diff --git a/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md b/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md index 700ca98a9..56ed1e88c 100644 --- a/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md +++ b/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md @@ -161,6 +161,32 @@ Kerberoast is very stealthy if exploitable Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='Security';ID=4769} -MaxEvents 1000 | ?{$_.Message.split("`n")[8] -ne 'krbtgt' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[8] -ne '*$' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[3] -notlike '*$@*' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[18] -like '*0x0*' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[17] -like "*0x17*"} | select ExpandProperty message ``` +## Kerberoast w/o domain account + +In September 2022 a vulnerability was discovered by [Charlie Clark](https://exploit.ph/), ST (Service Tickets) can be obtained through KRB_AS_REQ request without having to control any Active Directory account. If a principal can authenticate without pre-authentication (like AS-REP Roasting attack), it is possible to use it to launch an **KRB_AS_REQ** request and trick the request to ask for a **ST** instead of a **encrypted TGT**, by modifying the **sname** attribute in the req-body part of the request. + +The technique is fully explained in this article: [Semperis blog post](https://www.semperis.com/blog/new-attack-paths-as-requested-sts/). + +{% hint style="warning" %} +You must provide a list of users because we don't have a valid account to query the LDAP using this technique. +{% endhint %} + +#### Linux + +* [impacket/GetUserSPNs.py from PR #1413](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/pull/1413): + +```bash +GetUserSPNs.py -no-preauth "NO_PREAUTH_USER" -usersfile "LIST_USERS" -dc-host "dc.domain.local" "domain.local"/ +``` + +#### Windows + +* [GhostPack/Rubeus from PR #139](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus/pull/139): + +```bash +Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoastables.txt /domain:"domain.local" /dc:"dc.domain.local" /nopreauth:"NO_PREAUTH_USER" /spn:"TARGET_SERVICE" +``` + **More information about Kerberoasting in ired.team in** [**here** ](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting)**and** [**here**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberoasting-requesting-rc4-encrypted-tgs-when-aes-is-enabled)**.**