### **Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)\*\*\*\*
If you want to **know** about my **latest modifications**/**additions**, **join the** [**PEASS & HackTricks telegram group here**](https://t.me/peass)**.**
If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to ****[**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) ****that will be reflected in this book.
Don't forget to **give ⭐ on the github** to motivate me to continue developing this book.
From Windows Vista, all **protected objects are labeled with an integrity level**. Most user and system files and registry keys on the system have a default label of “medium” integrity. The primary exception is a set of specific folders and files writeable by Internet Explorer 7 at Low integrity. **Most processes** run by **standard users** are labeled with **medium integrity** \(even the ones started by a user inside the administrators group\), and most **services** are labeled with **System integrity**. The root directory is protected by a high-integrity label.
There are several levels of integrity:
* **Untrusted** – processes that are logged on anonymously are automatically designated as Untrusted. _Example: Chrome_
* **Low** – The Low integrity level is the level used by default for interaction with the Internet. As long as Internet Explorer is run in its default state, Protected Mode, all files and processes associated with it are assigned the Low integrity level. Some folders, such as the **Temporary Internet Folder**, are also assigned the **Low integrity** level by default. However, note that a **low integrity process** is very **restricted**, it **cannot** write to the **registry** and it’s limited from writing to **most locations** in the current user’s profile. _Example: Internet Explorer or Microsoft Edge_
* **Medium** – Medium is the context that **most objects will run in**. Standard users receive the Medium integrity level, and any object not explicitly designated with a lower or higher integrity level is Medium by default. Not that a user inside the Administrators group by default will use medium integrity levels.
* **High** –**Administrators** are granted the High integrity level. This ensures that Administrators are capable of interacting with and modifying objects assigned Medium or Low integrity levels, but can also act on other objects with a High integrity level, which standard users can not do. _Example: "Run as Administrator"_
* **System** – As the name implies, the System integrity level is reserved for the system. The Windows kernel and core services are granted the System integrity level. Being even higher than the High integrity level of Administrators protects these core functions from being affected or compromised even by Administrators. Example: Services
* **Installer** – The Installer integrity level is a special case and is the highest of all integrity levels. By virtue of being equal to or higher than all other WIC integrity levels, objects assigned the Installer integrity level are also able to uninstall all other objects.
You can get the integrity level of a process using **Process Explorer** from **Sysinternals**, accessing the **properties** of the process and viewing the "**Security**" tab:
![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28349%29.png)
You can also get your **current integrity level** using `whoami /groups`
And if `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU /v UseWUServer` is equals to `1`.
Then, **it is exploitable.** If the last registry is equals to 0, then, the WSUS entry will be ignored.
You can use: [Wsuxploit](https://github.com/pimps/wsuxploit) - This is a MiTM weaponized exploit script to inject 'fake' updates into non-SSL WSUS traffic.
**If** these 2 registers are **enabled** \(value is **0x1**\), then users of any privilege can **install** \(execute\) **`*.msi`** files as NT AUTHORITY\**SYSTEM**.
**LAPS** allows you to **manage the local Administrator password** \(which is **randomised**, unique, and **changed regularly**\) on domain-joined computers. These passwords are centrally stored in Active Directory and restricted to authorised users using ACLs. Passwords are protected in transit from the client to the server using Kerberos v5 and AES.
When using LAPS, 2 new attributes appear in the computer objects of the domain: _ms-msc-AdmPwd_ and _ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime._ These attributes contains the plain-text admin password and the expiration time. Then, in a domain environment, it could be interesting to check which users can read these attributes...
### WDigest
If active, **plain-text passwords are stored in LSASS** \(Local Security Authority Subsystem Service\).
[**More info about WDigest in this page**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#wdigest).
Microsoft in **Windows 8.1 and later** has provided additional protection for the LSA to **prevent** untrusted processes from being able to **read its memory** or to inject code.
[**More info about LSA Protection here**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#lsa-protection).
**Credential Guard** is a new feature in Windows 10 \(Enterprise and Education edition\) that helps to protect your credentials on a machine from threats such as pass the hash.
