass, Microsoft disabled the option to write files in `~/Library/LaunchAgents`. However, it was discovered that if you put a **zip file as a Login Item** the `Archive Utility` will just **unzip** it on its current location. So, because by default the folder `LaunchAgents` from `~/Library` is not created, it was possible to **zip a plist in `LaunchAgents/~$escape.plist`** and **place** the zip file in **`~/Library`** so when decompress it will reach the persitence destination.
+
+Check the [**original report here**](https://objective-see.org/blog/blog\_0x4B.html).
+
+### Word Sandbox bypass via Login Items and .zshenv
+
+(Remember that from the first escape, Word can write arbitrary files whose name start with `~$`).
+
+However, the previous technique had a limitation, if the folder **`~/Library/LaunchAgents`** exists because some other software created it, it would fail. So a different Login Items chain was discovered for this.
+
+An attacker could crate the the files **`.bash_profile`** and **`.zshenv`** with the payload to execute and then zip them and **write the zip in the victims** user folder: \~/\~$escape.zip.
+
+Then, add the zip file to the **Login Items** and then the **`Terminal`** app. When the user relogins, the zip file would be uncompressed in the users file, overwriting **`.bash_profile`** and **`.zshenv`** and therefore, the terminal will execute one of these files (depending if bash or zsh is used).
+
+Check the [**original report here**](https://desi-jarvis.medium.com/office365-macos-sandbox-escape-fcce4fa4123c).
+
+### Word Sandbox Bypass with Open and env variables
+
+From sandboxed processes it's still possible to invoke other processes using the **`open`** utility. Moreover, these processes will run **within their own sandbox**.
+
+It was discovered that the open utility has the **`--env`** option to run an app with **specific env** variables. Therefore, it was possible to create the **`.zshenv` file** within a folder **inside** the **sandbox** and the use `open` with `--env` setting the **`HOME` variable** to that folder opening that `Terminal` app, which will execute the `.zshenv` file (for some reason it was also needed to set the variable `__OSINSTALL_ENVIROMENT`).
+
+Check the [**original report here**](https://perception-point.io/blog/technical-analysis-of-cve-2021-30864/).
+
+### Word Sandbox Bypass with Open and stdin
+
+The **`open`** utility also supported the **`--stdin`** param (and after the previous bypass it was no longer possible to use `--env`).
+
+The thing is that even if **`python`** was signed by Apple, it **won't execute** a script with the **`quarantine`** attribute. However, it was possible to pass it a script from stdin so it won't check if it was quarantined or not:&#x20;
+
+1. Drop a **`~$exploit.py`** file with arbitrary Python commands.
+2. Run _open_ **`–stdin='~$exploit.py' -a Python`**, which runs the Python app with our dropped file serving as its standard input. Python happily runs our code, and since it’s a child process of _launchd_, it isn’t bound to Word’s sandbox rules.
+
+<details>
+
+<summary><a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/pentesting-cloud-methodology"><strong>☁️ HackTricks Cloud ☁️</strong></a> -<a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live"><strong>🐦 Twitter 🐦</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.twitch.tv/hacktricks_live/schedule"><strong>🎙️ Twitch 🎙️</strong></a> - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE"><strong>🎥 Youtube 🎥</strong></a></summary>
+
+* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
+* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
+* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
+* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
+* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
+
+</details>

macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-security-protections/macos-sip.md

@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ Researchers found that during the installation of an Apple-signed package (.pkg
 
 Moreover, it was discovered that **`/etc/zshenv` could be used as a general attack technique**, not just for a SIP bypass. Each user profile has a `~/.zshenv` file, which behaves the same way as `/etc/zshenv` but doesn't require root permissions. This file could be used as a persistence mechanism, triggering every time `zsh` starts, or as an elevation of privilege mechanism. If an admin user elevates to root using `sudo -s` or `sudo <command>`, the `~/.zshenv` file would be triggered, effectively elevating to root.
 
+In [**CVE-2022-22583**](https://perception-point.io/blog/technical-analysis-cve-2022-22583/) it was discovered that the same **`system_installd`** process could still be abused because it was putting the **post-install script inside a random named folder protected by SIP inside `/tmp`**. The thing is that **`/tmp` itself isn't protected by SIP**, so it was possible to **mount** a **virtual image on it**, then the **installer** would put in there the **post-install script**, **unmount** the virtual image, **recreate** all the **folders** and **add** the **post installation** script with the **payload** to execute.
+
 ### **com.apple.rootless.install**
 
 {% hint style="danger" %}