Basically, you exploit a **CSRF vulnerability **to make a specific user access some **information **that the **victim can access** but you can't. Then, you **check **the **time **it take the request to be responded and depending on that you can know if the content was correctly accessed or not.
For example, imagine that the **admin of a web** page can **access all **the inside the **webfiles **service and **you only **can access **yours**, and you want to know the **content **of a **file **that starts with the string "_**flag**_".
There is a **CSRF **vulnerability in the **seach by content** function and you can make the **admin visit any page**. Then, you could make the admin visit a malicious web server (yours) that will **exploit **the **CSRF **and will make the victim **search for **the file that starts with "_**flag**_". The attacker will make a **loop **so it will make the victim **search for every possibility** in: _flagX_. Then, if a character took **more time **that the rest, you can **asume **that it was the **correct **one and you can start a **new loop** with "_flag{X_" until you get the flag.
That is the **idea **but in the **real world **you need queries that retrive content take **much more time** that the queries that doesn't return anything.
You can **make the victim search** for the file that contains "_**flag**_" using an **Iframe** (exploiting a CSRF like in the prevous situation). Inside the Iframe you know that the _**onload event **_will be **executed always at least once**. Then, you can **change **the **URL **of the **iframe **but changing only the **content **of the **hash **inside the URL.
If the first URL was **successfully loaded**, then, when **changing **the **hash **part of the URL the **onload **event **won't be triggered** again. But **if **the page had some kind of **error **when **loading**, then, the **onload **event will be **triggered again**.
If you can make the page error when the correct content is accessed and make it load correctly when any content is accessed, then you can make a loop to extract all the information without meassuring the time.
Imagine the **same situation as in the Timing attack method **and you also know that the **admin **is using a **Chrome browser** (for example, Chrome-headless) **with Chrome XSS Auditor.**
Then, you can use **iframes **to make the victim **search **for the page containing "_**flagX**_" (beeing X **any **possible **character**)inside a loop, and you also add to the URL inside the iframes a **fake parameter **that **contains javascript code that will only appear when a valid content is retrived**.
For example, if when you **search for **the **content**_** "my file"**_ the web server responds with a page that **includes **this **javascript **code:
Then, you can use Chrome XSS Auditor to **launch an error **when a **valid response is sent** from the victim server. Then, with the **Iframe **trick you can **detect **when you have find a **file **that **contains **"_**flag**_" **and the next valid character**.
Using the previous technique (with Chrome XSS Auditor) you can **steal chunks of the code returned to a user** (like tokens for example). For more information: [https://portswigger.net/blog/abusing-chromes-xss-auditor-to-steal-tokens](https://portswigger.net/blog/abusing-chromes-xss-auditor-to-steal-tokens)
You could make the **administrator **(a headlessChrome)** visit any page **and there was a **CSRF **vulnerable page that was able to** search files by content**. You also **knew **that the **flag starts **by _**fb{ **_and only the admin had access to it.
It was also important to notice that when you made a **search**, the results of the seach **appeared inside **an **iframe **(if something was found). And** none iframe appeared** if **anything **was found.
You could **check **how **many iframes **where created **inside your iframe**, and** if an**y, then the **character **would be **correct **and you could start extracting the next one.
This is a code example of this from: [https://sectt.github.io/writeups/FBCTF19/secret_note_keeper/README](https://sectt.github.io/writeups/FBCTF19/secret_note_keeper/README)