****[**More info about Credentials Guard here.**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#credential-guard)\*\*\*\*
**Domain credentials** are used by operating system components and are **authenticated** by the **Local****Security Authority** \(LSA\). Typically, domain credentials are established for a user when a registered security package authenticates the user's logon data.
[**More info about Cached Credentials here**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#cached-credentials).
UAC is used to allow an **administrator user to not give administrator privileges to each process executed**. This is **achieved using default** the **low privileged token** of the user.
[**More information about UAC here**](../credentials.md#uac).
If you **belongs to some privileged group you may be able to escalate privileges**. Learn about privileged groups and how to abuse them to escalate privileges here:
First of all, listing the processes **check for passwords inside the command line of the process**.
Check if you can **overwrite some binary running** or if you have write permissions of the binary folder to exploit possible [**DLL Hijacking attacks**](dll-hijacking.md):
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v
"system32"^|find ":"') do for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%y in ('echo %%x') do (
You can create a memory dump of a running process using **procdump** from sysinternals. Services like FTP have the **credentials in clear text in memory**, try to dump the memory and read the credentials.
**Take into account that the service upnphost depends on SSDPSRV to work \(for XP SP1\)**
### **Modify service binary path**
If the group "Authenticated users" has **SERVICE\_ALL\_ACCESS** in a service, then it can modify the binary that is being executed by the service. To modify it and execute **nc** you can do:
**Check if you can modify the binary that is executed by a service** or if you have **write permissions on the folder** where the binary is located \([**DLL Hijacking**](dll-hijacking.md)\)**.**
You can get every binary that is executed by a service using **wmic** \(not in system32\) and check your permissions using **icacls**:
```bash
for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %a in ('wmic service list full^|find /i "pathname"^|find /i /v "system32"') do @echo %a >> %temp%\perm.txt
for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %a in (%temp%\perm.txt) do cmd.exe /c icacls "%a" 2>nul | findstr "(M) (F) :\"
```
You can also use **sc** and **icacls**:
```bash
sc query state= all | findstr "SERVICE_NAME:" >> C:\Temp\Servicenames.txt
FOR /F "tokens=2 delims= " %i in (C:\Temp\Servicenames.txt) DO @echo %i >> C:\Temp\services.txt
FOR /F %i in (C:\Temp\services.txt) DO @sc qc %i | findstr "BINARY_PATH_NAME" >> C:\Temp\path.txt
```
### Services registry permissions
You should check if you can modify any service registry.
You can **check** your **permissions** over a service **registry** doing:
```bash
reg query hklm\System\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v imagepath #Get the binary paths of the services
#Try to write every service with its current content (to check if you have write permissions)
for /f %a in ('reg query hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services') do del %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul & reg save %a %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul && reg restore %a %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul && echo You can modify %a
Check if **Authenticated Users** or **NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE** have FullControl. In that case you can change the binary that is going to be executed by the service.
Check **permissions of the binaries** \(maybe you can overwrite one and escalate privileges\) and of the **folders** \([DLL Hijacking](dll-hijacking.md)\).
Check if you can modify some config file to read some special file or if you can modify some binary that is going to be executed by an Administrator account \(schedtasks\).
A way to find weak folder/files permissions in the system is doing:
net view /all /domain [domainname] #Shares on the domains
net view \\computer /ALL #List shares of a computer
net use x: \\computer\share #Mount the share locally
net share #Check current shares
```
### hosts file
Check for other known computers hardcoded on the hosts file
```text
type C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
```
### Network Interfaces & DNS
```text
ipconfig /all
Get-NetIPConfiguration | ft InterfaceAlias,InterfaceDescription,IPv4Address
Get-DnsClientServerAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft
```
### Open Ports
Check for **restricted services** from the outside
```bash
netstat -ano #Opened ports?
