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The SSPI will be in charge of finding the adequate protocol for two machines that want to communicate. The preferred method for this is Kerberos. Then the SSPI will negotiate which authentication protocol will be used, these authentication protocols are called Security Support Provider (SSP), are located inside each Windows machine in the form of a DLL and both machines must support the same to be able to communicate.
The **credentials** (hashed) are **saved** in the **memory** of this subsystem for Single Sign-On reasons.\
**LSA** administrates the local **security policy** (password policy, users permissions...), **authentication**, **access tokens**...\
LSA will be the one that will **check** for provided credentials inside the **SAM** file (for a local login) and **talk** with the **domain controller** to authenticate a domain user.
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[User Account Control (UAC)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works) is a feature that enables a **consent prompt for elevated activities**. Applications have different `integrity` levels, and a program with a **high level** can perform tasks that **could potentially compromise the system**. When UAC is enabled, applications and tasks always **run under the security context of a non-administrator account** unless an administrator explicitly authorizes these applications/tasks to have administrator-level access to the system to run. It is a convenience feature that protects administrators from unintended changes but is not considered a security boundary.
When UAC is in place, an administrator user is given 2 tokens: a standard user key, to perform regular actions as regular level, and one with the admin privileges.
This [page](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works) discusses how UAC works in great depth and includes the logon process, user experience, and UAC architecture. Administrators can use security policies to configure how UAC works specific to their organization at the local level (using secpol.msc), or configured and pushed out via Group Policy Objects (GPO) in an Active Directory domain environment. The various settings are discussed in detail [here](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings). There are 10 Group Policy settings that can be set for UAC. The following table provides additional detail:
| [User Account Control: Admin Approval Mode for the built-in Administrator account](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings#user-account-control-admin-approval-mode-for-the-built-in-administrator-account) | FilterAdministratorToken | Disabled |
| [User Account Control: Allow UIAccess applications to prompt for elevation without using the secure desktop](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings#user-account-control-allow-uiaccess-applications-to-prompt-for-elevation-without-using-the-secure-desktop) | EnableUIADesktopToggle | Disabled |
| [User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for administrators in Admin Approval Mode](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings#user-account-control-behavior-of-the-elevation-prompt-for-administrators-in-admin-approval-mode) | ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin | Prompt for consent for non-Windows binaries |
| [User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for standard users](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings#user-account-control-behavior-of-the-elevation-prompt-for-standard-users) | ConsentPromptBehaviorUser | Prompt for credentials on the secure desktop |
| [User Account Control: Detect application installations and prompt for elevation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings#user-account-control-detect-application-installations-and-prompt-for-elevation) | EnableInstallerDetection | Enabled (default for home) Disabled (default for enterprise) |
| [User Account Control: Only elevate executables that are signed and validated](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings#user-account-control-only-elevate-executables-that-are-signed-and-validated) | ValidateAdminCodeSignatures | Disabled |
| [User Account Control: Only elevate UIAccess applications that are installed in secure locations](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings#user-account-control-only-elevate-uiaccess-applications-that-are-installed-in-secure-locations) | EnableSecureUIAPaths | Enabled |
| [User Account Control: Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings#user-account-control-run-all-administrators-in-admin-approval-mode) | EnableLUA | Enabled |
| [User Account Control: Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings#user-account-control-switch-to-the-secure-desktop-when-prompting-for-elevation) | PromptOnSecureDesktop | Enabled |
| [User Account Control: Virtualize file and registry write failures to per-user locations](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings#user-account-control-virtualize-file-and-registry-write-failures-to-per-user-locations) | EnableVirtualization | <p></p><p>Enabled</p> |
Some programs are **autoelevated automatically** if the **user belongs** to the **administrator group**. These binaries have inside their _**Manifests**_ the _**autoElevate**_ option with value _**True**_. The binary has to be **signed by Microsoft** also.
Then, to **bypass** the **UAC** (elevate from **medium** integrity level **to high**) some attackers use this kind of binaries to **execute arbitrary code** because it will be executed from a **High level integrity process**.
You can **check** the _**Manifest**_ of a binary using the tool _**sigcheck.exe**_ from Sysinternals. And you can **see** the **integrity level** of the processes using _Process Explorer_ or _Process Monitor_ (of Sysinternals).
* If **`0`** then, UAC won't prompt (like **disabled**)
* If **`1`** the admin is **asked for username and password** to execute the binary with high rights (on Secure Desktop)
* If **`2`** (**Always notify me**) UAC will always ask for confirmation to the administrator when he tries to execute something with high privileges (on Secure Desktop)
If the value is **`0`**, then, only the **RID 500** user (**built-in Administrator**) is able to perform **admin tasks without UAC**, and if its `1`, **all accounts inside "Administrators"** group can do them.
And, finally take a look at the value of the key **`FilterAdministratorToken`**\
If **`0`**(default), the **built-in Administrator account can** do remote administration tasks and if **`1`** the built-in account Administrator **cannot** do remote administration tasks, unless `LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy` is set to `1`.
The UAC bypass is needed in the following situation: **the UAC is activated, your process is running in a medium integrity context, and your user belongs to the administrators group**.
It is important to mention that it is **much harder to bypass the UAC if it is in the highest security level (Always) than if it is in any of the other levels (Default).**
If UAC is already disabled (`ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin` is **`0`**) you can **execute a reverse shell with admin privileges** (high integrity level) using something like:
### **Very** Basic UAC "bypass" (full file system access)
If you have a shell with a user that is inside the Administrators group you can **mount the C$** shared via SMB (file system) local in a new disk and you will have **access to everything inside the file system** (even Administrator home folder).
[**UACME** ](https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME)which is a **compilation** of several UAC bypass exploits. Note that you will need to **compile UACME using visual studio or msbuild**. The compilation will create several executables (like `Source\Akagi\outout\x64\Debug\Akagi.exe`) , you will need to know **which one you need.**\
If you take a look to **UACME** you will note that **most UAC bypasses abuse a Dll Hijacking vulnerabilit**y (mainly writing the malicious dll on _C:\Windows\System32_). [Read this to learn how to find a Dll Hijacking vulnerability](windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking.md).
3. You probably will need to **write** the DLL inside some **protected paths** (like C:\Windows\System32) were you don't have writing permissions. You can bypass this using:
1.**wusa.exe**: Windows 7,8 and 8.1. It allows to extract the content of a CAB file inside protected paths (because this tool is executed from a high integrity level).
Consists on watching if an **autoElevated binary** tries to **read** from the **registry** the **name/path** of a **binary** or **command** to be **executed** (this is more interesting if the binary searches this information inside the **HKCU**).
EFS works by encrypting a file with a bulk **symmetric key**, also known as the File Encryption Key, or **FEK**. The FEK is then **encrypted** with a **public key** that is associated with the user who encrypted the file, and this encrypted FEK is stored in the $EFS **alternative data stream** of the encrypted file. To decrypt the file, the EFS component driver uses the **private key** that matches the EFS digital certificate (used to encrypt the file) to decrypt the symmetric key that is stored in the $EFS stream. From [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encrypting\_File\_System).
* Files and folders are decrypted before being copied to a volume formatted with another file system, like [FAT32](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File\_Allocation\_Table).
The encrypted files using this method can be **tansparently access by the owner user** (the one who has encrypted them), so if you can **become that user** you can decrypt the files (changing the password of the user and logins as him won't work).
This way requires the **victim user** to be **running** a **process** inside the host. If that is the case, using a `meterpreter` sessions you can impersonate the token of the process of the user (`impersonate_token` from `incognito`). Or you could just `migrate` to process of the user.
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