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Privileged Access Management (PAM) Trust
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@ -102,6 +102,7 @@
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- [Trust relationship between domains](#trust-relationship-between-domains)
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- [Child Domain to Forest Compromise - SID Hijacking](#child-domain-to-forest-compromise---sid-hijacking)
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- [Forest to Forest Compromise - Trust Ticket](#forest-to-forest-compromise---trust-ticket)
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- [Privileged Access Management (PAM) Trust](#privileged-access-management-pam-trust)
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- [Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation](#kerberos-unconstrained-delegation)
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- [SpoolService Abuse with Unconstrained Delegation](#spoolservice-abuse-with-unconstrained-delegation)
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- [MS-EFSRPC Abuse with Unconstrained Delegation](#ms---efsrpc-abuse-with-unconstrained-delegation)
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@ -3030,6 +3031,34 @@ kirbikator lsa .\ticket.kirbi
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ls \\machine.domain.local\c$
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```
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### Privileged Access Management (PAM) Trust
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Require: Windows Server 2016 or earlier
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If we compromise the bastion we get `Domain Admins` privileges on the other domain
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* Default configuration for PAM Trust
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```ps1
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# execute on our forest
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netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /ForestTransitive:Yes
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netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /EnableSIDHistory:Yes
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netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /EnablePIMTrust:Yes
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netdom trust lab.local /domain:bastion.local /Quarantine:No
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# execute on our bastion
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netdom trust bastion.local /domain:lab.local /ForestTransitive:Yes
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```
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* Enumerate
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```ps1
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# Using ADModule
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Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True) -and (SIDFilteringQuarantined -eq $False)}
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# Enumerate shadow security principals
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Get-ADObject -SearchBase ("CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services," + (Get-ADRootDSE).configurationNamingContext) -Filter * -Properties * | select Name,member,msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid | fl
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```
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* Compromise
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* Using SID History
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* Using the previously found Shadow Security Principal
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### Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
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> The user sends a TGS to access the service, along with their TGT, and then the service can use the user's TGT to request a TGS for the user to any other service and impersonate the user. - https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html
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@ -3798,4 +3827,5 @@ CME 10.XXX.XXX.XXX:445 HOSTNAME-01 [+] DOMAIN\COMPUTER$ 31d6cfe0d16ae
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* [Introducing MalSCCM - Phil Keeble -May 4, 2022](https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/introducing-malsccm/)
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* [Certifried: Active Directory Domain Privilege Escalation (CVE-2022–26923) - Oliver Lyak](https://research.ifcr.dk/certifried-active-directory-domain-privilege-escalation-cve-2022-26923-9e098fe298f4)
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* [bloodyAD and CVE-2022-26923 - soka - 11 May 2022](https://cravaterouge.github.io/ad/privesc/2022/05/11/bloodyad-and-CVE-2022-26923.html)
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* [DIVING INTO PRE-CREATED COMPUTER ACCOUNTS - May 10, 2022 - By Oddvar Moe](https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/diving-into-pre-created-computer-accounts/)
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* [DIVING INTO PRE-CREATED COMPUTER ACCOUNTS - May 10, 2022 - By Oddvar Moe](https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/diving-into-pre-created-computer-accounts/)
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* [How NOT to use the PAM trust - Leveraging Shadow Principals for Cross Forest Attacks - Thursday, April 18, 2019 - Nikhil SamratAshok Mittal](http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2019/04/abusing-PAM.html)
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