```
### Routing Table
```text
route print
Get-NetRoute -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft DestinationPrefix,NextHop,RouteMetric,ifIndex
```
### ARP Table
```text
arp -A
Get-NetNeighbor -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft ifIndex,IPAddress,L
```
### Firewall Rules
\*\*\*\*[**Check this page for Firewall related commands**](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#firewall) **\(list rules, create rules, turn off, turn off...\)**
More[ commands for network enumeration here](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#network)
Binary `bash.exe` can also be found in `C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-lxssbash_[...]\bash.exe`
If you get root user you can listen on any port \(the first time you use `nc.exe` to listen on a port it will ask via GUI if `nc` should be allowed by the firewall\).
```text
wsl whoami
./ubuntun1604.exe config --default-user root
wsl whoami
wsl python -c 'BIND_OR_REVERSE_SHELL_PYTHON_CODE'
```
To easily start bash as root, you can try `--default-user root`
You can explore the `WSL` filesystem in the folder `C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Packages\CanonicalGroupLimited.UbuntuonWindows_79rhkp1fndgsc\LocalState\rootfs\`
From [https://www.neowin.net/news/windows-7-exploring-credential-manager-and-windows-vault](https://www.neowin.net/news/windows-7-exploring-credential-manager-and-windows-vault)
The Windows Vault stores user credentials for servers, websites and other programs that **Windows** can **log in the users automaticall**y. At first instance, this might look like now users can store their Facebook credentials, Twitter credentials, Gmail credentials etc., so that they automatically log in via browsers. But it is not so.
Windows Vault stores credentials that Windows can log in the users automatically, which means that any **Windows application that needs credentials to access a resource** \(server or a website\) **can make use of this Credential Manager**& Windows Vault and use the credentials supplied instead of users entering the username and password all the time.
Unless the applications interact with Credential Manager, I don't think it is possible for them to use the credentials for a given resource. So, if your application wants to make use of the vault, it should somehow **communicate with the credential manager and request the credentials for that resource** from the default storage vault.
Then you can use `runas` with the `/savecred` options in order to use the saved credentials. The following example is calling a remote binary via an SMB share.
Note that mimikatz, lazagne, [credentialfileview](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/credentials_file_view.html), [VaultPasswordView](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/vault_password_view.html), or from [Empire Powershells module](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/dumpCredStore.ps1).
### DPAPI
In theory, the Data Protection API can enable symmetric encryption of any kind of data; in practice, its primary use in the Windows operating system is to perform symmetric encryption of asymmetric private keys, using a user or system secret as a significant contribution of entropy.
**DPAPI allows developers to encrypt keys using a symmetric key derived from the user's logon secrets**, or in the case of system encryption, using the system's domain authentication secrets.
The DPAPI keys used for encrypting the user's RSA keys are stored under `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}` directory, where {SID} is the [Security Identifier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Identifier) of that user. **The DPAPI key is stored in the same file as the master key that protects the users private keys**. It usually is 64 bytes of random data. \(Notice that this directory is protected so you cannot list it using`dir` from the cmd, but you can list it from PS\).
Write-Verbose 'No application pool or virtual directory passwords were found.'
$False
}
}
else {
Write-Verbose 'Appcmd.exe does not exist in the default location.'
$False
}
$ErrorActionPreference = $OrigError
}
```
### SCClient / SCCM
Check if `C:\Windows\CCM\SCClient.exe` exists .
Installers are **run with SYSTEM privileges**, many are vulnerable to **DLL Sideloading \(Info from** [**https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc**](https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc)**\).**
reg query "HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions" /s | findstr "HKEY_CURRENT_USER HostName PortNumber UserName PublicKeyFile PortForwardings ConnectionSharing ProxyPassword ProxyUsername" #Check the values saved in each session, user/password could be there
SSH private keys can be stored inside the registry key `HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys` so you should check if there is anything interesting in there:
If you find any entry inside that path it will probably be a saved SSH key. It is stored encrypted but can be easily decrypted using [https://github.com/ropnop/windows\_sshagent\_extract](https://github.com/ropnop/windows_sshagent_extract).
