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*
* .
</details>
## Gatekeeper
**Gatekeeper** is a security feature developed for Mac operating systems, designed to ensure that users **run only trusted software** on their systems. It functions by **validating software** that a user downloads and attempts to open from **sources outside the App Store**, such as an app, a plug-in, or an installer package.
The key mechanism of Gatekeeper lies in its **verification** process. It checks if the downloaded software is **signed by a recognized developer**, ensuring the software's authenticity. Further, it ascertains whether the software is **notarised by Apple**, confirming that it is devoid of known malicious content and has not been tampered with after notarisation.
Additionally, Gatekeeper reinforces user control and security by **prompting users to approve the opening** of downloaded software for the first time. This safeguard helps prevent users from inadvertently running potentially harmful executable code that they may have mistaken for a harmless data file.
### Application Signatures
Application signatures, also known as code signatures, are a critical component of Apple's security infrastructure. They're used to **verify the identity of the software author** (the developer) and to ensure that the code hasn't been tampered with since it was last signed.
1.**Signing the Application:** When a developer is ready to distribute their application, they **sign the application using a private key**. This private key is associated with a **certificate that Apple issues to the developer** when they enrol in the Apple Developer Program. The signing process involves creating a cryptographic hash of all parts of the app and encrypting this hash with the developer's private key.
2.**Distributing the Application:** The signed application is then distributed to users along with the developer's certificate, which contains the corresponding public key.
3.**Verifying the Application:** When a user downloads and attempts to run the application, their Mac operating system uses the public key from the developer's certificate to decrypt the hash. It then recalculates the hash based on the current state of the application and compares this with the decrypted hash. If they match, it means **the application hasn't been modified** since the developer signed it, and the system permits the application to run.
Application signatures are an essential part of Apple's Gatekeeper technology. When a user attempts to **open an application downloaded from the internet**, Gatekeeper verifies the application signature. If it's signed with a certificate issued by Apple to a known developer and the code hasn't been tampered with, Gatekeeper permits the application to run. Otherwise, it blocks the application and alerts the user.
Starting from macOS Catalina, **Gatekeeper also checks whether the application has been notarized** by Apple, adding an extra layer of security. The notarization process checks the application for known security issues and malicious code, and if these checks pass, Apple adds a ticket to the application that Gatekeeper can verify.
#### Check Signatures
When checking some **malware sample** you should always **check the signature** of the binary as the **developer** that signed it may be already **related** with **malware.**
codesign -d --entitlements :- /System/Applications/Automator.app # Check the TCC perms
# Check if the signature is valid
spctl --assess --verbose /Applications/Safari.app
# Sign a binary
codesign -s <cert-name-keychain> toolsdemo
```
### Notarization
Apple's notarization process serves as an additional safeguard to protect users from potentially harmful software. It involves the **developer submitting their application for examination** by **Apple's Notary Service**, which should not be confused with App Review. This service is an **automated system** that scrutinizes the submitted software for the presence of **malicious content** and any potential issues with code-signing.
If the software **passes** this inspection without raising any concerns, the Notary Service generates a notarization ticket. The developer is then required to **attach this ticket to their software**, a process known as 'stapling.' Furthermore, the notarization ticket is also published online where Gatekeeper, Apple's security technology, can access it.
Upon the user's first installation or execution of the software, the existence of the notarization ticket - whether stapled to the executable or found online - **informs Gatekeeper that the software has been notarized by Apple**. As a result, Gatekeeper displays a descriptive message in the initial launch dialog, indicating that the software has undergone checks for malicious content by Apple. This process thereby enhances user confidence in the security of the software they install or run on their systems.
### Enumerating GateKeeper
GateKeeper is both, **several security components** that prevent untrusted apps from being executed and also **one of the components**.
It's possible to see the **status** of GateKeeper with:
```bash
# Check the status
spctl --status
```
{% hint style="danger" %}
Note that GateKeeper signature checks are performed only to **files with the Quarantine attribute**, not to every file.
{% endhint %}
GateKeeper will check if according to the **preferences & the signature** a binary can be executed:
The database that keeps this configuration ins located in **`/var/db/SystemPolicy`**. You can check this database as root with:
```bash
# Open database
sqlite3 /var/db/SystemPolicy
# Get allowed rules
SELECT requirement,allow,disabled,label from authority where label != 'GKE' and disabled=0;
requirement|allow|disabled|label
anchor apple generic and certificate 1[subject.CN] = "Apple Software Update Certification Authority"|1|0|Apple Installer
anchor apple|1|0|Apple System
anchor apple generic and certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.9] exists|1|0|Mac App Store
anchor apple generic and certificate 1[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.2.6] exists and (certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.14] or certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.13]) and notarized|1|0|Notarized Developer ID
[...]
