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ETW Providers
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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
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- [Wrapper input://](#wrapper-input)
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- [Wrapper zip://](#wrapper-zip)
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- [Wrapper phar://](#wrapper-phar)
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- [Wrapper iconv:// and dechunk://](#wrapper-iconv-and-dechunk)
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- [Wrapper convert.iconv:// and dechunk://](#wrapper-converticonv-and-dechunk)
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- [LFI to RCE via /proc/*/fd](#lfi-to-rce-via-procfd)
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- [LFI to RCE via /proc/self/environ](#lfi-to-rce-via-procselfenviron)
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- [LFI to RCE via upload](#lfi-to-rce-via-upload)
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@ -252,9 +252,13 @@ include('phar://test.phar');
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NOTE: The unserialize is triggered for the phar:// wrapper in any file operation, `file_exists` and many more.
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### Wrapper iconv:// and dechunk://
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### Wrapper convert.iconv:// and dechunk://
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The goal is to leak the content of a file, one character at a time.
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- `convert.iconv://`: convert input into another folder (`convert.iconv.utf-16le.utf-8`)
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- `dechunk://`: if the string contains no newlines, it will wipe the entire string if and only if
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the string starts with A-Fa-f0-9
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The goal of this exploitation is to leak the content of a file, one character at a time, based on the [DownUnderCTF](https://github.com/DownUnderCTF/Challenges_2022_Public/blob/main/web/minimal-php/solve/solution.py) writeup.
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**Requirements**:
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- Backend must not use `file_exists` or `is_file`.
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@ -192,9 +192,80 @@ ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) is a Windows-based logging mechanism that provid
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| Microsoft-Antimalware-Protection | {E4B70372-261F-4C54-8FA6-A5A7914D73DA} |
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| Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence | {F4E1897C-BB5D-5668-F1D8-040F4D8DD344} |
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You can see all the providers registered to Windows using: `logman query providers`
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```ps1
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PS C:\Users\User\Documents> logman query providers
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Provider GUID
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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.NET Common Language Runtime {E13C0D23-CCBC-4E12-931B-D9CC2EEE27E4}
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ACPI Driver Trace Provider {DAB01D4D-2D48-477D-B1C3-DAAD0CE6F06B}
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Active Directory Domain Services: SAM {8E598056-8993-11D2-819E-0000F875A064}
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Active Directory: Kerberos Client {BBA3ADD2-C229-4CDB-AE2B-57EB6966B0C4}
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Active Directory: NetLogon {F33959B4-DBEC-11D2-895B-00C04F79AB69}
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ADODB.1 {04C8A86F-3369-12F8-4769-24E484A9E725}
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ADOMD.1 {7EA56435-3F2F-3F63-A829-F0B35B5CAD41}
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...
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```
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We can get more information about the provider using: `logman query providers {ProviderID}/Provider-Name`
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```ps1
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PS C:\Users\User\Documents> logman query providers Microsoft-Antimalware-Scan-Interface
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Provider GUID
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Microsoft-Antimalware-Scan-Interface {2A576B87-09A7-520E-C21A-4942F0271D67}
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Value Keyword Description
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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0x0000000000000001 Event1
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0x8000000000000000 AMSI/Debug
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Value Level Description
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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0x04 win:Informational Information
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PID Image
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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0x00002084 C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
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0x00002084 C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
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0x00001bd4
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0x00000ad0
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0x00000b98
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```
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The `Microsoft-Windows-Threat-Intelligence` provider corresponds to ETWTI, an additional security feature that an EDR can subscribe to and identify malicious uses of APIs (e.g. process injection).
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The most common bypassing technique is patching the function `EtwEventWrite` which is called to write/log ETW events.
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```ps1
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0x0000000000000001 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_ALLOCVM_LOCAL
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0x0000000000000002 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_ALLOCVM_LOCAL_KERNEL_CALLER
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0x0000000000000004 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_ALLOCVM_REMOTE
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0x0000000000000008 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_ALLOCVM_REMOTE_KERNEL_CALLER
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0x0000000000000010 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_PROTECTVM_LOCAL
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0x0000000000000020 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_PROTECTVM_LOCAL_KERNEL_CALLER
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0x0000000000000040 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_PROTECTVM_REMOTE
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0x0000000000000080 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_PROTECTVM_REMOTE_KERNEL_CALLER
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0x0000000000000100 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_MAPVIEW_LOCAL
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0x0000000000000200 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_MAPVIEW_LOCAL_KERNEL_CALLER
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0x0000000000000400 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_MAPVIEW_REMOTE
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0x0000000000000800 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_MAPVIEW_REMOTE_KERNEL_CALLER
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0x0000000000001000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_QUEUEUSERAPC_REMOTE
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0x0000000000002000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_QUEUEUSERAPC_REMOTE_KERNEL_CALLER
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0x0000000000004000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_SETTHREADCONTEXT_REMOTE
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0x0000000000008000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_SETTHREADCONTEXT_REMOTE_KERNEL_CALLER
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0x0000000000010000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_READVM_LOCAL
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0x0000000000020000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_READVM_REMOTE
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0x0000000000040000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_WRITEVM_LOCAL
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0x0000000000080000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_WRITEVM_REMOTE
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0x0000000000100000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_SUSPEND_THREAD
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0x0000000000200000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_RESUME_THREAD
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0x0000000000400000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_SUSPEND_PROCESS
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0x0000000000800000 KERNEL_THREATINT_KEYWORD_RESUME_PROCESS
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```
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The most common bypassing technique is patching the function `EtwEventWrite` which is called to write/log ETW events. You can list the providers registered for a process with `logman query providers -pid <PID>`
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## Windows Defender Antivirus
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@ -302,4 +373,5 @@ The **Enterprise Context** column shows you what each app can do with your enter
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* [Determine the Enterprise Context of an app running in Windows Information Protection (WIP) - 03/10/2023 - Microsoft](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/wip-app-enterprise-context)
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* [Create and verify an Encrypting File System (EFS) Data Recovery Agent (DRA) certificate - 12/09/2022 - Microsoft](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/windows-information-protection/create-and-verify-an-efs-dra-certificate)
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* [DISABLING AV WITH PROCESS SUSPENSION - March 24, 2023 - By Christopher Paschen ](https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/disabling-av-with-process-suspension/)
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* [Disabling Event Tracing For Windows - UNPROTECT PROJECT - Tuesday 19 April 2022](https://unprotect.it/technique/disabling-event-tracing-for-windows-etw/)
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* [Disabling Event Tracing For Windows - UNPROTECT PROJECT - Tuesday 19 April 2022](https://unprotect.it/technique/disabling-event-tracing-for-windows-etw/)
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* [ETW: Event Tracing for Windows 101 - ired.team](https://www.ired.team/miscellaneous-reversing-forensics/windows-kernel-internals/etw-event-tracing-for-windows-101)
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