More information about this technique here: [https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/](https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/)
Before KB2928120 \(see MS14-025\), some Group Policy Preferences could be configured with a custom account. This feature was mainly used to deploy a custom local administrator account on a group of machines. There were two problems with this approach though. First, since the Group Policy Objects are stored as XML files in SYSVOL, any domain user can read them. The second problem is that the password set in these GPPs is AES256-encrypted with a default key, which is publicly documented. This means that any authenticated user could potentially access very sensitive data and elevate their privileges on their machine or even the domain. This function will check whether any locally cached GPP file contains a non-empty "cpassword" field. If so, it will decrypt it and return a custom PS object containing some information about the GPP along with the location of the file.
Search in ****_**C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Group Policy\history**_ or in _**C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\Group Policy\history** \(previous to W Vista\)_ for these files:
* Groups.xml
* Services.xml
* Scheduledtasks.xml
* DataSources.xml
* Printers.xml
* Drives.xml
**To decrypt the cPassword:**
```bash
#To decrypt these passwords you can decrypt it using
You can always **ask the user to enter his credentials of even the credentials of a different user** if you think he can know them \(notice that **asking** the client directly for the **credentials** is really **risky**\):
You should also check the Bin to look for credentials inside it
To **recover passwords** saved by several programs you can use: [http://www.nirsoft.net/password\_recovery\_tools.html](http://www.nirsoft.net/password_recovery_tools.html)
### Inside the registry
#### Other possible registry keys with credentials
[**MSF-Credentials Plugin**](https://github.com/carlospolop/MSF-Credentials) **is a msf** plugin I have created this plugin to **automatically execute every metasploit POST module that searches for credentials** inside the victim.
[**Winpeas**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite) automatically search for all the files containing passwords mentioned in this page.
[**Lazagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) is another great tool to extract password from a system.
The tool [**SessionGopher**](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/SessionGopher) search for **sessions**, **usernames** and **passwords** of several tools that save this data in clear text \(PuTTY, WinSCP, FileZilla, SuperPuTTY, and RDP\)
Imagine that **a process running as SYSTEM open a new process** \(`OpenProcess()`\) with **full access**. The same process **also create a new process** \(`CreateProcess()`\) **with low privileges but inheriting all the open handles of the main process**.
Then, if you have **full access to the low privileged process**, you can grab the **open handle to the privileged process created** with `OpenProcess()` and **inject a shellcode**.
[Read this example for more information about **how to detect and exploit this vulnerability**.](leaked-handle-exploitation.md)
[Read this **other post for a more complete explanation on how to test and abuse more open handlers of processes and threads inherited with different levels of permissions \(not only full access\)**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/).
## Named Pipe Client Impersonation
A `pipe` is a block of shared memory that processes can use for communication and data exchange.
`Named Pipes` is a Windows mechanism that enables two unrelated processes to exchange data between themselves, even if the processes are located on two different networks. It's very similar to client/server architecture as notions such as `a named pipe server` and a named `pipe client` exist.
When a **client writes on a pipe**, the **server** that created the pipe can **impersonate** the **client** if it has **SeImpersonate** privileges. Then, if you can find a **privileged process that is going to write on any pipe that you can impersonate**, you could be able to **escalate privileges** impersonating that process after it writes inside your created pipe. [**You can read this to learn how to perform this attack**](named-pipe-client-impersonation.md)**.**
## From Administrator Medium to High Integrity Level / UAC Bypass
\*\*\*\*[**Learn here**](../credentials.md#uac) **about what are the "integrity levels" in Windows, what is UAC and how to**[ **bypass it**](../credentials.md#uac)**.**
## **From High Integrity to System**
### **New service**
If you are already running on a High Integrity process, the **pass to SYSTEM** can be easy just **creating and executing a new service**:
From a High Integrity process you could try to **enable the AlwaysInstallElevated registry entries** and **install** a reverse shell using a _**.msi**_ wrapper.
[More information about the registry keys involved and how to install a _.msi_ package here.](./#alwaysinstallelevated)
### From SeDebug + SeImpersonate to Full Token privileges
If you have those token privileges \(probably you will find this in an already High Integrity process\), you will be able to **open almost any process** \(not protected processes\) with the SeDebug privilege, **copy the token** of the process, and create an **arbitrary process with that token**.