```
Note how the first rule ended in "**App Store**" and the second one in "**Developer ID**" and that in the previous imaged it was **enabled to execute apps from the App Store and identified developers**.\
If you **modify** that setting to App Store, the "**Notarized Developer ID" rules will disappear**.
There are also thousands of rules of **type GKE**:
```bash
SELECT requirement,allow,disabled,label from authority where label = 'GKE' limit 5;
These are hashes that come from **`/var/db/SystemPolicyConfiguration/gke.bundle/Contents/Resources/gke.auth`, `/var/db/gke.bundle/Contents/Resources/gk.db`** and **`/var/db/gkopaque.bundle/Contents/Resources/gkopaque.db`**
Upon **downloading** an application or file, specific macOS **applications** such as web browsers or email clients **attach an extended file attribute**, commonly known as the "**quarantine flag**," to the downloaded file. This attribute acts as a security measure to **mark the file** as coming from an untrusted source (the internet), and potentially carrying risks. However, not all applications attach this attribute, for instance, common BitTorrent client software usually bypasses this process.
**The presence of a quarantine flag signals macOS's Gatekeeper security feature when a user attempts to execute the file**.
In the case where the **quarantine flag is not present** (as with files downloaded via some BitTorrent clients), Gatekeeper's **checks may not be performed**. Thus, users should exercise caution when opening files downloaded from less secure or unknown sources.
{% hint style="info" %}
**Checking** the **validity** of code signatures is a **resource-intensive** process that includes generating cryptographic **hashes** of the code and all its bundled resources. Furthermore, checking certificate validity involves doing an **online check** to Apple's servers to see if it has been revoked after it was issued. For these reasons, a full code signature and notarization check is **impractical to run every time an app is launched**.
Therefore, these checks are **only run when executing apps with the quarantined attribute.**
{% endhint %}
{% hint style="warning" %}
This attribute must be **set by the application creating/downloading** the file.
However, files that are sandboxed will have this attribute set to every file they create. And non sandboxed apps can set it themselves, or specify the [**LSFileQuarantineEnabled**](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information\_property\_list/lsfilequarantineenabled?language=objc) key in the **Info.plist** which will make the system set the `com.apple.quarantine` extended attribute on the files created,
Actually a process "could set quarantine flags to the files it creates" (i tried to apply the USER\_APPROVED flag in a created file but it won't apply it):
Quarantine information is also stored in a central database managed by LaunchServices in **`~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.LaunchServices.QuarantineEventsV2`**.
The kernel extension is only available through the **kernel cache on the system**; however, you _can_ download the **Kernel Debug Kit from https://developer.apple.com/**, which will contain a symbolicated version of the extension.
XProtect is a built-in **anti-malware** feature in macOS. XProtect **checks any application when it's first launched or modified against its database** of known malware and unsafe file types. When you download a file through certain apps, such as Safari, Mail, or Messages, XProtect automatically scans the file. If it matches any known malware in its database, XProtect will **prevent the file from running** and alert you to the threat.
The XProtect database is **updated regularly** by Apple with new malware definitions, and these updates are automatically downloaded and installed on your Mac. This ensures that XProtect is always up-to-date with the latest known threats.
However, it's worth noting that **XProtect isn't a full-featured antivirus solution**. It only checks for a specific list of known threats and doesn't perform on-access scanning like most antivirus software.
You can get information about the latest XProtect update running:
XProtect is located on. SIP protected location at **/Library/Apple/System/Library/CoreServices/XProtect.bundle** and inside the bundle you can find information XProtect uses:
* **`XProtect.bundle/Contents/Resources/LegacyEntitlementAllowlist.plist`**: Allows code with those cdhashes to use legacy entitlements.
* **`XProtect.bundle/Contents/Resources/XProtect.meta.plist`**: List of plugins and extensions that are disallowed to load via BundleID and TeamID or indicating a minimum version.
* **`XProtect.bundle/Contents/Resources/XProtect.yara`**: Yara rules to detect malware.
* **`XProtect.bundle/Contents/Resources/gk.db`**: SQLite3 database with hashes of blocked applications and TeamIDs.
Note that there is another App in **`/Library/Apple/System/Library/CoreServices/XProtect.app`** related to XProtect that isn't involved with the Gatekeeper process.
### Not Gatekeeper
{% hint style="danger" %}
Note that Gatekeeper **isn't executed every time** you execute an application, just _**AppleMobileFileIntegrity**_ (AMFI) will only **verify executable code signatures** when you execute an app that has been already executed and verified by Gatekeeper.
