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https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks
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88 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
88 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
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{% hint style="success" %}
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Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
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Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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<details>
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<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
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* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
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* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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# CBC
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If the **cookie** is **only** the **username** (or the first part of the cookie is the username) and you want to impersonate the username "**admin**". Then, you can create the username **"bdmin"** and **bruteforce** the **first byte** of the cookie.
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# CBC-MAC
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**Cipher block chaining message authentication code** (**CBC-MAC**) is a method used in cryptography. It works by taking a message and encrypting it block by block, where each block's encryption is linked to the one before it. This process creates a **chain of blocks**, making sure that changing even a single bit of the original message will lead to an unpredictable change in the last block of encrypted data. To make or reverse such a change, the encryption key is required, ensuring security.
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To calculate the CBC-MAC of message m, one encrypts m in CBC mode with zero initialization vector and keeps the last block. The following figure sketches the computation of the CBC-MAC of a message comprising blocks![https://wikimedia.org/api/rest\_v1/media/math/render/svg/bbafe7330a5e40a04f01cc776c9d94fe914b17f5](https://wikimedia.org/api/rest\_v1/media/math/render/svg/bbafe7330a5e40a04f01cc776c9d94fe914b17f5) using a secret key k and a block cipher E:
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![https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/bf/CBC-MAC\_structure\_\(en\).svg/570px-CBC-MAC\_structure\_\(en\).svg.png](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/bf/CBC-MAC\_structure\_\(en\).svg/570px-CBC-MAC\_structure\_\(en\).svg.png)
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# Vulnerability
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With CBC-MAC usually the **IV used is 0**.\
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This is a problem because 2 known messages (`m1` and `m2`) independently will generate 2 signatures (`s1` and `s2`). So:
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* `E(m1 XOR 0) = s1`
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* `E(m2 XOR 0) = s2`
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Then a message composed by m1 and m2 concatenated (m3) will generate 2 signatures (s31 and s32):
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* `E(m1 XOR 0) = s31 = s1`
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* `E(m2 XOR s1) = s32`
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**Which is possible to calculate without knowing the key of the encryption.**
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Imagine you are encrypting the name **Administrator** in **8bytes** blocks:
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* `Administ`
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* `rator\00\00\00`
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You can create a username called **Administ** (m1) and retrieve the signature (s1).\
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Then, you can create a username called the result of `rator\00\00\00 XOR s1`. This will generate `E(m2 XOR s1 XOR 0)` which is s32.\
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now, you can use s32 as the signature of the full name **Administrator**.
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### Summary
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1. Get the signature of username **Administ** (m1) which is s1
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2. Get the signature of username **rator\x00\x00\x00 XOR s1 XOR 0** is s32**.**
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3. Set the cookie to s32 and it will be a valid cookie for the user **Administrator**.
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# Attack Controlling IV
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If you can control the used IV the attack could be very easy.\
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If the cookies is just the username encrypted, to impersonate the user "**administrator**" you can create the user "**Administrator**" and you will get it's cookie.\
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Now, if you can control the IV, you can change the first Byte of the IV so **IV\[0] XOR "A" == IV'\[0] XOR "a"** and regenerate the cookie for the user **Administrator.** This cookie will be valid to **impersonate** the user **administrator** with the initial **IV**.
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## References
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More information in [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CBC-MAC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CBC-MAC)
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{% hint style="success" %}
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Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
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Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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<details>
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<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
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* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
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* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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