Using this technique is usually **selected any process running as SYSTEM with all the token privileges** \(_yes, you can find SYSTEM processes without all the token privileges_\).
**You can find an** [**example of code executing the proposed technique here**](sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md)**.**
### **Named Pipes**
This technique is used by meterpreter to escalate in `getsystem`. The technique consists on **creating a pipe and then create/abuse a service to write on that pipe**. Then, the **server** that created the pipe using the **`SeImpersonate`** privilege will be able to **impersonate the token** of the pipe client \(the service\) obtaining SYSTEM privileges.
If you want to [**learn more about name pipes you should read this**](./#named-pipe-client-impersonation).
If you want to read an example of [**how to go from high integrity to System using name pipes you should read this**](from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md).
### Dll Hijacking
If you manages to **hijack a dll** being **loaded** by a **process** running as **SYSTEM** you will be able to execute arbitrary code with those permissions. Therefore Dll Hijacking is also useful to this kind of privilege escalation, and, moreover, if far **more easy to achieve from a high integrity process** as it will have **write permissions** on the folders used to load dlls.
**You can** [**learn more about Dll hijacking here**](dll-hijacking.md)**.**
#### **Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)\*\*\*\*
#### PS
\*\*\*\*[**PowerSploit-Privesc\(PowerUP\)**](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit) -- Check for misconfigurations and sensitive files \([check here]()\). Detected.
[**JAWS**](https://github.com/411Hall/JAWS) ****-- Check for some possible misconfigurations and gather info \([check here]()\).
[**privesc** ](https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc)-- Check for misconfigurations
[**SessionGopher**](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/SessionGopher) ****-- It extracts PuTTY, WinSCP, SuperPuTTY, FileZilla, and RDP saved session information. Use **-Thorough** in local.
[**Invoke-WCMDump**](https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-WCMDump) ****-- Extracts crendentials from Credential Manager. Detected.
[**DomainPasswordSpray**](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray) ****-- Spray gathered passwords across domain
[**Inveigh**](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh) ****-- Inveigh is a PowerShell ADIDNS/LLMNR/mDNS/NBNS spoofer and man-in-the-middle tool.
[~~**Sherlock**~~](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Sherlock) ~~****~~-- Search for known privesc vulnerabilities \(DEPRECATED for Watson\)
[~~**WINspect**~~](https://github.com/A-mIn3/WINspect) ~~****~~-- Local checks **\(Need Admin rights\)**
#### Exe
[**Watson**](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Watson) ****-- Search for known privesc vulnerabilities \(needs to be compiled using VisualStudio\) \([**precompiled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/watson)\)
[**SeatBelt**](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt) ****-- Enumerates the host searching for misconfigurations \(more a gather info tool than privesc\) \(needs to be compiled\) **\(**[**precompiled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/seatbelt)**\)**
[**LaZagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) ****-- Extracts credentials from lots of softwares \(precompiled exe in github\)
[~~**Beroot**~~](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/BeRoot) ~~****~~-- Check for misconfiguration \(executable precompiled in github\). Not recommended. It does not work well in Win10.
[~~**Windows-Privesc-Check**~~](https://github.com/pentestmonkey/windows-privesc-check) -- Check for possible misconfigurations \(exe from python\). Not recommended. It does not work well in Win10.
\*\*\*\*[**winPEASbat** ](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)-- Tool created based in this post \(it does not need accesschk to work properly but it can use it\).
#### Local
[**Windows-Exploit-Suggester**](https://github.com/GDSSecurity/Windows-Exploit-Suggester) -- Reads the output of **systeminfo** and recommends working exploits \(local python\)
[**Windows Exploit Suggester Next Generation**](https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng) -- Reads the output of **systeminfo** andrecommends working exploits \(local python\)
#### Meterpreter
_multi/recon/local\_exploit\_suggestor_
You have to compile the project using the correct version of .NET \([see this](https://rastamouse.me/2018/09/a-lesson-in-.net-framework-versions/)\). To see the installed version of .NET on the victim host you can do:
```text
C:\Windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe -version #Compile the code with the version given in "Build Engine version" line