{% endhint %}
Therefore, previously it was possible to execute an app to cache it with Gatekeeper, then **modify not executables files of the application** (like Electron asar or NIB files) and if no other protections were in place, the application was **executed** with the **malicious** additions.
However, now this is not possible because macOS **prevents modifying files** inside applications bundles. So, if you try the [Dirty NIB](../macos-proces-abuse/macos-dirty-nib.md) attack, you will find that it's not longer possible to abuse it because after executing the app to cache it with Gatekeeper, you won't be able to modify the bundle. And if you change for example the name of the Contents directory to NotCon (as indicated in the exploit), and then execute the main binary of the app to cache it with Gatekeeper, it will trigger an error and won't execute.
Any way to bypass Gatekeeper (manage to make the user download something and execute it when Gatekeeper should disallow it) is considered a vulnerability in macOS. These are some CVEs assigned to techniques that allowed to bypass Gatekeeper in the past:
When extracted by **Archive Utility**, file **paths longer than 886** characters would fail to inherit the com.apple.quarantine extended attribute, making it possible to **bypass Gatekeeper for those files**.
Check the [**original report**](https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/the-discovery-of-cve-2021-1810) for more information.
When an application is created with **Automator**, the information about what it needs to execute is inside `application.app/Contents/document.wflow` not in the executable. The executable is just a generic Automator binary called **Automator Application Stub**.
Therefore, you could make `application.app/Contents/MacOS/Automator\ Application\ Stub`**point with a symbolic link to another Automator Application Stub inside the system** and it will execute what is inside `document.wflow` (you script) **without triggering Gatekeeper** because the actual executable doesn't have the quarantine xattr. 
Example os expected location: `/System/Library/CoreServices/Automator\ Application\ Stub.app/Contents/MacOS/Automator\ Application\ Stub`
Check the [**original report**](https://ronmasas.com/posts/bypass-macos-gatekeeper) for more information.
In this bypass a zip file was created with an application starting to compress from `application.app/Contents` instead of `application.app`. Therefore, the **quarantine attr** was applied to all the **files from `application.app/Contents`** but **not to `application.app`**, which is was Gatekeeper was checking, so Gatekeeper was bypassed because when `application.app` was triggered it **didn't have the quarantine attribute.**
```bash
zip -r test.app/Contents test.zip
```
Check the [**original report**](https://www.jamf.com/blog/jamf-threat-labs-safari-vuln-gatekeeper-bypass/) for more information.
Even if the components are different the exploitation of this vulnerability is very similar to the previous one. In this case with will generate an Apple Archive from **`application.app/Contents`** so **`application.app` won't get the quarantine attr** when decompressed by **Archive Utility**.
In the [**source code**](https://opensource.apple.com/source/Libc/Libc-391/darwin/copyfile.c.auto.html) it's possible to see that the ACL text representation stored inside the xattr called **`com.apple.acl.text`** is going to be set as ACL in the decompressed file. So, if you compressed an application into a zip file with **AppleDouble** file format with an ACL that prevents other xattrs to be written to it... the quarantine xattr wasn't set into de application:
Check the [**original report**](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/12/19/gatekeepers-achilles-heel-unearthing-a-macos-vulnerability/) for more information.
AppleDouble file formats store the attributes of a file in a separate file starting by `._`, this helps to copy dile attributes **across macOS machines**. However, it was noticed that after decompressing an AppleDouble file, the file starting with `._`**wasn't given the quarantine attribute**.
{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```bash
mkdir test
echo a > test/a
echo b > test/b
echo ._a > test/._a
aa archive -d test/ -o test.aar
# If you downloaded the resulting test.aar and decompress it, the file test/._a won't have a quarantitne attribute
```
{% endcode %}
Being able to create a file that won't have the quarantine attribute set, it was **possible to bypass Gatekeeper.** The trick was to **create a DMG file application** using the AppleDouble name convention (start it with `._`) and create a **visible file as a sym link to this hidden** file without the quarantine attribute.\
When the **dmg file is executed**, as it doesn't have a quarantine attribute it'll **bypass Gatekeeper**.
```bash
# Create an app bundle with the backdoor an call it app.app
* Do you work in a **cybersecurity company**? Do you want to see your **company advertised in HackTricks**? or do you want to have access to the **latest version of the PEASS or download HackTricks in PDF**? Check the [**SUBSCRIPTION PLANS**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)!
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* **Share your hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**hacktricks repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **and** [**hacktricks-cloud repo**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud).
